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The 1980s and 1990s are historical periods of economic reforms in both China and the 
former Soviet Union. Comparative study of principal proposals of economic reform 
and transformation in the two countries in this period is the subject of this thesis. There 
are five  main chapters excluding the  introduction.  Chapter 2  is  the  theoretical 
framework of the thesis which is based on essential concepts of Comparative Economic 
System. Before the main theme began, primary economic problems and difficulties in 
pre-reform periods in China and the former Soviet Union were discussed in Chapter 3. 
So was a brief review of reform efforts in the past in the two countries. 
In Chapter 4, major proposals of economic reform in Chinese economy from late 1978 
till 1992 were studied. Of these included reform measures in the rural economy. the 
opening up policy, state-owned enterprises reform. new policy for non-state sector and 
comprehensive plans after 1985. Chapter 5 discussed the 1987 reform package. the 
1990 reform plans including Presidential Plan and Shatalin Plan. A brief summary of 
the Russian reform plan in 1991 was also done in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 is the concluding part of the thesis. The author compared in details the two 
cases and drawn conclusions as the following:  (a)  Both Chinese and Soviet reformers 
designed the transformation from centralised planning control to decentralised market-
oriented economy; (b)  The structures of the existing economic system, i.e, decision-
making. information. motivation and ownership structures, required various degrees of 
alteration in the two countries. Soviet reformers called for massive destatisation and 
privatisation of the state-owned undertakings. while China insisted on a structure with 
predominant state-owned enterprises; (c)  The  economic reforms strategies in the two 
countries are different. In general China took a muddle-through. evolutionary. partial 
and moderate way. while Soviet reformers chose a theory-led, revolutionary, partial and 
radical road to implement the transformation; Acknowledgement 
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Chapter  1:  Introduction 
Since the 1980s the world has  been witnessing tremendous and dramatic 
changes taking place in  the  former socialist countries, or to  put it in 
economic terms, the centrally planned economies (CPEs). The political 
changes  have  been  particularly  outstanding.  Here  is  a  cartoon 
describing  vividly  how  -rast  are  things  moved  in  the  former Soviet 
Union in a year! 
( I ) 
Starting from  earlier reforms  in  their economies, political and social 
changes  have  taken  place  one  by  one  in  China,  the  East European 
countries, and the former Soviet Union in the period of a few years. In 
China, the communist government had to use guns and tanks to suppress 
the  largest demonstrations that have ever happened in the history of the 
People's Republic.  As  the  result of political pressures in East Europe 
and the former Soviet  Union,  the  "Berlin Wall" collapsed and East 
Germany vanished as a country. The former Soviet Union was replaced 
by the  Commonwealth of Independent States.  Fifteen  new sovereign 
states were born.  The changes in  the  former socialist countries have Chaoter 1  2 
been  so  fundamental  and  forceful,  at  least  on  the  surface,  that 
communism is said to  be disappearing in  a majority of them. Under the 
new  political  regimes,  the  centrally  planned  economies  have  been 
pushed aside  in  favour of a transition  to  private market economies. 
Socialist principles have suspended, if not yet denied, due to alterations 
in politics. In a word, the world has been rocked by the rapid deviation 
from communism  and simultaneously from centrally planned economic 
systems. 
It  is  clear  that  the  relentless  but  only  partly  successful  movement 
towards  economic  reform  in  Eastern  Europe,  China  and  the  former 
Soviet  Union  has  entered  a  new  era:  i.e.,  the  transformation  of a 
centrally  planned  economy  into  a  market-oriented  one,  instead  of 
moderate restructuring within  the  framework  of the  existing system. 
People  are  now  more  concerned  about  how  to  effect  this 
transformation  than  about  why  it  was  inevitable.  Of  course,  the 
practicalities of economic transition in  these fonner socialist economies 
has  raised  a  number of interesting  but  challenging questions for the 
student  of  comparative  economic  systems  (Campbell  1990).  For 
instance, how do you monitor and analyse the process of transfonnation 
in the CPEs, the trend, the strategies, the speed and so on? But before 
this question can be answered. one must  know,  or be able to predict, the 
destination of the transition and the things that must be done in order to 
reach a conclusion.  However,  in  this  respect,  we  find  ourselves still 
poorly equipped  with theoretical tools as  well as empirical data. First 
of all, we lack a conceptual basis and an  analytical framework for our 
job. For example, it is fully understood that economic transition in the 
CPEs is  going towards the destination of a market-oriented economy, 
which would entirely dismantle both the command economy and state 
ownership. However,  what type of market  economy will  be created? 
And is there any adequate theoretical model that could be copied by the 
former planned economies'?  It  is  not  inaccurate to  say that there has Chapter 1  3 
never actually  been  one  single  model  of  a  market  economy in  the 
world.  In  terms  of government  intervention,  the  American economy 
differs from  Britain,  where  the  government takes  more responsibility 
for the welfare of the population. In Japan where" the bureaucracy has 
maintained  and  uses  skillfully  its  authority  over the  private  sector" 
(Marer,  1991). Needless to  say,  a developed  market economy and  a 
developing market economy show sharp differences as  well.  So what 
will be the destination of the  ongoing transition  in  CPEs? Moreover, 
the development of advanced market economies in  the west  has gone 
through various stages with different features.  Which stage and  what 
feature  should or can  the  former  planned  economies follow?  While 
Kornai advocated  learning from  the  very  beginning,  i.e.,  from  the 
period of primitive accumulation of capital  (Kornai,  1990), there are 
also suggestions of following  the  modern regulated market economy ( 
Wu,  1991). But it  seemed that reformers  in  the former CPEs, in China 
and the former Soviet Union in  particular,  were more concerned with 
the  essential  features  that  all  market  economies  share  than  the 
characteristics of various models of it. 
Nevertheless, research on this subject could be of great significance and 
value in both an academic and a practical sense. Transition to a centrally 
planned economy in  the countries involved was primarily a process of 
political and military struggle which the communist parties won. Now, 
the transition the other way round  havs  to  be  a matter of economics, 
reasoning quite apart from the inevitable political and social changes. 
Economic analysis would also be  enriched in  its scope if the study of 
transition from the one economy to the other could draw some relevant 
conclusions. This  is  because  there  has  been  no  adequate conceptual 
framework for understanding,  let  alone  guiding such a transition,  in 
Western mainstream economics, nor in socialist or Marxist economics. 
What is  more  significant  here  is  the  fact  that  operational plans  are 
desperately required  in  the  former  planned economies for a smoother Chapter 1  4 
and more successful transition,  because the  transformation is such  an 
unprecedented process  in  economic  history that there is  no theory or 
experience for  reference  and  guidance.  So,  empirical studies of the 
ongoing process in individual countries should certainly provide helpful 
information and lessons for policymakers in all the countries involved. 
It is, therefore, an  adventure worth trying. 
However, things are not so bad as  to suggest that the present research is 
not feasible, despite the undoubted difficulties. Economic reform and 
transformation in centrally planned economies has attracted the research 
interests of economists for  decades, both in the West and in the East. It 
became a relevant academic and practical subject in Western economics 
because  the  existence,  operation  and  alteration  of  the  Soviet-type 
planned  economy  was  a  challenge  to  mainstream  market  thinking. 
According to  market  theory,  it  is  not  possible for a centrally planned 
economy to work at  all  (Bornstein  1969).  Although centrally planned 
economies were established by  communist revolutions in the former 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, their operation became more 
and more an issue of economic controversial as time went  on. Some 
economists contributed to the study of the mechanisms in the Soviet-type 
economy witnin  the  framework  of mainstream  Western analysis and 
concepts.  Comparisons  between  a  market  economy and  a  planned 
economy, in principle and practice, have been developed in recent years. 
As  a  result,  a  new  branch  of economics  has  been established,  i.e., 
comparative economic systems. In  this discipline, the elements of an 
economic system, the concepts of altering it, its major differences  with 
other systems and related issues are discussed, though the achievements 
so far have  not  been satisfactory enough.  The comparative method, 
cases studies on individual countries, and qualitative analysis are applied 
in addition to the normal means of economic analysis. The conceptual 
basis and research methodology of this thesis is based on this discipline. ChaPter 1  5 
( II ) 
Of course, the author is  not so ambitious as  to cover a wide range of 
research in  terms of the  number of cases and topics in relation to  the 
transition of the centrally planned economies. That sort of research is 
practically impossible.  Instead,  she  has  chosen China and the former 
Soviet Union as  the two cases for  a comparative study of the issues of 
economic reform proposals in  the  per:iod  from  late  1970s, in China's 
case, and mid-1980s in the Soviet case, up until the early 1990s. 
It is needless to  stress that  comparative study plays a very important 
role in case studies in the field of economics, because only through this 
channel can more cases  be  analysed on the basis of the same principle 
so that some relevant conclusions can be  drawn. This is especially true 
for the study of economic reforms in centrally planned economies when 
the purpose is  to generalise the major features of the economic system 
in transition  in  various  countries.  This  is  because  the  Soviet-type 
planning economy is the only one that has been artificially transplanted 
into other countries from the former Soviet Union. China followed  the 
very essence of the  Soviet-type economy  in  the  initial  period of its 
socialist economy(  Grossman  1967).  This fact makes the ground solid 
for our relevant comparison. This is  despite the  historical, societal and 
cultural differences between the  two countries. Furthermore, there are 
other good reasons for carrying out such a comparative research when 
it promises  fruitful results. First and mainly,  the two cases present two 
different models for the transition of economic systems, in the sense that 
revolutionary and evolutionary processes took place in each of the two 
countries  with  the  different  emphases  in  the  leading roles  of non-
economic factors  in the  process  (Goldmans 1987/88). Secondly, these 
two large planned economies have been the  two faling behind on the 
way to  the  reform and  transformation, compare Hungary, Poland and 
other East European countries. Their cases thus reveal the data for what ChaRter 1  6 
was and  is  going on in  the  latest  stages of the  transformation of the 
centrally planned economies. 
Specifically,  the  former Soviet Union has  also  been selected for the 
present  study  also  because  of  its  special  position  in  the  world  of 
centrally planned economies,  i.e.,  it  originated them.  China is  chosen 
for additional reasons.  (a)  It  rules Gut  the possible argument about the 
ideal size and level of economic development in a pre-socialist economy 
for a  planning system to  work  properly and  efficiently,  an  argument 
often referred to  in  the case of East European countries (Kaser,  1987). 
In this  respect,  China is  a  better qualified candidate for represent the 
centrally planned economies than those small but developed countries. 
So the conclusions from the comparison of the former Soviet Union and 
China shall  be  of a  more  general  nature.  (b)  As one of the world's 
largest planned economies, China's  situation ought to  be  paid  more 
attention to than before,  from Western observers in particular. As a 
Chinese student in  this  field,  the  author feels  obliged to introduce a 
more intimate knowledge of economic reforms in China. So far these 
have been poorly understood  and  less  well  studied  than most other 
planned economies like the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  I 
But it is also true that the centrally planned or Soviet-type economy in 
China has never been an absolute copy of the one in the Soviet Union or 
other socialist countries (Grossman,  1967). Owing to a complex set of 
factors,  the  Chinese  economy  deviated  from  the  classic  original 
centrally planned economy principally in the following features. Firstly, 
it is a huge and less well developed country. Central planning control in 
its regions could not be as tight and strict as in  other cases, particularly 
in the former Soviet Union. Secondly, planning control in China did not 
cover the economic activity in as detailed and wide a manner as in other 
planned economies{Goldmans 1987/88). As  a result, discretionary and 
'One can tell this by surveying the relevant publications in the West (in English). 
However, studies of some centrally planned economies such as North Korea, Vietnam 
and Cuba are even fewer. Chapter 1  7 
spontaneous  behaviour contrary  to  planning  instructions  was  very 
possible.  These  factors  made  the  background  to  economic 
transformation in China different from the former Soviet Union. 
This thesis does not deal with every detail of all the issues of economic 
reform  in  the  two  countries.  Rather,  it  confines  itself  to  those 
outstanding points of the major proposals and plans which were adopted 
or approved officially  in China since late  1970s and  in the former 
Soviet Union since the mid-1980s.  In certain cases some influential 
discussions of the major issues in the transition are also included, though 
they were not accepted for implementation, e.g., some reform plans in 
the former Soviet Union before and shortly after it collapsed in 1991. 
Among the reasons for limiting the analysis to official blueprints only 
are  that,  although in such centralised societies changes of economic 
system  could  happen  spontaneously  without  official  approval  or 
advocacy. 
2  They could not be substantial or influential unless approved 
afterwards  by  official  decree.  One  can  also  find  suggestions  for 
economic transformation proposed by economists mainly in academic 
positions. However, only those suggestions accepted by the authorities at 
the top were likely to be carried out. 
Two major questions are examined in the thesis: (l)what are the changes 
in the existing economic systems that were intended, and  (2)  how have 
they been carried out in the two countries?  The issues around these 
questions include the critical aspects of centrally planned economies 
such as changes in planning control, the status of state-owned industrial 
entities, and market mechanisms. The process of the transformation in 
the two countries is  also  be analysed in terms of reform strategies, i.e., 
the depth, width and speed of the intended changes. Other characteristics 
of the reform packages in the two countries are also discussed as well. 
2  For example, there was the case of peasant families dismantling collective labour 
in agriculture in some provinces like Anhui in China without approval of the central 
authorities before the end of 1978. Chao\er 1  8 
The  research  has  been  conducted  during  one  of  the  most  excItmg 
periods in  the world's post-war history and  in  the  history of the two 
countries.  This  is  another  reason  for  their  selection.  The  radical 
reforms  in  China  and  the  former Soviet Union  have  been connected 
with the names of the  two great  leaders:  Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail 
Gorbachev. The period from  lare  the  1970s in  China is  undoubtedly the 
era of Deng, while the  mid-1980s to late  1991  in  the Soviet Union is 
that of Gorbachev. These two men opened the doors to vast new hopes 
for their countries(Goldmans 1987/88). 
An ever increasing number of publications in the two countries, and in 
the West in English,  have been born out of the economic reforms under 
their leadership.  This  is  especially  true  in  China's case.
3  As  a  major 
actor on the stage of planned economies, the Soviet Union had always 
been  the  topic  of  a  large  number  of  publications  in  the  West.The 
availability of such material  paved  the way for the present study.  Of 
course,  the  author  has  particular  advantage  of  access  to  first  hand 
references  in  China's  case.  Yet  we  must  be  careful  approving  or 
disapproving of the sources available to  us.  The different background, 
not only economically but also culturally,  mean  extra efforts must be 
made to understand accurately the contexts and terms used in the official 
documents and discussions. Only then can they be correctly understood 
by  outsiders.  To  take  a  simple  example,  the  term  'radical'  and 
'conservative'  refer to  entirely  different  things  in  the  West and  in 
China. In China,  'radical' in the discussion of economic reform means 
advocacy of a market-oriented destination, while  'conservative' means 
the opposite. In this case, radical reformers in China might be said to be 
joining the  family  of the  Conservatives  in  Britain.  Furthermore,  on 
some occasions the languages used in official documents is  ambiguous 
on  purpose.  An  intimate  inside  knowledge  enables  one  to  guess 
3  The majority of English publications of Chinese economy since 1949 is in relation 
to the economic reform after 1978. Chapter 1  9 
accurately their real  meaning.~ 
We  can learn very little from  the  published works on the comparison 
between China and  the  former Soviet Union  in  relation to the  latest 
movement in economic reform. This is  a little researched subject, and 
and therefore is reason for the selection. Of the few available art;,c1es in 
this field(see Goldmans  1987/88 and  Kaser 1987), the discussions are 
primarily focused  on  country studies  and  provide a  general cover of 
political  and  social  factors  affecting  the  course of economic reform. 
This thesis will thus differ from existing published research in a number 
of respects.  Firstly,  the  perspective  of the  present  research seeks to 
generalise the  major features  of the  economic transformation in the 
CPEs.  It  is  more  concerned  with  theory  construction  than  country 
studies. Secondly,  analytical  methods  and  economic  concepts  for 
monitoring the ongoing process of the economic transformation take an 
important position. This sort of effort,  the present author believes, is 
among  the  few  trial  works  in  the  field  of  comparative  economic 
systems. Thirdly, the thesis covers the  most important periods in both 
China and the former Soviet Union in their economic transition, i.e., the 
1990s. There can be no dispute that Junel989 and August 1991 signalled 
their turning-points. There is  no  published research work, yet, on the 
comparative  study  these  crucial  periods.  Fourthly,  as  a  piece  of 
economics research,  the  thesis  is  one of the  very few to  discuss the 
economic reforms in the two countries  in  relative detail rather than just 
general  analysis.  Last but  not  least,  the  author is  equipped with  an 
intimate knowledge of the thinking in the planned economies and the 
analytical method of mainstream economics in the market economies. 
It is therefore reasonable to expect some contribution from the thesis to 
a better understanding of the issues of economic transition in the former 
planned economies. 
• The official document on the regulations for the use of the  land leased by peasants 
in the mid-1980s  in  China  is  a  good  example,  since  it  tried to  avoid  meaning 
privatisation but actually implied it (Zhu &Fan 1989). C4lapter 1  10 
However, in comparative research there is  a particular hurdle that must 
be crossed. That is  the  problem of measuring.  How can we assess the 
degree to which  things have changed and settled in new positions? One 
must admit that most issues in this study are hard to quantify, though not 
entirely  unquantifiable.  We  can  reasonably  expect  some  roughly 
accurate quantification. 
( II I ) 
The  structure  of  the  thesis  is  organised  as  follows.  An  analytical 
framework  is  established  in  the  Chapter Two,  which aims  at  briefly 
answering the questions that must be discussed before carrying on the 
research.  For example,  what  is  an  economic  system? What are  the 
differences between a market economy and  a planned economy? And 
more  important,  how  are  we  to  analyse  the  economic  reform? 
Therefore,  the  analytical  framework  discusses  the  basics  of  the 
economic system. the  major differences between planned and market 
economies and the concepts of economic reform. Before the main theme 
of  the  thesis  begins,  Chapter  Three  introduces  the  economic  and 
political  backgrounds  for  reforms  in  China  and  the  former  Soviet 
Union.  This  examines  why  a  radical  reform  was  unavoidable  and 
possible  in  the  two  large  planned  economies  in  the  period  under 
discussion. It also focuses  on the imperative difficulties and problems in 
the Chinese and Soviet economies up  to the late 1970s and mid-1980s, 
respectively.  Then,  the  root  causes for their outstanding troubles are 
discussed.  A brief review of their previous  experiences of economic 
reforms and that of the East European countries is also conducted in this 
chapter. Finally, political factors  in launching the reforms are touched 
upon briefly. 
The  main  body of the  thesis  consists of three chapters.  The crucial Chapter 1  11 
proposals for economic reform in China from the late 1970s  and in the 
former Soviet Union  from  the  mid-1980s  are  presented  in  Chapter 
Four  and  Chapter  Five  respectively.  In  China's  case,  the  analysis 
comprises reform plans for sectors and for the entire economy before 
1989 and the proposals for further reform after 1989 up  until  1992. In 
the former Soviet Union's case, plans for economic reform in  1987 and 
the  1990s  are  dealt  with.  The  Russian  reform  programme  after the 
disintegration of the USSR at  the end of 1991  is  also briefly discussed. 
Based on  the  data  provided in  these  two  chapters, Chapter Six  fulfils 
the task of measuring the  reforms in  a few  dimensions set out in an 
analytical framework, and of pulling together  the general conclusions. 
The questions to be discussed include the similarities and differences in 
the  major changes  proposed  in  the  two  countries,  the  transformation 
strategies attempted, and concluing  comparisons. 
Finally,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the  result  of this  study can only be 
preliminary. It refers to the paper plans for economic transformation in 
the two countries, though the real situation is taken into account where 
necessary and possible. Due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
in  1991, many proposals in  the  country had  never been implemented. 
Whereas the situation in China is  entirely different where most of the 
plans have been carried out. It is therefore virtually impossible to judge 
which model of transformation is more likely to be  successful than the 
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Chapter  2:  Analytical Framework:  Economic System and Its 
Reform 
Economic reforms and transformations in  China and the Soviet Union 
in this  study  were  recognised  in  general  as  the  kind  of  efforts  to 
restructure  the  economic  system,  --the  centrally  planned  economy,--
instead  of  anything  else.  It  is,  therefore,  very  necessary  to  make 
reasonably clear the theoretical assumptions about the economic system 
and  its  reform.  Only  on  this  basis  could  the  proposed  subject  of 
research  be  carried  out  properly  and  the  satisfactory  results  be 
achieved. 
Owing  to  the  great  contribution  of  the  economists  who  have  been 
devoted to the discipline of comparative economic systems, it is possible 
now to set up the analytical framework for this dissertation more or less 
easily as  we can to  stand on the shoulders of the predecessors in this 
field. However, the task of this chapter still remains  a hard job, because 
of the  lesers development of the  relevant discipline in regard to our 
research subject  thereby  limiting the possibility of constructing a fine 
infrastructure paving the road for  practical research. What was known 
so far about economic systems, the planned economy in particular, is far 
from sufficient to  explain the  practice in  a  real world,  not to say the 
drastic  changes of the  existing economies.  Therefore,  only  a  rough 
framework of theory  should be expected. 
To establish the theoretical framework for  our analysis, three aspects 
are dealt with: a)  Basic elements of an economic system; b) Outstanding 
points of major differences in planned and market economies; c)  Some 
issues of concepts for reforming and transforming an economic system. 
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What are the major components of an economic system? In comparative 
economic systems,  the  DIM  approach  (Neuberger &  Duffy,  1976)  of 
economic systems is one of the few  plausible arguments at the moment. 
According  to  this  approach,  three  structures  construct an  economic 
system. They are decision-making structure, information structure and 
motivation structure.  It  is  by  the  characteristics of  these three  main 
structures that one  can tell  the  nature  of an  economic system.  Or in 
other words,  the  differences  between  various  economic  systems  lie 
principally in  the three structures. However, for the study of economic 
systems as  the  present thesis does,  the  DI~l approach is by and large 
applicable  but  not  fully  sufficient.  One  more  key structure must be 
added,  i.e.,  structure  of ownership.  The  new  approach  used  in  this 
paper is thus the DIMO assumption which is believed more appropriate 
and sufficient for present research. 
2.1.1  Decision-making structure 
Of the four basic structures of an economic system, the decision-making 
structure is considered as the most important and decisive element of an 
economic system.  It  discusses  the  nature,  sources and  allocation of 
decision-making authority across the society of an economy.  For the 
purpose of our research, focus  is  put on the distribution of decision-
making power and the  means of exercising it in the economy, i.e. the 
question of who makes what decision and how it is carried out. 
The degree  of centralisation,  or concentration,  of decision-making 
power is the device to measure the pattern of distribution of decision-
making power. To name them as  two extremes of spectrum, there are at 
least  centralised  and  decentralised  decision-making  patterns.
l 
Centralised location of decision-making power occurs when there  is 
'.In the  real world things are certainly far more complex. Any combination of 
degrees of centralisation and decentralisation could result a number of points on the 
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only  one  or  few  authorities  in  (he  society  which  grasp  all  major 
decision-making power,  whilst  the  contrary  case  is  the  pattern  of 
decentralised distribution of decision-making power.  So,  in  reality the 
number and  relative importance of the  decisions made at the top and 
higher echelons indicate the extent of concentration of decision-making 
power. 
Apart from the distribution of authority, the means of carrying out any 
decision also reveal the nature of the  decision-making structure. There 
are at least three alternative ways for a decision maker to implement the 
decision.  Firstly,  the  decision  maker  can  command  other agents  to 
choose specific  actions.  The  second  choice  is  to  change the  set of 
alternative actions  to  provide  limited  choices for other agents.  The 
third  way  to  achieve  the  goal  of  a  decision  is  by  affecting  the 
consequences  resulting  from  a  specific  decision  exercised  by other 
agents( Neuberger & Duffy,  1976).  From the above list of the means of 
exercising decisions one can classify the means used in various patterns 
of distribution of decision-making power.  In  principle,  the  first  two, 
defined  as  direct means,  can  be  taken  only  under circumstances of 
centralised control of decision-making authority, and the third one, the 
indirect one, is  the  normal channel for a decentralised society where 
agents can carry out their own decision in that way only. 
As a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to tell the 
accurate degree of concentration of the decision-making power in any 
economy.  Of course,  the  two  extremes  can not be found in  the real 
world,  and  there exists only the  patterns  in  between.  However,  for 
conventional  reasons,  the  hierarchical  structure of decision-making 
authority in a centrally planned economy is  usually categorised as the 
centralised distribution of decision-making power. It is also commonly 
accepted that a market economy is  of a decentralised decision-making Cbapter2  15 
structure. 
Since there are reasons for expecting systemic differences in decision-
making behaviours among agents,  the  pattern of the distribution of the 
power  in  the  economy  plays  a  crucial  role  in  determining  the 
performance of an economic system. This is  the clue to  understanding 
the  nature  and  direction  of any  economic  reforms  in  a  centralised 
planned economy in  particular, and any change in  an  economic system 
in general. 
2.1.2  Information Structure 
Next  to  decision-making  structure,  information  structure  of  an 
economic system takes an  important position in the functioning of the 
system.  It  performs  as  the  mechanisms  and  channels for collecting, 
transmitting,  processing,  storing,  retrieving  and  analysing economic 
data for the  operation of economic  activities  ( Neuberger &  Duffy, 
1976).  Here the  direction and  forms  of the information flow  are  of 
special concern. 
Information flows  may go vertically or horizontally depending on the 
requirement  of  the  decision-making  system  and  the  nature  of the 
message.  Normally a centralised distribution of the decision-making 
power will  need  a  mainly vertical  flow  of the  information from the 
higher echelons down to  the  lower ones as  the  instructions must be 
transmitted between them. The means via which the information can be 
transmitted in an  economy can  be  classified  into two main groups: 
monetary and  non-monetary. Monetary means provide information in 
terms of money, e.g., prices of goods and services( Hayek, 1945). Non-
monetary information  is  involved  in  the  messages  in forms  of , for 
example, state order of quantities of products. In this case, money has Chaptec2  16 
no role to play.  Moreover, the contents of the  information bundle vary 
in different economic systems with  the  various direction of the flow, 
even if to a large extent they are of the  same basic nature but different 
forms. For example, the  price of goods in  a market economy may be 
named something else in the planned economy in an instruction or order 
issued from the top in a planned economy. So the alteration of the forms 
of  information  flow  also  means  change,  though  partially,  of  the 
information structure of an economic system. 
The role of information structure in  the  functioning of an economic 
system also exists  in  coordination  of economic activities  which will 
determine in very  large extent the  outcome of the economy( Komai, 
1992). That is,  the  interrelated decision makers act  according to  the 
information, obtained through the  information mechanism, about those 
decisions of other decision makers which will affect his set of possible 
actions, the consequences of his actions and lor the utility he will obtain 
from any given consequence ( Neuberger & Duffy,  1976).  The major 
mechanisms for achieving coordination in  the economy are market and 
planning  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  two  terms,  apart  from  their 
functions as two main categories of economic systems. 
The significance of the working state of the information structure shall 
be emphasised in the sense that when there is  no sufficient information 
provided, problems in  the coordination process will occur. There are 
two possible ways to  solve the problems:  to  adjust the  information 
structure to provide the necessary information; or to change the other 
parts of the economic system to bring the decision-making power to the 
agents who have the information ( Neuberger & Duffy, 1976). Altering 
the information structure,  approaches  can be  attempted through the 
direction and the forms of the information flow. But those changes must 
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least. 
2.1.3  Motivation Structure 
As far as  the  third structure of an  economic system,  the motivation 
structure, is concerned, the realisation of decisions is discussed. There 
are various purposes for which the participants in the economy are self-
motivated and various ways for them as  decision-makers to get other 
agents to comply with their own wishes.  Actually this topic has been 
referred to  partially where  the  means  of implementing decisions are 
dealt with. Those means are exercised depending on various motivations 
of the participants in the economy. Generally speaking, the participants 
can be motivated to carry out any decision because of , 1)  reliance on 
tradition  or  customary  obligation;  2)  appeal  to  egocentrism--
accumulation of wealth, respect of peers, etc.; 3)  appeal to solidarity or 
the willing subordination of the individual's personal objectives to those 
shared by the group; 4)  coercion ( Neuberger &  Duffy, 1976). In other 
words, incentives of the participants in the economy can be divided into 
two basic categories: material and non-material ones.Material incentives 
take, primarily, the form of money, while non-material motivation rely 
mainly on spiritual rewards. 
It is not an easy job to outline the possibilities of adjusting or altering 
the  motivation  structure  in  order  to  improve  the  performance  of 
economic activities, because there is  a lack of well-designed analytical 
tools in this respect that can be taken into use here. An understanding of 
the nature of motivation structure seems to be a much more complicated 
task than of other structures, notwithstanding the latter task is hard as 
well. However, changes in motivation structure certainly will result in 
changes in economic life. Ways of adjusting or altering the motivations 
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the predomination of one kind of incentive by the other or diversifying 
the fonns of incentives instead of focusing on one or few of them. For 
example, some forms of the non-material motivation can be replaced by 
some of the  material  incentives  as  the  prevailing  motivation  in  the 
economy. This process can be  realised in  some cases by simultaneous 
consequences of the changes in other structures of the economic system 
and also through  the deliberate plan in  changing motivation structure 
itself. 
2.1.4  Ownership Structure 
How important  is  the structure of ownership of productive assets  in 
detennining the  nature of an  economic system,  or in  influencing the 
operation of a certain economic system and further the outcome of the 
economy?  It  is  still  a  big  topic  under  argument  at  the  movement. 
Nevertheless, ownership structure of an economy plays an indispensable 
part  from the basic structures of the economic system discussed above ( 
Brus & Laski, 1990). To support this argument, simply pointing out one 
fact  shall  be  enough.  The  fact  the  state-owned  enterprises  own  an 
overwhelming share in a centrally planned economy, without exception, 
serves  as  the  precondition  for  the  centralised  planning  system. 
Moreover,  as  commonly  recognised,  ownership  is  one  of the  most 
important sources for obtaining decision-making power. 
Much effort has  been devoted  to  the classification of ownership of 
productive  assets,  such  as  private  ownership,  public  ownership, 
collective ownership and so on. To the present author, the definitions of 
the existing categories of ownership are not efficient enough to cover 
the real situation in practical analysis of this issue. Moreover, they can 
not explain some type of ownership in practice convincingly.  Therefore, 
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distinguished  into  two  maIn  groups:  individual  ownership and non-
individual  ownership.  Individual  ownership  means  that  physical 
persons own the property of a business entity, the forms of which may 
include owner-run private entity,  partnership, cooperative, joint-stock 
company and so on.  Non-individual ownership refers to the types of 
assets owned in the name of , for instance, state, institutions or fW1ds 
with their legal existence, in which no  physical persons are involved as 
the owners. By this classification of ownerships, the difference between 
the natures of the two categories of ownership is clearly outlined. But it 
is still necessary to point out that in some cases the form of organising 
production  can combine the  two types of the ownership. A  certain 
form  of  undertaking  can  be  shared  by  the  two  different  kinds  of 
ownerships. For example, a joint-stock company can be established  by 
either individual owners, or by institutions, and it can also be owned by 
the two kinds of owners at the same time. So, the form on its own can 
not tell the nature of the ownership of the entiti . 
The ownership issue here concerns not only who actually owns the 
assets, but also of the way of operating the business. At this movement, 
the question becomes more difficult since the methods of managing an 
entity depend not solely on the status of the ownership of the entity. 
Many factors play roles on the stage. Based on this point of view, it is 
reasonable to say that changes on the methods of managing the business 
without  corresponding  changes  in  the  nature  of ownership can be 
expected  to  contribute  to  improvement of the  performance of an 
economic system. 
3  The  fundamental  alteration  of  the  nature  of 
ownership will. of course, playa more important role in this respect. 
2  In his The  Socialist System,  Kornai discussed in some detail various forms of 
ownership. (see Kornai. 1992) 
S  Commercialisation of State-owned enterprises in reformed planned economy is 
one of the examples in the sense that attempt was intended to make the enterprises 
working as an independent producer in market economy without changing ownership 
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Up to  now,  we  have  covered  briefly  the  four basic  structures of an 
economic system.  According to the discussion above, the differences of 
various economic systems lie,  at  least,  in  the  differences of the four 
structures. In addition, any effort to reform or restructure an economic 
system is equal to changing either some of the structures, or all of them. 
Of the four basic strucwres of an  economic system, the nature of the 
decision-making structure has  the decisive position in determining the 
operational characteristics of other structures. In some cases, altering 
key  parts  of the  structures  will  consequently  lead  to  the  necessary 
changes of other parts of the structures. For example, if the degree of 
decision-making concentration is  modified towards the decentralisation 
end of the  distribution arrangement,  the direction of the information 
flow  will  subsequently  be,  as  required,  changed from  the  vertical 
towards  the  horizontal  so  that  the  new distribution of the decision-
making power can work  efficiently and properly. 
2.2  Major  Issues  of  Differences  in  Market  and  Planned 
Economy 
The reason for introducing the  topic as  shown in the heading to  this 
paper, which focuses on the reforms in two planned economies, is that a 
broader knowledge of the  fundamental  differences between a  market 
economy and  a  planned economy will  be  absolutely necessary and 
helpful for a  better understanding of the nature and tendency of the 
reforms  in  China  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Because the  scope of the 
reforming efforts in a centrally planned economy should not be limited, 
both in theory and practice, to  a certain boundary by which a market 
and planned economy is  divided. As a matter of fact, there is no clear 
line of boundary in theory between the two, yet. The author agrees with 
Prof.  Peter  Wiles  in one  of the  similarities  between a  market and 
planned economy. As he pointed out, ..  'law of production' are evidently Chaoter2  21 
everywhere the same" (Wiles,  1977). 
Notwithstanding differences between market and planned economies are 
undoubtedly numerous and  are well researched. 
4  What  we touch on 
here is confined to some key points of the following aspects:  a)  basic 
features  of the  structures of economic  system;  b)  major instruments 
used by governments for regulating the economy. 
2.2.1  Market and planning systems: theoretical assumptions 
Market and  planning  systems  under  this  discussion  are  defined  as 
economic systems instead of any other meaning of them,  since the two 
terms  are  often  used  to  mean  different  things  in  various  contexts. 
Needless  to  say,  there  has  never  been  a  pure  market  or planned 
economy in the real world. However, for analytical simplicity, one must 
begin with a theoretical  model to  gain the basis for understanding the 
real situation. 
Analysis of the essence of a market economy is relatively simple. There 
are  various  models  of  market  economy,  e.g.,  full  market  economy, 
regulated  market  economy  and  so  on,  but  the  essential  difference 
between them is whether it is  profit maximisation or it is profit plus the 
notional salary of the entrepreneur or even profit plus the whole wage 
bill that is maximised (Wiles, 1964). Here, a perfect competitive market 
system can be defined as an economy of complete decentralisation with 
such  a  sufficiently  large  number of decision-making  agents  in the 
production of each good and service  that none of them is able to have a 
significant effect on the supply (Neuberger & Duffy. 1976). The market 
mechanism--the invisible hand--works.  In this economy. it is assumed 
that  each  agent  can  consider  the  actions  of  other  agents  as  not 
• Any textbook in comparative economic systems, or something similar, discusses 
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interrelated  with  his.  There  exists  no  central  agency  exercising  any 
decision-making  authority over the  economy,  and  the  results  on  the 
market place are based solely on the actions of the  multitude of buyers 
and sellers. 
The  nature  of  the  decision-making  structure  in  a  market  system 
determines the features of the information structure. A market economy 
is served principally by horizontal channels of infonnation transmission 
through which flow only data  on offers of purchase and sale, i.e. only 
data on quantities and prices. No  information is  necessarily transmitted 
on internal conditions within any  production or consumption unit, and 
buyers and sellers do not need to  care who send the message. Prices of 
goods and services are the only signals for decision-making. 
As to the motivation structure, pure utility maximisation, e.g, producers 
maximising profit,  sellers of resources equating the  utility of income 
with disutility of providing the service, and consumers maximising the 
utility from  spending their income on various goods, play major parts 
in motivating the economic activities, apart from other incentives. The 
invisible  hand  of  the  market  mechanism,  operating  through  the 
information  structure  by  changes  in  price  signals  and  competition 
among  all  producers  and  consumers,  mobilises  all  participants  to 
perform in accordance with the wishes of each other. 
The  pattern of ownership  in  a  market  economy is  formed  with  an 
overwhelming  share  of  individual  ownership  under  various  forms 
(Komai, 1992). 
like a market economy, there are various models of a planned economy 
too.  In an  ideal  case,  a planned  system  is  doing the same job as  the 
market  system  does  but  in  an  entirely  different  way  (Brown  & Cbapler2  23 
Neuberger,  1969) _ First  of  all,  decision-making  power  is  highly 
concentrated at  the top,  the  planning authority_  Planners seek for the 
desired state of the economy according to their preferences,  and their 
decisions  are  supposed  to  be  carried  out through  the  orders  to  the 
peripheries of the economy--all the participants except the top agency. 
Centralisation  of  the  decision-making  structure  necessitates  the 
corresponding  actions  of  the  information  structure.  So,  obviously, 
vertical  flow  of  the  information  is  an  essential  feature  there  for 
communication of,  1)  all  the  necessary message from the production, 
consumption, trade and other economic sectors to the central planning 
agency,  and  then,  after processing  all  the data,  2)  instructions and 
orders from the top to  the bottom, finally,  3)  the feedback information 
required to evaluate the extent to which the commands are fulfilled. It is 
apparent that the forms of all  the information are not confined only to 
the quantities and prices, but also others such as qualitative requirement. 
The motivation structure of a planned system seems quite complicated, 
if one accepts the assumption that the objectives and interests of all the 
participants in the economy are not unified by central planning agency, 
which is  constructed as  the  foundation  of planning control. All  the 
forms of manifestation of the  motives can be found out in a  planned 
economy while it  is  hard  to  say which of them takes a  predominant 
position.  To  be  coherent  with  the  decision-making  structure,  the 
objectives of all  participants in the economy must be unified by the 
authority,  i.e,  everybody takes  the  planner's  preference as  his  own 
preference. The official declaration in this respect makes one believe 
that non-material incentives are emphasised in this society, but there is 
no evidence to  deny the  significant  role of the  material  incentives. 
Moreover, the variety of the objective functions of other participants in 
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inaccurate  and  incorrect information to  the  centre,  which will cause 
consequent problems in plan formation,  and implementation, if there is 
no  protective  measures  to  reduce  or prevent  the  possibility of this 
situation from happening. Unfortunately, those problems are monitored 
in a planned economy as a whole. In one word, structure of motivation 
of the planning system is distorted and therefore, there is a potential to 
adjust and improve its operation to  serve for better performance of the 
planning control. 
Ownership structure  of the  planning system looks  relatively simple 
compared to  a market system. Non-individual ownership, of it mainly 
the state-owned business, predominates there.  In the ideal situation, the 
state or its agencies act not only as the owner but also as the manager of 
its business. 
As  there  is  no  pure  market  economy,  nor  is  there  a  pure  planned 
economy.  Some  factors  of the  market  mechanism  retain  in  planned 
economies, such as  forms of prices and  money. But, as  Wiles pointed 
out,  "some of functions  of money  are  cut  away  by the  Soviet-type 
economy,  where  inter-enterprise  money  is  'passive',  i.e.,  does  not 
normally affect anyone's decisions" (Wiles,  1964). The role of money. is 
one  of  the  basic  differences  between  the  two  economic  systems. 
Monetary relation is essential to a market economy, while in a planned 
economy money's  role  is  passive.  Monetary  relation  is  weaker and 
narrower than market economy (Kornai,  1992). 
To help summarise  the basic features of market and planned economic 
systems, a simplified panel is given below. 
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Panel 2-2-1  Basic differences in  market and planned economy 
Structures 
Decision-making 
Information 
Motivation 
Ownership 
Market  System 
Decentralised 
Indirect means 
Horizontal flow 
Monetary  means 
Material-oriented 
Individual 
Planning  System 
Centralised 
Direct means 
Vertical flow 
Non-monetary & partial 
monetary means 
All 
Non-individual 
In its broad sense, instruments used by government for controlling and 
regulating  economic  activities  consist  of  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative  tools  in  achieving  the  targets  set  for  the  objectives. 
Economic institutions and  mechanisms included in the category of an 
economic system can be labelled as  the qualitative instruments.But the 
instruments studied here are  referred to  as  those major (in  very small 
number)  quantitative tools  used  by governments for implementing its 
policies.  And  the  analysis  focus  will  be  put  on some  typical  and 
commonly  used  instruments  in  a  market  economy  where  those 
instruments  are  created  and  developed  normally.  Quantitative 
instruments, to a large extent, are not of a neutral nature, except for a 
few,  because  they  are  paid  different  attentions  when  serving  for 
different economic systems.  Some of them  are  in affinity only with 
certain  type  of  economic  institutions.  The  focus  on  different 
instruments,  therefore,  reveals,  to  some  extent,  the  nature  of the 
economic system, though not as fully as the economic institutions do. 
Generally  speaking,  the  following  groups  of  instruments  are  the Chapter 2  26 
principal ones taken by  a government in a market economy (Kirschen, 
1974). 
Group (1), Public Finance 
(1.1) Government expenditure: 
Government investment 
Current purchases of goods and service 
(1.2)  Government revenue 
Direct ta..'(es on households' incomes 
Direct ta..'(es on enterprises' incomes 
Indirect taxes on internal transactions and on production 
Social security contribution 
Ta..'(es on property 
Group (2), Money and credit 
(2.1) Interest rate instrument 
Central bank rate 
(2.2) Instruments on credit creation by banks 
Reserve ratios. etc. 
Quantitative limit') on advances 
Approval of individual loans 
Group (3), Exchange rare 
(3.1)  Devaluation 
(3.2)  Revaluation 
(3.3)  Multiple rates 
(3.4)  Floating rates 
In the planned economy,  one can  also find  out some of the forms  of 
instruments  applied  in  a  market  economy.  But their  functions  and 
consequences differ in the  two systems. For example, the function of 
public finance tools in groupO) in a market economy is primarily  for 
improving  the  income  distribution  by  government  revenues  and 
expenditures,  which  plays  a  supplementary  role.  But,  in  a  planned 
economy  income  distribution  is  set  at  the  stage  when income  is 
generated. Through public finance  tools the state controls the whole 
economic life. 
In  a  market  system  money  and  credit  instruments  serve  for  the 
objectives of full employment, price stability and balance of payments Chapter 2  27 
equilibrium,  and  also  for  overall  or selective  economIC  expansion. 
These objectives are pursued in  the planned economy by other means, 
i.e., direct control of the economic activities. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, in a typical planned system, tools of money and credit playa 
very minor and passive role, and sometimes what exisst there are only 
these tools in name. 
In affairs relating to foreign economic activities in a classical planned 
economy,  the  situation  is  simple  for  analysis  because of the  large 
isolation of the planned economy from the other part of the economic 
world, i.e., market economy. In  a typical planned economy currency is 
not convertible to any foreign currency at all, and the exchange rate is 
officially fi-xed regardless of any actual change of the circumstances. 
After all,  in  a  planned economy,  the  state  is  the owner of the  major 
productive  means.  It  is,  therefore,  fairly  reasonable  to  expect that 
instruments of direct control play crucial part in this sort of economy. 
2.3  Concepts of Reform  of An  Economic System 
The first question that will be raised by a study on economic reform is: 
what does reform of an economic system refer to? In a  conventional 
definition, reforming an economic system means to change the nature of 
the basic structures of the  system,  the  mechanisms and instruments 
related to the operation of the  system discussed in the previous two 
sections. Specifically, to quote Hewett, to reform an economic system is 
to reform the  institutional  arrangements constituting the system by 
which  resources  are  allocated.  Every  system  consists of a  set of 
institutions  that  somehow  decide  what  will  be  produced?  in  what 
quantities?  who  will  produce  it?  what  techniques  and  factor 
combinations will be used? and who will receive the product? Economic Cbaoter2  28 
reforms  are  the  efforts  to  alter the  existing way those decisions are 
made  in  pursuit  of  improving  the  performance  of the  economy  ( 
Hewett, 1988). 
The significance of the economic system in determining the outcome of 
the economy is  not a topic of any argument. But it is also true that the 
outcome of the economy is  determined not only by the function of an 
economic  system  but  a  number  of factors.  Efforts  to  improve  the 
performance of the economy can be sought in changes to other aspects 
of the economy instead of the  economic system. For instance, slight 
change of government policy on a specific  affair can be expected to 
produce an effect in terms of improvement. 
What is important here is the fact that economic performances could be, 
without  systemic  changes,  improved  by  adjusting  economic  policy 
decisions.  This  makes  things  more  complicated because it is  very 
difficult  not  to  confuse  the  two  sorts  of reforms  in  the  economy. 
However,  policy changes  take  place,  as  commonly agreed,  more 
frequently  than  those of an  economic system.  Policy change is  the 
ordinary instrument for government  to  take  in regulating economic 
activities.  On  the  contrary,  effort  on  restructuring  the  systemic 
arrangements and mechanisms takes longer time in debating, planning 
and implementing. It occurs very occasionally, and in a larger scale than 
any policy change ( Bomstein, 1977). The consequences of the two sorts 
of changes differ as well in a large degree. The interrelation of the two 
sorts of changes can be found  without doubt,  though it can not be 
expressed in a clear way yet. On some occasions, essential adjustment of 
important economic policies requires  the  corresponding actions on a 
systemic arrangement.  Otherwise  they will  not be realised properly 
within the existing framework of the systemic structure. Normally the 
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institutional arrangements.  as  one can see from the  practice. But, the 
converse is  not  true.  Changes on an  economic system will definitely 
cause large scale changes on economic  policies,  if not  all  of them  ( 
Bornstein, 1977). 
To observe and analyse any economic reform in the CPEs, four aspects 
must be examined:  (a)  the degree of the changes intended, i.e., the depth 
of the alteration;  (b)  the wide range of the changes;  (c))  the speed for 
the action to  take place and  complete;  (d)  the relation of the blueprint 
and the action.  FoLlowing  this  way of thinking, four pairs of refonn 
strategies and  technologies  are  to  be  classified and discussed in this 
section. These are applicable in the discussion of the main theme of this 
thesis. 
2.3.1  Radical v.  Moderate 
~v  _radical' ,or _moderate  we ,1LS'<less .tlie .dftntli _ot=tlie _cetorm. _fe, . .  llie 
distance awa'('from the Classical s'(stem  .. to use-Komai's words·'Kornai  •. 
1992). Usually moderate is referred to a kind of adjustment which aims 
at improving the performance of the existing economic system, while 
radical means a fundamental  transformation of the present system to 
another type. Specifically, adjustment On an economic system is the kind 
of reforming effort undergoing within the  framework of the existing 
system. For instance, it may  refer to,  as  often happens, price revision 
that changes the relative prices of some goods in short supply to meet 
demand for them while retaining the price fonnation mechanism intact. 
If the  way of price  formation  is  altered  from,  say.  administrative 
control pricing to  market-clearing  pricing.  then this  sort of effort is 
thought of as a radical reform instead of an adjustment. At this stage the 
depth of a refonn is of concern. C/Japter2  30 
To state the obvious, economic systems differ in its basic components, 
and some of the parts play the key roles in determining the nature of an 
economic system. When the  nature of those structures is  altered from 
one end  to  another,  the  economic system will be  expected to lose its 
existing essence. A typical case  in this  respect can be  found from the 
change  in  the  nature  of  a  decision-making  structure.  When  the 
centralised distribution of decision-making power in a planned system is 
altered to  a decentralised one, accompanied by changes to other parts 
of the system which take place simultaneously, then the revised system is 
no  longer  to  be  called  a planned systems. The depth of the change 
depends on the relevance of the  parts being changed in determining the 
nature of the system  6  •  Sometimes a significant quantitative requirement 
needs to be met as well as such qualitative changes. 
It is  safe to  say that a radical reform creates a new type of economic 
system which by its nature  is  distinct from  the pre-reformed one.  An 
adjustment  of economic  institutions  will  not  result  in  this  kind  of 
change. 
2.3.2  Comprehensive v.  Partial 
Under the subheading of comprehensive and partial reform, the scope 
of the reform will be examined.  Proposals for reforming an economic 
system may be designed for  every element of the system, or only parts 
of the whole system. The former one is  called comprehensive reform 
and the latter partial reform. Let us  take an example. A comprehensive 
reform is conceived when the decision-making structure and structures 
of information, motivation and ownership of the system are going to be 
S  According to M. Bornstein, there are two ways of decentralisation, administrative 
decentralisation and economic decentralisation( Bomstein, 1977). A radical reform, 
thus, requires economic decentralisation together with administrative decentralisation. 
• Komai made an interesting classification of the causality line of a socialist system 
and defined accordingly the radicalness of a reform{ Kornai, 1992). CbaDter2  31 
touched for altering at  mean time. While,  if only one of them, or less 
than four of them will  be  changed, this  sort of reform is  of a partial 
nature. 
Judging the  type  of a reform  as  comprehensive or partial, one  must 
observe the complete blueprint of the reform proposal and the complete 
process.  A  comprehensive  reform  has  to  take  the  form  of a  partial 
reform at the beginning by peaceful change suggestions and so on. 
Establishing the concepts of  comprehensive and partial reforms will be 
helpful  for one  to  understand  the  scope  of reforms on an  economic 
system and the depth of the  reforms, since the two sides of the reform 
are apparently interrelated. 
This raises a question: what is  the relation between a comprehensive 
reform and a radical reform?  Or to  ask  it in other way, how can one 
label one reform comprehensive and another radical or whatever else 
composes the pair of  terms? In answering this question, it is important 
to  mention briefly the relation between the scope of a reform and  its 
depth. We are enabled to do this, in theory in the first instance, after the 
above discussion. 
On  the  one  hand,  first  of all,  a  comprehensive  reform  does  not 
necessarily refer to a radical reform. It may take place with adjustment 
of a large number of components in  the economic system. At the same 
time it can be designed as a radical reform with a very high possibility. 
Secondly, a partial reform can be carried out either as a radical reform 
or as an adjustment, depending on the objectives it aims at. As a matter 
of fact,  the real  situation in  this field  is  not so flexible as the theory 
defines. Usually, a comprehensive reform  is  devised as  a radical one, 
and a partial reform as  measures of adjustment. On the other hand,  a C!Jaoter2  32 
radical reform usually is formed as a comprehensive one in its scope, 
though this is  not the only possibility of choice for it.  Related to this 
point, a partial reform may bring about with it the adjustment in most 
cases other than radical reform on the economic system. 
2.3.3  Revolutionary v.  Evolutionary 
Plans  on  restructuring  the  economic  system  could  be  carried  out 
through a shock treatment at one stroke, or brought  in over a longer 
time period in a gradual way. The speed difference here is classified in 
this thesis as the revolutionary and evolutionary transitions, though the 
label of revolutionary is  used  by other authors for other meaning in 
analysing economic reforms in the CPEs.
7  The longer it requires  to 
complete one round of a  reform package with the same contents, the 
more  evolutionary  and  gradual  it  will  be  (Dornbusch,  1991).  For 
example, retail price liberation may be planned to finish in one year, or 
in a few years. 
Speed of an intended reform in some cases is determined by the nature 
of the  parts  that  are  to  be  changed.  Some  sort of changes of an 
economic mechanism requires less time or preparation than others. For 
instance, decentralisation of decision-making power in a certain degree, 
e.g.,  between  the  central  authority  and  local  authorities or sectoral 
authorities seems a relatively easier and quicker task to fulfil than the 
ones in freeing enterprises or prices. 
But, it is also true that the speed of implementing a  reform plan in 
many cases is the choice of the planners irrespective of the contents to 
7  As pointed correctly by Komai, there is no consensus in the literature dealing with 
economic reforms in the CPEs. 'Revolution' is referred to more than one definitions. 
The word used in this thesis takes the  meaning of (a)  in his classification (Komai, 
1992), i.e., it refers to a swift, sudden explosion, as opposed to evolution, which is 
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be touched. That is to say, there is no definite relation between the speed 
of a  reform  and  other strategies  and  technologies.  A  revolutionary 
reform  could  take  place  as  either  a  radical  or  moderate,  either 
comprehensive or partial reform. 
2.3.4  Theory-led v.  Muddle-through 
Theory-led  in  this  context  does  not  refer  to  economIC  theory  that 
underpins proposals for restructuring the economic system. It is defined 
as  one sort  of technology  to  carry out a  reform with which a well-
planned blueprint for  action  is  preferred  before any reform actually 
begins.While muddle-through states a situation that less guidance by a 
working plan is prepared for the changes intended. Spontaneous actions 
in altering an economic mechanism belong to this sort of technology. 
Reformers  may  choose  a  muddle-through  road  for  the  reform  for 
reasons. For example, preparation of reform plan, including discussion 
and debating on the critical issues, is  time consuming. Due to lack of 
experiences  in  designing  and  implementing  economic  reform  in  a 
planned economy, working out a blueprint appears especially difficult. 
It is.  therefore, not unreasonable  to find a reform with less or without 
well-prepared plan. though theory-led reform sounds a good guarantee 
for a better result of the reform. 
2.3.5  Scale points of transforming an economic system 
To summarise our discussion about the concepts involved in reforming 
an economic system, here the present author has attempted to establish a 
device to indicate accurately the process of the reform. 
The degree of the changing process of any basic structure in the system 
can be  expressed  as  a  number  of points  on  a  curve on coordinate Chap1er2  34 
depending on the aspects being replaced. In Diagram 2-3-1, the two 
axes are designed as  the  depth of  change and width of the change. 
Changes  from  one  end  to  another,  e.g.,  from  centralisation  to 
decentralisation can be dotted by points. Thus, the  diagram  exemplifies 
the process as applied to the  alternation from  a centralised decision-
making structure to a decentralised one. There are multiple choices to 
reach a certain destinaticn depending on various combinations of width 
and depth of the change intended. 
Applying this simple model to explain the transforming process of the 
complete economic system from  one end to  another,  one can draw a 
modified graph with more variables. It is  needless to stress that this 
device is taken only for analytical purposes for a better understanding 
of the nature of the complicated process of an economic reform. There 
is no intention to explain the reality of economic reform by this kind of 
tool which apparently neglects some factors. 
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Chapter 3:  CPEs:  Radical  Reform  Unavoidable 
Changes in economic mechanisms  developed in any country along  with 
the development of their histories. This world  is  dynamic rather than 
static.  The  market  economy  in  the  West  has  experienced a  series of 
changes since its birth. However,  the  dramatic alterations that occurred 
in  the  centrally  planned  economies  in  the  1980s  made  the  process 
distinctive due to  the fundamental  changes that  were introduced there. 
The  basics  of  the  centralised  planning  system  or the  administrative 
control of the economy had been put under a restructuring scheme. It is, 
therefore, fairly reasonable to  raise the question why  radical reform of 
the  centrally  planned  economies  was  unavoidable  in  China  and the 
former Soviet Union in particular? And  why particularly in 1980s? This 
is  the  task  of the  current chapter. The economic situations in  the  two 
countries  in  pre-reform  periods  were  briefly  described  in  the  first 
section of this chapter.  After that,  the  root causes of the problems and 
difficulties were analysed according to  the  individual cases. In the final 
part of this  chapter,  the  history of reform efforts  in  CPEs including 
China, the Soviet Union and the East European countries were generally 
surveyed  in  a  view of  what  had  been  tried  to  remedy the  endemic 
diseases within the planning system. 
3.1  Economic situations in  China and the Soviet Union 
3.1.1 Imperative difficulties in China 
The centrally planned economic system was established in China in early 
1950s,  following the Soviet model. It was over twenty years later that 
large scale reform  began in  the  lace  1970s.  However, in China, it was 
only in the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-1957)  that the Soviet-type 
system was completely copied  after  the  original one.  The centralised OJapter3  36 
system was more or less modified since,  particularly in  the location of 
the decision-making power between the  central and  local authorities. In 
the meantime the nature of the administrative control economy remained 
unchanged  until  the  late  1970s  when  the  new  reforms  started.  The 
necessity for radical  reform  arose  from  the  severe difficulties in  the 
economy up to the late 1970s. 
Stagnation of living standard and  agricultural production 
Chinese people couldn't be  intoxicated  with  the  records of economic 
growth on paper when they looked at  the  figures revealing the situation 
of their living standard in  the late  1970s  after nearly thirty years of the 
communist revolution of 1949'  . The increase of income per capita was 
almost of a static  feature,  taking into account  the  inflation factor.  For 
example, in  1952, per capita  income in  Chinese currency--RMB yuan--
was 104 yuan. In 1966, the beginning year of the  'Cultural Revolution', 
the figure was over 200 yuan. Then, ten years later, in 1976 the amount 
only increased to 261  yuan. To  be  more specific, employees in the state-
owned sector got their average  wages  increased by only 1.1  percent 
annually in current price since  1957  ( Riskin,  1987). This meaned that 
every year the  average wage rose only 0.33 yuan, which was very likely 
to be offset by very moderate  inf1ation~ . According to some estimates, 
the average wage in  real terms in  1977 was 1  7 percent lower than it was 
in 1957 ( Riskin, 1987). 
Not only the income, with a rate of 2.2 percent of consumption growth 
annually from 1953 to 1978 ( Riskin,  1987), people found the increase 
of volume of food  and  other consumers' goods very slow as well. On 
i Economic growth rates ti,ll 1970s in China. according to its official figures. were 
retained at a quite high speed. they were especially outstanding compared with other 
relevant countries. (See Zhang. 1982,) 
Z Here are examples of the figures of intlation in China in the period before 1980s: 
the Retail Price Index in 1957 was 1.5%. and in 1978. 0.7%(State Bureau of Statistics, 
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some occasions, they even suffered a reduction of food supply.  Table 3-
1-1  provides the relevant figures. 
Table 3-1-1  Increase of consumption of major agrarian products per capita, 
1978 compared to 1957 
Grain 
4.6% 
Conon 
- 13.5% 
Edible Oil 
- 17 .  ..+0'c 
Meat  Seafood 
..+3.2%  - 1% 
Sources:  Chen Xiwen,  "  China's Agricultural  Economy: from  over-fast growth to 
nonnal growth", in  Economic Research.  No.  12,  Dec., 1987, p.23. 
Apart from  this,  the housing problem appeared serious too, due to the 
neglect of  'non-productive'  sectors  over a  long  period.  The  already 
cramped housing space of 4.3  square  metres  per urban inhabitant in 
1952 declined to 3.6 square metres in  1977 ( Riskin, 1987). 
The stagnation and deterioration in people's living standards throughout 
the whole country was severe. Meanwhile the situation in the rural areas 
was even worse. With about 80 percent of the population staying in rural 
areas, agriculture in China played a significant role in national economy. 
It  must,  first  of  all,  supply  food  and  other  basics  for  the  whole 
population which had already reached  one billion by 1978. According to 
Chinese estimates, besides food, still 80-85 percent of the necessities of 
the population had to be met from agricultural production in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, at the present stage of economic development, agriculture 
was  a  very  important  source  for  capital  accumulation  for 
industrialisation. By the exchange of industrial goods and agricultural 
products at unfavourable trading  terms  for  the  latter,  agriculture had 
provided  a  huge  amount  of capital  to  non-agricultural  sectors.  For 
example, 60-90  percent of foreign currency required by industry was 
gained through export of agricultural products during the 1960s and the Chapter 3  38 
1970s(The  State  Committee  for  Reform  of  the  Economic  System. 
1988b). 
However,  the  growth  of  agricultural  production  was  far  from 
satisfactory. The annual growth rates of gross output in  this sector was 
4.2 percent in  the  period of 1952-1978  (see table  3-1-1). In  the  same 
period, grain increased  2.4  percent,  corron  2.0  percent and  oil-bearing 
seeds  0.8  percent  annually  (The  State  Committee  for  Restructuring 
Economic System, 1988). During this  period, the  population grew at the 
rate of about 2 percent annually(State Bureau of Statistics, 1990). 
The  productivity  of  labour  in  agricultural  production  had  not  been 
improved at all. Up to  1980, the grain output per agricultural labour still 
remained at the level about 1,000 kg,  which was the  1957 figure, despite 
investment on infrastructure and technology ( Chen Xiwen. 1987). 
The state of poverty in rural area  in China at that time after thirty years 
of 'socialism' was shocking. It was admitted that there were about 100 
million amongst the rural population still suffering from starvation up to 
the late 1970s ( The State Committee of Restructuring Economic System, 
1988). 
Disproportion of the economy 
The  imbalance  of economic  structures  was  one  of the  outstanding 
problems in the Chinese economy in  the late 1970s. It expressed itself 
mainly in two ways. One appeared as the disproportion in the growth of 
various  sectors  in  the  economy.  The  other  was  represented  in  an 
irrational  ratio  of  the  distribution  of  national  income  between 
accwnulation (investment) and consumption. 
For a long period the  actual order of priority  for sectors' growth was Chapter 3  39 
the  typical  pattern of the  CPEs  as  follows:  heavy  industry first,  light 
industry second and agriculture last.  The order was  believed necessary 
for fast growth of the economy by the planners( Liu,  1984). As  a result, 
the irrational structure of the sectors developed. Table 3-1-2 showed the 
picture below. 
'rable 3-1-2  Economic Structures in 1966 and 1976 in China 
GSP (100%)  NT  (100%) 
1966  1976  1966  1976 
Agriculture  29.7  25.-+  43.6  41.0 
Industry  53.1  58.1  38.2  43.3 
Construction  6.-+  8.0  3.7  4.9 
Transportation  3.3  2.9  4.2 .  3.8 
Trade  7.5  5.6  10.3  7.0 
Sources: Li Chengrui, "Analysis of China's economic situation during the decade Of 
1966-1976", in  Economic Research,  No.1. 1984. P28. 
Notes:  GSP--Gross Social Product 
NI--National Income 
It was clear that the relative position of agriculture in national economy 
was weakened in the late 1970s  because  of  the  relative decline  of its 
growth.  Within  the  industrial  sector,  the  share  of  light  industry 
increased, but not as fast as  heavy industry. In addition, the latter itself 
was faced  with the problem of the underdeveloped mining branch and 
overdeveloped processing branch.  As  to  other sectors,  the  decline of 
transportation and commerce was obviously against the rational pattern 
of economic development, and  inevitably aggravated the bottleneck of 
infrastructures in the economy. 
The inappropriate ratio between accumulation and consumption was the Cha[Jter3  40 
other sort of disproportion. This problem seemed to be of a longstanding 
nature too. In 1952, the share of accumulation took 21.4 percent of the 
total  national  income.  In  1966  it  increased  to  30.6  percent  and 
afterwards it remained at this level, while it  sometimes went  up to 34.1 
percent in  some  years  during  the  decade  ( Li  Chenrui,  1984).  Apart 
from the large share of accumulation,  the distribution of the investment 
was  not for 'non-productive' sectors, such as  housing, hospital, school 
and so on.  This was  because,  during  the  First Five-Year Plan period 
(1953-1957)  67  percent of total  investment was devoted to productive 
sectors and 33  percent to  'non-productive' sectors. In  the late 1970s the 
ratio  became  82.8  percent:  17.2  percent  (  Li  Chenrui,  1984).  This 
policy of investment left consumption unimproved over a long time, and 
intensified the trend towards an  unbalanced development of the economy. 
Prod  ucti vi ty 
In  contrast  to  the  sustained  high  rates  of  economIC  growth,  the 
productivity growth in the Chinese economy was not optimistic at all. It 
was not unfair to say that Chinese economic growth  had been gained, to 
a  very  large  extent,  through  a  huge  increase  of resources  rather than 
their efficient use.  In general,  from  1953  to  1980,  the  gross value of 
fixed assets in state-owned enterprises grew twenty times, and the gross 
value of circulating capital eighteen times.  But, the increase of gross 
social products was only 7.2 times,  and  national income 4.2 times( Li 
Chenrui, 1984). If we took the output per unit of capital in industry in 
1952 as 100, then, in 1957 it was 103. In  1965 and in  1978 they were 68 
and 74 respectively ( Riskin, 1987). So, the state of capital productivity 
in the late 1970s was unsatisfactory indeed as compared to any of the 
previous  period.  Things  were  not  so  bad  in  the  increase  of labour 
productivity  since  in  State-owned  enterprises  it  went  up.  This 
achievement was mainly realised through increase of amount of capital 
per worker. Cbaoter3  41 
Unemployment 
The word  "unemployed" was  pronounced only in  the  late  1970s in 
China. After the communist revolution, the government had claimed that 
it  eliminated  any  kind  of  unemployment  and  every  person  was 
guaranteed a job. This was more or less true at least in  urban areas up to 
the  1970s. But, with the ending of the  ten  years  'Cultural Revolution' 
when  a  huge  number  of  young  educated  people  returned  from  the 
countryside to their own cities and  towns where they used to stay,3  the 
work of allocating them a job,  as  well  as  others of working age at that 
time, was far beyond the capacity of the  planners' control. A new and 
urgent problem occurred. 
According to available estimates, in  1979, the  number of the unemployed 
population in urban area amounted to approximately  10 million, or 9.5 
percent of the  total  non-agricultural  labour force.  In  1980,  the figure 
turned to be 12-13 million  ( Riskin,  1987). Due to  the poor statistics in 
this field, exact figures of rate of unemployment in the late 1970s were 
not  available,  but 5  percent  was  a  reasonable  estimate.  In  Liaoning 
Province (in North-East of China), for example, in the years from  1977 
to  1980,  there were about 2.6  million people waiting for jobs, among 
them 2  million  were  educated  young  people  coming  back from  the 
countryside ( Li Chengrui, 1984). 
The impact of the unemployment problem was felt  not only in its own 
economic sense but also in  its socia I consequences. The society was in 
danger of upheaval with the  sudden growth of an  idle population and 
increasing resentment towards  past and  present policies on their fates 
among the young educated people and their families. 
3.1.2  The outstanding problems in the Soviet economy 
j  It was a policy during late 1960snlate 1970s that a majority of school graduates in 
urban areas must go to countryside to be peasants. Chapter 3  42 
Economic growth 
Economic growth had  been the  most important indicator in the Soviet 
economy, and high growth rates  had  been the  top goal of planners. But 
the  trend  shown in  Table  3-1-3  was  not  optimistic.  Due to  the  well-
known  unreliability of Soviet statistics,  a  supplementary picture was 
provided in Figure 3-1-1. 
Table 3-1-3  Soviet Economic Growth Rates (%), 1951-1985 
( Average Annual Growth Rates, comparable prices) 
1951-55  1956-60  1961-65  1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85 
Official Data 
NMP  11.3  9.2  6.5  7.8  5.7  4.3  3.6 
NNP  9.5  8.2  6.0  7.1  5.1  3.8  3.2 
Western Data 
GNP  5.5  5.9  5,1  5.2  3.8  2.7  2.4 
Sources: Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, .. Soviet Economic Reform", in Canadian Slavonic 
Papers, No.3, 1988, p.  306, 
Notes:  NMP--Net Material Product produced 
NNP--Net National Product utilised 
Fj~  3-1-1  Growth rates of national income in USSR. 1966-1985 
" 
"  10  " 
___  official data 
" 
". 
Aganbegyan's calculation 
Sources:  Abel Aganbegyan, The  challenge: Economics of  Perestroika,  Hutchison 
Education, 1988, p  .. 2 Chanter 3  43 
It was clear that in the mid-1980s the growth rates in the Soviet economy 
could never reach to the height gained in  mid-1960s, not to say the peak 
of the post-war period.  And  the  decline of growth rate up  to the  mid-
1980s  lasted for an ever longer  period which enabled us to take it as the 
most serious drop of growth rates  till  the  mid-1980s in  Soviet history. 
This conclusion  might  need  a  slight  revision  when  one  studied  the 
growth record  year  by  year  instead  of  in  five-year  intervals. The 
growth curve showed a small upward movement in one or two years in a 
declining  five-year  period.  However  the  general  tendency  in  Soviet 
economic growth rates after the 1970s was one of a downward curve. 
The  declines  of  growth  rates  occurred  not  only  in  the  aggregate 
economy,  but  also  in  sectors.  In  industry,  from  the  late  1970s to  the 
mid-1980s,  things  were  even  worse  than  the  overall  growth 
rates(Gregory & Struard,  1986). The worst case in  growth rates  was 
found  in  agriculture (Nove,  1986b).  The  Soviet  economy  had  been 
perplexed by  its weakest sector almost since the new economic regime 
was established.  In  post-war periods,  the  growth  rates  in  this  sector 
fluctuated sharply.  Agriculture  was  in  a  position  of permanent crisis 
(Aganbegyan,  1988).  But it  seemed that Soviet economy was  used to 
surviving with its poor agricultural production owing to its capability of 
importing grain by selling its oil and  other  natural  resources.  So,  the 
difficulties  there might  not  be considered as severe as those in industry 
and the overall economic growth. 
Growth of productivity 
With  economic growth  rates  going downwards,  the  performance of 
productivity was  even  worse,  especially of the  slow and  stagnatory 
capital productivity growth. Over two and half decades since the  1960s 
capital productivity remained a negative growth pattern. The situation in 
all  factor  productivity  and  labour  productivity  and  in  industry were Chaoter3  44 
described by Table 3-1-4. 
Table 3-1-4  Factor Productivity Growth Rates in the Soviet Union, 1961-1982 
(Average Annual Growth Rates) 
1961-65  1966-70  1971-75  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Overall factor 
prod.uctivity  0.5  1.1  -0.05  1.0  -0.1  -0.3  -2.6  -1.1  -1.6  -1.3 
In industry  0.1  0.6  1.0  -0.9  -0.3  -2.6  -2.2  -1.1  -1.6  -1.3 
Labour 
productivity  304  3.2  2.0  3.5  2.1  1.7  -0.8  0.6  1.2  0.9 
In industry  3.5  3.1  4.4  I.H  2.6  1.6  0.7  1.7  1.6  1.5 
Sources: Paul  R.  Gregory &  C.Stuart, So viet Economic Stmcture and Performance, 
third edition, Harper & Row Publishers,  New York,  1986, p.  335. 
As far as  the  increase  in  agricultural  productivity was concerned, the 
rates of growth in  output per agricultural  labour might give an answer. 
(see Figure 3-1-2). 
Fj~  3-1-2  Rates of mwh of output Qet a~cultural worker 
Sources:  David A.  Dyker, ed.  The  Soviet Union  under Gorbachev: prospects jor 
reform, CROOM HELM,  1987, p.96. ChaQter3  45 
Having examined the records of growth in  productivity by the relevant 
indicators, it seemed safe to  conclude that the Soviet economy had been 
facing a very serious challenge in  the  sense that it  could not sustain a 
reasonable  efficiency  in  the  use  of  its  existing  economic  resources. 
Consumption and "quality problem" 
It is necessary here to distinguish the types of consumption in a Soviet-
type economy: the collective consumption which  may be taken as a sort 
of population  welfare,  and  the  private  consumption.  Because  in  a 
socialist economy, the collective consumption, such as medical care, child 
care and so on,  took  an  important  position  in  population's wellbeing. 
Consumption was the sector in the Soviet economy which was treated  as 
the last one on the planners' priorities lists.  First of all, the increase of 
disposable income showed a slow and declining trend. What was more 
significant was the fact that with the permanent shortage of consumers' 
goods, which was described as one of the essential features in a centrally 
planned economy by Janos Kornai  ( Kornai,  1980), the slow growth in 
income could not be  turned into real  consumption. To  some extent, for 
the Soviet people paper currency was an empty promise. 
In social welfare, the field of collective consumption, past achievement 
seemed to  stop growing.  Under the  circumstances  of slow economic 
growth,  it  was hard  to  resolve  the  problems  occurring in  relation to 
social welfare of the Soviet population. As Aganbegyan admitted, the fall 
in economic growth rates had been especially painfully reflected in this 
sector. Because resources were allocated to  social welfare according to 
the so-called "residual principle", housing, health care and other items 
were always the last customers on the queue to be served depending on 
how much investment had left after allocation to productive sectors. For 
example, the share of investment allocated to  housing construction was 
reduced from  23  percent  in  1960  to  14-15  percent in  1981-85 period. Cbapter3  46 
The expenditure on education once amounted to  10  percent of national 
income in 1950  (the highest rate  in  the  world at  that time), but in recent 
years  it  fell  to  7  percent.  The  situation  in  health  care  was  also 
unsatisfactory. Only a mere 3 percent of GNP was devoted to this sector, 
which was the smallest share compared to  all  developed countries. The 
infant mortality in the Soviet union in  1985 was 26 out of 1,000 and was  .. 
the fiftieth place from the top  in  the  world. Life expectancy at birth was 
63  years for Soviet men  in  1984-85, which put the Soviet Union on the 
same line  as  the  upper  middle-income  countries.  such  as  Mexico  or 
Brazil ( Aganbegyan, 1988). 
Secondly, the poor quality of goods and services aggravated the situation. 
The quality problem was not confined to consumers' goods and services, 
though consumers suffered  from  it  directly  and  in  some cases  to  an 
intolerable extent. Soviet defence factories could provide some products 
competitive with the best available in the world. But most civilian goods 
were "terrible"  --quoting Abel Aganbegyan's word-- in  terms of quality. 
According to an estimate, only  17-18  percent  (by  the  most optimistic 
estimates) or 7-8 percent (by  the  most  pessimistic estimates) of Soviet 
manufactured goods reached "world standards" ( Aganbegyan, 1988). In 
other words,  only these could  be  sold  in  world  markets.  Even in its 
trade  with  Eastern  Europe,  the  Soviets  could  not  compete  in 
manufactured goods. Its export structure of goods was typically that of a 
developing country.  According  to  the  UN  Economic  Commission for 
Europe, in  1955, 28 percent of Soviet exports to  Western Europe were 
manufactured  goods,  in  1983,  the  figure  fell  to  6%  (Aganbegyan, 
1988). 
In the domestic market. even if there had been excessive demand on the 
market the  stocks  of some  goods  were  piled  up  because consumers 
refused to  accept them.  Aganbegyan had  made  an  eloquent assessment Cha,pter3  47 
about the deteriorating tendency of goods quality ( Aganbegyan, 1988): 
From year to year  we lose our former advantage and positions. Remember 
the fifties. Yes, our things were not as beautiful and fashionable as foreign 
ones,but as a compensation any of ours were hardwearing  ... And how is it 
now? It is a horrible situation: more than two thousand times a year colour 
television sets catch fire in Moscow alone. Together with the houses burn. 
Defence sector 
The defence sector was  the  place  where  the  Soviet Union showed its 
great strength.  And  there  had  been  an  argument for a long time which 
assumed that a Soviet-type economy ideally met the requirement of rapid 
military  expansion  at  the  expense  of  civilian  production  and 
consumption. In fact it had been generally agreed that the Soviet Union 
had been able, up to  the mid-1980s, to compete with the U.S  defence 
establishment while the productive capacity and living standard there fell 
far behind the U.S. However, along with  the chronic slowing growth of 
the economy, and with the changing character of military technology, the 
former  top  priority sector found  itself  in  an  embarrassing  situation. 
Firstly,  increasing attention  had  to  be  put on the opportunity costs of 
military priorities when the economy could not retain a reasonable rapid 
growth rate since the  1970s. According to  CIA estimates, from the mid-
1970s on,  the  growth  rates  of Soviet  military  spending  had  fallen. 
During  1966-1976,  the  rate  was  3  percent  annually  in  constant US 
Dollars and 4-5 percent annually in constant Rubles; from the mid-1970s 
on, the rate was down to about 2 percent per annum, either measured in 
constant Dollars or in constant Rubles ( Bova, 1988). This was obviously 
a result of the high pressures from  the overall slowdown of economic 
growth.  In  turn  the  cut-down  on  military  expenditures  would  be 
significant in the sense that the U.S.S.R.'s military power compared to 
the U.S.  had,  though  not  only,  been  based greatly on its quantitative 
advantages. Chapter 3  48 
At the meantime, Soviet defence power was  faced  a new threat coming 
from the changing role  of military  technology which had  made much 
recent progress. In most, the Soviet Union was left behind the U.S., e.g. 
microelectronics, computers and software and biotechnology etc.  ( Bova, 
1988). 
3.1.3  Problem patterns in the Chinese and Soviet economies 
On the basis of the data provided in  the  previous sections, a comparison 
of the major economic problems in  China ancl  the Soviet Union is now 
possible. The result of the comparison revealed an  interesting pattern in 
the two countries. The number one difficulty in the Soviet economy  was 
the sharp decline of economic growth  rates,  whereas the comparable 
problem  in  the  Chinaese  economy  was  found  in  stagnation  and 
deterioration of people's living standard, which was the other side of the 
growth problem. In the Soviet Union increase in living standard in terms 
of growth of per capita  income did  not  become  the  very outstanding 
problem,  although  people  found  some  difficulties  in  realising  their 
income due to the short supply of consumers' goods and services. 
Agriculture was the place which had a similar rank in the problem list in 
the  two  countries.  The  growth  of  agricultural  production  and 
productivity in both of the two economies was far from satisfactory. But 
it seemed that the consequences of the underdevelopment of agriculture 
were not exactly  the same as it ranked on the list, because the Chinese 
economy suffered much more.  As explained in this Chapter earlier, the 
Soviet Union could  afford  to  import  its  grain and  other agricultural 
products to solve and ease its problem of agricultural production. China 
could  not follow  in  this  way  as  there  was  no  sufficient  exporting 
capability from the natural resources. Cbapter3  49 
Other problems with a similar rank on the  list  were the disproportion of 
economic structures and  the slow or negative growth of productivity in 
the two economies. 
It seemed safe to  conclude  that  there  were  two  problems in  the  two 
economies  that  could  not  match  their  counterparts  in  each  other 
economy.  They  were  the  difficulty  in  employment  in  China  and  the 
growth of the defence sector in  the Soviet Union. This result required to 
be explained in  the  perspective of special  circumstances other than the 
economic system in the two countries. It  was to  be dealt with briefly in 
Section 3.2.1. 
In short,  the  first  three or four serious  problems  in  China's economy 
were the stagnation of living standard growth, agriculture, disproportion 
and  productivity growth. In  the Soviet economy they included decline 
in  economic  growth  rates,  productivity  growth,  agriculture  and 
disproportion.  Of those problems we  found  three from each economy 
match each other in a broad  sense. They shall  become,  logically,  the 
starting point for  exploring the  root causes,  because these similarities 
occurred out of the very few  similarities in  the  two economies. i.e.  the 
centrally planned system.  We  hypothesized, at this stage of the present 
study, that the main difficulties in the two economies were endemic in the 
centrally planned system. To  prove this  hypothesis is the task of next 
section. 
3.2  Challenges for the CPEs 
What challenges were the centrally planned economy facing in China and 
the Soviet Union? Why was  radical reform  necessary? The study on the 
major problems and their sources  in  the  two economies enabled us to 
draw some principal conclusions. Chapter 3  50 
For any problem in an  economy,  the causes could come from various 
sources,  such  as  political,  social,  cultural  and  economic  etc.  In  our 
discussion of economic reforms in  China and the Soviet Union, what is 
concerned  here  are  the  problems  endemic  in  the  centrally  planned 
economy. Those problems and difficulties occurred in the two economies 
could be in principle attributed to  two groups of sources: the systemic 
ones and non-systemic ones. By this classification, those problems caused 
mainly by non-systemic factors should appear in the face of new troubles 
which might be explained by casual  and  special events in each of the 
country. In this section, we were,  at  first,  to undertake a brief study on 
some special newly occurred problems in the two economies in order to 
clear up the way for our further relevant discussions. Then, the tough 
job to dig out the roots of major problems in our two cases were carried 
out. 
3.2.1  Explanations for some special problems 
External sources of China's  troubles 
As I pointed out earlier, Chinese economy up until the late 1970s worked 
adequately in  terms of the economic growth speed. But this  had not 
saved  it  from  trouble  resulting  from  other  severe  problems  in  the 
economy. Why  did those difficulties occur, or were they aggravated, in 
the late 1970s? Were there special events  that might cause these results? 
Reviewing China's economic history since late 1940s, one could pick up 
at least two factors that negatively aggravated economic situation in the 
late 1970s. 
The first one was found in the over-fast growth of population. China was 
an over-populated country in  the  world even in  1949 when the total 
population was already more than half a billion. However, according to Chapter 3  51 
Mao Zedong and his allies, a large population was an advantage for the 
country.  It was believed that the  more  people, the  more powerful  the 
communist country. Thus any idea of population control was criticised 
and forbidden. And no measure had been taken along this line until the 
mid-1970s. As a result, the growth rate of population retained at over 2 
percent annually,  and  sometimes  it  went  up  to  3  percent every year. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that in  1966 China's population went up 
to 0.745 billion, and in  1978 the figure rose to about one billion. Within 
less than 30 years the population doubled on the  basis of half a billion 
(State Bureau of Statistics, 1990). 
The huge burden of population on the economy seemed too heavy to be 
borne by the country where the level of economic development was still 
very  low,  despite  high  growth  rates.  The  over-fast  increase  of the 
population made the heroic records of overall economic growth inferior 
when measured  in terms of per capita. The stagnation and decline on 
living standard was partly the result. 
Moreover,  the  difficulty  in  employment in  the  late  1970s,  to a  large 
extent, should be attributed to  the consequences of over-fast growth of 
population,  too.  It  was true  that  the  sudden  increase of unemployed 
population in the late 1970s was primarily caused directly by the rapid 
return of the young educated people from the countryside. However, this 
movement  was  nothing  more  than  the  exposure  of  a  longstanding 
problem. Why were hundreds of thousands of the urban educated young 
graduates  sent to countryside during the  'Cultural Revolution'? Besides 
the political consideration"',  to  reduce  the  pressure of employment in 
cities was also a key concern. Since the industries could accept only a 
small share of the school graduates every year,  the  majority of them 
• Mao Zedong believed that workers and peasants are more revolutionary than the 
intellectuals. Therefore, he thought it necessary for the young educated people to be re-
educated in the countryside by working together with the peasants. Chapter 3  52 
could either become peasants, or stay in the cities as unemployed. But the 
latter choice was not allowed officially. So the problem was disguised by 
reducing urban population and postponing it for a few years later. 
Another important factor in  explaining  the  severity of economic and 
social problems was the influence of ten years of 'Cultural Revolution'. 
It was inaccurate to say that  those  imperative problems in the  Chinese 
economy and society were caused directly by the  'Cultural Revolution'. 
But the political movement must be blamed for worsening the situation. 
In  the  first  instance,  the  large  scale  mass  movement  destroyed  the 
necessary  order  for  efficient  and  proper  working  of  the  economic 
mechanisms.  For instance,  in  the  early years of the  "revolution", the 
economy ceased  growing but declined,  because production was often 
stopped or interrupted in order to  allow people to participate in  political 
meetings and demonstrations. The consequence of political pounding on 
an administrative  economy certainly must be serious. 
The more harm the ten years' revolution did on the economy lay also in 
its encouraging, by  political need,  the  traditional strategy of economic 
development which distorted the rational structures of the economy and 
led the economy into a vicious circle.  Needless to say,  unemployment 
was partly the result of the revolution, too. 
Exo~enous  factors of Soviet problems 
When people, both Soviet economists and  Western  observers, tried to 
discover the factors undermining economic growth in the Soviet Union, 
the immediate and definite candidate was the shortage of newly supplied 
natural resources inputs starting from  the  late  1970s. In the past, Soviet 
economic growth  realised  itself  relying,  to  a considerable extent,  on Chapter 3  53 
significant  Increase  of  natural  resources,  materials,  and  labour  etc. 
Taking a typical postwar five-year period as  an  example, e.g.  1970-75, 
in these five years, the extraction of fuel  and  raw materials grew by 25-
30 percent, and a funher 10-11  million people were recruited. However, 
this scale of increase of resources supply ceased after the mid-1970s due 
to natural or historical reasons. For example, growth rates of production 
of fuels and raw materials declined sharply,  from 25  percent in  1971-75 
to 10  percent in  1976-80 and  7  percent in  1981-85. The same pattern 
appeared  in  supply  of  labour  force.  In  1971-75  growth  rate  of 
employment in  production sphere was  6 percent,  in  1976-80, 4 percent 
and in 1981-85, 2% percent( Aganbegyan, 1988). 
The decline  in  growth  of extraction  of  fuels  and  raw  materials  was 
mainly connected with the worsening geological and economic conditions 
in mining. The most accessible natural  resources were not in sufficient 
supply to meet the requirements of demand, and in  many of these kind of 
regions the volume of extraction slid down. So,  it was necessary to dig 
for deposits in Siberia and to discover new deposits in the Northern and 
Eastern regions where the cost of production was unavoidably rising ( 
Joint Committee of Congress, 1982). 
The reason for reduction on labour supply growth seemed simple. As a 
matter of fact,  from  1981-85, the Soviet Union entered a demographic 
slump which directly reflected the consequences of World War Two. The 
number of children born  during  the  war,  and  the  next generation of 
those children  who were just at  working  age  in  the  late  1970s,  was 
smaller than any other generation ( Aganbegyan, 1988). 
Of course, shortage of resources supply, either in fuel and raw materials 
or in labour force, could not be completely separated from the factors of 
economic system  in terms of its efficient use  in  production. The deeper Chapter 3  54 
roots of the problems were to be discussed later. 
The military burden on the Soviet economy seemed to  be  another non-
systemic factor in affecting economic growth. The defence sector was 
the one that benefited most from  the Soviet-type economy. But it could 
contribute very little to  the civilian economy. It became more and more 
a  burden,  and  played  some  part  in  the  slow  economic growth rates. 
Even the lowest estimates showed that  a large share of resources was 
devoted  to  military  purposes
5
.  This  would  undoubtedly  weaken  the 
capability  for  economic  growth  and  improving  or  solving  the 
longstanding problems in  the economy.  Retaining a relatively stronger 
defence  sector seemed  to  have  no  direct  relation  with  the  centrally 
planned economy. 
Apart  from  the  factors  mentioned  above  for  the  Soviet  economIC 
difficulties, there was one more factor that should not be  neglected. The 
Soviet Union had to take care of its CMEA countries by supplying cheap 
raw materials and other economic aids. This could have aggravated its 
own difficulties, too. 
To conclude, the sources of the outstanding problems in China's economy 
in the  late  1970s, one should say  that some external or non-systemic 
factors played an important part in explaining some difficulties, such as 
unemployment and the stagnation and deterioration of people's living 
standard. Nevertheless, the major problems in  China's economy in the 
period under discussion had something to  do with the centrally planned 
economy instead of casual factors.  Exogenous sources might aggravate 
the  situation,  but  they  could  not  on  their  own  cause  those  serious 
problems  in  the  economy.  Even  the  so-called  exogenous  factors 
3 There was no exact figure of how much of GNP that was spent on military 
expenditures. A 25% estimate was thought reasonable by Prof. A.Nove when the author 
discussed this issue with him. Chaoter3  55 
themselves  might  be  created  in  the  land  of  the  centrally  planned 
economy. At least the centrally planned economy provided the stage for 
those actors. 
The Soviet case seemed convincingly  to  prove the  argument that the 
majority of the  imperative problems  in  the  Soviet economy had  been 
caused by the economic system,  as one could not find out more than few 
causes to blame without referring to the planning system. 
3.2.2  Root causes of the major problems 
Economic growth rates 
Economic growth rates had been the most important goal of planners in 
centrally planned economy.  It  was  in  this  field  that  the  heroic records 
had been made in  both China's and Soviet economy.  As  a result, it had 
been  suggested  that  the  centrally  planned  economy  was  superior in 
promoting a rapid economic growth to the potential limit, which made 
the market economy too inferior to  bear a comparison ( Hewett, 1988). 
Many factors which contributed to  rapid growth rates in a Soviet-type 
economy could not be found  in  a West  market economy.  For example, 
the government was more continuosly interested in the tiniest details of 
economic efficiency than any other government. Given an equal volume 
of investment in a Soviet-type economy and  a  West  market economy 
country,  much  more  funds  were  directed  towards  uses  that promoted 
further  economic  growth  in  the  former  case  (Wiles,  1964).  The 
achievements in this respect by the Soviet Union up to the mid-1960s and 
by China  up  to  the  late  1970s  proved  the  assumption.  However,  the 
empirical studies on economic growth rates in later periods in the Soviet 
Union, i.e. after the mid-1960s, cast doubt on the full conviction of the 
assumption.  The comparison  between  the  Chinese  and  Soviet cases 
supported  the  doubt.  A  revision  on  the  assumption  was  necessary, Chapter 3  56 
because it  was  only true  conditionally.  That  is,  the  miracle  of rapid 
growth  rates  performed  by  the  centrally  planned  economy could  be 
sustained only in a certain period and  by extensive means  ( Goldman 
1983). To  be  exact,  it was only  in  the early stages when the planned 
economy started to work could it  mobilise  all  the potential possibilities 
to reach ever high growth rates  of the  economy at  any cost. As  it was 
correctly  pointed  out,  "  a  nation's  reserves  have  all  been  mobilized 
"(Wiles,  1977). In  addition,  the  possible miracle also depended on the 
conditions of endowment of economic  resources  in  the  country under 
which  the  centralised  planning  system  could  play  its  full  part.  The 
difficulty faced  by  the  Soviet  economy  in  the  mid-1980s  in  getting 
sufficient  supply  of  resources,  e.g.  raw  materials,  fuel  and  labour, 
contributed to a large extent to  the severe situation of economic growth. 
The planned  economy failed  in  sustaining  a  reasonably  high  rate  of 
growth because it  failed  to  expand the economy in  an intensive way ( 
Schroeder, 1986). 
Agriculture 
The experiences in  agricultural  production  in  the  Chinese and Soviet 
economies made it crystal clear that this sector had got no benefit from 
the  centralised planning system,  either in  the  early stages or in  late 
periods. In turn, both China's and Soviet economy was troubled greatly 
by the  underdevelopment of agriculture.  The situation in  China was 
more severe  because the starting level of agricultural production for 
further development technically had been low under the circumstances of 
its huge population. This conclusion made it convincing to argue that the 
centrally planned economy failed to promote reasonable development in 
agriculture which made that sector underdeveloped compared with other 
sectors in the economy (Nove, 1986a). 
It seemed that the advantages of the centralised planning system could not Chaoter3  57 
be  taken properly in organising agricultural production as it was in non-
agricultural sectors in  the  two  economies. The following  are  the  main 
reasons.  First of all,  as  far  as  the  natural  conditions for agricultural 
production were concerned, they did  not provide much possibility for a 
central planning system to  achieve what it  could in  other fields  of the 
economy, for example, the rapid growth rates in  industry. Because there 
were fewer  unused  resources  which  could  be  mobilised  to realise  an 
extra high rate of growth in  agricultural production. China was rich in 
labour force  but the cultivable land  was  in  short supply.  In  the Soviet 
Union, the contrary was the case: surplus cultivable land but shortage of 
labour since  more  and  more  peasants  left  for  the  cities.  Therefore, 
agriculture by its nature was not the ideal stage for the centrally planned 
economy to play its  full  role.  wloreover,  this type of economic system 
only made  things worse  in  agricultural  production  (Wiles,  1977). The 
way in which the agricultural production was organised in China and the 
Soviet Union was principally the same: collectivisation and centralised 
management. The outcome seemed against what had been expected by the 
planners who firmly believed that collective farm and planned direction 
would  bring  about  a  faster  growth  in  agriculture  than  ever before. 
Unfortunately,  the results did  not verify the  assumption. From our two 
cases, it seemed that agriculture was not the  proper place to implement 
central planning management due  to  the  characteristics of production 
which were quite different from  industry. To direct production of every 
village, commune or collective farm  under various working conditions 
correctly and promptly was beyond the planners' capability in both our 
cases. Sometimes such strict control resulted in damage and made things 
even worse. This was described by Nove as the poor planability of the 
central planning system( Nove 1986c). 
The failure of the  planning system  in  agriculture was attributable not 
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non-individual ownership of production  means.  The collectivisation in 
agriculture had been done mainly by  compulsory or violent ways in the 
two countries, although the process was  not exactly the same in each. 
Peasants showed little enthusiasm on working in the public field. 
Agriculture  was  supposed  to  play  a  very  significant role  in  national 
economic development as a source for primitive capital accumulation for 
industrialisation  in  a  centrally  planned  economy,  where  some  other 
sources like foreign investment was  in  short supply or unavailable. So, it 
was not supprising that planners always attempted to get more and more 
surplus from agriculture by every possible means, such as unfair scissors 
prices  in  exchange of agricultural  products  and  manufactured goods, 
over-high rates of taxation etc.  Collectivisation and planned control of 
agricultural production  served  this  purpose too.  In  the Soviet Union 
planners went further in  this direction, especially in  its early stages of 
industrialisation, than in China. Such a status for agriculture in a planned 
economy determined the attitudes of the planners towards this sector. No 
priority was given to it,  unless  it  was exploited too  much to retain a 
survival  growth.  However,  due  to  the  problem  of  planability  in 
agriculture, the situation could not be  much improved even when it was 
given the policy priority for investment  after Stalin's time.
6 
All those factors above, together with mismanagement in this sector, left 
little room for agriculture to develop itself normally, if at all. 
Productivity 
Economic efficiency was one of the most important concepts which must 
be discussed in the analysis of any economic system. Because it was not 
easy, if not impossible, to formulate an  accurate quantitative measure to 
evaluate  the  efficiency  of production,  productivity  turned  to  be  an 
• This was  especially stressed by Prof. A.  Nove when discussed with the present 
author on this issue. Cbapter3  S9 
acceptable  and  common  criteria  among  economists  for  indicating 
technical efficiency in  the  use of productive resources  ( Bergerson & 
Levine, 1983). According  to  socialist economic theory, central planning 
and public  ( non-individual)  ownership could provide more possibility 
for growth of productivity. Because the capacity of production can be 
fully  used  without  limitations  in  the  market  economy,  for  instance, 
leaving some of the productive capacity aside due to  recession or other 
difficulties for selling goods on the market. This assumption was agreed 
among some Western observers  as  well  on  the  ground that,  since the 
overwhelming goal of a Soviet-type economy was to grow the economy 
as fast as  possible in  a  relative short  period,  the  existing capacity of 
production thus must be put into full  use or over-used under tight plans( 
Nove, 1986a}. Moreover. the advanced technologies would be taken into 
the production process without difficulty  if  planners decided to,  since 
there was no secrecy and consideration of cost which was necessary to be 
taken into account in this type of economy like in any market economy. 
However, the reality showed a different picture in both  economies. The 
data gave such a contrary answer that a centrally planned economy has 
not proved efficient at  improving the technical efficiency of production. 
The economic waste in  a  planned economy was  unbelievably huge  ( 
Tiusanen, 1991). As Wiles put it,  ..  the STE (Soviet-type economy} .. .is a 
better mobilizer than user.  The input volume index grows more rapidly 
than  elsewhere;  but  the  FPR  (Factor  productivity  residual)  is  not 
remarkable"  (Wiles,  1977). This could explain partly the stagnation of 
the population's iving standard in China, as discussed earlier, apart from 
the over-fast growth of the population. Because reduced growth rate of 
productivity hindered economic growth. The crucial issue lay mainly in 
the nature of enterprises and the planability for allocation efficiency. The 
mechanisms working behind the productivity growth was more or less 
similar in the two economies. despite different backgrounds in the length Chaoter 3  60 
of the centrally planned system and other factors. Panel 3-2-1  may help 
us to  summarise briefly the systemic factors that affect the improvement 
of productive efficiency in  enterprises
7
•  The planability of centralised 
planning system was  discussed  in  a  later section when the  technical 
preconditions for planning control was dealt with. 
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If the final outcomes of productivity growth were against the planners' 
expectations, then the disproportion of the economic structures in the 
, For detailed discussion on this issue, there are a number of references, e.g., 
Winiecki, 1988; Kornai, 1992; Gregory & Struart, 1986. CbaDter3  61 
centrally planned economy should be  considered as  the deliberate work 
of the planners. Both of our cases suggested this assumption. 
It is  interesting to  note that  in  any  textbook on socialist economics, a 
planned and proportionate development of the economy was described as 
one of basic principles and  main characteristics of the planned economy. 
Because, it was said that only by planning could the economy achieve an 
ideal state. But, as  a matter of fact,  planners neglected this principle by 
selecting few  sectors as  priorities  in  making the  national plans. These 
sectors were guaranteed a faster growth than others through privileges 
given to them in  getting investment and  other productive resources. In 
both  economies, the  pliority  sectors were  heavy industry versus light 
industry;  manufacturing  branch  versus  mining;  industry  versus  non-
industrial sectors. As a result, the  whole  economy had been developing 
in an unbalanced way with the planners' preferences concentration on a 
few privileged  sectors. 
The distorted structure of the centrally planned economies was a built-in 
bias in the system as required  by  the  extensive growth of the economy 
(Winiecki,  1988).  However,  the  cost  had  to  be  finally  paid. 
Disproportion of economic structures became one of the main factors 
handicapping the smooth and rapid growth of the economy in the  Soviet 
Union after the  mid-1970s,  if  not  earlier.  While in China the disease 
came  relatively  earlier  in  the  period  of  its  planned  economy  and 
threatened a further growth of the economy. This was because the legacy 
of the pre-communist economy was not so strong  in China for it to bear 
the  discrimination of the non-industrial sectors by supporting the rapid 
growth of the national economy with less investment and improvement, 
especially in  agriculture.  The problem  expressed  itself and gave the 
alann to the society through the stagnation and deterioration of people's 
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increased  the  significance  of  those  lesser  privileged  sectors  on  the 
planners'  list,  and  made for  earlier recognition of the  disproportion 
problem in the country than in the Soviet economy. 
Consumption 
The earlier study on the  consumption sector in  the  Chinese and Soviet 
economies proved the well-known argument that in a centrally planned 
economy consumption  was  treated  as  the  last  one  on the  planners' 
priority  list.  The  standard  of consumption,  both  the  collective  and 
private consumption, was always kept at the minimum level, if possible, 
in the early period. And difficulties in  consuming were not solved even 
when more income was distributed  to  people. Repressed inflation and 
shortage in CPEs greatly affected  the  improvement of people's living 
standard through consumption ( Komai, 1992;  Winiecki, 1988). 
Consumption had been a longstanding problem in China and the Soviet 
Union. It was not only a problem of a smaller share of consumption in 
distribution of national income which mainly occurred in the early stages 
of the economy. The nature of the problem was found in the shortage of 
consumers' goods and services, as  well. Production of consumer goods 
was obviously sacrificed owing to  the stress on production of producer 
goods in order to seek  high growth rates for the economy. In the  early 
stages of  unbalanced development in  the  planned economy,  planners 
carried out their policy through pressing the share of consumption to a 
minimal low level. People had  to  get the food and other necessities by 
ration because these items were  in short supply.  They were told they 
must suffer at  present in  order to  be  better-off in future.  When the 
'future' came, when people got increased income, which was a policy 
designed for incentive purposes in the Soviet economy, they still found it 
difficult to enjoy more consumption under the circumstances of shortage 
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The consumption phenomena in the two countries, in the Soviet Union in 
particular,  posed  two  questions.  First,  if the  increase of income was 
accompanied by  increase of labour productivity and final  goods, why 
could the goods  not be  got in  the  market?  Second, if the prerequisite 
for increase of income was not true, how could it be the case? 
From the analysis of the nature of state-owned enterprises in a centrally 
planned economy, it was not difficult to get such an impression that what 
concerned the managers most was  to  fulfil, or overfulfil, plan targets in 
volume terms so that extra income as  the  reward could be obtained, no 
matter whether or not  the  products were of fine  quality or of a proper 
category to be sold on the market. Thus, when the awards were given, a 
number of final goods could only stay in the warehouses. 
On the other hand, increase of income could be realised at a faster speed 
than that of  the growth of labour productivity in a planned economy. On 
the one hand, the decision to  raise disposable income would be made on 
the ground of false information about the growth of labour productivity 
in  the  same  period,  or  without  this  sort  of  consideration  when  the 
planners  thought  it  necessary.  Everything  would  be  possible  just 
depending on the planners'  orders,  not on anything else. Then again, 
when  the  managers  were given  more  decision-making  power in this 
respect, they usually intended to  raise wages of the staff for incentive 
purposes. 
Technical issues for planning control 
When we discussed the systemic factors which were responsible for the 
problems in the two economies, the noncompletion or poor performance 
of the planning control system must not escape  blame. It was not unfair 
to say so in relation  to  the  consequences  brought by the  incomplete 
planning control in  the  two  economies.  However,  if  one  explored the Cbaoter3 
causes of such inefficient workings of the  system,  the charges on the 
system itself seemed  unfair.  On  many  occasions,  planners  could  do 
nothing because of the insufficient equipments provided for their jobs. It 
was  needless  to  poi.nt  our  the  fact  that  centrally  planned  economy 
required technically advanced equipments and instruments in making and 
implementing  plans.  An  efficient  communication  network  and 
mechanisms for getting  correct  information  from  the  periphery were 
also very essential. 
The technical preconditions for proper planning work existed in at least 
the following requirements. The first and basic one was that the adequate 
and efficient equipment must be used by all planning organisations within 
the system so that the frequent and  serious delays and errors could be 
avoided. The larger the scale of message volume planners had to deal 
with,  the  shorter the  time  allowed  for  finishing  the  work,  the  more 
advanced technical  equipment which  must  be  employed. The second 
requirement for competent control by planning was the communication 
net throughout the economy.  Last but  not  least,  correct and  accurate 
information  message  to  the  central  planners  was  crucial  for  proper 
working of planning system. This required not only physical conditions, 
though in China and the Soviet Union such factors troubled the efficient 
operation of the  planning system.  What was  more important was the 
motivation  of  the  periphery  organisations  to  provide  the  correct 
information.  Or,  in other words,  the central planning authorities must 
be, by any means,  guaranteed to receive the correct information they 
needed for their job. 
3.3  Reforming efforts in  the  past 
For the  mam  purpose  of the  subject  of  the  present  paper,  i.e.  the 
proposals for economic reforms in  China and the Soviet Union in the Cbarter3  65 
relevant periods,  what concerned  us  here is,  up  to  the late  1970s what 
had been tried or carried out in  order to  improve the performances of 
the centrally planned economies,  not  only  confined  to  China  and  the 
Soviet Union  but  also  in  the  other socialist economies  like  the  East 
European countries.  It was  obvious that  reform  efforts  in the  past in 
either the Chinese or the former Soviet economy had failed to achieve 
their aims. This was why those longstanding problems discussed earlier 
in this  chapter were  still  there,  and  new  reform  was  necessary in  the 
1980s and 1990s. However,  it  was not the subject of this thesis to analyse 
why and  how  the  previous  reform  efforts  did  not  sucess.  What was 
concerned here was what had been tried  in  the past in order to see any 
progress in the newly launched reforms. 
3.3.1  Reforming attempts before 1978 in China 
In the relative short history of the centrally planned economy in China, 
reforming or adjustment attempts had actually never stopped. In as early 
as  the  late  1950s, when the  new  planning system was established for 
about one five-year plan  period,  the  disadvantages of over-centralised 
decision-making  power at  the  centre  was  conceived.  In  1957  some 
official documents
S  were adopted for decentralisation of the decision-
making power from the centre down to  local authorities and enterprises. 
These  proposals  were  implemented  from  1958  on  which  could  be 
perceived as the first wave of an administration-decentralisation-oriented 
reform in China.  Local  authorities were endorsed with more decision-
making powers in their regions for things such as planning, investment, 
fiscal and taxation, and labour allocation. They also took over a number 
of  large  state-owned  enterprises  which  used  to  be  under  direct 
supervision of the ministries,  though  they were still subject to  plans. 
Central planning control on enterprises production was loosened through 
a In October, 1957, three drafts of reforming the systems of industrial management, 
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allowing  more  autonomous  righrs  to  enrerprise.  Plan  indicators were 
reduced in  number.  The enterprises could  share the  profit they made 
with the State, and they were given some rights to decide on personnel 
affairs in such undertakings. 
But, the reformed state didn't last long. In the early 1960s when Chinese 
economy encountered a severe time, partly due to poor harvests in 1959 
and 1960, a measure of  recentralisation took place. The central control 
of large industrial enterprises which were  under the supervision of the 
local  authorities  was  restored.  At  the  meantime  planned  control  in 
agriculture  and  rural  area  was  largely  relaxed  due  to  the  severe 
reduction of growth in agricultural  production. The way of organising 
production  was  changed  from  collective  management  to  household 
contrace  and  private  plots  were  allowed  for  the  peasant  families. 
Furthermore, prices of stare  procurement of agricultural products were 
raised and tax levies on rural  business  reduced. In industries, material 
incentives were stressed for  promoting higher labour productivity.  All 
these measures contributed to recovering economic growth and the living 
standard  from  the  difficult  early  1960s(Brugger,1981). However,  all 
these  measures were  not  taken  as  the  ones of economic reform.  As 
mentioned  above,  they  were  considered  officially  as  the  short-term 
methods to cope with difficulties in the economy. 
The second wave of official reform effort occurred in the late 1960s. 
During 1966-76, the ten years  'Cultural Revolution', economic reform 
became  a  political  matter.  Decentralisation  of the  decision-making 
powers from the centre to  loca  I  governments was repeated. But there 
was no careful design and  plan for this reform. It was mainly the result 
of a political movement in the country where the central agencies were 
knocked down( Zhou, 1984). 
• The household contract at that time became the original fonn in the newly launched 
refonn in late 1970s which was discussed in due course in this thesis. Chapter 3  67 
It  seemed safe  to say  that  there  had  been  no  well-prepared economic 
reform on the  planning system in  China, except repeated redistribution 
of the authorities between the centre and the local agencies now and then. 
But the experience in rural reform in  the early 1960s played some part 
in the history which was followed  in  the  newly launched reform under 
our discussion. 
3.3.2  Economic reforms before  1985  in  the Soviet Union. 
In the Soviet Union, there was more to  be discussed than in China's case 
as the situation was different. Here the brief analysis was limited to the 
post-war period after Stalin. In  this  period two large scale reforms on 
the centrally planned  economy  took  place.  They were  Khrushchev's 
reform and Kosygin's reform under Brezhnev. 
Khrushchev's  reform  had  been summarised  as  a  kind  of sovnarkhoz
1o 
reform since its focus was put on reorganisation of the administrative 
agencies from ministries to territorial production administrations for the 
purpose  of  improving  the  efficiency of  management by planning 
control. However, much had been tried in  the  agricultural sector in this 
round of reform.  The essence of the  measures  in  agriculture was in 
increasing  prices  for  state  procurement,  allowing  and  encouraging 
private  plots  for  peasants  and  increasing  inputs  and  investments. 
Kolkhozes were given more freedom to make decisions ( Nove, 1986b). 
The  most  influential  economic  reform  in  the  Soviet  Union  before 
Gorbachev's era was launched in  Brezhnev's regime in the mid-1960s--
the  1965  Kosygin reform. Relatively speaking,  it  was a well-prepared 
reform. Some substantial proposals were put forward during this round 
of reform. The major points intended could be summed up as  follows. 
16 In Russian, Sovnarkhoz means territorial administration organisation. Chapter 3  68 
Firstly,  it  restored  the  central  (Moscow)  control  of the  economy by 
dismantling the territorial organisations. Ministries were re-established ( 
Nove,  1986b). The focus  of Kosygin's  reform  was  put on improving 
economic efficiency in the country.  The  performance indicators of the 
enterprises were reduced in  number and revised in content to give more 
managerial  powers for decision-making
ll
.  Another  major step  in  the 
1965 reform was on the charge of fixed  assets of the enterprises at the 
average rate of 6 percent for more efficient use  (Nove, 1986b). 
In the early 1980s, before Gorbachev took  power, economic reform in 
the Soviet Union seemed to be declining from the tide of the mid-1960s. 
But the contribution of Andropov in determinedly calling for changes in 
the  traditional  economic  system  should  not  be  ignored,  though  no 
substantial proposals took place in  his very short period. 
In summary, the centrally planned system in China and the Soviet Union 
have been more or less modified from  the original type. But the nature 
and basics of the system remained  intact.  In  both countries there had 
been no  attempt for a  departure  from  the  essentials of the  centrally 
planned economy. 
3.3.3  Experiences of East European countries up to the late 1970s !2 
East European countries!J  shared the same type of economic system with 
the Soviet Union and China up  to late  1980s. But they felt much earlier 
on the difficulties endemic to  the centrally planned economy than the 
it The remained indicators set by central planning authorities were, the volume of 
goods to be sold; the main assortment of goods; the wage fund; the amount of profits 
and level of profitableness; payment into the state budget and allocations from the state 
budget (Kosygin, 1965). 
12  This section was based on the works of Adam  (1989), Bornstein (1977), and 
Kaser (1986). 
13 For conventional purpose, Yugoslavia is included in this group of countries here, 
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Soviet Union and  China. This  was  because these  small but developed 
countries could not sustain the extensive growth for a long term. In fact, 
the great achievement and experiences in reforming the centrally planned 
economies  were realised in  groups of these countries like Yugoslavia, 
Poland,  Hungary  and  others.  For  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  it  was 
necessary to cover briefly  what had  been attempted in this field in order 
to assess the processes in  China and the Soviet Union under the primary 
discussion. 
To  a  large  extent,  reform  ideas  and  efforts  in  centrally  planned 
economies had been attempted as  the ones of decentralising the decision-
making structure. In most cases, decentralisation, both administrative and 
economic,  was  the  essential  content  of  economic  reforms  in  East 
European countries.  For example,  decision-making  powers of central 
ministries and  planning agencies  were  weakened. Some of them were 
transferred down to lower authorities, associations , for example, or to 
enterprises.  Administrative  reorganisation  occurred  as  the  result  of 
decentralisation in  many East European countries. Reducing centrally set 
output  plans,  or abolishing  them,  was  the  common  action taken  by 
reformers. Enterprises were normally given more autonomous rights in 
various aspects of business. 
With decentralisation of decision-making power from the centre to the 
intermediate and periphery, the  information flow direction changed at 
the meantime. More messages went in a horizontal way, for instance, the 
contacts between enterprises increased. What was more relevant was the 
tendency  of  reforming  efforts  towards  marketisation.  Two  primary 
achievements in this field were outstanding. One was the mechanism for 
setting  prices.  The  other one  was  the  method  for  allocating  input 
resources. In some  countries like Hungary,  prices for some consumers' 
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the market and fluctuated according to the demand situation. As to the 
distribution  of  material  inputs,  some  radical  measures  called  for 
eliminating administrative allocation by planning quota and introducing 
contracts between suppliers and customers in  a market framework. 
As  far  as  ownership  was  concerned,  smaIl  sized  private  business  In 
certain and  limited sectors  of [he  economy was  permitted,  mainly in 
service and handicraft. :'Io subsrantial attempt was conducted on changing 
the non-individual ownership of the state sector. 
In agriculture,  reform  went  further  than  in  other sectors.  In Poland, 
decollectivisation took place in [he  1950s. 
Generally  speaking,  economic  reforms  10  East  European  countries 
started earlier and went deeper than China and the Soviet Union. But 
practical progress in changing the traditional economic system in those 
countries was much less than the paper plans, many of which could not 
be implemented for political reasons. In summary, the reforming efforts 
in centrally planned economies before 1980s had never gone beyond the 
moderate  adjustment in  the  sense  that  no  attempt  had  been made  to 
transform the planned economy into a non-planned economy. This was 
especially true in the case of our two economies. 
3.4  Political  background 
This thesis was, as pointed out in the introduction(Chapter One), focused 
on the economic proposals for transformation of the planned economies 
of China and the Soviet Union. However,  as is well known, any decision 
on economic  reform  in  these  countries,  the  large  scale  and  radical 
reforms in particular, could never be separated from political and social 
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party  dictated  the  SOcIety,  non-economIC  factors  played  crucial, 
sometimes decisive, roles in  the  decisions about an  economic reform, 
e.g.  what  direction  would  the  reform  go  and  how  to  carry  out the 
reform  and  so  on.  To  be  specific,  discussions  on  reform  affairs  had 
never been the pure academic  matter for economists in  China and the 
Soviet Union. It was rather a political matter decided at the top level of 
the leadership. Apart from this,  social environment and the attitudes of 
the people also influenced the  process of the  reform by  promoting or 
obstructing  it.  So  it  was  necessary  to  introduce  briefly  the  political 
background against which the economic reforms were discussed in the 
two  countries  for  a  sound  understanding  of  the  process  of  the 
transformation.  Because  the  attitude  and  determination  of  the  top 
leadership of the Party and government towards economic reform in the 
two countries was of significance. 
It was interesting to note that China's radical reform was initiated almost 
immediately  after  the  official  announcement  ending  the  "Cultural 
Revolution" which came to its end on the death of  Mao Zedong. In the 
Soviet Union M.  Gorbachev took power shortly after the long Brezhnev 
regime. Under the old long time regime, the ignorance of the severity of 
the economic problems,  the  inertia  and  reluctance  in  taking effective 
reforming  actions,  or more  relevant,  the  ideological  constraints etc. 
obstructed and postponed the necessary reforms. Once such a regime was 
brought to an end by the death of the top leaders, the chance was born 
for any possible and positive change in the economy and society (Kornai, 
1992). Fortunately, the chances were taken promptly in the two countries 
by the leaderships of Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev. 
To launch and lead the radical reform surviving through the process, the 
powers of reformers played a critical part. The posts the reformers held 
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hierarchical  society  were  crucial  to  guarantee  the  working  out  and 
implementation of radical reform  proposals. It was only authorised by 
the top leadership of the Party and  government that any proposal could 
become decree  and  official  policy  for  being followed  in  the  planned 
economy.  Furthermore,  reformers  must  be  able  to  overcome all  forces 
from  the  opposite side  against  the  radical  reform.  On these occasions 
personal power mattered.  In  our case,  it  seemed that Deng Xiaoping, --
the paramount leader in  China without proper status or any official title 
from  the  late  1980s,  -- was  more  able  to exercise  decisive  personal 
influence  on  the  process  of  the  economic  reform  in  China  than 
Gorbachev in  his  country.  This was  because in  the  Soviet Union, the 
People's Congress played more and  more part in  the political life of the 
country.  Gorbachev therefore  had  to  move  this  mountain,  in the  first 
instance, to approve and pass any practical reform legislation. 
The strong motive of the reformers in  China and the Soviet Union was 
also generated from the longstanding ambition of the communist leaders 
to catch up with the advanced capitalist economies and strengthen their 
own countries as  the  world great powers in  political,  economical and 
military  affairs.  In  the  Soviet  Union  the  dream  was  realised  only 
partially in some of the  defence fields,  while the economic power was 
still lagging far behind  its  competitors.  In  the  mid-1980s even those 
advances  gained were  in  danger of being  lost due  to poor results  in 
economic growth (Joint Economic Committee, 1982). In China, things 
had  been far  less  satisfactory,  if  one  was  reminded  of the  ambition 
expressed by the slogans such as  .. surpass United Kingdom and catch up 
with the United States within 15  years!" put forward in the late 1950s. 
The Chinese and Soviet leaders were very sensitive to the results of the 
relevant comparisons of economic indicators, e.g. those between China 
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Political struggles between the  reformers and conservatives{ the left)  at 
the top and below could be reflected from the process of the discussions 
about the economic reforms, as  one might find out in  the context of our 
further analysis. Cbanter4  74 
Chapter  4:  Prescriptions For China's  Economy,  1978--1992 
The period from  the late  1970s onwards witnessed some of the  greatest 
historical changes, primarily economical, though political as well, since the 
communist  revolution  of  1949.  In  1976  Mao  Zedong,  until  then  the 
paramount leader of China, died. Shortly afterwards, his wife, Jiang Qing, 
and  the  other  members  of  the  "Gang  of  Four"  were  arrested.  Deng 
Xiaoping  immediately returned  to  political  life.  Although it took  some 
years for him to assume the top position in the Chinese leadership, he and 
his supporters began to  implement their reformist economic programme. 
At the end of 1978 during the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of 
the 11th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping 
made  a  speech  about  the  urgent  necessity  of reforming  the  existing 
centrally planned economic system (The State Committee for Reform of 
the  Economic System,  1988b). During the discussion it was pointed out 
that the existing system over-concentrated national decision-making powers 
at  the  centre,  which  resulted  in  inefficiency  in  the  economy.  Policy 
adjustment and  reform in agriculture in particular were discussed. From 
that time  on,  a series of reform  proposals were  put on the  agenda for 
discussion and implementation by the Party and the government. 
During the  1980s Chinese reformers called repeatedly for reductions in 
administrative  interventions  in the  economy,  for  greater  reliance  on 
economic "levers", for the decentralisation of economic decision-making, 
and for an increased role for market forces.  At the same time there were 
debates between moderate  and  radical  reformers.  The moderate  school 
led by Chen Yun advocated that China should move towards a system where 
a  "planned economy is  primary,  and  markets  are  supplementary"  (lihua 
lingji Wei Zhu,  Shichang Tiaojie Wei Fu)  (Beijing Review,  1985). Others Chapter 4  75 
proposed that China should move beyond  the moderate's vision to a system 
where, in fact if not in name,  the economy would be  regulated primarily 
by market forces. Official decisions were always compromises between the 
two groups. The aim of reform in general was  "to transform the function 
of the  state planning organs,  gradually reduce  mandatory planning and 
expand  guidance  planning,"  and" to  use  economic  instruments,  and 
gradually establish a new economic mechanism where the state regulates 
markets,  and  markets  guide  enterprises  "  (  guojia  tiaojie shichang, 
shichang yindao qiye.)  ( Wu Jinglian, 1988). Generally speaking, Chinese 
economic reform has  been a process of gradual progress from  moderate 
adjustment of the  centralised planning system to  radical  transformation 
towards a market-oriented economy with socialist characteristics, which 
will be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
The process of reform in China since 1978 can be viewed as taking place in 
four  stages  in  the  sense  that  packages of proposals  were presented  in 
various  mixes  of  moderate  and  radical  reform.  The  initial  period, 
i.e.,1978-84, witnessed proposals biased towards primarily sectoral issues. 
In  1985-89  a  larger  scale  discussion  on  economic  reform  produced 
proposals for comprehensive initiatives to alter systematically the planned 
economy as a whole. After the events of Tiananmen Square in June 1989, 
economic reform came to a standstill for  about two years. Until 1991 little 
discussion took place on continuing the  plans made in the years before 
1989, let alone suggesting further reform. It was only from late 1991  that 
the voice of the reformers began to be heard again in public. Of all the 
statements made,  Deng Xiaoping's speech while inspecting Guangdong 
Province and especially Shenzhen was the most significant in revitalising 
radical economic reform in the country. 1992 saw a gradual advance by the 
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Of course,  economic  reform  in  China  from  the  late  1970s to  the  early 
1990s was played out against a  changing political and social background 
(Burton,  1990).The general political situation was stable,  apart from  the 
events of Tiananmen Square (Chan, 1991). Nevertheless, behind the scenes 
there were power struggles and important personnel changes within the top 
leadership of the CCP and of the government, even before lIme 1989. And 
it was into the Winter of 1991-92 before the political situation at the top 
was sufficiently resolved for economic  reform to  regain its  momentum, 
signalled by Deng Xiaoping's inspection tour of Southern China. 
Reviewing more than a decade's reforming efforts in the light of critical 
official documents and important discussions,  the author has  structured 
this chapter in the following manner. First of all,  the proposals for sectors 
of the economy are studied, because this these gave significant momentum 
to  the whole process and were the  actual starting point of the economic 
reform. The issues in this first section are the  reform designs and decrees 
for agricultural  production and the rural economy, the open door policy 
and foreign economic activities, and the changes in state-owned industrial 
enterprises. However, some points of the discussion concerning the state-
owned industrial enterprises are left to the second section where an analysis 
of the  comprehensive  blueprints for  reform  is  the  main topic.  In  that 
section, the main features of the model of the economic system designed by 
the reformers  are  briefly surveyed.  For instance, what  orientation was 
intended,  market or combination of planning and market? What was the 
proposed status of the state-owned enterprises, the backbone of the planned 
economy? Key aspects of the complete blueprints for changing the whole 
system are analysed in details, including central planning control, state-
owned enterprises  and  market  mechanism.  The principal  points of the Chap1er4  v 
proposals for  economic reform after the events of Tiananmen Square are 
examined in a concise  way  in  the third section of this chapter, with the 
focus on the discussion after 1991, though in a general manner. It is in the 
fourth section that the depth and width of the economic reform in China is 
analysed  in  the  language of theoretical  assumptions,  and  along  with  a 
general description of the  major features  of the  Chinese-type economic 
system. Finally,  of course,  a  conclusion is  drawn  on  the  extent of the 
endeavour put into reforming the centrally planned economic system in 
China during the whole period.  For logical and technical considerations, 
some discussions and in particular some conclusions, are left to Chapter Six 
where the comparative study of the  economic reforms in  China and  the 
former Soviet Union is conducted. 
4.1  Sectoral  reform  efforts 
As  is well known, economic reform in China started with the rural sector 
of the economy. However, reform efforts in the urban area, on state-owned 
industrial enterprises in particular, was more important owing to its central 
role in the national economy. The opening-up policy precipitated dramatic 
changes not only in the foreign trade sector but also in the entire national 
economy, which, under Mao's regime, had been almost completely isolated 
from the outside world--especially from  the  Western market economies. 
Last but not least, a growing private sector mushroomed in both  rural and 
urban areas. These four areas of reform from  1978 to the late 1980s, i.e., 
the rural sector, the state-owned industrial enterprises, foreign trade and 
the private sector, are the subject of this section. 
4.1.1  Rural economy Chap1er4  78 
It was  logical that agricultural production became the  top priority on the 
reforming agenda in China if one looks at the situation discussed in Chapter 
Three.  In  a  large country where  the  rural  population still accounts  for 
about 80% of the total population, the development of agriculture to large 
extent determined growth in other sectors of the  I economy.  In addition, 
Chinese leaders could no longer ignore the crying of the peasants in face of 
the difficulties and problems that occured in agriculture in the late 1970s. 
This  is  why  the  initial  breakthrough  in  economic  reform  occurred  in 
agriculture. 
In general  the  reform  efforts  in  agriculture  after  1978  were  aimed  at 
reducing direct interventions in planning and pricing. The importance of 
direct planning of production and  procurement was  reduced, and  prices, 
incentives  and  market  forces  were  increasingly  relied  on  by  the 
government  to  guide  the  rural  sector.  Specific  measures  included 
reductions  in  state  planning of agricultural  production,  commerce  and 
pricing; decentralisation of decision-making authority to local governments 
and producers; greater leniency towards and encouragement of free market 
exchanges; and increased reliance on market prices. 
The  reform  of the  system  and  mechanism  of organising  agricultural 
production and  related matters came gradually with time.  At  the  Third 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1978 two important policy 
decisions were approved:  (a)  to increase the government's purchase price 
of farm produce by an  average of 24.8%;  (b)  to recognise the rights of 
production teams to self-management. In the early stages, attention was 
paid to this  sector in order to  increase its  share of centrally allocated 
investment and so to improve its performance. But one specially important 
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products. The government raised the prices it paid for farm products by a 
considerable margin starting with the summer crop in 1979, and it allowed 
a further 50% premium on the portion of products sold above its targets 
(The State Committee for Reform of the Economic System, 1988bl. After 
1979 all farm products, with the exception of cotton, could be sold on the 
free  market.  Prices  there  were  even  higher  than  the  premium  prices. 
Therefore, three price levels existed at the same time:  official, premium 
and  free  market.  In  addition,  the  share  of  compulsory  purchase  of 
agricultural products by the State was  for a long time kept constant at the 
level of the period 1971--75, which meant that it was automatically raised 
with the increase in production. Furthermore, up to 2.5 billion kg of grain 
was to  be deducted from the state purchase quota ( The State Committee 
For Reform of the Economic System, 1988b). All these measures indicated 
beginning of a process of changing the traditional planned management 
system of agricultural production. Given this situation, the farmers devised 
every  possible  means  to  reduce  sales  at  official  prices.  In  1979  the 
government purchased 31.50  million tons  of grain at the official price 
under the compulsory supply system, but by 1981  this had fallen by as 
much as 23%, to 24.32 million tons. By 1985 the government used official 
prices for only 30% of its purchase of grains (Kojima, 1988) 
There were two major stages in reforming the rural sector. From 1978 to 
1984, restructuring was promoted through institutional change based on the 
decentralisation of farming operations. To achieve this, a series of policies 
were put into operation aimed at establishing the household responsibility 
system,  reforming  the  peoples'  commune  structure,  diversifying  the 
agricultural and rural economies andcreating specialised households, and 
adjusting prices, taxes and quotas (Wang & Zhu, 1987). In the second stage, 
i.e.,  from  1985  on,  reform  was  directed  towards  marketisation  and Chapter 4  80 
privatisation. State monopoly purchase of agricultural produce was reduced 
and  the  role  of prices  and  markets  increased.  Land-leasing  terms  were 
extended from three to five years and then to  fifteen  (Zhu &  Fan,  1989). 
Rural  industries,  principally  collective  or  individual  ownership, 
mushroomed. Reform of the rural sector was deemed so important position 
that  every  year  from  1983  the  number  one  document  of the  central 
committee of the CCP was about agriculture (Kojima, 1988). 
Tht~ household  responsibility  system,  or the  production  responsibility 
system,  was  the  most  impressive  measure  for  restructuring  the  rural 
economy. It was not new, because it occurred for a time in the early 1960s 
(Donnithorne, 1967). And in fact, up to late 1981, the reorganisation of the 
agricultural  production  responsibility  system  (Nongye  Shenchan  Zeren 
Zhi) was largely limited to the restoration, or refinement of the work-point 
system  ( The  State  Committee  For Reform  of the  Economic  System, 
1988b). Document No.1, 1984 consolidated the gains achieved since 1978 
in transforming rural organisation (Wang & Zhu,  1987). And from  1984 
on,  the household responsibility system in various forms  established its 
position as the primary organisational form of agricultural production. 
The household responsibility system takes various forms. But the principle 
behind  the  reform  were  uniformity.  The  pre-reform  organisation  of 
agricultural production saw masses of labour working on collective land, 
organised  by  the  brigade,  commune  or  even  higher  authority,  and 
following assignments issued directly from the local planning agency, and 
indirectly  from  the  central  planning  authority,  depending  on  the 
importance of the products (Blecher,  1988). This system was replaced by 
individual labour working on land leased from the village authority(the 
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share of the production of the  household or group at state-sets planned 
prices.  But any quantity of the  products remaining could be sold on the 
free market. The decisions about prcxiuction, i.e, what, how and how much 
to grow or raise, were at the discretion of the farmers in the household. No 
other planning interference than for the  requirements listed above was 
supposed  to  be  in  effect  (  Wang  &  Zhu,  1987).  In  other  words"  the 
responsibility system in  agricultural production in its  early stage was  a 
process of decollectivisation in the organising and disposal of production . 
In terms  of economic  reform,  the  responsibility  system  was an  effort 
partially to decentralise decision-making power. Perhaps more significant 
was the change in motivation. Because leasing by the state, still the 'owner' 
of the land, took into consideration the productive capability of the soil it 
favoured the farmers. The more they produced, the more they could claim 
as their own. 
From 1984 onwards the development of the responsibility system came into 
full  swing,  the  so-called late  phases of the process. When the  time for 
which land could be leased was extended from less than three years in the 
early  1980s to  fifteen  years  or even longer,  together with  other new 
policies, the essence of the system of organising agricultural production 
seemed to be radically altered  (Komai,  1992).  In terms of technically 
arranging production, farmers now virtually "own" the land, though they 
are not authorised to sell it. What they are allowed to do is through official 
arrangement to transfer any unwanted land to other farmers who do want 
it  (Zhu &Fan, 1989). This surely flies in the face of orthodox communist 
ideology  and  the  impact has  been  profound.  Document  No.1,  1983, 
permitted "labour swapping between farm families" and "families which 
have lost their labourers or which are short of labour, to employ occasional 
farm workers for the purpose of maintaining their living" ( Wang & Zhu, Cbapter4  82 
1987). No  matter how modest these initial stipulations may sound, their 
subsequent  implementation  lead  to  a  fulll-fledged  endorsement  in 
Document No.1,  1984, of virtually unlimited transfer of leasehold rights 
(Wang &Zhu, 1987). It is, therefore, not unreasonable to say that a private 
economy operating under market conditions was well on its way in China's 
agricultural sector.  The fact  that  the  remnans  of planned  control  were 
largely eliminated with a series of measures strenglhens the argument. As a 
result of these  measures,  1)  the  share of production taken  up  by state 
purchase  was  reduced  substantially;  2)  from  1985  onwards,  state 
procurement  of  grain  and  cotton  became  no  longer  a  compulsory 
requirement, but the subject of contracts between the state and the farmers; 
3)  for other items like pork, seafood and vegetables, there was eventually 
be no state buying, and they were sold at free  prices( Zhu & Fan,  1989). 
Although there was  no  detailed statement at the time about when these 
measures would come into effect, they very soon did. 
With  this  alteration  in  the  fundamental  way  of organising  production 
other related mechanisms and policy instruments came on to the agenda for 
change.  For example,  the  system  of trading  was  adapted  to  the  new 
requirements.  An  appeal  was  made  tor accelerate the decontrol  of the 
entire rural supplies and sales cooperative networks, the cooperative shops, 
which curiously had been converted into state ownership as late as  1978 
(Solinger,  1984). The ownership of the cooperative shops was gradually 
transformed  in  the  mid-1980s  into  share-holding  or  partnership 
undertakings owned by  individuals(  Zhu & Fan,  1989). They could  no 
longer be subordinated to the  state-owned commercial agencies,  which 
must negotiate with the farmers about the prices of goods before  contracts 
are  signed.  Changes also came  about in credit and  banking involved in 
rural affairs. Rural credit cooperatives, which saw both their deposits and Chao!er4  83 
their  loans  increased  tremendously,  as  a  result  of  creeping 
decollectivisation and rising peasant incomes, were given greater powers in 
financing rural industrial/commercial activities and the freedom to change 
their interest rates. Some small credit societies, transforming from existing 
ones or newly established,  began to  exercise the  functions of a bank or 
similar financial  institution.  They were  no  longer,  as  they appeared  on 
paper, the lower echelons of the state-owned Agriculture Bank --which is 
not a bank at all ( Zhu & Fan, 1989). At  the same time,  private banking 
agencies were permitted among farmers for the  purpose of supporting the 
rural economy.  Moreover,  rural  industries owned by  private individuals 
and  institutions were  greatly encouraged and  grew rapidly  (Byrd  &Lin, 
1990). 
In all these ways Document No.1,  1984, marked a new phase in the rural 
reform in China. It effectively set the stage for further growth of the rural 
economy by generating confidence as to the durability of the new system. 
Apart from this,  more new policies were put in place to provide further 
freedom  for  peasants  to engage  in  business  other than farming.  Rural 
industries and associated activities mushroomed as a result. The number of 
industrial enterprises increased tenfold between 1983 and  1985, and rose 
50% more by 1988. The number of employees more than doubled between 
1983  and  1985  and  increased by 27%  more by 1988. By the late  1980s 
rural industrial output was about 25% of the national total ((Zweig, 1991). 
As  is  discussed  in  detail  in  the  next  section,  this  played great part in 
promoting China's export trade. 
4.1.2  Opening-up policy and foreign trade 
Among other changes, opening up  to the outside world was proposed by Chaoler4  84 
the reformers immediately after Deng Xiaoping  reemerged at  the top of 
the leadership in the late  1970s. This had far-reaching implications for the 
transformation of the  planned  economy.  The  reforms  undertaken  after 
1978 in the sphere of foreign economic policy greatly increased China's 
interaction with the international economy. In contrast to  the period from 
the 1960s to the mid-1970s, China  welcomed direct foreign investments; it 
accepted aid,  loans,  and  credits from  foreign  governments,  international 
organisations and commercial banks, and it multiplied the channels through 
which  it  hoped  to  acquire  advanced  technological  know-how  and 
managerial  experience.  In  addition,  Chinese  reformers  accepted  the 
proposition that a universal set of international economic mechanisms and 
instruments exists, which China should  learn to  employ.  In  opening its 
doors to  the  rest of the  world,  therefore,  China  abandoned its belief of 
restricting  economic  and  technological  ties  solely  to  other  socialist 
countries and limiting international economic relations to the methods and 
strategies customarily employed by other socialist states.  After all,  the 
objectives in opening to the West were to attract hard currency investment 
and  up  to  date  technologies;  to  improve  domestic  production  and  to 
promote exporting capability( Cannon, 1988). And  what was particularly 
significant was  that these  objectives  were  really  intended  to  introduce 
market factors into China's domestic economy, literally by open door, but 
in a sense by the back door  .. 
The  establishment  of special  economic  zones  and  the  elebaration  of 
favourable  policies for business with foreign  countries in  some  coastal 
cities were the main operational results of the open-door policy. As early as 
1980, regulations were issued for establishing special economic zones in 
Guangdong Province ( Wang &Zhu,  1987). In its first and, in the end, most 
far-reaching  measure  in  1979,  China  designated  four  areas  along  the Chapter 4  85 
southeast  coast--Shenzhen,  Zhuhai,  Xiamen,  and  Shantou--as  "special 
economic zones" (Wang  &  Zhu,  1987). This first group was located near 
Hong Kong, from where increasing trade and investment was expected, and 
was  specifically  intended  to  encourage  foreign  investment  in  export 
projects.  The government  built  modem physical infrastructures, provided 
well-trained labour,  and  offered  preferential  tax  rates,  exemptions  and 
holidays. All four of these  are  coastal cities, with relatively convenient 
access to ocean transport routes. Two, Xiamen and Shantou, were selected 
partly because of their links with large overseas Chinese communities that 
could become sources of investment capital. All four were 'special' in the 
sense  that,  although  on  some  occasions the  central  or local  planning 
authorities  could  interfere  with planning instructions,  the fundamental 
driving  force  was  the  market;  foreign  companies  and  joint ventures 
constituted the main forms of undertaking; the export of goods and services 
to the world market was the over-ridingl goal; and consequently, the local 
authorities were granted much more extensive powers in managing and 
supporting these activities  ( Phillips  &  Yeh,  1989).  Another important 
function of these  zones was to serve as mechanisms for the introduction, 
study, and absorption of technology into a wider range of industries than in 
most processing-exporting zones elsewhere in the world(Harding, 1987). 
Finally, the special economic zones were also meant to be arenas for testing 
economic and social reforms considered too radical or too experimental 
for the rest of the country. Over the whole period since 1979 Shenzhen, in 
particular, has progressed further toward a market economy than any other 
part of China. 
In 1984, following the success of the few Southern special economic zones, 
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permitted  to  offer  tax  incentives  for  foreign  investment  similar  to, 
although  less  generous  than,  the  inducements  offered  in  the  economic 
zones.(Beijing Review,  Apr.16,  1984)  They  were  also  encouraged  to 
establish  economic  and  technical  development  areas,  usually  in  their 
suburbs, which were allowed to offer tax incentives to investors that were 
practically identical to those; provided in the zones. By the middle of 1986, 
many provinces were also allowed to offer tax exemptions, reductions, or 
holidays  to  targeted  foreign  ventures  (Beijing  Review,  Apr.16,  1984). 
Local governments in the fourteen cities also got  power greater than their 
counterparts in closed areas but less than in the zones to make  decisions 
relevant to regulating foreign business. 
With the broadening of the open-door policy, three "development triangles" 
in southeastern and central China--the Yangzi River delta, the Pearl River 
delta, and the delta area around Shamen, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou--were 
identified as trade and investment promotion areas. (Beijing Review, Jan.19, 
1987). These triangles comprised thirteen cities, forty six counties and two 
towns,  and they were given the same privileges as  the fourteen coastal 
cities. Like the special economic zones, they were to be a base for exports 
and  a  "filter to  digest  modem  science  and  technology  and  advanced 
managerial methods ... so as to discard the dross and select the essential "( 
Harding, 1987). But the main emphasis of the triangles was not to be on 
technology-intensive manufacturing, as in the special economic zones or the 
economic and technical development areas in the coastal cities, but rather 
on growing and processing the agricultural products that could be sold on 
international markets. 
In 1988, the Chinese government went further and  decided to  set up  a 
special province on Hainan Island in  the South China Sea ( Zhu &Fan, QJapter4  87 
1989). The provincial government of Hainan was to be fully independent 
on all economic and domestic matters, except those involving in particular 
public security,  customs  and  civilian  transportation.  It  is  undoubtedly 
obvious that a quasi-free  market  economy experiment was  intended  in 
Hainan's case because the purpose elabarated for the new province is, in the 
near future,  to develop an  internationally oriented investment  economy 
like Hong Kong. 
Reform of the traditional foreign trade system in China's planned economy 
was one of the areas where action was taken earlier than elsewhere in the 
economy.  For  example,  in  the  late  1970s,  the  State  Council  had 
promulgated a series of reforms, some of which--such as the law on joint 
ventures-- were dramatic. They included a decentralisation of foreign trade 
authority,  a reduction in the  degree to which the official exchange rate 
overvalued  the  domestic  currency  and  a  reduction  in  direct  import 
subsides. The latter two  measures  tended to bring  the  price of imports 
more  into line with their true  economic cost.  Simultaneously the State 
Council  reduced  the  scope of the  national  foreign  trade  plan  ( Lardy, 
1992b). 
As part of foreign trade system reform,  many new forms  of trade were 
introduced.  Among  the most  important were  the export processing and 
compensation trades, which was believed to take the advantage of cheap 
labour in the rural areas in particular. Exporting oriented enterprises in the 
rural areas were greatly encouraged,  no  matter how small they were. In 
fact,  a  large  number of township  and  villege  enterprises  in Southern 
Chinese countryside were established aiming at producing for exporting. 
As  a result, non-state owned undertakings, including collective township 
enterprises and joint ventures played a significant part in expanding foreign Chaoter4  88 
earnings.
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Last but not least, the so-called Overseas Chinese played an important role 
in  the  rapid  growth  of the  external  economy.  Capital investment and 
specific  projects  form  Hong  Kong.  Taiwan,  Singapore  and  Chinese 
communities in North America and elsewhere were the first and the  most 
important contributions  to  the  early growth  of foreign  business.  Hong 
Kong, in particular,  became a major entrepot through which China could 
sell exports and procure imports. its share of China's trade rose from about 
11 % in 1978 to 22% to 23% in the mid-1980s. Of Chinese exports to Hong 
Kong, only about 40% were used in the territory, while the remaining 60% 
were  re-exported  to  third  countries.  Similarly,  about  75%  of China's 
imports from Hong Kong came from outside the territory, including from 
trading partners, such as Taiwan and South Korea, with whom China had 
no diplomatic or direct economic relations in the 1980s.
2 
With  the  opening-up  policy,  foreign  trade  became  more  and  more 
important in the national economic development of China. In contrast to 
the  mid-1970s,  let  it alone  the  1960s,  a significant part of the  whole 
economy is involved in external activity now. The growth of foreign trade 
in China was among the fastest of any country in the 1980s, and as a result 
China has become one of the major trading powers in the world. In 1978, 
I  The below table shows the growth of exports by rural and joint venture enterprises in  1985-
1991. (Lardy, 1992 a) 
Table  4-1-1  Exports of Rural and Joint Ventures Enterprises, 1985-91  (US$ billions) 
Rural enterprises  Joint ventures enterprises 
1935  3.9  0.3 
1936  4.5  Q.5 
19Y  5.1  12 
1~  M  ~ 
1~  10.1  4.9 
1~  1~  7.8 
1~  1~ 
2 Diplomatic relation between China and South Korea was established in 1993. Chapter 4  89 
China's rank on the list of world major trading powers was at the 32th. In 
the 1990s it rose to the 11th (Beijing Review,  1993). 
The measures adopted to produce this result are of particular interest here 
because they indicate the tendency towards reforming the centrally planned 
economy.  First  of  all,  they  brought  about  to  some  degree  the 
decentralisation of decision-making powers concerning foreign economic 
activities. Secondly, the  economic mechanism in the various 'special' areas 
became increasingly market oriented; and  in  some cases marketisation of 
the regional economy can be expected in due course. Finally, the influence 
of large-scale foreign business building up in a relatively short time were 
far  from  negligible  in  the  development  of economic  reform  and  the 
national  economy  as  a  whole  (  State  Committee  for  Reform  of  the 
Economic System, 1988b). 
4.1.3  State-owned industrial enterprises: a brief look 
Reforming the state-owned industrial enterprises to a large extent meant 
changing the  nature  of the central planning system, because this  sector 
constituted its  core.  It could not,  therefore,  be expected to  be along as 
simple and  straightforward  lines  as  in  other sectors  already discussed. 
Unlike rural changes, industrial reforms provided little clear-cut evidence 
of success in increasing efficiency or reorienting production the better to 
match demand.  The  depth of the  reforming  attempts was restricted  in 
various  ways  by  more  complicated  factors,  for  example,  than  in 
agriculture(Brus &  Laski,  1989).  Some issues in this sector have to be 
studied in the context of the overall design of the economic reform, as is 
done in next section of this chapter. Chap1er4  90 
In  general,  the  policy  of  improving  the  efficiency  of  state-owned 
enterprises was limited by the partial decentralisation of certain decision-
making powers, the so-called autonomous rights of the  enterprise.  From 
late 1979 down to early 1984, the reforming process went through three 
overlapping phases. First, there was a restoration of the  "enterprise fund" 
system. Secondly, the profit retention system was introduced of which there 
were at least two major versions, one in  1979, the other in  1983. Thirdly, 
experiments with the  "substitution of taxation for profit remittance"  {yi  Ii 
dai shui)  began in  1980 but was  considerably expanded in  1983.  These 
various changes in policy were directed towards decentralisation of power 
from  the  state to the  enterprise level,  especially in the  financial  arena. 
However,  reform efforts in the  state-owned industrial enterprises did not 
really get beyond the experimental stage  ( Bureau of Enterprises,  1988). 
Only a small number of the enterprises was put on the list of reforming 
places in order to observe the effects and  consequences. Two important 
documents discussed  the  experiments  and  set down the  rules for those 
enterprises engaged in them  ( Wang &  Zhu,  1987). Among other things, 
the rules covered the distribution of the  revenue of the enterprises  and 
their financing as shown in the following examples.  (1)  Instead of turning 
over all the profit made by the enterprise to the state, a certain share of it 
could be  retained  and  used  for  the  purpose of further development of 
production capacity or improvement of production technology. The amount 
of the profit left to the enterprises varied according to each individual case. 
(2)  For some enterprises, a new rule was established for profit disposal. 
Taxes including business tax,  assets tax and  income tax would take the 
place of profit turnover. That is to say, enterprises would stop handing 
over their profit to the state but instead pay various categories of tax. The 
relationship between the state and the enterprises would thus be altered. 
They were to be encouraged to become gradually self-financing after tax. Chaoler4  91 
(3)  Other enterprises  were given the  full  right  to  dispose  of the  funds 
remaining to  them from  profit-sharing with the  state. Higher authorities 
could  neither  take  away  part  of  the  fund,  nor  interfere  in  how  the 
enterprises chose to  spend it.  (4)  Enterprises were  to  pay for their fixed 
assets and apply for bank loans to meet their current expenditures.  (5)  To 
some extent, enterprises would be able to make their own production plans 
on the basis of the directive and  non-directive planning norms issued by 
higher authorities, taking into account demand and supply on the market. 
And they could adjust or revise the  plan if necessary.  In addition,  after 
fulfilling  planned production, enterprises were to be allowed to  produce 
extra goods and sell them at planned or flexible prices--the latter being a 
price  in  between  the  planned  and  the  market  price-- according  to 
individual cases.  (6)  Related to this rule, enterprises were given the right to 
set  prices for the goods produced above the planned quota. However, first 
of all, flexible prices could only go downward. Secondly, only those goods 
which were in surplus supply, or with excessingly high prices, could be 
priced at flexible rates. Finally, the State pricing authority would define the 
limit of flexibility, e.g, a percentage of deviation from the planned price ( 
Wang & Zhu, 1987). 
After 1984, the refonning endeavour in industrial enterprises was moved 
from  the  laboratory into practice.  A decree was published by the State 
Council to extend the  measures  listed above to  a majority of the state-
owned enterprises  ( Bureau of Enterprises,  1988). Enterprises were also 
given decision-making powers on other important issues. For instance, the 
numbers and categories of goods that could be sold on their own initiative 
were increased.  Within  a  limit of 20%  above  or below fixed  planned 
prices,  enterprises  could  sell  non-planned  goods  at  flexible  prices. 
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Furthermore,  enterprises were  allowed  to  let or sell  their idle  or spare 
productive assets, but they were required to invest the income in improving 
technology and renewing equipments( Wang & Zhu, 1987). 
Remarkable  progress in  the  reform of the  industrial sector came  in  the 
effort to  apply the  contract responsibility system after 1984( Bureau of 
Enterprises, 1988). The name and purpose were conceived as the same as 
in  the  agricultural  sector.  Notwithstanding,  the  content  seemed  quite 
different since  more  complicated relations and  sophisticated technology 
were involved. In theory, the contract responsibility system was  intended 
to  play  the  role  of  a  comprehensive  prescription  for  remedying  the 
traditional diseases in managing industrial undertakings(The Capital Steel 
& Iron Company, 1988). It was at least an attempt to decentralise some of 
the decision-making from the top authorities and administrative institutions 
down to the enterprises. Enterprises were to negotiate with the  state the 
share or the amount of their profits that should submit to it. To enterprises 
working at loss, the profit-sharing was to take the form of a fixed amount 
of loss  for which the state wouldl be responsible,  and  after which the 
enterprises themselves would be responsible; and in the case that they made 
a  profit,  they would  be allows to  retain  it.  Of course,  the terms of the 
contracts of responsibility could not be uniform since each was determined 
by bargaining. ( Wu,  1988). In fact,  the new system affected mainly the 
distribution of the enterprises' revenue and their self-financing ability. 
As far as ownership reform was concerned, there were two propositions. 
(a)  State enterprises could be leased to individuals or, more commonly to 
groups of workers, for terms of three to six years. Potential lessees had to 
secure backing from financial guarantors and pass an examination <;>f  their 
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to  the  state,  they  would  acquire  full  power  over  the  operations  and 
personnel. By mid-1987, about three thousand state enterprises had been 
transferred to  new management through some form of leasing ( Harding, 
1987)  (b)  For  larger  state  enterprises,  reformers  proposed  a  second 
ownership reform scheme known as  Gufenhua  , which can be translated 
into English accurately, if rather awkwardly, as "stockification". Under this 
scheme,  ownership  would  be  vested  in  shares,  which  would  then  be 
assigned or sold to various government agencies and public organisations, 
to enterprise workers,  and to  individual citizens who would then elect a 
board  of  directors  to  appoint  and  supervise  the  enterprise  manager 
(Harding, 1987) 
Before the discussing comprehensive economic reform,  which included 
various  issues  to  do  with  state-owned  industrial  enterprises,  a  brief 
summary of the discussions above is necessary because in the next section 
sectoral  issues  are  excluded  wherever  possible.  Agriculture  reform, 
especially the creation of the household responsibility system, proved to be 
a solution for rural problems because decentralisation and marketisation 
were acceptable within one sector of the whole economy due to its relative 
technical independence which resulted from its lesser development.  At the 
same  time  reform  related  to  foreign  business  was  an  example  of 
decentralisation and  marketisation by regions;  and this proved workable 
because of unbalanced development in a huge country like China. But, as 
far as  the reforming effort in the state-owned enterprises, the key part of 
China's centralised planning economy, was concerned, nothing comparable 
in depth and width had been proposed at this stage. However, it soon made 
its appearance. 
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Private economy was a very new term to Chinese students of economics in 
the late 1970s like myself, because we were taught that all property in the 
country is state-owned in the name of the people and that only in capitalist 
state  was  there  a  private  business  which  was  undoubtedly  related  to 
exploitation of the working class by capitalists. Private business was also so 
negligible that no non-state sector could be discussed. However, small scale 
individual commercial undertakings did survive the socialist transformation 
in 1956 though the number was reduced dramatically. For instance, in 1957 
there  were  3,590,000  individual  commercial  firms  (  such  as  shops, 
restaurants  and  repair  shops  etc.),  whereas  in  1978  there  were  only 
610,000  (Solinger,  1984).  What  was  more  significant was  that  private 
business, no  matter how small, was condemned as of capitalist nature and 
the individuals engaged in it were treated as of a very low social class. As 
one Shanghai trade  man  put it,  "the individual peddler is  the  worst off 
person in the new society."  (Solinger,  1984). 
Collective undertakings remained only in its name  since they were put 
totally  under  central  planning  control  together  with  the  state-owned 
enterprises. There was  virtually no  difference between the two types of 
ownerships in the 1970s. 
The  policy  change  in  the  non-state  sector  in  the  reform  period 
dramatically  changed  the  situation in  the  country.  A  rapid  expansion 
occurred in the  number of privately owned  and  operated enterprises in 
China's  major  cities.  This  led  to  increased  job  opportunities  for 
unemployed urban residents and an improvement in the provision of scarse 
urban services. But important as this was, the new enterprises remained, at 
least on paper,  limited  in  scope.  They were  allowed  to  hire  only five Cbap1er4  95 
employees or apprentices from  outside the  employer's family  and  were 
restricted  to  such  sectors  of  the  economy  as  catering,  services,  and 
handicrafts (Harding, 1987). 
Anyhow,  the  private  economy  mushroomed.  It  was  important  at  the 
margins. In 1985, for example, nearly half of the increase in national retail 
sales was  accounted for by the  private sector. By 1986, the smte-owned 
enterprises produced only 68.7%  of the  total industrial output while  in 
1976, the figure had been 80.8% ( Harding, 1987). 
The boom in the non-state sector was also found in the rapid growth of the 
township and  rural enterprises,  which  not  only contributed to domestic 
economic growth but also became very active in foreign trade. In fact,  in 
1984-85, township and rural enterprises made 4.5% of China's total export 
earnings. By 1990, this figure had become 20.8% (Zweig, 1991). 
4.2  Comprehensive  blueprints  of economic  reform 
It was  not  until  late  1984  that  discussions  and  decisions  on  the 
comprehensive reform of the economic system were put on the agenda of 
the top leadership, even though a number of sectoral reform measures had 
already been introduced.  "The Decision on Economic System Reform by 
the  Central  Committee of CCP"  in October.  1984,  supplemented by  a 
document in 1985 with detailed suggestions on specific issues of reform, 
indicated  a  turning-point.  In  1987  the  13th  Party  Congress  further 
confirmed the line of the economic reform (the CCP Document, 1987). It 
set the tone and  principles for a comprehensive reform of the centrally 
planned system. Furthermore, discussions and suggestions from economists Cbap!er4  96 
were also published which enriched the official proposals
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topics embodied in these discussions are of interest. They are  (1)the main 
features  of the  prospective economic system,  (2)  marketisation of the 
economy,  and  (3)  decentralisation. 
4.2.1  The prospective model of the economic system 
According  to  the  official  proposals,  the  mainstream  of  the  reformed 
system was  to  be  a  "commodity economy"  1  which  was  explained as  a 
planned market economy, if we translate the  exact words in Chinese. By 
that confusing name was meant market-oriented economy with a certain 
degree  of  planning  control (  Kornai,  1992).  It  left  room  for  the 
conservatives  to  argue that a "commodity economy is  not necessarily a 
market economy".  The primary characteristics of the  centrally planned 
economy would remain, while the market mechanism would  be  active in 
some areas of activity. The inclination seemed to be towards more market 
and less planning, although it is very hard to see clearly the division line 
between them, or the weight to be given to each of them. Despite the rapid 
growth of private  and  collective enterprises,  the  core  of the  economy 
remained state owned and operated. With the developing role  of market 
forces,  the  state  played  a  smaller part in  the  allocation  of goods  and 
services in the economy. But up to the late 1980s, the economy  remained 
highly regulated. The state still issued detailed annual and five-year plans. 
About  30  to 40  percent of industrial output was subject to  mandatory 
planning, and another 40 percent to 50 percent governed by non-directive 
plans. Many key prices were set by the government. For instance, interest 
rates, the prices offered for agricultural output under the contract system, 
3 For example, the State Committee for Reform of the Economic System organised research 
on  a  mid- and long-term  reform  plan  in  which  the outstanding economists  in  the country 
participated(State Committee for Reform of the Economic System, 1988a). And some economists 
proposed alternative plans for comprehensive  reform(Li, 1989; Wu &. Zhou, 1988). Chaater4  97 
the  retail  prices  for  state-distributed  agricultural  commodities  and  for 
industrial commodities produced according to mandatory planning, and the 
range within which the prices of other industrial products could fluctuate 
(Harding,  1987). 
The status of the state-owned enterprises lay at the heart of reaching the 
new model of the economic system. The chief aim of the reform was to 
inject  greater flexibility  into  interaction  among  the  various  economic 
agents, and to  give a greater role to  market mechanisms in  coordinating 
resource  allocation.  To  this  end,  reform  measures  were  introduced  to 
reduce the scope of central planning and material allocation by cutting the 
number  of  commands  sent  to  enterprises,  thus  giving  them  greater 
autonomy  in  making  production  and  investment  decisions.  To  make 
enterprises more  cost-conscious in their operations,  a variety of profit-
retention schemes were introduced, and  bank loans increasingly replaced 
budgetary allocations  in  financing  investment.  In  1988, the Law of the 
State-owned Industrial Enterprise was approved by the People's Congress 
describing the  nature of the  reformed state-owned industrial enterprise ( 
Zhu and  Fan,  1989). The independence  of the enterprise as  a producer 
including  hard  budget  constraint  or  self-financing,  was  particularly 
underlined. A step was even taken towards the destatisation of state-owned 
enterprises(State Committee for Reform of the Economic System, 1988b). 
For instance, small shops and services owned by the state were to be sold to 
private owners.  A few  medium-sized and  even large-sized state-owned 
industrial  and  trade  undertakings  were  chosen  for  the  experiment  of 
transforming them into joint-stock companies which could be owned by 
individuals as well as by organisational shareholders and the state itself. At 
the stage under discussion, this experiment postulated that only small value 
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major share holder (Section of Enterprise Management, 1988). 
As  mentioned  in  section  4.1,  non-state  ownership  was  encouraged  to 
develop,  including private business both in  rural  and  urban  areas.  The 
structure  of ownership  in the  reformed  economy  was  supposed  to  be 
multiple with a predominance of state ownership(CCP documents, 1987). 
The two most outstanding characteristics of the reform blueprints were the 
inter-related intentions to  decentralise its  administration and to  marketise 
its operation. 
4.2.2  Decentralisation 
With  a drive  towards  marketising  the  economy,  the  decentralisation of 
decision-making was unavoidable. The reform proposals stated that the role 
of government agencies in economic management was going to be changed 
along with the deepening reform of the  economic system as  a whole(the 
CCP  Document.  1987).  Among  other  things,  the  central  planning 
committee would focus  on mid- and  long-term plans, avoiding detailed 
directive control.  Economic institutions for comprehensive management 
would be  strengthened in order to enable them to make reasonable and 
accurate  decisions  and  regulations  on  macro-economic  issues.  Local 
governments would be given more power to rely on economic  regulations. 
Organisations and institutions working in sectors and branches would shift 
their  attention from  daily  production  supervision  to  long-term  target 
control and technological improvement. 
Decentralisation from  the  centre  down to  the local  authorities was the 
major point at this stage in the process  in  China.  compared to  what is Chapter 4  99 
discussed later in the Soviet case. So local governments played an important 
part in further reform 
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•  To improve incentives for better local supervision 
of enterprises in the  1980s the state introduced revenue-sharing schemes 
that allowed most provinces to  retain all or a fixed portion of the profits 
from local enterprises (Wong,  1985). 
However.  decentralisation  brought  its  own  problems  which  created  a 
dilemma  for  the  reform.  Although  control  over  finances,  material 
allocations,  and  other  forms  of  economic  decision-making  was 
decentralised to a degree unprecedented in the past, only a small proportion 
of this decentralisation moved according to "economic" principles; the bulk 
went to increase the resources and freedom of action of local government 
organisations. As a result, serious problems that already characterised the 
economic system were perpetuated and in some cases exacerbated. Chief 
among  these  have  been  the  phenomenon of excessive  and  redundant 
investment and the creation of vested interests which lobby against further 
changes. Equally important, the surrender by the central government of a 
significant portion of its revenues left it in a precarious budgetary state, 
forcing it into reacting to a series of shocks and crises. Unable to dominate 
events, the government had to scramble repeatedly to "put out fires" and to 
prevent  disastrous  outcomes.  The  resultant  instability  in  its  policy 
significantly impaired its ability to formulate  a consistent programme of 
economic reform (Naughton,  1985). Initially, central leaders envisioned a 
series  of reforms  that  would  gradually  move  a  relatively  centralised 
system toward a partially marketised "mixed" economy.  But they found 
themselves facing a decentralised system in which they must manipulate 
economic rules and incentives and penalties. In general, this made further 
reforms more difficult: having already given away the "carrot" of greater 
local control of resources,  planners had  to wield the  "stick" of greater 
4  For administrative  and economic decentralisation, see Chapter 2, footnote 5. Chapler4  100 
economic accountability. In the meantime, numerous local interests  became 
accustomed to  disposing of a large volume of resources without bearing 
significant responsibility for their effective  use.  Ultimately,  the  central 
government was put in  a position where it might have to reassert control 
over much of the economic realm,  but whether in a manner compatible 
with further economic reforms remained an open question. There  was also 
general agreement that macroeconomic efficiency remained low and  even 
declined  in  the  reform  period,  thereby  negating  any  marginal  gains  in 
microeconomic efficiency.  The  chief  culprit  in  poor  macroeconomic 
performance  was  excessive  and  inappropriate  investment.  Despite  the 
government's  repeated  calls  to curtail  investment  so  as  to  concentrate 
resources  on  improved  utilisation  of  existing  plant  and  equipment, 
investment on fixed assets increased from 66.9 billion yuan in 1978 to 84.6 
billion in 1982. All the increase came from local investment, which more 
than doubled during the period. This investment was financed out of the 
vastly increased resources that profit-retention and depreciation allowances 
bestowed  on  enterprises,  along  with  new  funds  transferred  to  local 
government revenues by fiscal decentralisation (Naughton, 1985). 
4.2.3  Marketisation 
To introduce market mechanisms into regulating economic activities, the 
reform proposals called for developing markets for various purposes. The 
first group was created for consumer goods. As noted before, there were 
already free markets for foodstuffs both in rural and urban areas where a 
large number of vegetables, meats and cereals, could be purchased. Under 
the  new  reform free or quasi-free  markets for  some less  important or 
small-value manufactured goods were established in many cities.  On the 
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enlarged  In  their  range  of  business(  Zhu  &  Fan,  1989).  In  addition, 
markets for production goods  were beginning to  emerge gradually as  a 
result  of declining  state  distribution.  The  introduction  of  capital  and 
technology markets was  also under consideration in consequence of the 
growth of other types of market.  The  labour market was  not mentioned 
substantially.  However,  reform  proposals  stressed  that  the  necessary 
mobilisation of the labour force would be promoted, but that control of its 
distribution of labour was to be loosened( Zhu & Fan, 1989) 
The essence of a market mechanism---the market-clearing price---was  to 
be introduced at a slower speed than changes in other parts of the system. 
Price adjustment was the first step towards price liberation. A dual-price 
system,  i.e.,  planned  price and  free  price,  was  the  next step.  Finally,  a 
three-tier prices  formation  systemS  was  to  be  effected  instead  of fully 
market-set prices (Wu  &Zhao,  1988). Of the  three, planned prices would 
apply to  a small number of essential production goods and to  a very few 
consumer goods and services which are regarded as of national importance. 
The majority of consumer goods and services and some production goods 
would be priced individually on the basis of flexible prices, with limits set 
by the  appropriate state authority.  Free market pricing policy would be 
exercised on some consumer goods,  mainly foodstuffs  and  agricultural 
products which were in sufficient supply.  At the same time, a revision of 
the planned prices would take place. Specifically, they were to be adjusted 
to narrow the gap between them and  market prices of  goods of similar 
quality and category. The existing price structure of many goods was that 
the: planned price was the lowest, free market the highest, and the flexible 
in the middle. So to revise planned prices was to raise them to a reasonable 
level( CCP document, 1987). 
S It is also called as dual-tier price system in the relevant literature because two mechanisms--
planning and market--are involved in setting prices. Cbanter 4  102 
4.3  Reform  Proposals in  1990s 
There were actually two phases of economic reform in the 1990s in China. 
The events of Tiananmen Square were a heavy blow to the process in terms 
of both practice and  proposals (Chan, 1991). The radical tone set at the 13th 
Party Congress of CCP was replaced, though not completely, by emphasis 
on following the socialist road. This was especially true in the immediate 
afterwards  in  1989  and  1990.  Reform  was  declared  to  be  the  self-
perfection of the  socialist economic system based on public ownership. 
There was practically no fresh proposal under discussion until the middle 
of 1991, when the CCP Central Committee put forward suggestions for the 
Ten-year  Development  Programme  and  the  Eighth  Five-Year  Plan 
(Beijing Review, Feb.12-18, 1990). Following that, in late  1991, the State 
Committee for Reform of the Economic Systems worked out a blueprint 
for economic reform during the periods of the Eighth Five-Year Plan  and 
the  Ten-Year  Development  Program  (Beijing  Review,  Feb. 18-Mar.3, 
1991). The appeal for renewed  radical reform was  not announced until 
early  1992  initiated in the speech by  Deng  Xiaoping  ( People's Daily, 
Mar.10,1992). The 14th Party Congress, held in October 1992,  marked a 
turning-point for the 1990s. However, there is still no substantial progress 
on concrete planning for extensive reform. What is available now are  the 
main intentions from  1992. From among these, the prospective model for 
the new type of economy, marketisation, and opening-up are the focus of 
our discussion. 
4.3.1 Economic reform up to 1991 
Planning and market Chapter 4  103 
After 1989, it was repeatedly emphasised in official reform publications 
that the  future  economic system in China would be  one combining a 
planned economy with market regulation. Measures of reform would both 
embody  the  advantages  of  the  planned  development  of  the  national 
economy and effectively give play to the role of market competition in 
order to achieve the coordinated growth and expansion. The aim  was to 
establish a unified and open socialist market system with equal competition 
and  overall  regulation  through  planning(  Beijing  Review,  Feb.,12-18, 
1990). 
The combination of planning and market would be realised through three 
forms of regulation. On the one hand, mandatory planning of a compulsory 
nature would remain in position,  but the  plans would take into account 
market demand and supply.  On  the other hand,  market forces would be 
released,  under  the  overall  guidance  of  state  plans,  to  regulate  the 
production of some goods. Between these two means of regulation would 
be guidance planning, or non-directive planning, which would be binding 
in the sense that it defined the direction and goal of economic activities but 
would be executed mainly through economic policies and instruments  ( 
Beijing Review, Feb., 18-Mar.,3,  1991). 
As far as the role of the government was concerned, it was said that its 
function  as  administrator of the state-owned sector would be separated 
from  its  function  as  owner,  as  would the  duties of the  governmental 
administrative departments from those of the enterprises. The institutions 
for economic management at various levels would be restructured in the 
course  of transforming  their functions.  For this  purpose,  direct  and 
indirect regulating means would be imposed with a consequent reduction in 
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Meanwhile, market forces  would be  particularly strengthened in pricing. 
With the exception of some essentials, the  production and  pricing of the 
majority  of consumer  goods  would  be  regulated  by  market  demand. 
Efforts would also be made to develop monetary, technical, information, 
labour and other sorts of markets for producers'  goods(Beijing Review, 
Feb.,18-Mar.,3,  1991). 
Stock-share companies and State-owned enterprises 
It was stressed that the trial of stock  -share companies began before 1989 
would be carried out continuously in a number of large- and medium-sized 
enterprises in Shenzhen and Shanghai (China Daily, Nov.23,  1991)  It was 
believed that the share-holding system might be an effective remedy for the 
ailing state-owned enterprises. As to the forms of share-holding company, 
there was no detailed architecture. However, the general principle was that 
once the share-holding system was adopted, the state-owned fixed assets, 
including production equipment, real estate,  reserve funds,  depreciation 
funds,  working capital  and other investments,  would be  converted into 
shares with dividends allocated accordingly. The project on assessing the 
values of state property in state-owned enterprises was begun (China Daily, 
Nov., 20,  1991). 
Further opening-up 
The opening  -up policy would be enforced further,  it was said, through a 
series of measures. First of all. more regions were given rights similar to 
those of the special economic zones. For example, in Shanghai, the largest 
and most important industrial city in China, a sizable area--Pudong--was 
given this special status( Beijing Review, Sept.,9-15, 1991). And secondly, 
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were issued very much in their favour. For instance, an amendment to the 
Law On loint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment revised some 
key  items  so  that  foreign  capital  would  get  a  greater  return  on  its 
investment in  the  country.  It  was  guaranteed  that  there  would  be  no 
nationalisation or requisition of joint ventures. And the post of chairman of 
the  board of directors was  no  longer confined to  Chinese  as  had  been 
required in earlier editions of the Law ( Beijing Review, May 7-13,  1990). 
4.3.2  Radical reform in 1992 
Early in  1992,  the  new  and  very  radical  approach to  further economic 
reform was made public, following the time-consuming struggle between 
the reformers led by Deng Xiaoping and  the conservatives. Deng's south 
China talks  and  pronouncements have  once  again  altered the  country's 
outlook  and  have  undoubtedly  made  a  historic  contribution  to  its 
transformation from  a planned economic system to  a market economic 
structure.The general principle for economic reform said little more than 
that the only goal now is to promote economic development as rapidly as 
possible by any effective means. The implication is obvious: ideological 
obstacles should be removed in order to allow the market system to play a 
full  role  in  the  prospective  economy,  under  conditions  of individual 
ownership if necessary.  As Deng put it, " we should be bolder than before 
in  conducting  reform  and  opening  and  have  the  courage  to 
experiment."(Beijing Review,  1994).  And  he  went on,  "  those who  are 
unable to move ahead with reform and opening, and who lack the courage 
to  break  new  ground,  are,  to  put it bluntly,  afraid  that they would be 
introducing too many capitalist factors, and therefore taking the capitalist 
road.  The  crux  of the  matter  is  whether  this  road  is  'capitalist'  or 
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whether it promotes the growth of productive forces in a socialist society, 
whether it enhances the overall national strength of the socialist state and 
the people's living standards." (Beijing Review,  1994)  To  be specifical,  " 
whether there should be more planning or more market factors is  not the 
essential difference between socialism and capitalism  .... Both planning and 
market are economic means. The basic nature of socialism is to emancipate 
and  develop  the  productive  forces,  eliminate  exploitation,  rule  out 
polarisation, and  ultimately achieve common prosperity." (Beijing Review, 
1994)  This  was  overwhelmingly  approved  in  spiritat  the  14th  Party 
Congress of the CCP (People's Daily, Oct., 21,  1992). However, by the end 
of 1992, an operational blueprint for such extensive restructuring was still 
a matter of discussion . 
Prospective model of the economic system 
What  the 14th Party Congress produced was a firm attempt to establish a 
"socialist market economy"(the CCP Document, 1992). Although China's 
post-Mao leaders are  devoted to reform,  they also remain committed to 
socialism. Therein lies a paradox. The principles of economic reform just 
discussed  conflict  with  a  crucial  element  of  the  socialist  ethic  in 
contemporary China. The spirit of reform calls for an increase in private 
enterprise,  but the  socialist ethic demands  the predominance of public 
ownership of the means of production. Reform allows a greater role for 
market forces in the economy, but the socialist ethic insists on the continued 
primacy of state planning. And reformism emphasises the use of material 
incentives  to  stimulate  production,  but  socialism  warns  against  a 
polarisation of rich and poor and extols the spirit of "plain living and hard 
struggle". This tension between the reformist spirit and the socialist ethic 
has  been  at  the  centre  of the  debate  over economic  reform  that  has 
continued throughout  the  post-Mao era.  The  moderate  reformers  have Cbaoter4  107 
given  high  priority to  maintaining an  economic  system that  embodies 
traditional socialist values, whereas the radical reformers have been more 
willing  to  accept  a  greater  degree  of  private  ownership,  market 
mechanisms, and even economic inequality. 
It was stressed in Jiang Zeming's speech at the 14th Party Congress that the 
<4socialist market economy" differed from  the  planned market economy 
proposed by the 13th Party Congress in 1987,  not only in  terminology but 
also in essence. By socialist market economy was meant  letting market 
forces,  under the macro-economic control of the  state, serve as the basic 
means of regulating the allocation of resources so as to subject economic 
activity to  the  law of value and  to make  it responsive to the changing 
relations between supply and demand.  <4The  socialist market economy is a 
component part of the basic system of socialism. So far as the ownership 
structure is concerned, for a long time to come we should allow diverse 
sectors of the economy to develop side by side.  The public sector  .. .is to 
remain  predominant,  with  the  private sector  ... as  a  supplement."  (CCP 
Document, 1992). 
Specifically, planning control will continue at the macro-economic level 
but it will be substantially reduced in scope. The market mechanism will be 
fully operative in the majority of economic activities. In particular, it will 
be introduced into allocating economic  resources  and coordinating the 
economy  as  a  whole.  However,  in  the  future  Chinese  model  public 
ownership, Le.,  state ownership, will be the predominant type in various 
areas.  For  instance,  the  existing  state-owned  enterprises  may  be 
transformed into joint stock companies,  but the state will be the main 
share-holder. This will particularly apply to the medium and large-sized 
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nature  of the  so-called  socialist  market economy  (the  CCP  Document, 
1992). 
Plannin~ control 
Direct planning control,  it is  said,  will  be  confined  to  a few  items  of 
national importance. Indirect planning concrol, i.e., guidance planning and 
economic instruments such as  taxation,  interest rates  and  the like.  6,  will 
playa major part in managing the  whole economy(People's Daily, Sept., 
24,  1992).  A  state  order  system  at  pJanned  prices  will  replace  state 
procurement  for  some  production  goods  ,  while  the  majority  of 
commodities will find their own prices on the free market( People's Daily, 
Sept., 25, 1992). 
Marketisation 
In the  new  round  of economic  reform,  the  market  mechanism will be 
particularly active in the price formation of production goods. The three-
tier system will gradually be eliminated  through  reducing state-set and 
increasing  market-set  prices.  The  number of production goods  whose 
prices are set by the state was to  be  reduced from 737 in  1991  to 89 in 
1992 ( People's Daily, Sept., 2, 1992). This means that about 600 were to be 
priced primarily by  market forces 
7 
•  Of the 89 products, state guidance 
prices
8  were to apply to 55  and only 34 were to be directly priced by the 
state agency. 
The establishment of a wholesale market, a production goods market and 
capital and  labour markets are mentioned repeatedly in the new reform 
proposals(People's  Daily,  Sept.,11,1992).  And  in  this  connection  it  is 
, See Chapter 2, 2.2.2, instrument focus. 
7 Of these, the  prices of 571  were to  be set at the level of enterprises ,and 22  at the level of 
local authorities(People's Daily, Sept, 2,  1992). 
8 That is, the state only sets the ceiling or bottom limit. See section 4.2.2. ChaDter4  109 
significant that the stock market has grown markedly during the  1990s in 
some important cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
Before ending this section, two further points about opening-up and private 
economy should be mentioned. Following the opening-up of the country's 
coastal regions,  the inland area became the next focus of attention. The 
Capital cities of the North-West Provinces
9  were given similar privileges 
in the autumn of 1992  (People's Daily,  Sept.,3,  1992). Thus,  there were 
altogether about 300 cities in China opened up to foreign business( People's 
Daily,  Oct.,8,  1992). This shows a strong determination to integrate the 
domestic economy with the international market. 
The private economy also continued to  grow in the  1990s. In 1992 the 
private sector produced a total of 113 billion yuan in gross output. By the 
end  of  the  year  there  were  15.3  million  individual  industrial  and 
commercial units  throughout the  country,  with 24.6  million employees. 
(Beijing Review, 1993) 
So the  Chinese economy is  moving toward a mixed economy.  In  1992 
government  mandatory  planning  extended  to  only  10%  of industrial 
production, whereas before 1992 the figure was 40%. Only 10% of retail 
sales commodity prices were set by the state. Market prices applied to 70% 
of all  industrial  materials  and  70%  of agricultural  products.  (Beijing 
Review,  1993) 
4.4  Approaching to  a  New  Economic System 
The purpose of this section is to review and summarise the proposals of 
economic reform in' China in the decade from the late 1970s to the 1990s in 
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the  language  of the  theoretical  assumptions  set  out in  our  analytical 
framework.  The question here  is  where has  China got to,  on  paper,  in 
reforming its centrally planned economy, measured by the ruler established 
in this dissertation. As pointed out above, the tones and plans of the reform 
in  the  period  of  about  14  years  were  not  uniform.  So  the  relative 
importance  of  the  various  stages  are  given  special  attention  where 
necessary.  Two  aspects in particular are  under discussion:  (1)  partial or 
complete change in  the  basic elements of the economic system;  and  (2) 
systemic features of the Chinese-type economy:. 
4.4.1  Changed structures 
Have the  basic structures of the  economic  system been  altered by the 
reform  proposals?  To  answer this,  the  most  important aspects  of four 
systemic structures are surveyed in the light of our theoretical framwork 
Decision-making power. Two aspects of decision-making power  need to be 
examined  in order to  see the  direction and  depth of China's economic 
reform. First is its location. Decentralisation has always been the principal 
direction of any economic reform in a centrally planned economy due to 
the very fact of excessive centralisation. However,  as  Morris  Bomstein 
classified  it  (  Bornstein,  1977),  administrative  decentralisation  and 
economic  decentralisation  refer to  different  magnitudes  of reform.  In 
China's  reform  proposals,  both  economic  and  administrative 
decentralisation are given important positions , but the former constitutes 
an essential component in the late  stages. Decentralisation of decision-
making in  agricultural  production  could  be  said to  have  gone  as  far 
towards the limit as is possible in a centrally planned economy at the stage, 
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measures were legalised and  became the overwhelming mode.  It is not 
inaccurate to  conclude,  therefore,  that the  post-reform decision-making 
structure in Chinese agriculture is,  to a  large extent,that  of a regulated 
market economy with  minimum intervention by the Sstate. This is because, 
apart from the change in the degree of concentration of making decisions, 
the means of the state's executing  decisions in this sector is modified as 
well. Commanding from the centre will not now work effectively, and the 
state will seldom be able to poke its  nose directly into  interfering with 
farmers' actions, except by decreasing its purchases within contracts. Such 
regulation as it will have over agricultural production will be by economic 
means, e.g. by the purchasing  prices it pays. 
However, the economic system as a whole has not been changed as greatly 
as in the case of the rural sector. It was administrative decentralisation  to 
the local authorities that was the  major first step in the reform process. 
Even the decentralisation process in the special regions for foreign business 
is more or less limited to the administrative issues. In the special economic 
zones,  where the most advanced areas in terms of marketised economy are 
located, local government still retains critical power to make key decisions, 
and planning control in its broad sense is  actively employed on many 
occasions. In the state-owned enterprises reform attempts are by way of 
economic decentralisation through endorsing more autonomous rights to 
managements to conduct their daily business. The aim of transforming 
these  enterprises  into  independent  producers  through  a  responsibility 
system and joint stock companies was specified in the reform proposals and 
subsequently  legalised. But it was stressed that state ownership would 
remain. 
Looking over the economy as a whole, the decentralisation tendency, both CtJapter4  112 
administrative  and  economic  ,  has  been  accelerating  extensively.  The 
decentralisation  of  decision-making  power  to  local  authorities  is 
particularly impressive. But  mandatory instructions still stand as the main 
tool for authorities at any level to get the relevant decisions implemented. 
Information  structure.  It is  obvious  that  the  important  information 
structure  has  been  changed  with  the  steps  towards  decentralising  and 
marketising  the existing economy. For example, information  travels more 
and  more  in  a  horizontal  rather  than  a  vertical  direction"  with  the 
loosening of planning control from  the centre.  Much of the information 
takes the form of prices and quantities instead of instructions, qualitative 
requirements and so on. 
As far as the co-ordination mechanisms in the economy are concerned, the 
market plays an  increasing role, taking the place of the planning tool. In 
the important sectors of agriculture and foreign trade, market forces take a 
predominant position among regulating  instruments. From the point of 
view of consumption, markets are working efficiently. In the production of 
state-owned enterprises market signals are taken account of in decision-
making and other respects. Nevertheless, the whole economy is coordinated 
partly by planning, partly by market, depending on the individual case. The 
administrative mechanism in this field plays a decisive role because the 
growth of market forces is constrained by the planners no  matter whether 
they are  reformers or not.  This is,  unfortunately, the typical case; or  to 
put  it  another way,  this  is  the  only choice  possible  in  the  course  of 
transforming  the  centrally planned  economy into  any kind  of market-
oriented economy. 
Motivation structure. One of the most impressive features of progress in Chaater4  113 
China's  economic  reform  lies  in  its  success  in  motivating  individual 
participants in the economy by focusing  on  new  incentives. In a society 
unified by values like solidarity, non-material motivation used to underlie 
all  individual  economic activitiess,  apart of course from  the  traditional 
incentives of central planning controls.  The reform  proposals have  paid 
increasing attention to material incentives as the principal way to realise the 
intentions of the state and to meet the wishes of the population. Individual 
interests deviating from  those  of the  planners are  no  longer denied  and 
neglected,  but are  encouraged to  develop through the growth in private 
business.  The  different  goals  and  aims  of  the  various  agents  in  the 
economic  system,  i.e.  the  state,  the  planners,  the  producers  and  the 
consumers, are taken into consideration when necessary. 
Ownership structure. Issues of ownership have been dealt with only slightly 
and with great caution in the reform proposals. State-ownership, or non-
individual ownership, is declared to  be the predominant category in the 
post-reform situation,  especially in  the  non-agricultural  sectors  which 
constitute such a vital part of China's economic capacity. In the rural areas, 
the long-term leasing of land to individual households should be regarded 
as  a  sort  of  individual  ownership,  even  if  it  is  still  called  collective 
ownership. Individual ownership can also be found in the small sector of 
private business and in part of the state-owned sector where some of the 
small scale enterprises and shops have been sold or let to individuals. The 
responsibility system in industrial production does not change the nature of 
ownership in the state-owned enterprises. At most it is experimenting with 
the  separation of the  influence of ownership from  the  outcome  of the 
technical management of production, since some of the defects of the state-
owned  enterprises  are  attributed  to  managerial  shortcomings.  Share-
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or  non-individual owned since the  state or institutions will hold a large 
proportion of the stocks.  Of course,  individuals are  allowed to  purchase 
shares, but this category of share-holders will not be significantly large in 
the near future. 
4.4.2  The Chinese-type economy: systemic features 
According to  their proposals,  the  reformers  in  China  are  attempting to 
transform  the  existing  centralised  planning  economy  into  a  so-called 
socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. Unfortunately, there 
is still no  definitive description of what exactly this will be,  but only a 
general and vague one, which makes any conclusion difficult. To help, we 
may review the reformers' ideas about the major features of the economic 
system  by  looking  at  stages  in  the  normal  transition  process  from  a 
centrally planned economy to  a market economy. Then,  by locating the 
Chinese-type  economy  at  its  appropriate  position,  its  systemic 
characteristics  can be shown in a more or less clear way. 
How then do the Chinese reformers think about transforming the old to the 
new Chinese-type economy--the socialist market economy? Based on the 
discussions  in this  chapter,  it is  possible  to  choose  some  points  that 
represent the main features of the system in operation during the course of 
transition. To the architects of China's economic reform, there are certain 
stages that will be experienced by reform on the road to its destination. ( see 
Panel 4-4-2). 
It is  not the subject of our discussion to determine whether or not the 
combination of the changes at each stage between the poles of  planning and 
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is a static expression of an economic system. What we are concerned with 
here  is  to  identify  a  certain position  anticipated  for  the  Chinese-type 
economy  by those who are reforming it.  To the present author, Stage 4 is 
that position. It would be,  in a few words,  a  market-oriented economy 
under the  very strong shadow of state intervention because of the existence 
of substantial state-owned industrial undertakings. 
Panel4-4-2  Major Sta~es of  Transformin~  Pla:nnin~ Economy In China 
Planning Control  Market forces 
Stage 1  P- Mo 
Stage 2  P- - M+ 
Stage 3  p--- M++ 
Stage 4  P  ---- M+++ 
Notes: 
p-:  loosening planning control in a very limited sense and to some small 
sectors  or branches  considered  as  exceptions,  for  example,  reducing 
planning orders for agricultural production; 
p --:  reducing the  extent of planning control for a  whole  sector in the 
economy and for a certain share of the production of the state-owned non-
industrial enterprises not controlled directly by the state plan, for instance, 
no state planning for agricultural production; 
p---: central planning agencies  no  longer involved in  short-term plan 
formation but only in long-term development programmes, the means of 
planning control less significant for the whole economy than economic 
instruments such as credit and finance; 
p ____ :  no specific direct planning but only broad indirective planning  •. 
state intervention existing but not  playing the commanding role  in the 
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Mo:  market forces not to be found in important sectors of the economy; 
M+: some elements of market forces  introduced into some  parts of the 
economy  which  do  not  influence the  existing way  of operation of the 
economic system,  for example,  small-sized free  markets  for some food 
gcxxis; 
M++: at least half of the economic activities working in accordance with 
market forces,  and  markets for a majority of consumer goods  and  some 
producer goods; 
M+++: fun-blooded  market  mechanisms  apply,  and  a  set  of  markets 
established. Chag1er5 
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M.S.Gorbachev was history together with the USSR. It is inaccurate to 
say that the radical reform of the Soviet-type economic system in the 
Soviet Union started under M.S. Gorbachev's era. It is  true,  however, 
to say that it was Gorbachev who had made it possible and feasible for 
the  most  fundamental  change  in  this  field  in  the  Soviet  history. 
Uskorenie, glasnost' and perestroika were put forward bringing  hope to 
revitalise the Soviet society (Battle,1988). Among the major objectives 
of Gorbachev's leadership, economic restructuring stood out as the most 
crucial strategy for approaching a satisfactory society ( Hewett, 1985). 
During the period of 1985-1991, the Soviet economy and society had 
experienced the most crucial time in its history. As far as the economic 
reform was concerned, discussions on the relevant issues of the reform 
had  been  the  hot  topic  in  the  country  ever  since  the  mid-1980s. 
Surveying  the  course  of economic  reform  in  terms  of substantial 
proposals, three phases of the reform could be discerned up to the end 
of 1991  when the country finally saw its end as a political entity. The 
packages of proposals and plans are those published during the periods 
of 1985-1987/88(Phase 1), 1989-1990(Phase 2), and 1991(Phase 3). 
The  economic  reform  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  was  launched 
immediately after Gorbachev assumed his post in 1985(Current Digest, 
1991b). However,  a systematic official proposal for economic reform 
had  not  been  put forward  until  1987.  In June  1987,  a  package  of 
measures for  altering the operation of economic mechanisms in the 
Soviet economy was approved as a decree by the Supreme Soviet. The 
full  title  of  it  was  "  The  Basic  Provisions  for  Fundamentally 
Reorganising Economic Management"  ( Aslund,  1991). Following the 
general  principle,  there  were  other supplementary decrees  adopted ChapterS  118 
officially,  e.g.  ten  decrees  involving  planning,  the  management  of 
scientific-technical progress, material supplies, financial  mechanisms, 
price  formation,  banking,  statistics,  branch  ministries,  republican 
organs, and social policy etc. Moreover, a new law on the state-owned 
enterprises  (associations)  also  constituted  a  key  part  of the  reform 
measures  in  1987.  For conventional  purposes  we  shall  call  those 
measures as  a whole the reform package of 1987. By this title it does 
not lilmt the contents of the package to the proposals adopted in 1987 
only.  Some elements of the measures put forward  in  earlier years, for 
instance, in  1986, were included, because the process of reforming the 
economic system had been continuous. In one word, the reform package 
of 1987 defined above would be regarded as the official document on 
economic  reform  in the Soviet Union  up  to  1990 when  the  further 
design publicly began. 
1990, or to  be  exact,  1989 and  1990,  saw at  least over ten plans for 
reforming the Soviet economy in a more radical way than the package 
of 1987(Financial Times, Nov.5,  1991). Of them three were officially 
organised and  worked out.  They were,  (1)  the  Ryzhkov government 
programme which  was  based  on the"  Albalkin Blueprint"  (October, 
1989) and presented in September,  1990( Current Digest,  1990b);  (2) 
Shatalin's 500-day plan formed in August, 1990(Current Digest, 1990e); 
and (3) the Presidential plan published in October,  1990(Current Digest, 
1990f). There was argument and discussion around these three major 
packages  for  economic  reform  in  the  country.  The  problem  of 
economic reform, as Aslund put it, was not whether it would go toward 
a market economy but how(Aslund,  1991). The Ryzhkov government 
plan  designated a moderate-radical reform which aimed at establishing 
a regulated market economy in the Soviet Union, while Shatalin's 500-
day  plan  called  for  radical  transformation  of the  economy  into  a 
genuine market economy with substantial private ownership.  It was 
commonly  agreed  that  the  Presidential  plan,  entitled  "the  Basic Chapter 5  119 
Guidelines for Stabilisation of the National Economy and Transition to 
a Market Economy"  ( Izvestia,  1990),  was  the  result of compromise 
between  the  radical  Shatalin's  plan  and  the  moderate  Ryzhkov 
government programme. It was  accepted  as  the operational blueprint 
for economic reform in the Soviet Union at that time(Current Digest, 
1990d). The  consensus on  the  major issues of the  economic  reform 
between the Shatalin plan and the Presidential plan would be of interest 
in this thesis. 
Entering  the  1990s,  the  political  situation  deteriorated.  Economic 
reform  at  all-Union  level  stood  still  against  a  background  of  a 
disintegrating  the  USSR  and  political  struggles  centring  around 
Gorbachev(Lapidus, 1990/91). Anyhow, pieces of plans were published 
from the central government about economic reform, privatisation and 
price  reform  in  particular.  But the  most  influential  ones  were  put 
forward by the Russian republic itself ( Tedstrom, 1991c; Bush, 1991 ), 
based on the essence of the Shatalin's SOO-day plan. 
The structure of this chapter was arranged according to the Soviet case, 
though  the  analysis  pattern applied  in  Chapter Four was  followed. 
There should be no reason against the decision that for the purpose of 
this thesis  the  1987 package  of reform  and  the  plans  in  1990  must 
become the major subject for analysing and discussing reform proposals 
in the  Soviet Union during  Gorbachev's  era.  Two  sections of this 
chapter therefore focused individually on the two packages of reform 
proposals. The major points of concern included proposed changes to 
the  role  of central  planning,  marketisation,  status  of state-owned 
enterprises and foreign economic activity. In Section Three where the 
introduction of reform proposals after 1990 was dealt with, Russian 
reform programme was one of the major topics when there was actually 
no substantial suggestion for economic reform at an all-Union level. A 
summary part of the discussion was the final section, i.e, Section Four, Chapter 5  120 
where the mainstream of economic system transformation in the Soviet 
Union up to 1991 was summarised in terms of economic system theory. 
And the major features of the prospective model of economic system 
designated were analysed in the framework of existing classification of 
various economic systems. 
5.1  The economic  reform  package of 1987 
The 1987 package for restructuring economic mechanisms covered a 
wide range of issues in the Soviet economy. Almost all the main aspects 
of the operation of the system had  been mentioned and dealt with.  It 
involved, for instance,  the  role of central planning,  the  status of the 
state-owned enterprises, the role of central and regional administrative 
bodies, the supply system, prices and wages, finance and credit, foreign 
trade and external economy, private and cooperative economic activity, 
agricultural reform and so on ( Schroeder, 1987). Constrained by space, 
we could only concentrate on some of them. The important areas of 
concern here  were the intended changes on,  (1)  the central planning 
control;  (2)  state-owned enterprises; (3)  market forces relating to price 
formation  and  allocation of investment;  (4)  private  and  cooperative 
business and others. Detailed discussions on these issues should enable 
one to reveal the characteristics of the nature of economic reform in the 
Soviet Union. 
5.1.1  Central Planning Control 
Central planning control, or to use  its  another name,  administrative 
control, was the core of the centrally planned system. The 1987 reform 
package stated that the general planning control by the centre over the 
national  economy  would  be  retained.  The  Soviet economy  would 
continue being planned and  managed as  "a unified national economic 
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directions  of economIC  development  and  enforce  programmes  of 
scientific-technical progress that were worked out from  the  top.  The 
system  of  state  orders  to  state-owned  enterprises,  i.e,  the  plan 
directives, would be  retained,  and  through  it the  government would 
continue to dictate production and  allocate the  requisite materials for 
the part of output produced for state orders. What was noticeable was 
that  the  share  of the  state  orders  in  total  output  was  supposed  to 
decrease gradually. 
The change to central planning control was said to be on its focus and 
the means of  control.  Only the  most important variables of national 
importance  would  be  under  consideration of the  central  planning 
committee,  while  all  operational  decisions  were  left  to  lower 
levels(Aslund, 1991). This would be realised by working out the basic 
economic  policies  and  specific  targets for a  long-term plan,  i.e.  15 
years, at the top, namely, by Gosplan. The formation of the operational 
plans---five-year and annual plans---would be done at republican and 
ministerial  level  and  even  down  to  the  enterprises'  level  on  the 
condition that in those plans the policies and goals set by the centre must 
be  followed  and  embodied.  The  centre  would  retain  the  power to 
supervise and approve the operational plans. However, planners would 
principally  use  economic  instruments  to  guide  economic  activity, 
avoiding  direct commands to individual enterprises as happened before 
the reform. As a result, the enterprises would receive from the planning 
authority the following orders  ( Schroeder,  1987):  (a)  non-obligatory 
control figures that specified value of output, profit, foreign currency 
receipts, and major indicators of scientific and technological progress 
and social development;  (b)  a mandatory bill of state orders for output 
that "ensure meeting society's priority needs";  (c)  limits, which include 
rationed goods and  centralised investment allocations;  (d)  long-term 
economic  normatives  based  on  a  list  approved  by  the  Council  of 
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payments for capital and  labour,  and the allocation of profits among 
various  kinds  of  taxes  and  reserve  funds  set  up  by  ministries  and 
enterprises.  The three  major funds  were the  bonus fund,  the  social 
development fund, and the fund for financing research and development 
and investment. 
5.1.2  State-owned Enterprises 
With the loosening of central planning control, the status of state-owned 
enterprises  was  declared  to  be  altered.  The  new  Law on the  State 
Enterprises (Associations)  defined  the  features  of  the  state-owned 
enterprises as,  (a)  firms founded and liquidated by superior authorities; 
(b)  accorded legal rights of possessions, use,  and disposal of physical 
assets  under  state  ownership;  and  (c)  formally  subordinate  to 
government agencies--ministries or regional institutions (Aslund, 1991) 
What was significant in terms of economic reform lied in the part of the 
Law  relating  to  the  decision  making  power  of  the  enterprises. 
Specifically  speaking,  the  firm  "was  entitled  to  make  on  its  own 
initiative any decisions provided that they do not run counter to existing 
legislation". For instance, it was able to work out and approve its 5-year 
and annual plans  of higher authority, on the condition listed at the end 
of the previous section. And the firm should  also base its plans on the 
demands of its customers, which would result in the contracts between 
the firm  and  its customers.  Under the  new Law,  the enterprise was 
endowed practical autonomous rights referring to  setting output and 
input mix  of its  production;  choosing  its  customers  and  suppliers; 
deciding on the structure of wages and bonuses and magnitude of capital 
investments. Nevertheless, the firm was required to be responsible for 
financing its current and capital expenditures from its sales revenues 
and other internally generated funds.  This meaned that the enterprise 
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business on its own. This was called the "full economic accountability 
and self-finance"{ Schroeder, 1987). The implication of self-financing 
indicated the inclination towards altering the soft budget constraints on 
enterprise, though the reform intention of the new Law was a far from 
efficient measure for coping with the problem. 
One should not overestimate the depth of the reform proposal in the 
new Law on State Enterprises if one examined the statement on the 
major issues.  For example, with the new Law,  the four categories of 
plan indicators were retained. The enterprise was obliged to obey plan 
discipline  and  fulfil  the  plan orders and  contracts,  which would be 
considered  as  the  most  important  criterion  for  evaluating  the 
performance of the enterprise and rewarding it. Here one could see the 
1987 reform  proposal full  of contradictions for what it intended to 
change and to retain. On some issues the reformers designated a radical 
transformation. At the same time they showed a conservative attitude 
towards the related issues. For instance, full economic accountability 
and self-financing of the state-owned enterprises was emphasised in the 
reform plan. But the same plan kept a system of state order remained. 
As long as planned control determined the production of the enterprise, 
how could one expect it to be self-financed in the real sense?1 
The most radical  elements of the  new  Law concerned the  internal 
management of enterprise. Self-management in enterprise was adopted 
by the Law. There shall be, as it said,  a Labour Council elected by all 
members of the firm. The election of key managerial personnel would 
be done in the same way. The Council was given powers on deciding a 
variety of matters relating to the use of the enterprise incentive funds 
and to the pay, discipline, and training of the workforce. The selection 
of the managers, which would be carried out at intervals of every 5-
1  The author agreed with Alec Nove when he pointed out in a personal talk with the 
author that as long as there was any plan directive for enterprise, no matter how few it 
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year,  must be ratified  by the  proper superior authorities.  Managers 
might be removed by vote of the collective, i.e,  all  members of the 
enterprise( Aslund, 1991). 
There was one further radical point that should be noticed in the new 
Law. It provided the possibility for declaring bankrupt and liquidating 
finns that persistently made losses ( Aslund, 1991). However, there was 
no detailed measure for implementing this procedure. 
5.1.3  Redivision of decision-making power 
Administrative decentralisation constituted a  major part of the  1987 
reform package.  Much attention was paid  to  dividing the decision-
making power between the centre and lower echelons, between central 
agencies and sectoral institutions. The functions,  roles  and sizes of 
bureaucracies  at  both  higher  and  lower echelons  were  said  to  be 
revised. 
The structure of administrative organisation in the Soviet economy can 
be drawn roughly like two branches of a tree: 
The centre 
/'  \ 
Sectoral bodies  Re~lQnal bodies 
Under this structure,  restructuring  the decision-making power went in 
two ways. On the one hand, by redefining the functions of the central 
organisations and  sectoral organisations  (ministries)  it was moving 
towards  recentralisation.  On  the  other  hand,  decentralisation  In 
perspective of ministerial bureaucracies was on its way. 
First of all, the existing all-Union committees such as Gosplan, Gosnap, Chanters  125 
the State Committee for Science and Technology, would be reorganised 
in  order  to  allow  them  change  their  working  foci  from  detailed 
management to longer-term strategy of the national economic planning 
and development( Schroeder, 1987). In particular, Gosplan was to play 
a key role in coordinating the work of all central bodies dealing with 
economic issues, to work out five-year and fifteen-year plans,  and to 
determine the composition of state orders and other related jobs. 
Furthermore,  some  new  bodies  were  created  at  the  level  of 
superministries
2 
,  which were subordinate directly to the USSR Council 
of Ministries. The purpose for such a sort of recentralisation was said to 
reinforce  the  centre  in  planning  the  strategic  development  of the 
relevant  branches,  and  to  carry out  a  radical  reform  of economic 
management. 
As  to  the  ministries,  a  certain  part  of  them,  namely,  sectoral 
subbranches,  would  be  replaced  by  the  establishment  of  •  several 
thousands' large associations, including interbranch state associations, 
concerns and state associations, and enterprises under the direct control 
of the ministries( Johnson and Kroll, 1991). As a result, the function of 
the  ministry in  the  management of the  economy would  have  been 
changed.  It would  act as  an  intermediate  link  in  planning  and  the 
administrative  process,  in  lieu  of  the  day-to-day  management  of 
numerous  firms.  It  was  supposed  to  play  the  role  of a  general 
supervisor who  was  responsible for principal  issues  relating to  the 
activities of the association and enterprises subordinate to it( Aslund, 
1991). 
On the side of decision-making power division between the central and 
regional  bodies,  the  reform  process  was  in  line  with  one-way 
2  Such as  the State Foreign-Economic Commission, the State Agro-Industrial 
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decentralisation. By the "basic Provision" of the 1987 reform package, 
the republican councils of ministers and their inferior organs, notably 
the local soviets, were accorded a  greater role and responsibility for 
regional economies.  The decision-making powers of republican and 
local governments would be strengthened ( Schroeder, 1987). 
In summary, the 1987 reform package stepped further in the direction 
of  redividing  the  administrative  responsibility  in  structure  of 
bureaucracy, both recentralisation and decentralisation to and from the 
centre. 
5.1.4  Market forces in pricing and investment allocation 
In discussion of introducing market forces or mechanisms by the 1987 
reform package, only some aspects of the issue are briefly covered 
here. They refer to the price formation and the means of allocating 
investment including production materials. 
The 1987 reform package called for,  in principle, a radical reform on 
the  pricing system. This reform encompassed all categories of prices, 
e.g. wholesale, procurement, and retail prices and rates. Attention was 
paid to interrelating the changes in the various sets of prices( Bornstein, 
1987). 
Prices revision was taken as  the preparatory step for reforming the 
mechanism of price formation. Prices of certain goods would be revised 
according to their market demand prices. For example. there would be 
a substantial increase in the price of fuels and raw materials relative to 
that of manufactured goods( Schroeder, 1987). 
Although the reform tone was high,  market forces  in setting prices 
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carried out. In the reformed pricing system prices would be formed by 
more than one formula(  Hewett,  1988).  A  few  products of national 
importance, such as raw materials, fuels, scarce goods etc. would take 
the form of state-set price, or as called, planned price. The share of this 
kind of price would be reduced greatly. In determining state-set price, 
several factors would be taken into account. It consisted of "socially 
necessary expenses of production and sale, utility, quality, and effective 
demand." ( Schroeder. 1987). Specifically, they included the charges for 
natural resources, capital. any labour,  and  the costs of environmental 
protection.  For the  bulk  of remaining  products,  the  contract  price 
would be applied. It was the price negotiated between buyer and seller. 
following rules established by Goskomtsen on the same basic principle 
as state-set prices. The real market price was not mentioned yet in the 
1987 reform package. while the sensitive issue of revising retail prices 
to conform to the  new pricing formula  was  avoided  as  well.  The 
statement that changes in retail prices "not only must not reduce living 
standards of workers, but also must raise them for some groups and 
more fully promote social justice," implied the concern and reluctance 
of radically reforming the price setting mechanism (Aslund. 1991). 
Like  some  of  the  past  reform  designs,  the  1987  reform  package 
intended to take effective use of bank credits and interests to serve as 
important  economic  levers  in  promoting  efficient  resource  use  ( 
Patrakov. 1987). And bank credits were to become a more important 
source of financing  investment. Together with self-financing of the 
enterprises,  the  function  of banks  was  emphasised.  The  banking 
organisations would be  correspondingly enlarged  ( Schroeder, 1987). 
Changes in allocating investment consisted of the change of supply 
system  of  production  goods.  In  this  respect,  wholesale  trade  of 
producers' goods would substitute, to a large extent, the centralised and 
administrative ration for the main channel of supply( Hewett,  1988). Cbaoter5  128 
However,  it  was  Gosnab  that  would  be  in  charge  of  organising 
wholesale  trade.  The  inputs  required  for  production of state  orders 
would  remain  being  rationed  with  some  other "particularly scarce" 
goods. 
In summary, some kinds of market forces would be  introduced in the 
new  pricing  system  and  the  mechanism  in  allocating  investment 
resources. But there was  no detailed measures for implementing these 
sorts of changes. 
5.1.5  Other issues 
Under this subheading, other essential aspects of the Soviet economy 
that  would  be  reformed  by  the  1987  reform  package  beside  those 
mentioned  above  were  to  be  discussed  briefly.  They  comprised 
agricultural reform,  new policy for cooperative and private business, 
and external economy. 
In the Soviet economy,  agricultural  production  had  been  more  of a 
problem.  It was,  therefore,  not  surprising that reform  in  this  sector 
started earlier than the overall reform. Some measures had been put 
forward  as early as  1985, when the first decree on agricultural reform 
was adopted officially ( Aslund,  1991). The main tone for improving 
agricultural production sounded like its counterpart in the initial stage 
of rural reform in  China, i.e.  increasing the autonomy of farms  and 
stressing the material incentives. According to the reform decree, farms 
were  allowed  to  sell  a  larger share  of  products  at  market  prices. 
Measures to market farm products more flexibly were introduced, and 
many  of the  arrangements,  similar to  those  applying  to  industrial 
enterprises,  would  be  exercised  by  farms.  Moreover,  collective 
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The  1987  reform  package  did  not  refer very  much  to  agricultural 
reform,  though in a general way it did.  However, the issue still stood 
out as important. Collective contracts and full economic accountability 
and self-financing brigades, family groups in particular, using intensive 
technology  were  strongly  endorsed  by  Gorbachev  and  CPSU ( 
Comparative Economic Studies, 1990). 
The second issue  of concern referred to the  private and cooperative 
entities in the Soviet economy. In the years 1986 and 1987, documents 
on permitting and  extending private  business  and  cooperatives were 
adopted( Aslund, 1991). The role of cooperative and private business in 
the  Soviet  economy  had  been  confirmed,  though  confined  to  the 
provision of consumer goods and services in small size. This was a 
minor  but  breakthrough  step forward  towards  radical  reform  in  a 
centrally  planned  economy  like  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  field  of 
ownership  structure.  The  Law  on  the  State  Enterprise  held  that 
cooperatives could be established under a state enterprise
3
• The Law on 
Cooperatives stipulated that cooperatives, unlike state enterprises, would 
not be subject to  compulsory plan assignments;  it could be granted 
substantial freedom to set wages and prices. However, the cooperatives 
would also be not able to get supply from the Gosnap, which would 
largely determine the fate of this sort of undertakings. That is,  they 
would not play a significant part in the economy. 
Last but  not  least,  in  1987,  there  was  an  important  step taken  in 
promoting external economic activity in the USSR. The decree of the 
USSR Council of Ministers on the Establishment in the Territory of the 
USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures with the Participations of Soviet 
Organisations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries was 
published  in January which marked  a  breakthrough in  this  sphere 
3  The development of this kind of cooperatives which took about 80 percent of 
cooperative business in the former Soviet Union is discussed in relevant Soviet press( 
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(Tiusanen,  1990). This, together with other supplementary decrees, set 
the legal framework for development of the external economy of the 
USSR 
5.2  Radicalisation  of economic  reform:  the  1990  plans 
Although only about two or three years  later than  the  1987 reform 
package, the 1990 reform plans set an almost entirely different tone for 
radically  transforming  the  planned  economy  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
Switching  to  a  market  economy,  accompanied  by  destatisation  of 
ownership of property, became the mainstream of the reform, the first 
ever in the history of the Soviet economy. For reason of convention, the 
1990 reform plans here are defined as a summary and consensus of the 
main  points  of  the  reform  proposals  in  the  Presidential  plan  and 
Shatalin's  plan,  with  the  former  plan  carrying  more  weight  in  the 
discussion. The range of the reform plans were fairly wide covering a 
number of major issues in the economy. For example. they referred to 
property ownership  in general,  ownership  and  disposition of land, 
operating rules for all enterprises regardless of ownership, measures to 
promote  small  businesses,  prevention  of  monopoly,  and 
demonopolisation, establishment of a western-style central bank and a 
two-tier commercial banking system, creation of a  securities market, 
general conditions for investment and employment, and foreign trade 
etc. While the general reform proposals, including the Presidential plan, 
were rich  in putting forward  the general line for the changes on a 
number of important areas, unfortunately, only some of the  changes 
could  be  dealt with  here.  They  are,  (1)  marketising  the  centrally 
planned economy; (2)  destatisation and privatisation of the state-owned 
business; (3)  price formation;  (4)  other issues of opening-up the Soviet 
economy and land reform. 
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As it stated, " there was no alternative to switching to a market" and this 
choice "has been made a choice of historic importance to the fate of the 
country"  (  Schroeder,  1991),  the  Presidential  plan  was  going  to 
radicalise  the  reform process through  marketisation of the  planned 
economy.  Calling for transforming the Soviet economy to  a genuine 
market economy in principle, it was to establish a single market in the 
entire country.  Correspondingly, central bank and a "reserve system" 
would  be  the  case  in  the  new  market  economy  (  Current  Digest, 
1990f).4  Most prices would be determined by supply and demand of the 
market, but this procedure would go gradually in the Presidential plan 
and faster by Shatalin'  s  plan. Enterprises would become independent 
and operate primarily in a market environment. The Ruble would be 
convertible internally first and then externally at the end of the reform
5
• 
A market economy was thought of as the only way for the Soviet Union 
to achieve the dynamic development of the national economy, a suitable 
standard of well-being for the population. As Gorbachev.himself put it, 
"economic  freedom,  the  economic  independence  of  production 
collectives and individuals, presupposes many forms of interaction using 
rules  and  mechanisms  of exchange  and  distribution.  All  this  was 
possible within the framework of the market." ( Tedstrom, 1990). 
In the course of the reform, (it would take two or more years according 
to  the  implementing  schedule  of  the  Presidential  plan,)  the 
comprehensive central planning would be eliminated gradually with the 
state  order system being retained  in order to  gain stability of the 
economy in the early stages of the reform process. A new body called 
the Union Contractual System would  take  the  place  of the central 
4  This was one of the issues that Presidential plan disputed with Shatalin's plan 
because the latter designed a looser economic tie between the republics(Current Digest, 
1990e) 
5 Internally convertible ruble means Soviet citizens and undertakings can take part in 
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planning agency to issue state orders to enterprises, and the magnitude 
of the orders would keep declining ( Hewett, 1990/91). 
Switching to  a market economy in  the  1990 reform plans was  taken 
more or less as a critical political decision because there was no detailed 
and practical measures proposed to  implement the  process. However, 
institutions would be established to  allow further development in  the 
short future of a genuine and efficient set of market mechanisms so that 
a  market  economy  would  be  shaped  in  the  Soviet Union  ( Hewett, 
1990/91). 
5.2.2  Destatisation and privatisation 
The core feature and  the most noticeable content of the 1990 reform 
plans was the appeal and device for fundamentally transforming state 
ownership in the Soviet economy. Destatisation and privatisation were 
proposed to achieve this aim by both the presidential plan and Shatalin'  s 
plan. 
Destatisation  (razgosudarstvlenie),  according to  the  definition of its 
architects, meaned a process of taking the assets out of the hand of the 
state,  or bureaucrats,  whilst it does  not  necessarily imply selling or 
giving those assets to individual persons. The latter was defined as 
privatisation process (Hewett, 1990/91). 
According  to  the  architects  of  property  reform,  ownership  was 
classified in the  law as  citizens'  ownership(  individual  ownership), 
collective ownership. and state ownership. The course of destatisation 
and  privatisation  would  be  unfolded  by  steps,  depending  on  the 
importance of the state-owned assets in the national economy. Leasing 
was the  ready measure for the starting of the  process of transition of 
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some cases, the transfer to leasing status had been an intermediate step 
in the conversion of state enterprises to collectively owned enterprises 
through employee buyouts. As far as  certain categories of state assets 
and small business were concerned, a quick sell-off and straightforward 
privatisation would be carried out (Current Digest,  1990f). By certain 
categories of state assets it referred to a portion of the state-held fleet of 
autos  and  trucks,  unfinished  construction  projects,  uninstalled 
equipment and construction materials, various civilian products now in 
the hands of the military, and assets held by "social organisations" and 
other party organisations supported with state funds( Hewett, 1990/91). 
The the  majority of large enterprises would be transferred from the 
hands of the state to state-holding companies first. And then in a quite 
long period, they would be sold to individuals through stock sales. Of 
course,  the state would continue its  control or monopoly in certain 
branches of the economy, such as defence contract, the nuclear power 
industry,  infrastructure etc. Moreover, the state was able to dispose of 
assets through stock shares in the economy( Current Digest, 199Of). 
To  reach  destatisation  and  privatisation,  there  were  devices  and 
transitional forms.  At the initial stages, investment funds  would be 
established,  as  a  transitional form  of ownership which was of non-
individual ownership, to start the process of converting state-owned 
enterprises to joint-stock companies. state-owned enterprises would be 
given a book value by the state property fund, for which a packet of 
stocks would be issued and then passed on to the appropriate investment 
fund. So those enterprises would become joint-stock companies under 
the  inv,estment  funds.  These funds  would  perform as  owners,  and 
receive dividends which would be turned over to the budget of the 
Union, Republican or local governments who created the funds.  Over 
time, through these funds, the stocks would be sold to the population, to 
workers of the enterprises involved and to foreign investors ( Hewett, ChapterS  134 
1990/91) . 
It was fairly reasonable to expect a pattern of mixed economy in the 
sense that  state  sector and  private  sector coexisted in  the  course  of 
reform in  the Soviet Union.  For instance,  the  Law on the  Enterprise 
adopted  in  1990  ( Aslund,  1991),  superseding the  Law on the  State 
Enterprise in  1987,  covered  all  types  of  business entities,  e.g.  state 
owned enterprise, cooperatives, family firms, joint ventures and others. 
Private  companies  were  encouraged  to  develop  (  Hanson,  1990). 
Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the degree of destatisation, 
particularly  privatisation  of  ownership  in  the  Soviet economy.  As 
expected by the planners of 1990 reform package including the authors 
of Shatalin's plan, by the end of the reform course, there would be state 
and  joint-stock companies,  cooperatives,  enterprises operating  on  a 
leasehold  basis,  and  private  business.  It was  anticipated  by  the 
Presidential  plan  that of those  ownerships,  about  40  percent of the 
economic activities would be operated by joint-stock companies, about 
10  percent to  15  percent by state enterprises  and  cooperatives, only 
about 5'% of the total by private business entities (  Hewett, 1990/91). 
5.2.3  Pricing mechanism 
Decontrolling prices, or liberalisation of prices control, was one of the 
key components of the  1990 reform plans.  The general principle for 
reform of the price system set by the Presidential plan was to rely on 
market mechanism to set the bulk of prices  ( Current Digest,  1990f). 
But  thE~ speed of change on wholesale prices and retail  prices  were 
different. 
With the  beginning stages ongoing, prices of products of state orders 
would  be  set  by  negotiations  between  the  enterprises  and  the  Union 
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no  agreement was reached. State controlled prices would be applied in 
the case of monopolistic products.  Apart from  these,  most wholesale 
prices  for  manufactured  goods  would  be  fully  negotiated  between 
buyers and sellers ( Hewett, 1990/91). 
Retail prices reform constituted one of the most sensitive areas, as it had 
always  been,  in  the  1990 reform plans,  especially in the Presidential 
plan.  At the  beginning of the reform period, they would be frozen in 
order to  avoid  causing  hyperinflation  and  dissatisfaction among  the 
population.  Later  on,  they  would  be  liberated  gradually  with  one 
exception. That was,  about  100-150 goods  would continue to  enjoy 
subsidisation  from  the  state  for their prices  throughout  the  reform 
process. The complete picture at the end of the proposed reform period 
would look like this: the bulk of consumer goods should move freely to 
market supply and demand, and only a few goods or necessities would 
be priced by the state with subsidisation. 
In summary, prices would take various forms  in the Soviet economy 
after the reform. At the wholesale level there would exist three types of 
prices for goods:  (1)  state set prices;  (2)  partially state-set prices for 
state order products;  (3)  free prices set by negotiations between non-
state buyers and sellers on the market. For retail prices, there would be 
two forms: state subsidised prices and free-market prices. 
5.2.4  Other issues 
In this part, two main issues were to be discussed briefly. They are the 
new policy for foreign  economic  activities  and  reform  in the  rural 
economy. 
It was in the  1990 reform plans that the importance of opening up the 
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opening trade  with,  and  receiving  investment from,  the  rest  of the 
global economy where the  Western market economy dominates.  The 
general thrust of the  new regulations  in  foreign  economic  activities 
would be,  the Presidential plan said, to foster the rapid integration of 
the  Soviet  economy  into  the  world  economy  through  encouraging 
existing enterprises to export and foreign businessmen to invest in the 
Soviet  Union.  Joint  ventures  with  foreign  partners  were  strongly 
encouraged  through  measures  such  as  exemption  or a  low  rate  of 
taxation on  them.  The relevant legislation specified that joint ventures 
would not be subject to centrally determined plans and exempted them 
from  taxes  on  profits  during  the  first  two  years  of  operation  ( 
Schroeder, 1991). A subsequent amendment allowed foreign companies 
to have majority ownership of ventures, and a decree issued in October 
1990 authorised  100 percent foreign ownership of enterprises on the 
Soviet territory (Johnson & Kroll,  1991). 
Furthermore, the  presidential plan expected that the  Ruble  would be 
gradually made  convertible on the current account and  even on the 
capital  account.  Its  exchange  rate  would  be  determined  in foreign 
exchange markets where about ten to fifteen commercial banks would 
enjoy full rights to buy and sell foreign exchanges ( Hewe~  1990/91) . 
In the field of rural refonn, a great step forward was taken in the 1990 
Presidential plan.  A massive land reform would begin, along with the 
privatisation of farming  and  farm-related  services.  The goal  was to 
reconstitute some of the 60,000 State and collective farms into private 
or cooperative farms,  while breaking  up  others  for the creation of 
150,000-180,000 small farms  (Current Digest,  1990f). These  farms 
would enjoy economic freedom in  growing or raising what they wish, 
and  could  sell  their  products  at  market  prices.  Privatisation  in 
transportation and food-processing industries would take place which 
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food available to the population ( Hewett, 1990/91). 
Unlike the reform package of 1987, 1990 reform plans, particularly the 
Presidential plan,  were produced in a  rush  against a  background of 
complex of social,  political and economic crisis in  the country.  The 
conflicts and vagueness of them were therefore unavoidable. Generally 
speaking, however, the 1990 reform plans marked a turning point in the 
process  of economic  reform  in  the  former  Soviet Union from  the 
moderate  reform  to  radical  transformation  of the  centrally planned 
economy. 
5.3  Reform  proposals in  1991 
1991, the last year of the former Soviet Union, witnessed numerous 
events happened in the country, but few actions on economic reform at 
all  Union level.  In the  last programme for economic reform in the 
Soviet Union,  the  Minister Pavlov's  official  anticrisis  programme 
(Current Digest, 1991e), nothing new was announced. It was said that 
the  new blueprint,  introduced  after the  "500 Day"  programme was 
ruled out in the autumn of 1990, was based and borrowed from those 
previous, ill-fated proposals. It called for a  genuine market-oriented 
reform while some centralised measures were to be imposed in order to 
stabilise the country's economy.  However,  there was one step worth 
note. It was the draft law on the denationalisation and privatisation of 
industry  approved  by  the  Union  Council  and  the  Council  of 
Nationalities (Johnson & Kroll, 1991). 
In 1991,  with the disintegrating of the  USSR,  the Russian republic 
played an important role in economic reform in the Union. Because it is 
territorially the major body of the former USSR, either in physical size 
or in political-economic affairs, the Russian reform programme in 1991 
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5.3.1  Privatisation 
The draft law on the denationalisation and privatisation spelled out for 
the first time the principle of the process. According to it , privatisation 
should  be  undertaken  predominantly  with  compensation,  i.e., 
institutions or individuals who acquired state-owned property must pay 
for it. The architects of the law thus rej ected the widely  -debated idea of 
free and equal distribution of state-owned property to the work force 
by  denationalisation  and  privatisation( Current Digest,  1991j). The 
state property fund was established. Its function was to assess the proper 
values  of state  property  as  preparatory  step  for  destatisation  and 
privatisation  ( Current Digest, 1991  j) . 
Possible forms of privatisation included direct acquisitions of factories 
by  their workers,  reconstituting  of establishments  into  joint-stock 
companies, and leasing with right of subsequent purchase. Under the 
law,  if workers should refuse to buy their factory, it might be auctioned 
off or otherwise sold to the most appropriate bidder (Johnson & Kroll, 
1991). 
Land reform was  declared to  be  carried out soon in  the country  ( 
Current Digest,  1991a). The ineffectively used land on collective and 
state farms , after being in the hands of local Soviets in the form of a 
special land fund,  would be  given to  newly created peasant farms, 
leaseholders and agricultural cooperatives. 
As far as the property division between the Union and the republics was 
concerned, the law said that individual republics might extend extra 
preferences to businesses within their jurisdiction. 
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Price reform was one of the few  foci  of the economic reform in the 
Soviet Union  in  1991.  Following the  line  of the  Presidential reform 
plan of 1990, there was a decree of the President in  April  1991, for 
implementing retail price revision and reform(Current Digest, 1991c). 
First of all,  a ceiling price was  set by  the  central government  after 
agreement with  the  republics  for  increasing  a  number of consumer 
goods. For example, the prices of meat,  bread, grains and  baby foods 
would  not go  up  over 200  percent,  eggs,  tea  and  oils  not over  100 
percent (Current Digest, 1991c). More consumer goods were said to be 
freely  priced  after  price  revision.  But  the  central  government  and 
republics would playa significant part in monitoring and regulating the 
price  reform.  At  this  stage,  price formation  was  still largely in  the 
hands of central or local authorities, including fixing the newly revised 
prices and setting limit for price change. It was repeatedly stressed that 
compensation for the increase of retail price to Soviet citizens would be 
provided properly by the state. 
5.3.3 Russian reform programme 
Faced with economic chaos and a lack of effective leadership on the part 
of the all-Union government, the RSFSR had taken upon itself the task 
of devising its own programme of economic stabilisation and reform. 
The initial proposals were discussed as early as April, 1991 ( Tedstrom, 
1991c), and the outline was roughly completed in October of that year( 
Bush,  1991).  Despite the vagueness and  hastiness of the programme 
presented, from the general principles of the programme, it appeared as 
the most radical and promising plan for reforming the Russian economy 
during the  period of our discussion.  It followed  a shock therapy  in 
relation to the speed of the transformation to a market economy. It went 
nearly  all  the  way in liberalising  prices  and  wages.  It  promised  to 
transform the way in which foreign trade was conducted, and it offered 
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the Ruble. But, the detail of the preconditions for a convertible ruble 
was not provided. Here only some critical points of our interest were 
covered  briefly  as  the  programme  itself  had  not  proved  to  be  a 
complete blueprint as yet. 
Liberalisation of prices  It was stated that  to make a switch to market 
prices in one motion was a severe, forced, but necessary measure. To be 
specific, the wholesale prices of major industrial goods such as fuel and 
raw materials and of farm  produce would remain under government 
control. So would  the retail prices of essential foodstuffs, medicines, 
public utilities, municipal transport, and children's goods. Liberalisation 
of other prices of goods and services would be completed in about six 
month. 
Privatisation  The  Russian  Republic  would  start  the  process  of 
privatisation in the small and medium enterprises in the services sector, 
trade,  industry  and  transport.  As  to  the  operational  forms  of 
privatisation, it was said that  shares in the larger industrial enterprises 
would be issued soon. Initially, shares would be divided between the 
state and employees of the respective factories. Subsequently, the state 
shares would be offered to the general public at market prices. But 
there was no statement about the proportion of the shares that would be 
sold to the work force in the factories. 
In agriculture, loss-making kolkhozes would be broken up,  and their 
land would be transferred to private farmers and to those who wished 
to set up small- and medium-sized "peasant trust enterprises". A massive 
boost for private farms was planned. 
External economic activity  By opening up  foreign trade and moving 
towards a fully convertible currency, foreign business was allowed to 
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republic. Free economic zone was proposed and began to be established. 
It  seemed  that  Yeltsin's  government  strongly  encouraged  foreign 
economic  activities  in  the  republic.  Notwithstanding,  the  Russian 
program did not convincingly give the practical opportunity for foreign 
investors to  invest in the country. For example, some essential issues 
such as buying of land or shares of Russian undertakings was not clearly 
discussed or mentioned. 
5.4  Towards  a  Soviet-type market economy 
On  the  basis  of the  concentrated  discussion  of economic  reform 
proposals,  primarily the  two  reform packages published in 1987 and 
1990,  a  summary of the  nature  and  direction  of the  reform  in the 
former Soviet Union would  be  given in  the  language  of theoretical 
assumptions set in the analytical framework. Following the structure of 
4.4, Chapter Four, two issues would be studied in this section. Firstly, a 
review of the changes on the basic structures of economic system is 
necessary. Then the present author attempted to describe the features of 
the  prospective  model  of  the  economic  system  intended  by  the 
reformers in the Soviet Union. 
Before we go to the core matter, a technical question must be resolved. 
That is the relative weight of the two reform packages in evaluating the 
nature  of the  reform  in the  country as  the  principal lines  of them 
differed in some extent. Here the two of them would be integrated as 
one package where it was possible. For example, one issue was dealt 
with in one of the reform packages  mainly.  And in the case of any 
conflict or different resolution on any matter in the two packages, the 
viewpoints  of the  1990  reform  plans  would  be  taken  into  account 
instead of the 1987 reform package. 
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The question  to be answered in this part  is what has  been done on 
paper in altering the critical elements of the central planning economy 
as a  kind  of economic system? The four structures, i.e.  structure of 
decision-making power, information, motivation and ownership would 
be examined in order. 
Decision-makin~ structure  It is interesting to notice that the direction 
of modifying the structure of decision-making power set by the 1987 
reform package goes to both ends of the spectrum: recentralisation and 
decentralisation, and both economic and administrative decentralisation. 
On the  one hand, the existing top organisations were reorganised with 
its  decision-making  power  reduced  to  long-term  and  strategic 
programming of the national economic development. Meanwhile, new 
central-level committees were created with decision-making  power 
recentralised from  the ministries. On the other hand,  the strength of 
republican and local governments were increased through endorsement 
of some of the  decision-making rights from the  hands  of all-union 
agencies in relation to the management of regional economic activities. 
What is the most significant change in the process of decentralisation 
lied in the strengthening autonomy of the state-owned enterprises as the 
result of loosening central planning control. 
Substantial change occurred correspondingly in the means of bringing 
about the expected outcome of the  decisions.  Command orders  no 
longer played an important part with  the increasing role of economic 
instruments and norms. But the exception should not be neglected, i.e. 
the remained state orders for a quite long time, and the state controlled 
prices for some goods. 
A  genuine  economic  decentralisation  could  be  expected  from  the 
destatisation and  privatisation which would make the enterprises the 
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Information  structure  Following  the  maIn  lines  of change  in  the 
structure  of  decision-making  power,  information  structure  was 
supposed to  work  partly in  different way.  The  vertical  flow  of the 
message was limited to a small volume, while the horizontal movement 
of the  information between suppliers  and  demanders,  producers and 
consumers would be prevailing. Simultaneously, orders and instructions 
would be replaced by norms, prices and so on. 
'With  reforms  on  the  price  system  unfolding,  prIces  of  vanous 
categories,  e.g.  state-set  prices,  negotiated  prices  and  free  market 
prices, would become the critical signals for economic activities. 
As  far  as  the  function  of  the  coordination  of  the  economy  was 
concerned, one should say that market forces would work in the process 
of marketising the economy. At the same time, significant non-market 
forces  would still remain in regulating and  controlling the economy, 
due to the remnant of the old central planning system in its broad sense. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to expect the new economic system designed 
by the  reform  proposals  would  coordinate  the  economic  activities 
largely through market forces under the shadow of state interference. 
Motivation structure  The radical  reform plan in the Soviet Union 
would create  incentives for actions  of agents  in the economy,  i.e. 
individuals and enterprises which were more powerful than the existing 
prevailing  ones.  The  proposal  for  self-management  in  enterprises 
increased  the  interests  of workers  in  running  the  business  more 
efficiently. 
Requirement for full economic accountability and self-financing would 
drive  the  enterprise  to  improving  its  performance  in  order  to  get 
reward.  And  it would produce the  same effect on  ministries because 
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performance of the enterprises subordinate to them. 
Destatisation  and  privatisation  threw  light  on  strongly  motivating 
individuals for efficient working. Unemployment and bankruptcy, from 
the negative side, enforced the role of material incentives for workers. 
Ownership structure  In respect of ownership, the reform plan showed 
its most  revolutionary character.  Individual ownership of productive 
assets was recognised and guaranteed in  thE! Soviet economy. Moreover, 
a diversified  pattern of ownership  structure  was  created. The  state-
owned sector,  joint-stock business  and  private-owned entities would 
work  together.  The  inclination  towards  privatisation  through 
destatisation would  result  in  a  relatively  large  private sector in  the 
economy. 
However, owing to the vagueness of the reform design on this matter, 
the  operation of the  ex-state-owned  enterprises  seemed  not  clearly 
explored. Simply assuming that the basic principle of running a join-
stock company in an existing market economy would not work because 
the mode of operating those enterprises artificially made  as  join-stock 
companies would presumably differ in one way or the other from the 
original samples in the West. 
5.4.2  The Soviet-type market economy 
The task of this part seemed more or less easier than its counterpart in 
Chapter 4, 4.4.2, thanks to the complete blueprints of Soviet economic 
reform in the  1990s. More information had been provided, especially 
by the publication of the 1990 reform plans. But there is no reason to 
be optimistic for achieving a satisfactory result of the study. 
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of the Soviet economy would lead the country thoroughly to a market 
economy.  But the prospective model would not be  simply built up  by 
joining the  family  of  Western-style  market  economies.  The  future 
economic system was defined as a market economy with Soviet features. 
To  reveal  the  nature  of the  Soviet-type  market  economy,  two  steps 
should be taken. Firstly, like what has been tried in Chapter Four,  4.4.2, 
stages of transforming the centralised planning economy to  a market 
economy implied in the reform proposals in the Soviet Union would be 
shown. The destination of the process would be the prospective model 
of the Soviet-type market economy.  Then,  space  would  be  spent on 
analysing the basic differences between a Soviet-type market economy 
and the normal Western-style market economy. 
Panel 5.3.2  Major Stages in Transition of the Planned economy In Former Soviet 
Union 
Notes: 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Plannin~ control 
p ... 
p ...... 
Market forces 
M* 
M** 
p ... :  Central  planning  control  was  loosened  through  administrative 
decentralisation in dealing with sectoral and  regional economies, and 
enterprises  got  more  autonomous  rights  in  decision  making.  But 
substantial planning control remained; 
p ...... : No significant planning control was conceived through operational 
plans. Only a limited degree of State intervention was retained by the 
means of the State order system and State controlled prices and so on; 
M*: Market forces played roles in limited areas, such as influencing the 
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instruments were given more power in regulating economic activities; 
M**: The  economy was,  to  a large  extent,  marketised.  In the  main 
spheres of economic activities a full-blooded market mechanism was 
expected. 
From the panel, one could point out that Stage 1 represents the intention 
of the  1987 reform  package  while  Stage  2 is  the  ideal end  of 1990 
reform  plans.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  goal  of  the  1990 
Presidential reform plan was to achieve a  market economy with strong 
shadow  of  planned  control.  This  is  called  a  Soviet-type  market 
economy. But the Shatalin plan, and those based on it like the Russian 
reform  programme,  designated  a  more free  market  economy within 
which the state would be pulled out of the economy as the commander 
in a centrally planned economy. 
Now, the question arises: what is the boundary between the Soviet-type 
market economy and the normal market economy? Generally speaking, 
the Soviet-type market economy would differ from the existing market 
economy from both sides: it would be,  on the one hand, more classic 
than the normal market economy, because the architects of the economic 
model learned only the basics of a market economy,  probably from 
textbooks. Market mechanism was thought naively as the powerful gun 
to kill the diseases of the planned economy. 
On the other hand,  however, the scope of the market mechanism in the 
Soviet-type economy would depend on the ability of the state control, 
and its ability to achieve these objectives through non-directive means. 
As  a  result,  it  would grow  as  a  market  economy  with great state 
intervention which would be the legacy of the ex-planned economy. 
Establishing  the  market  economy  from  the  basis  of a  centralised 
planning system and by the designers and officials deeply involved in 
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influential  state  intervention.  Consideration of keeping  stable living 
standards for the population, protecting the vested interest group, would 
result in a compromise. The believed role and responsibility of the state 
in the economy, at least in determining the development of the country 
for long term future purpose, would contribute to the formation of the 
Soviet-type  market  economy.  For  example,  the  existence  of  the 
significant  state-owned  joint-stock companies  would  influence  the 
operation of the market mechanism in principle, as  it is in the Western 
economy.  To guarantee the  living  standards of the  population, some 
products  would  continue  to  enjoy subsidies which definitely would 
distort the price structure set on the market. 
Finally, a few words about the Russian reform objective is necessary. It 
would  go  further  towards  a  market  economy than  the  plans  of the 
former Soviet Union. Whether it would reach a genuine Western-style 
market economy or not is  not the question of this thesis, but one could 
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Chapter 6:  Searching For Efficient Economic Systems:  A 
Comparison 
After the  two  chapters dealing with the  economic  transformations in 
China and the Soviet Union respectively,  in this chapter a comparative 
study is to be conducted on the proposals of economic reforms in China 
and the Soviet Union in the periods of our discussion. It is  also part of 
our conclusion about the  reforming efforts on paper in  the  two  large 
centrally planned economies.  Based on  the  materials  provided in  the 
previous chapters, Chapter Four and  Five, the  comparison is  done on 
several selected issues. First of all, reforming efforts in some essential 
aspects  of the  centrally  planned  economy  in  the  two  countries  is 
compared in their depth as well as  width. Of these aspects we include 
the  central  planning  control,  state-owned  enterprises,  market 
mechanism, opening-up and the rural economy. In the second section of 
this chapter, comparison of the proposed changes in the two economies 
is  conducted in terms  of a theoretical analysis  as  established in  the 
analytical framework of this thesis. Structures and major features of the 
prospective models of economic systems designed by the reformers in 
China and the former Soviet Union is the subject. Then, the author is 
going  to  contrast  the  strategies  and  technologies  of the  economic 
reforms embodied in the proposals in these two cases in order to reveal 
some relations between the  proposals and the strategies required for 
transformation of the centrally planned economy. In this final section, 
the two models of carrying out the transformation in  the ex  -CPEs  in 
our two cases is also to be discussed briefly. 
6.1  Similarities and  differences 
As discussed in our analytical framework, there should be no argument 
that to reveal the nature of the centrally planned economy in general in 
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touched  on in  terms of any  altering of the  system.  They are,  (1)  the 
central  planning control;  (2)  the  state-owned enterprises;  (3)  market 
mechanism in economic operations. In the context of the present study, 
two more issues should be added in brief referring to the opening  -up of 
the  closed  economy  and  reforming  the  mechanism  of  organising 
agricultural production. As  a matter of fact,  all  these issues have been 
paid attention to,  more or less impressively, in the reform proposals in 
China and the Soviet Union.  But the rank of importance of and degree 
of the  change  on  each  of the  aspects  in  the  two  cases  seem  to  be 
different, due to  the  different problems in  the  Chinese and the Soviet 
economies. Now,  it is time to conduct the comparison between the two 
cases to  trace  out a general tendency of economic transformation in 
centrally planned economy. In addition to telling what it  is,  the author 
also tried to  answer why it is  in  a brief way,  though. But it is not the 
author's intention to judge which model of transformation was  more 
successful than the other. It was commonly agreed that economic reform 
in  China has  been going well since 1978, whereas the former Soviet 
Union  collapsed before  many  of its  reform  plans  could  be  put  into 
action. There is therefore no solid ground for such a comparison. 
6.1.1  Central planning control and decentralisation 
As the key character of the centrally planned economy, central planning 
control ought to  be put on the  top of the  list of priorities for being 
restructured.  The  fact  is  that  it  came  first  as  the  starting  point  of 
economic reform in both of the countries. And even the  changes went 
at same pace in the initial stages in our two cases. For example, calling 
for decentralising the over-concentrated decision-making power at the 
centre,  measures  were  adopted  for  loosening  the  practical  planning 
control from the top in both economies. This is a common characteristic 
of the  reform proposals, either sectoral or comprehensive in  China's 
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However, where detailed arrangements were concerned, decentralisation 
went in three ways in our two countries:  (a)  from the central planning 
agencies  to  local  planning  authorities;  (b)  from  the  central 
administrative agencies to  ministries and  lower economic institutions, 
i.e, enterprises;  (c)  switching the focus of the work by central agencies. 
To help understand the situation, panel 6.1.1  is drawn below. 
Panel 6.1.1  Three roads of loosening central planning control 
Central planning and 
cl  b 
I 
I 
Locru aumQ~  i 
Associations 
Enterprises 
Road  (a)  is  mainly taken by Chinese reformers since the power of the 
local  planning  agencies  was  strengthened  greatly  in  the  course  of 
reform. The case of special economic zones, the opened-up coastal cities 
and special regions and Hainan Province, among other things discussed 
in  section 4.1.2,  chapter 4,  supports our argument.  Meanwhile, the 
Soviet reformers were very cautious to decentralise the decision-making 
power to the republics.  In their 1987 reform package and 1990 reform 
plans, e.g.  in the Presidential plan and Shatalin programme this issue 
was also a very sensitive subject ( see section 5.1.1, 5.2.1, chapter Five). 
This is because the position of the republics in political and economic 
structures of the former Soviet Union was entirely different from, say, 
the  provinces  in  China.  The  two  economies  were  organised  under 
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cellular.  In  China  each  level  of  administration  has  an  overall 
responsibility  for  its  subordinate  levels  (Donnithorne,  1967).  The 
central government's control was not as direct and strict as  it was in the 
former Soviet Union  where  the  economy was  highly  integrated  and 
controlled by Moscow.  The  fear of losing control over the  republics 
which showed a growing inclination of independence from the Union 
had  hindered genuine decentralisation  from  the  centre in  the  former 
Soviet Union. This was one of the reasons, for the present author,  that 
Shatalin plan could not be accepted by the Government. Obviously, the 
Shatalin plan proposed a much looser relation between the republics and 
the  centre.  Relatively  speaking,  Chinese  reformers  were  more 
comfortable than their Soviet colleagues on this  issue.  As  far  as  the 
second destination of decentralisation  (road  (b)  ) is  concerned, things 
seem  complicated.  Chinese  reformers  designated  a  gradual  de-
centralisation of enterprises but retaining  the  power of ministries,  as 
there was no  sign of weakening the ministries in the relevant proposals 
and measures. In the Soviet Union. a recentralisation was taken in the 
1987 reform package in the distribution of decision-making authorities 
between the central agencies and the ministries, while associations in-
between the  ministries  and  enterprises were given some power from 
both the central and ministerial agencies. The reason for the difference 
in the  two  countries  may be  found  in  structural  arrangement of the 
administrative system. In China. ministries have been part of the central 
authority to local  governments  and  enterprises  in  particular.  In  the 
Soviet Union,  as  noted  in  section  5.1.1,  chapter Five.  ministries in 
Moscow  formed  a  powerful  individual  level  in  the  system  of 
administration which subordinated to the top( all Union level}  authority 
and above the republics and enterprises. To  weaken the power of the 
ministries was one of the important goals of 1987 reform plans. not to 
say reform  programmes  in  1990s.  The  third  road  of loosening  the 
central control would  result in  decentralisation to the  levels of local 
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contents and degrees of power laid down by the central authorities when 
their concerns  were  switched from  detailed  and  short-term plans  to 
long-term and prospective programmes. This tendency occurred in both 
of our cases,  though there  is  of course  slight different  result  as  the 
lower echelons gained the decision-making power in  different degrees 
and  forms.  On  China's side,  both  local  governments  and  enterprises 
gained  more  power under the  policy of road  (c),  while in  the  Soviet 
case, associations and enterprises, other than ministries or republican 
planning agencies, were promised more power from the change of foci 
of the central agency. 
So it is interesting to note that the focus of improving central planning 
control through redivision of decision-making authorities in the Soviet 
reform plans was put on strengthening the power at the centre--the all-
Union level-- and according more autonomous rights to associations and 
enterprises,  while  reducing  the  role  of  ministries  in  economic 
administration  and  confining  the  power of republics.  In  China,  the 
power of the central institutions, including ministries in some cases, was 
weakened with some decision-making authorities being transferred to 
local agencies and enterprises. 
Here it is necessary to stress that loosening central planning control does 
not  necessarily lead to  non-planning regulation in the economy.  For 
instance,  as  it  is  in reality,  local  and  ministerial  authorities  would 
continue the planning or administrative control over the economy. This 
is  the  phenomenon  of  so-called  administrative  decentralisation 
(Bomstein, 1977). From our cases one could discover the very fact that 
the extent of introducing market forces did not go at same pace with the 
loosening  of the  central  planning  control.  Here,  a  review  of the 
discussions of section 4.4.2 and 5.4.2 in chapter Four and Five would be 
helpful for this argument. To the present author, the lag of the progress 
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control could possibly be explained, to a large extent, by the substitution 
of local or ministerial administrative control from the hands of central 
authorities. Nevertheless, decentralisation from the top is  the necessary, 
though  not  sufficient,  prerequisite  for  transforming  the  planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy. 
The fact that there was not much essential difference in the arrangement 
for changing the central planning control in China and the Soviet U  Irion 
can be explained from the very similarity of the economic system in this 
respect especially.  For almost all  the  problems which occurred in  the 
Chinese  and  Soviet  economies,  the  over-centralised  control  of  the 
economic activities had been blamed. In logic and in practice, loosening 
central  planning control was  expected to  solve the  problems to  some 
extent. 
6.1.2  State-owned enterprises and privatisation 
It is  needless to  stress that the performance of state-owned industrial 
enterprises, medium- and large-sized ones in particular, had been more 
of a longstanding problem in centrally planned economies. Great efforts 
had been made to search for prescriptions. Now, in the proposals of the 
Chinese and the Soviet reforms in  1980s and early 1990s, the old road 
was still followed but a new approach was conceived. It was commonly 
recognised in the two cases that the enterprises should be able to make 
some decisions on their production,  and  the related issues,  to  be  the 
producer in its genuine sense. To achieve this goal, reform architects in 
the two economies put forward different prescriptions. 
After the  usual  initial steps towards endorsing some certain sorts of 
autonomous  rights  to  the  state-owned  enterprises  as  the  result  of 
loosening central planning control over them, the Chinese and the Soviet 
endeavours started to  diverge.  In  China,  as  discussed in  section 4.1.3 Cbapter6  154 
and  4.2.1  in  Chapter Four, thinking  followed  the  way  to  relax  the 
tension  between  the  administrative  institutions  and  the  enterprises 
formed  in  the  long  past  when  the  latter  had  been  regarded  as  the 
subordinate agencies of the former.  Attention was paid to motivate the 
incentives and initiatives of the enterprises as  profit-seeking producers. 
The  contract  responsibility  system  in  state-owned  business  was 
attempted as a comprehensive remedial package  which was expected to 
play a crucial role for increasing the sense of economic accountability 
and easing the  defects of soft budget constraint endemic in  the  state-
owned enterprises  ( Kornai,  1980).  In  the  Soviet Union,  something 
similar  was  called  for  but  not  in  great  effort,  for  example,  self-
financing  and  full  accountability of the  enterprises  in  1987  reform 
package  ( see section 5.1.2). In  1990 and  afterwards, the most radical 
and revolutionary measure was produced which marked the remarkable 
step in the history of economic reform not only in the Soviet  economy 
but  also  in  the  centrally planned  economy  as  a  whole. 
1  Attempt at 
improving the  performance of the  state-owned enterprises within the 
existing frame of ownership appeared to  be abandaned, as  revealed by 
the analysis in section 5.2.2 and 5.3.2 of Chapter Five. Along with the 
destatisation  proposal,  the  former  State-owned  entities  would  be 
expected to operate under different circumstances and rules which were 
thought to be effective to overcome the endemic problems affecting the 
activities  of these  undertakings.  Without  detailed  discussion  of the 
operation of the destatised enterprises provided by the architects, one 
point should  at least be clear, i.e. the relation between the enterprises 
and  the  State  resulted  from  mainly  the  ownership  would  be 
fundamentally  changed.  State  intervention was  said  to  be  kept  to  a 
minimum level, except  state's purchase of a few important goods. 
The  trial  of stock-share  companies  under  non-individual  ownership 
I  The fact that the similar proposals were published in Poland. Hungary and other Eastern 
European countries earlier should not deny the argument because those proposals were produced WIder 
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among former state-owned enterprises in  China in the  1990s indicated 
the  reluctance for  a basic change  of the  ownership of the  large  and 
medium-sized  state-owned  entities.  This  may  be  explained  by  the 
ideological obstacles. Privatisation, among other things,  was officially 
believed to be against socialist principles. However, the  1992 policy for 
economic reform implied the possibility of a gradual breakthrough  In 
practicality. 
Difficulties in  reforming  the  state-owned  enterprises  arose  not  only 
from  their more  complex  internal  and  external  relationships  in  the 
economy, but also from the very fact that they had welfare function to 
their staff, too. In many cases welfare of the people, and their families, 
working  in  state-owned  enterprises  greatly  depended  on  the 
undertakings.  Any  change  of  the  status  of  the  enterprises  would 
negatively affect people involved. This  made  the  matter much  more 
complicated than it looked, and reformers had to be very cautious about 
it. 
By contrasting the  efforts  of improving the  efficiency of the  state-
owned  enterprises  in  our two  countries,  one  could  hardly  find  the 
prescriptions other than  thinking in these  ways:  1)  providing  more 
freedom on decision-making to the enterprises by reducing and revising 
planned indicators;  2)  changing management style by transferring the 
state-owned enterprises into stock  -share companies with the state being 
the major share holder;  3)  privatizing the state-owned undertakings. It 
is obvious that China has moved towards the second stage of the reform, 
while the Soviets proposed a resolution of the stage 3. 
6.1.3  Market mechanism and marketisation 
Introducing some factors of market mechanism into and  marketisation 
of the planned economy seemed to be the two major steps in altering the Chanter 6  156 
economIC  system  In the  two  countries.  The  difference  of the  two 
resolutions lies in the degree of transfonning the planned economy into 
one approaching a market economy. 
Introducing  market  factors  into  a  planned  economy  referred  in 
principle to partial market mechanisms in price fonnation, establishing 
some kinds of markets for consumer goods and the so-called economic 
means of government regulating instruments. This sort of measure was 
accepted on a large scale in China's economy where market forces were 
supposed to work in the sphere with central control. It should be agreed 
that massive achievements have been gained in this field in China since 
the market mechanism played a  more and more important part in the 
economy. Here the relative successful marketisation of the collective, 
private and foreign related sectors was significant in contributing to the 
reform  of  the  centrally  planned  economy  in  China.  This  was 
particularly clear when compared with the Soviet case which lacked the 
influence or demonstration effect of successful attempt at marketisation 
in any sector of the economy. In China's case it is also especially notable 
that some of the  instruments  used  by the government in a  market 
economy  were  taken,  in  various  scale,  in  the  reformed  Chinese 
economy.  For instance,  taxes,  interest rate  and exchange rate were 
accorded significance in economic life there ( see section 4.2.2 and 4.3. 
in chapter Four). 
Price fonnation in the refonned economies of the two countries is a 
good example for examining the role of market forces introduced. It 
seems that in both cases a  multi-tier price setting system combining 
market  mechanism  and  planning  control  had  been  adopted  as  the 
solution of the reform of the pricing mechanism (see section 4.3.2 of 
Chapter Four,  section 5.2.3 and 5.3.2 of Chapter Five ).  Even in the 
blueprint of marketising the planned economy in the Soviet Union put 
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wholesale level would exist instead of a sole market price. 
Marketisation  of a large share of state-owned business was one of the 
endeavours in China's reform. Selected sectors and regions were on the 
way to approaching a fully fledged market mechanism, e.g. agriculture 
and special economic regions (section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of Chapter Four ). 
Well,  'Soviet  reformers showed their encourage in the  1990s reform 
plans, for example, Shatalin plan.  and  even the  Presidential plan,  by 
calling for completely switching the economy into a Soviet-type market 
economy,  though the Shatalin programme went further in this respect 
than  the  Presidential  plan.  Marketisation  of  the  existing  planned 
economy,  which was the original and  typical sample of this type of 
economic  system,  sounded  possible  in  theory,  accompanied  by 
destatisation of the  state-owned enterprises.  Lacking  the  necessary 
details of how  the  process of marketisation would  go  on,  one  may 
assume that at least the basic rules for a market economy to work would 
be followed in the new type of economy. The problem here is by what 
means  do  we  reach  the  destination?  In  this  respect,  the  road  of 
introducing  market forces  into  the  key  parts of the  system for  the 
market mechanism to work properly was followed, for instance,  price 
liberation in the initial stages of the transformation (see section 5.2.3 
and 5.3.2 of Chapter Five). 
6.1.4  Other issues 
In this section two issues were chosen according to their importance in 
the reform processes in China and  the Soviet Union.  First came the 
opening-up of the closed economy.  And  then  the  reform  effort  in 
agricultural production, or in a broader range, the rural economy, was 
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The  policy  of  opemng-up  the  closed  planned  economy  took  a 
remarkable position in the process of economic reform in  China  ( see 
section 4.1.2  and  4.3  of Chapter Four).  This was,  perhaps,  the  most 
successful  part  of the  reform  efforts  proposed  and  implemented  in 
China without much argument. Meanwhile, nothing noticeable occurred 
in the Soviet economy in this field except the measure for introducing 
foreign  direct  investment  in  the  country  in  1987.  However,  a 
convertible ruble was  mentioned in  the  reform plans  in the  1990s in 
both the Shatalin plan and  the Presidential plan.  Foreign financial  aid 
was required for the reform. Nevertheless, the Soviets or Russians were 
still  not  ready to  open wide  its door to foreign  investors.They were 
unable to provide the necessary preconditions for a genuine opening-up. 
China's  policy  in  opening  up  its  economy to  the  world  market  and 
attracting substantial  amounts  of foreign  investment in  its  domestic 
economy should be attributed partly to the contribution of the Overseas 
Chinese and the existence of Hong Kong and Taiwan, advantages  the 
former  Soviet  Union  could  not  take.  The  legacy  of  China's  pre-
communist  history  as  the  semi  -colonies  of a  number of developed 
countries,  such  as  Great  Britain,  United  States  and  Japan,  put the 
country more or less closer to the West than the former Soviet Union. 
At the same time,  the  close economic relation of the former Soviet 
Union with the  CMEA did contribute to  its  isolation from  the  West 
economically. 
As to rural reform, it is safe to say that China has marched far ahead. 
Although  in  official  documents  no  privatisation  of the  land  was 
approved and confirmed, the latest development of the leasing system on 
land use and management in rural area implied this resolution. By the 
series  of reform  measures  taken  in  the  rural  sector in  the  Chinese 
economy,  a marketised economy was expected. In addition, it seemed 
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economic development was in earlier stages than the Soviet economy. 
The same sort of prescriptions for rural  areas  in the  Soviet Union 
encountered obstacles, despite the great efforts by the reformers there. 
The difficulties occurred in agricultural production seemed more severe 
in the Chinese economy than in the Soviet economy, according to the 
importance of this sector in their economies. The Soviet economy faced 
trouble agricultural production as well, but the relative position  it took 
and the ability of the economy of importing grains eased, to a certain 
degree,  the urgency of the  problem. There may be reasons  for  the 
difficulties to make effective reform in the rural economy, which could 
be  traced  through  the  tradition  and  techniques  of organising  the 
production,  the  longer time of planned control, and the inertia in the 
Soviet agriculture. Simple prescriptions like those adopted in China 
might  not  be  powerful  enough  to  kill  the  disease  in  the  Soviet 
agriculture. As a matter of fact, China has a larger rural population, a 
shorter history of planned control  and  less  advanced techniques of 
production in agriculture than the Soviet Union, which provided more 
room for manoeuvre towards effective change from planned control. At 
the same time, in the Soviet case more radical and powerful measures 
such as massive privatisation of the land were required. However, the 
different response of the peasants to the same reform measure in China 
and the former Soviet Union may also be explained by the quality of the 
peasantry in the two countries. In the Soviet Union peasants had lost 
interest and love for the land,  or rather. their enthusiasm  had been 
destroyed. This was especially true among the young generation. While 
in China the damage to the peasantry was not as severe as in the Soviet 
case. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that a private rural economy 
was  the  aim  of  both  Chinese  and  Soviet  (Russian)  economic 
transformation. 
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What type of economic system would be established by the economic 
reforms  in  China  and  the  former  Soviet Union? A modified planned 
economy or a regulated market economy? Or something in the  middle 
of the planned and market economies? From the discussions above, one 
is  able  to  answer this  question  in  terms  of the  theory  of economic 
systems and taking a  comparisive perspective. 
In Chapter Four (section 4.4)  and Five (section 5.5)  the basic structures 
of the economic system in the  new economies in China and the Soviet 
Union  were  described.  Here  we  can  contrast  in  the  first  place  the 
characteristics  of each  type  of reformed  economy,  and  then  their 
distance from planned  and market economies. 
6.2.1  Decision-making structure 
In China's reform plans, location of decision-making moved down from 
the top to the lower echelons and closer to enterprises. Local authorities 
in-between the centre and enterprises played a more important part in 
decision-making than they were in pre-reformed economy. 
In the Soviet Union, the intention of reform was to weaken the power of 
the echelons in-between the central  ( all-Union level)  and enterprises 
(associations), for instance ministries and republican authorities. And it 
was logical to expect a decentralised decision-making structure after the 
destatisation and privatisation of the ex  -state-owned enterprises. 
As to the means of implementing any decision, command and instruction 
of the authorities would be significant in the course of reform but the 
authorities would pay more attention to influence the consequences of 
the action of the  participants, e.g. enterprises, rather than controlling 
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proposed a  more thorough transition from  the traditional centralised 
decision-making structure in its 1990s reform plans (see section 5.2 and 
5.3  of Chapter Five).  Because,  with destatisation  and  privatisation 
unfolding, decision making would be done on the spot in a large part of 
the economy. 
The decision-making structure in the reformed economy of China and 
the former Soviet Union would  be,  therefore,  largely decentralised, 
which is closer to a  market economy and farther from the  existing 
traditional  planned  economy  (  see  section  2.1.1,  Chapter  Two). 
However,  the  fact  that  planned  or administrative  control would  be 
strong in either the  Chinese or the Soviet model after the  transition 
would  require  to  some extent  a  bit of centralised  decision-making 
power, particularly in China's case. 
6.2.1  Infonnation structure 
While giving more play to market prices and other monetary means as 
the signals in the economy, Chinese refonners decided to retain vertical 
flow of the infonnation in large state-owned enterprises for a certain 
long time. So the market mechanism would work together with planning 
control to coordinate  economic activities. 
In the Soviet reform plans, particularly the 1990 Presidential plan and 
the  proposals  afterwards,  a  quasi-market information structure  was 
assumed.  For example,  with  the  state  withdrawing  from  planning 
control  over  a  large  part  of  the  economy,  horizontal  flow  of 
information in the economy would be the essential form of transmitting 
the messages, such as prices, quantities and other monetary means. 
It is obvious that the infonnation structure designated by the Soviet 
reformers would be  more similar to a market type economy, while the Chan1er6  162 
Chinese  one  would  stay  a bit farther  from  the  market  economy.  Of 
course, both the Chinese and the Soviet models have gone away from 
the centrally planned economy. 
6.2.3  Motivation Structure 
In changing the nature of the existing non-material motivation structure, 
Chinese reformers paid much attention to  motivating the population by 
material incentives to  participate in  economic  activities, either in  the 
public  sector  or in  private  business.  Meanwhile,  Soviet  reformers 
received little response from the  populace for establishing a material-
oriented motivation structure. 
The difference in motivation structure between a market and a planned 
economy was revealed in the  Chinese model  of reform, especially in 
non-state sectors. In the Soviet case, incentives for working harder in 
the public sector seemed insufficient, and the intention of the reformers 
in  transforming  the  motivation  structure  had  to  be  on encouraging 
people to run their own business and massively privatising  former state 
property.  It is true  that both the economies after the  reforms  would 
establish a market-like motivation structure as defined in section 2.1.3, 
Chapter Two. 
6.2.4  Ownership structure 
In ownership structure, the Chinese-type market economy and Soviet-
type market economy show their essential difference. Chinese reformers 
would  not  go for a  largely private  market economy as  the  Soviets 
would. In China state enterprises were put on the agenda for switching 
into  stock-share  companies  but  the  nature  of  the  non-individual 
ownership would  not  be  altered  in  many cases.  These large  entities 
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although  private  business  mushroomed  and  played  more  and  more 
significant role in the economy ( section 4.1.4, Chapter Four). 
The Soviet reformers called for massive destatisation and privatisation 
of the  state-owned enterprises and  in  rural  areas  apart from  a  few 
exceptional cases. So non-individual ownership would prevail in  the 
prospective economy.  This kind of blueprint,  if implemented,  would 
push the Soviet economy very close to a genuine market economy, while 
China would remain half way towards a market economy in this aspect. 
To  summarise the  similarities  and  differences  in  the  basics of the 
economic systems proposed by the Chinese and Soviet reform plans and 
their respective distances from  planned  and market economies, Panel 
6.2.1 would be helpful. 
Despite the similarities in the reform designs of our two countries that 
qualify both the economies as market-oriented ones, the differences, 
however,  made the two economies as two types of market economy 
rather than one. What is significant here is that the differences of the 
proposed  market  economies  would  be  more  meaningful  than  the 
differences which existed in the traditional centrally planned economies 
in China and the Soviet Union. The discussion above and also in sections 
4.4.2 and 5.4.2 of the two previous chapters enabled one to draw this 
conclusion.  As  a  matter of fact,  the question of the depth of the 
transformations in the two economies were to be answered in the next 
section of this chapter. 
6.3  Strategies for  economic  reform 
Studies of economic reform should not  only include the contents of the 
reform plans, but also  the strategies chosen to complete them. Here the 
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destination? As discussed in our analytical framework, various choices 
could be made in the proposals and blueprints of the reforms. In our 
case, four sides of the reform strategies applied are briefly compared. 
They involve the way to organise a reform process, the time length of 
completing  the  course,  and  the  depth  and  the  width  of  a  reform 
intended. 
6.3.1  Theory-led v.  muddle-through 
Examining the complete period of economic reform, it seemed obvious 
that the Soviet reformers preferred to work out the detailed and overall 
blueprints for guiding  the  implemention on one round  of economic 
reform before any practical steps were taken. This was particularly true 
when  one  studied  the  two  principal  packages  of economic  reform 
blueprints in 1987 and 1990 and their implementations. No immediate 
and substantial action followed after the publication of the paper plans, 
not  to  say before the plans.  It seemed that reformers  in the  Soviet 
economy were very much concerned with theoretical preparation for 
economic reform.  However,  the contradictions in ideas of economic 
transformation hampered the implementation of the proposals. 
China's case was  different. As it was famously stated by Deng Xiaoping 
himself,  Chinese were  "filling for stones while walking  across  the 
river".  Designing a  complete blueprint for  reform did  not receive 
much attention at least in the major stages of the process. One could not 
even call  any reform  proposal  in one  sector,  not to say the whole 
economy, as a blueprint for operation, because in many cases the official 
documents only set the principles or approved relevant experiments to 
set an example. Piecemeal and specific plans prevailed and many of 
them  were  formed  on  the  basis  of  summarizing  of small  scale 
experiment which took place almost without any detailed theoretical 
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way of Chinese economic reform. 
Nevertheless,  neither  in  the  Soviet  theory-led  nor  in  the  Chinese 
muddle-through reform was there any sufficient theory of economics 
underpinning the reform proposals. If we ask,  is  there any school of 
economic theory which was accepted as the conceptual basis of a new 
type of economic system? The answer for both of our cases proved to 
be negative. The Soviet reform proposals were better organised in their 
shape,  but the  basis for transformation of a  planned  economy to  a 
market one  had  been established  on  the  simple  belief that  market 
mechanism  would  help  to  overcome  the  problems  occurred  in  the 
planned economy.  As pointed out in  our Introduction  (Chapter One), 
features of various models of a market economy were neglected here by 
the reformers.  This was  the  theoretical  background for the  Chinese 
reform as well, though not exactly the same. This might explain some 
obvious conflicts embodied in the Soviet reform plans for changing the 
economic mechanisms even on the paper, let it alone in practice, whilst 
the Chinese reform also faced this kind of conflict amongst individual 
proposals. 
Why did reformers in China and the Soviet Union take different ways to 
economic reform? To the Soviet Union where the history of running 
and modifying the centrally planned economy was much longer than in 
China, it might be recognised that piecemeal and small scale steps which 
did  not  require  well-organised  blueprints  would  no  longer  work 
efficiently in the late-1980s. Large scale effort must be attempted in 
order to be effective. For this sort of reform, delicate preparation in 
designs and plans seemed absolutely necessary.  In addition, this work 
could be done by some outstanding Soviet economists because they have 
been well trained  in a systematic way as the economists in a planned 
economy,  though,  and  allowed  to  a  play  greater role  in  this  field 
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that the reform designs for the Soviet economy were superior than the 
Chinese ones in qualitative terms. In China's case, a muddle-through 
strategy was chosen due to the very fact that the reformers themselves 
did  not well  know,  particularly  at  the  beginning,  where  the  reform 
would or should go and what ought to be done in order to reach to the 
intended end. They have been careful explorers in the sense that they 
preferred  small  scale  trial  for  any  intended  reform  action  before 
approval  for  large  scale  implementation  through  formal  reform 
decrees. 
To say that the Soviets chose a theory-led strategy for carrying out the 
transformation is to state the fact that action of practical reform was not 
feasible  before  any  proposal  was  officially  released.  While  only 
discussions  and debate  on  economic reform  plans  took place  in the 
former Soviet Union, China marched forward,  though slowly, steadily 
on the  way  of reform  with  or without  well-prepared  plans  for  the 
transformation. The political background behind the economic reforms 
in  the  two  countries  did  contribute  to  the  different  strategies  the 
reformers took. When anti-reform pressures were from below, muddle-
through could not happen in the former Soviet Union, as was the case in 
China. 
6.3.2 Revolution v.  Evolution 
The speed  of implementing and  completing one round of economic 
reform by plan showed a very sharp contrast between the Chinese and 
the  Soviet  experiences.  There  should  be  no  dispute  that  Chinese 
reformers pursued a gradual progress.  First of all, one might  notice 
that the length of time for the critical blueprints to be worked out was 
shorter in the Soviet economy than in China'  s. In other words. proposal 
work  was  more  time-consuming  in  China.  This  conclusion  is  also 
correct  on  the  occasion  of the  time  scheduled  for  completing  the Chap1er6  168 
implementation of the  reform  plans in  the  two  economies.  One  may 
simply refer to  the  case of the  1990 Presidential reform  plan in the 
Soviet Union which expected less than three years to  build up the main 
frame of the Soviet-type market economy. On the same issue Chinese 
reformers  repeatedly  stress  the  longlasting  endeavour  to  reach  the 
aimed  goal  of restructuring  which  would  alter  less  of the  existing 
planned economy than the Soviet Union or Russia. 
What factors set the timetables for implementing the reforms in the two 
countries? Are Chinese reformers, as  is well-known, more patient than 
their Soviet colleagues? As  a matter of fact,  the  hardship the Chinese 
economy faced in the  late 1970s was severe and a fast-going change was 
necessary. The wave of reform  at the initial stage of China's economic 
restructuring seemed to be leading this way.  But the long term results 
showed  the  opposite.  This  analysis  applies  to  the  Soviet case  in  a 
contrary manner. The late process there experienced a very dramatic 
movement, not smoothly and continuously like in China. Here, political 
factors  were obviously involved.  In the Soviet Union where struggle 
against anti-reformers and conservatives had been bitter not only at the 
top  leadership but also among the population, the  reformers believed 
that  for  radical  transformation  to  be  successful,  it  should  be 
implemented as quickly as possible. 
There was also one factor which should play role  in explaining the 
revolutionary progress in the Soviet reform proposals. As the original 
centrally planned economy in the world, the Soviet Union was a very 
late comer in the course of economic transformation. It thus gained the 
late-comer advantages
2  which  enabled  it  to  shorten  the  process  of 
transforming the  planned economy into  a  market-oriented  one.  For 
2  Late-comer advantages describe the fact that as a late-comer, it could avoid the 
unnecessary technical problems and difficulties encountered by the early comers and 
shorten the time to reach the same destination by learning and assessing the early-
comers experiences and lessons ( Gerschenkron, 1962). Cbaoter6  169 
example,  the  Soviet  reformers  could  learn  from  the  experiences of 
other socialist economies which began economic reforms much earlier 
than it. It could avoid the proven unnecessary mistakes in the course of 
the  transition.  In  the  meantime,  Chinese  reformers  did  have  this 
advantage on many important issues when it began its  design of the 
reform.  Of course, other elements, such as the nationality characters 
and cultural background of the Russian( Soviet people) and the Chinese, 
also  play  a  part  here.  It  is  very  interesting  to  note  that  Russian 
communist revolution in  1917  took  place  and completed in  a  much 
shorter time than the Chinese one in 1949. It was very possible that the 
same difference occurred in the course of economic revolution, too. 
In  relation  to  the  conclusion  drawn  in  the  previous  section,  it  IS 
interesting  to  notice  that  Soviet  case  is  one  of  theory-led  and 
revolutionary reform. What does it mean in our context? It may enable 
one  to  say  that  only  theory-led  reform  can  lead  to  the  result  of 
revolution, because the result can be achieved with a determined and 
well-planned goal. But theory-led reform may create an evolutionary 
transformation as well. 
6.3.3  Comprehensive v.  partial 
To verify the width of the economic reforms by comprehensiveness or 
partiality in the two economies, the two reform packages in the Soviet 
case must be dealt with individually due to the sharp difference between 
them in this point. This policy applies to the reform proposals for some 
sectors and for the whole economy in China as well, though the situation 
there is not as sharp as it is in the Soviet economy. 
China's economic reform of the rural economy involving the system of 
regulating the major aspects of production in this sector can be labelled, 
to a  large extent, as the comprehensive process, if one can isolate it Chapter 6  170 
from the rest of the national economy for the purpose of a theoretical 
analysis.  At  the  same  time,  reform  plans  for  other sectors  and  the 
economy as a whole seem not to cover the range which is wide enough 
to be  comprehensive. Some issues in the economy are not touched on in 
the paper. 
On the Soviet side, the label of comprehensiveness of a reform should 
be put on the 1987 reform package. While the 1990 reform plan showed 
its  partiality for  not  providing  or even  mentioning  some  important 
issues relevant in the process of economic reform. 
What one  can say in general  about  the  conclusion of a comparison 
between our  two cases in their width of range? As  far as  the  paper 
proposals  were  concerned,  the  Chinese  reformers  presented  more 
comprehensive work in the whole period than their Soviet colleagues. 
The real situation in practice showed that economic reform in  China 
involved  massive spheres which were  impressive  on its wide range. 
In  theory the  range  of the  reform  proposals  was  supposed  to  have 
something to  do  with the theory-led style of carrying out a reform. 
Emphasising the  theoretical designing of reform process makes it likely 
a comprehensive reform, compared to the case on the contrary. But our 
conclusion here  revealed that it is possible for a comprehensive reform 
to occur without great attention on the well-organised paper plan.  But 
it takes  longer time  to  cover a wide  enough range of the  economic 
mechanisms by a muddle through method. 
6.3.4  Radical v.  moderate 
Radical or moderate in the context of our discussion means the extent of 
the  transformation  of  planned  economy  into  a  market-oriented 
economy.  Radicalness is,  therefore, measured by the degree of market Cbapter6  171 
mechanism  introduced  into the  prospective economy.  Assessing the 
radical ness of  economic reforms in our two cases in the first place we 
can use  the information provided by the two panels, panel 4-4-2 and 5-
4-2  in which the stages of transformations are analysed. By matching 
the two panels, the difference in depth of reforms in the two economies 
is  approximately shown in Graphic 6-3-1. 
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i  +J 
c.S  S5 
J' > I 
J:  I  s:.  "7  ~ 
~  - i 
I 1 
l.  3  4- S  0 
~  fo1't2 
Sources:  ?lnei ~A2  or dlaprer ~ and  ?ane15.~2 of chapter 5. 
~ore: CS-Scage or China's reic:rm 
SS-Scage or Soviet rerc:rm 
Certainly, the  real  world is  not as  simple as  the curves indicate.  For 
example,  the  two  Soviet  economic  reform  packages  need  to  be 
considered individually, as they were in the previous section, when the 
comparison  between  the  two  countries  are  taken.  To  assess  the 
radical  ness of the Chinese reform, things are also slightly complicated. 
Because some parts of the proposals for reforming the planned system 
show their degree of depth, e.g. rural reform wheras the aggregate plan 
was more or less moderate. 
By moderateness  of the  economic  reform  in  China,  we  refer to  the Chapter 6  172 
comparison between  the  reform  proposals  in  general  in  the  Chinese 
economy  and  the  reform  plans  of 1990s,  the  Presidential  plan  and 
Shatalin  plan,  in  the  Soviet case  which  were  well-known  for  their 
radical tone. There shall be no  argument that the  1987 reform package 
in the Soviet Union was of a moderate nature compared to the early 
appeals of economic  reform  in  China,  e.g.  sectoral reforms proposed 
before 1984.  As explained in Chapter Five, the later 1990 reform plan 
took  more  weight  in  the  assessment of the  depth  of reform  in  the 
country. Therefore, on the final score of the paper plans, we should say 
that down the way of transition the Soviets lead. 
Radicalness and moderateness of an economic reform in the CPEs was 
undoubtedly  a  result  of the  complex  of political  struggles  among 
reformers  and  anti-reformers,  further,  among  communist reformers 
and non-communist reformers in the Soviet case. A radical reform like 
approach to a private market economy must require a breakthrough of 
the official ideology. In China, where the communist party still holds on 
to its monopoly of power in the society, it is difficult for the reformers 
to  abandon  entirely the  so-called socialist principles such as  public 
(state) ownership. 
The  discussion  of  our  cases  above.  revealed  the  significance  of 
techniques required for economic transformation. Interesting patterns 
occurred in terms of techniques taken by different reform plans in our 
two countries. First of all, reform in China in general was a moderate, 
comprehensive,  evolutionary  and  muddle-through  one  with  some 
factors of radicalness in some sectoral reforms. In the meantime, the 
labels of radicalness, partiality, revolution and theory-led classified the 
Soviet reform, while the moderate 1987 reform package  should not be 
ignored.  This conclusion implies  that,  in  the  real  cases,  no  definite 
interrelation could be traced between the depth and width of a reform, 
and the depth and speed of a reform. In other words, a radical reform is Chapter 6  173 
not necessarily to be a comprehensive one, and vice versa, like the case 
of 1990  reform plans in the Soviet economy and sectoral reforms in 
China. A radical reform need not be revolutionary, though it is likely to 
take place as a revolution, e.g. the rural reform in China and the 1990 
reform plans in the Soviet Union. 
Anyhow,  some relations between the pairs of reform strategies may be 
drawn as in Panel 6-3-1. From it, one could say that a radical reform or 
transformation did not require  any specific strategy to  be successful. 
This left much room for reformers to choose the way for implementing 
a  radical  reform.  Meanwhile,  a  revolutionary  transformation  asked 
much more for it to be successful. One of them was a well-designated 
paper  plan.  Otherwise  it  could  go  out  of  control.  This  primary 
conclusion was significant because it meant to reformers that a radical 
transformation could be completed in more than one way. 
6.4.  Some further concluding words 
Up to now, we have compared from three perspectives the proposals of 
economic reforms in China and the former Soviet Union, the major 
issues of the reform, the  changes proposed in terms of economic system 
theory and the strategies of the reform adopted in the two countries. 
Some conclusions were drawn according to each individual issue which 
would absolutely  improve the understanding of the situation in the two 
countries in the first instance. Moreover, the experiences of China and 
the former Soviet Union in transforming the centrally planned economy 
could be valuable not only for country studies but also for theoretical 
constructions  of  economic  system  studies.  Because  a  number  of 
questions rather than resolutions  have been put forward  in terms of 
economic theory in the course of the  economic transition in the two 
countries. Chaoler6 
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The comparison of economic  transformations proposed in our two 
countries was impressive in a perspective of prospect of the transition in 
the former  CPEs.  It raised  a  number of questions that  need  to be 
discussed further. Here we may be  able to touch very slightly on some 
of them, for which the answers remain to be seen. There are two groups 
of issues in relation to the proposals of economic transformations in our 
two countries that is of interest in this thesis. One is about the objective Chapter 6  175 
models of the economic system intended by the reformers, the other is 
related with the ways the trans-formations are being achieved. 
6.4.1 Issues of the objective models 
The comparative study of the economic reform proposals in China and 
the former Soviet Union in  1980s and  1990s as conducted in the  main 
theme of  this thesis contributes not only to the country studies, but also 
to  the  theoretical  construction  of economics,  particularly economic 
system studies. The similarities and differences in transformation of the 
centrally planned economies in  our two countirs, on the paper plan in 
the first place, raised a number of questions some of which  challengeed 
the mainstream economics. 
The experience of Chinese economic reform raised a very interesting 
question: is non-individual ownership compatible with the market me-
chanism?  Or,  in  general,  can  planned  control  be  combined  with  a 
market economy? It is obvious that Chinese reformers challenged the 
longlasting  debate  of the  "third  way"  of the  economic  reform  by 
attempting to build up a "socialist market economy" which would locate 
it between the classic planned economy and a private market economy. 
One may ask whether the Chinese approach feasible and  likely to be 
long lived? 
According to the prevailing argument, with which the present author 
agrees, that the compromise between planned and market economies, or 
put it in another way, between socialism and capitalism, is not possible. 
It would only make things worse. "Market socialism" was described by 
Philip Hanson as  "the Bermuda Triangle" (Hanson, 1991b). To him, it 
is  obvious  that  public  ownership  is  incompatible  with  the  market 
mechanism (see Figure 6.4.1). Chapter 6 
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However, the destination of China's economic reform in the foreseeable 
future is the attempt to live in the triangle. The present author believed 
it would and could stay there for a long time. To explain the probably 
exceptional case of China, the fact that China is a developing country as 
well as  a planned economy must be taken into consideration. In this 
kind of economy something which was assumed impossible in theory 
for West industrialised countries could be successful. 
What is  more important is  that the purpose of economic reform  in 
China  was  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  traditional  planned 
economy,  which was concerned  mainly with economic issues.  This 
made it unique in the course of its  transformation from  the former 
CPEs,  including  the  former  Soviet Union  and  the  East  European 
countries, in the sense that communist ideology  remained as the official 
policy though it  had been revised  and  relaxed  in many aspects  in 
relation to economic issues. Nevertheless, the state was still reluctant to 
give up its control over a  large share of the national economy and 
massive privatisation was rejected despite rapid growth of non-state 
sector in the country.  The ideal environment for a  genuine market-
oriented transition created by political revolution in the former Soviet Chaoler6  177 
Union and the East European countries was not achieved in China. So 
the role of market mechanism in the prospective economy of China 
would depend on the tolerance of the communist regime. 
In the former Soviet Union, or Russia for example, transition into a 
private market economy was a  political  matter as  well as  economic 
resolution.  This  also  cast  doubt  on  a  well-organised  and  smooth 
transformation in the country in terms of technical arrangements, even 
if the  reformers in the former Soviet Union knew better about their 
destination that their Chinese colleagues. 
6.4.2  Technical constraints of the transition 
Constraints  and  difficulties  of  the  historical  transition  In the  two 
countries were found first of all  in the paper plans. A well-organised 
blueprint  is  the  basic  prerequisite for  a  successful  transformation. 
However, this condition was not met satisfactorily in our two countries. 
Firstly, the proposals of reforms including official plans for operation 
did not provide sufficient details and the neccesary techniques for how 
the implementation would be realised.  General tones  and principles 
were  the  characteristics  of the  proposals.  It was  difficult  for  the 
reformers in either China or the Soviet Union to meet this requirement 
because, on the one hand, as noted in our earlier discussion in this 
section, they themselves were not clear in theory where they would 
lead the reform to and what the destination would look like. On the 
other hand, even if  they knew the end point of the reform, (e.g. it could 
be a kind of market economy). it would still be a hard job for them to 
design a proper plan for the transition since their knowledge of market 
economics was limited in both theory and practice. They were leaners 
rather than masters in this respect. The fact  the more radical  tones for 
transition  to  a  market  economy  the  less  detailed  arrangement  of 
restructuring provided by the reform plans in our two cases verified CbaPler6  178 
this  assumption.  Because  the  reformers  could  arrange  less  of  a 
completely new type of economy which they had little knowledge than a 
plan-oriented destination. The obvious conflicts in the proposals about 
the sequence of the reform could be attributable to this sort of reason. 
Secondly,  if the  end  point  was  clear,  it  would  be  necessary for  the 
reformers to  set the  list of things that must be done in order to  reach 
the destination. This was also not an easy job. There had been various 
suggestions for what to  do  in  the transition from the centrally planned 
economy to  a market economy,  and  the  reformers  had  to  judge and 
make  their  own  decisions,  although  some  of the  key  issues  were 
commonly agreed  as  the  necessary  ingredients  of the  package  of a 
market-oriented transfor-mation  (Farrell,  1991).  After setting the  list 
of things to do, the immediate question is what must be first done? The 
transition must be a complex of changes of numerous interrelated parts 
of the  economy  which  require  to  be  achieved  at  the  same  time, 
otherwise it could only make things worse.  As  a matter of fact,  no 
reform could be implemented at one stroke on all the essential issues. 
The  problem,  and  the  dilemma,  of  sequencing  of  the  transition 
occurred.  Furthermore,  the  prediction of the  possible problems  and 
consequences that would occur in the course of transformation was also 
one of the  crucial  requirements  for  the reform  planners when  they 
worked out the operational blueprint of the reform. 
What made things more complex in the context of economic reform in 
the former CPEs is that the reform had never been solely the matter of 
economics. The transition to a market-oriented economy would cause 
fundamental change of the whole society which would make the changes 
of constitutional, political, social and moral structures inevitable. The 
transformation  process  would,  therefore,  be  unpredictable  and 
uncertain.  In this  process  China  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  felt 
extraordinarily  hard  compared  with  the  East  European  countries Chapter 6  179 
because,  as  was  already  pointed  out,  there  was  little  democratic 
tradition politically, nor a sound market economy in the two countries 
before  the  communist revolution  that  could  be  restored.  This  was 
especially true of the Soviet case. 
Last but not least, although the economic reforms in the former CPEs 
have  entered  a  new  era of fundamentally  switching off the  classic 
planned economy, there is a long way for them to go to  the intended 
destination,  if there  is  such one as  they  hoped for.  It is,  therefore, 
necessary for further study of the semi-reformed planned economy, or 
whatever people may label it,  which would be different in operating 
principles  from  either  the  classic  planned  economy  or  a  market 
economy.  The tools  provided  by the  socialist economics  ( Marxian 
economics)  are out of date, and the mainstream economics in market 
economy  are  yet  insufficient.  This  thesis  is  one  of the  efforts  to 
contribute to the progress of the economic analysis of the former CPEs. 
But it is only one of the exploring ones. And there is, of course, a lot 
more work remaining to be done in this field. Bibliowaphy  180 
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Appendix I 
Accelerating Reform and 
Opening-Up 
Following  is  the  full  text  of the  report  delivered  October  12,  1992  by  Jiang 
Zemin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party,  at  the  14th  National  Congress  of  the  Party.  The  report  is  entitled 
"Accelerating  the  Reform,  the  Opening  to  the  Outside  World and  the  Drive 
for  Modernization,  so  as  to  Achieve  Creater  Successes  in  Building  Socia/ism 
With  Chinese  Characteristics." 
(  Beijing Review.  Vo1.35,  No. 43,  Oct.26~ 1992.) 
Comrades, 
The 14th :-.rational Congress of the Communist 
Party of China has been convened in a new situa-
tion  in  which our country is  accelerating its  re-
I  form,  its  opening  to  the  outside  world  and  its 
.  drive  for  modernization.  Now,  I should  like  to 
present a report to  the congress on  behalf of the 
13th Central Committee.  . 
This  congress  has  a  historic  mission  to  fulfil. 
The  members  of the  Party  and  the  people  of 
different _nationalities throughout China all have 
great hopes for it, and our friends in other coun-
tries who care ilbout China are also paying close 
I  attention  to  its  proceedings.  We  are  convinced 
that if  all deputies work to make it so,  this will be 
a united and successful congress.  .'  . 
Since the  Third  Plenary  Session  of the  11 th 
Central  Committee,  the  Party  and  the  people, 
guided by  the theory of building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics put forward by' Comrade 
Deng Xiaoping, have been working hard to carry 
out reform. The whole nation has been reinvigo-
rated, and historic changes have taken  place ac-
ross  the  land. The  productive  forces  have  been 
further emancipated, and the  political situation 
I  of stability and unity has  been steadily consoli-
dated. The 1.1  billion people of China. with their 
basic  needs  assured.  are  moving  towards  a  reia-Appendix 
tively  comfortable  standard  of  living.  We  have 
made major progress in developing the economy, 
improving  the  people's  living  standards and  in-
creasing the overall strength of the country. Chi-
na's  socialist  system  has  withstood  severe  tests 
and shown  great  vitality  in  the  face  of drastic 
changes in the:  world Sltuation. 
The imponant talks  given  by  Comrade  Deng 
Xiaoping whf!n he visited the south early this year 
have been a great encouragement to  members of 
the Party and to the people of all China's nauon-
alities.  The cadres and  the  masses  have  further 
emancipated their minds  and  are  full  of enthu-
siasm.  Leaders  and  people  Jre  united,  and  the 
whole  country  is  seething  with  activity,  giving 
promise  of  a  wonderful  future  in  which  the 
Chinese nation will have realized its lofty ideals. 
The  13th Central Committee has  made an ov-
erall  analysis  of  the  current  situation.  It  has 
agreed unanimously that domestic conditions are 
ripe for faster development. that the international 
environment is  favourable for it,  and that while 
the present moment poses challenges. it also pre-
sents opportunities for us  to  accelerate our adv-
ance.  The tasks  of this  congress  are,  under the 
guidance of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's theory of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to  ! 
review  the  practical experience of the  14  years 
since the Third Plenary Session of the 11 th Cen-
tral Committee and to formulate a strategic plan 
for  the  next  period.  It  is  also  the  task of the  I 
congress to  mobilize all Party comrades and the 
people of all nationalities to  achieve still greater 
successes in building socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics  by further emancipating  their  minds 
and seizing this opportune moment to quicken the 
pace of the  reform,  the opening  to  the outside 
world and the drive for modernization. 
I. Q~n.ra·1 Sumn1a,y of the Great 
Practice of the Last 14 Years  . 
..  .  ., 
In the last 14 years. adhering to the basic line 
of the  Party,  we·  have  been  building socialism 
with Chinese characteristics through reform and 
the opening  to·  th~ outside world. and· through 
the· liberation and development of the  produc-
tive·forces. In view of the deep and widespread 
social changes. that have taken place, we· can trUly 
say that we  have  begun  a  new  revolution.  the 
objective of-which· is to fundamentally change the 
economic strUCture that has hampered the devel-
ol'ment of the J)IOductive forces and to establish 
a  new and vigorous socialist economic structure. 
At the same time. we  have been carrying Out  a 
corresponding reform of political and other struc-
tures. in order to· realize the socialist moderniza-
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tion of China. 
In the history of our Party, the first generation 
of central leadership, with Comrade y(ao Zedong 
at the  core.  led  the  whole  Party and  the  people 
of aU  nationalities  first  in  the  long,  triumphant 
struggle  to  make  the  new-democratic  revolution 
and then in the dfon to establish the basic system 
of socialism and to  liberate and develop the prod-
uctive forces.  The semi-colonial and semI-feudal 
China of the past. which for over a hundred years 
had suifered from  foreign  aggression and bully-
ing,  was  turned  into a  new  and  independent so-
cialist China in  which  the  people  were  the  mas-
ters. This revolution. the greatest China had ever 
seen.  ushered in a  new era in  the  history of our 
country. 
The  second  generation of  the  central  leader-
ship,  with Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the core, 
has  led  the  whole  Party  and  the  people  of all 
nationalities in another great revolution, the goal 
of which  is  to  further  liberate  and develop  the 
productive  forces.  This  new  revolution  is  de-
signed to turn our underdeveloped socialist coun-
try into a prosperous, strong, democratic, cultur-
ally advanced and modern socialist country, so as 
to fully demonstrate the superiority of socialism 
in China. It is  based on our earlier revolutionary 
victory and on our great achievements in socialist 
construction, and it is  being carried out step  by 
step, in good order, under the leadership oi the 
Party. This revolution is  not intended to change 
the nature of our socialist system but to improve 
and develop iL  It is no minor patching-up of the 
economic structure but a fundamental restructur-
ing of the economy. The old economic structure 
lias its historical origins and has played an impor-
tant and positive role. With changing conditions. 
however, it has come to correspond less and less 
to  the  requirements "of the  modernization 'pro-
gramme.  The  most, profound  change  brought 
about by the reform in the last 14 years is that 
many  ideological  and structural .shackles  have 
been shaken off. This has released the initiative 
of the masses. so that China, with its 1.1  billion 
people, is now creatiJw a  vigorous~aljsm.  ., . 
.';At ,the present national congress. it is ·essential 
to-review the greai pl3Ctice of the people under 
m.e leadership of the Party over the past 14 Years 
and to draw careful conclusions about· the basic-
theory,  the  basic  line  and  the· ·strategic Policy 
decisions fotmuiated by the PattY in· the course of  . 
that practice..  This is of vital present and long-
term importance to the unification of the tbin  Hng 
of ill Party members, the application of the Par-
ty's  basic  theory,  the adherence to  its  basic line 
and  the  advance of the great cause of building· 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. Appendix 
We all remember that rhe toppling of the "gang 
of four"  saved  tht:  Party and  the  country  from 
disaster,  but  the  political.  ideological.  organiza-
tional  and  economic  chaos  left  over  from  the 
"cultural revolution" was still a very serious prob-
lem.  At  that  time  it  was  by  no  means  easy  to 
extricate  ourselves  from  the  predicament  and 
bring about a  new  situation. The Third  Plenary 
Session of the  11th  Central Committee.  held  in 
1978,  and  the central  leadership formed  at  that 
session with Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the core. 
took  up  this difficult  mission,  accomplished  the 
historic change  and  launched  a  new  era  in  the 
development of our socialist cause. 
Around  the  time  of  that  session.  our  Party 
encouraged  and  guided  a  major  debate  on  the 
proposition  that practice is  rhe sole cnterion for 
judging truth. This debate shattered the personal-
ity cult and the doctrine of the "two whatevers" 
!  the notion that after the death of Chairman Mao 
Zedong,  whatever policy  decisions  he  had  made 
must be firmly upheld and whatever instructions 
he  had given  must be  followed  unswervingly  -
Tr.1  and reaffirmed the idc!ological line oi eman-
cipating the mind and seeking truth from  facts. 
This represented our rectification of the ideolog-
ical line. 
At the Third Plenary St:Ssion of the  11 th Cen-
tral Committee. our Party abandoned the wrong, 
"Left" principle of "taking class struggle as  the 
key link." which was not appropriate in a  social-
ist  society,  and shifted the focus  of work of the 
Party and the state onto economic development. 
This represented our rectification of the political 
line.  At  the same  time.  the  Central Committee  ! 
made a  major policy  decision:  to  undertake  re-
form and to open China to the outside world. To  ' 
counter  the  wrong  ideological  trends  that  had  i 
manifested themselves in the preceding period. it 
stated  unequivocally  that  we  must  keep  to  the 
socialist  road and adhere to  the  people's  demo-
cratic dictatorship, to leadership by the Commun-
ist Party of China and to Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought. [These are known as  the 
Four Cardinal  Principles_  - rr. J The  idea  of 
"one central taslc. two basic points" began to take 
shape as the foundation for the Party's basic line 
in the new period_ 
The  Party emphasized  that  the  only  way  to 
ensure the implementation of the correct ideolog-
ical  and  political  lines  was  to  have  a  correct 
organizational line_ It recognized that as required 
at this historic turning point. we  had  to streng-
then the organization of the  Party by gradually 
adjusting and consolidating leadership at differ-
ent levels. We were to accomplish this by making 
the ranks of cadres more reVOlutionary, younger. 
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better educ:ned and  more  professlOnaily  compe-
tent.  by  dOing  away with de  (acto  hie  ~enure for 
leading cadres. and  by  encouraging co-operation 
between young :.lnd  old cldres and S::"Jdually  re-
placing the old with the young. 
The  Party also straightened out ce:-:am  major 
historical  issuc.:s  of right  and  wrong  . .-\  jenes of 
measures were  taken  to  ~edress lllCl'.:dual  injus- ' 
:lces.  and  vanous  poiicles  were  car:-:ed  out  to 
strengthen  Pany unity :lnd  mobIlize  111  posllive 
torces. A t its Sixth Plenary SesslOn  :i:e II  th Cen-
:ral Commmee adopted  J  resolutIOn  on  certain 
questions  in  the  history  of  the  Pl:-::.  stnce  the 
founding of the People's R(:public. b  :hat resolu-
tion  it  fundamentally  condemned  :i:;:  "cultural 
revolution"  anu rejected the theory Jf "continued 
~evolution  under  the  dic:atorship  J[  [he  prole-
tariat."  At  the same  time.  it  came  JUt  strongly 
against  the  wrong  ideological  tenae:1cy  to  deny 
the  value of Comrade  \Iao Zedongs work and 
\1ao Zedong Thought altogether. mamtained the 
importance oi the role Comrade \fao had played 
in  Chinese  history  and  reaifirmed  :he  value  of 
\1ao Zedong Thought as a guide to ac:ion. As the 
domestic situation develops and the international 
situation changes. the courage and far-sightedness 
of the Party in adopting this momentous resolu-
tion are becoming more and more apparent. 
Having rectified the erroneous ideological and 
political  lines.  the  Party convened its  12th  Na-
tional Congress in  1982. The congress pUL forward 
the  idea  of "integrating  the  universal  truth  of 
Marxism  with  the  concrete  practice  of China. 
blazing a  path oi our own and building socialism 
with Chinese characteristics" and set the target of 
quadrupling the gross national product by the end 
of the century.  in  two  stages.  Later.  the  Party 
proposed that. in a  third stage. socialist moderni-
zation  should  be  basically  accomplished  by  the 
middle of the next century. By setting these great 
goals.  the Party is  leading the people of all our 
nationalities forward into the 21st century. 
The  dominant  feature  of  the  new  period  is 
the policy of. reform and opening to  the outside 
world. which was  initiated at the Third Plenary 
Session of the 11 th Central Committee and which 
has been carried out in every area ever since the 
12th  National  Party Congress.  The reform  has 
surged from  the countryside to  the cities.  from 
the  economic structure  to  other structures  and 
from the revitalization of the domestic economy 
to the opelling to the outside world  .. 
The strategic decision to start the reform in the 
rural areas was in conformity with the realities in 
China. The household contract responsibility sys-
tem  with  remuner:ltion  linked  to  output was  a 
great  innovation  of  the  Chint:Se  peasants.  The Appendix 
Central  Comminee  of  the  Party  respected  the 
wishes  of the  masses  and actively supported  the 
experiment,  which  in  a  few  years  was  spread  , 
throughout  the  country.  A  major  problem  in 
the structure of the socialist  rural economy  was 
sotved  by  dismantling  the  people's  communes 
without privatizing ownership or the land and by 
introducmg the household contract responslbility 
system supplemented by  unified management. In 
this way, the 800 million peasants have gained the 
power to  make their own decisions about produc-
tion.  In  addition.  we  almost  entirely  did  Jway 
with the unified purchase of farm products by  the 
state according  to  fixed  quotas  and  lifted  price 
controls over most of them. thus helping agricul-
tural production break out of its  long-term stag-
nation.  The rural economy  rapidly  became  spe-
cialized. commercialized and socialized. People in 
both rural and urban areas have enjoyed tangible 
benefits from this, and it has glven impetus to all 
our undertakings in  reform and economic devel-
opment. Township .enterprises, another great  in- , 
novation of the Chinese peasants. have expanded 
enormously. They have created  a new outlet for 
surplus labour on the  land, a new way  for rural 
people  to  become  prosperous  and  to  modernize 
the countryside, and a  new means of promoting 
the reform and development of industry and of 
the economy as a whole. 
In accordance with the new simation in which 
reform had been introduced first in the country-
side,  then  in  the  cities  and  towns,  the  Third 
Plenary Session  of the  12th  Central Committee 
adopted a  resolution on economic restructuring. 
It  declared  that  our  socialist  economy  was  a 
planned  commodity  economy  based  on  public 
ownership  and  rejected  the  traditional  concept 
that a planned economy was  in direct opposition 
to a commodity economy. This represented a new 
development of Marxist theory on political econ-
omy  and  provided  a  new  theoretical  guide  for 
overall reform of the economic structure. Later, 
the  Party  decided  to  reform  the  management 
systems of science and technology and of educa-
tion,  and it set the objectives and  tasks  for the 
reform of the political structure. 
The establishment of the four special economic 
zones of Shenzhen, Zhuhai. Shantou and Xiamen 
was  an important step in opening China to  the 
outside world and a new experiment in utilizing 
foreign  funds.  technology  and  managerial skills 
to develop the socialist economy. Great achieve-
ments have already been  scored  in  these  zones. 
Facts have demonstrated  that  they are socialist, 
not capitalist. in nature. Later, more than a dozen 
coastal cities were opened, as were economic areas 
in the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta 
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and southeastern Fujian and around  the  perime-
ter of Sohai Bay. Also, Hainan Island was author-
ized  to  become  a  province  and  later  a  special 
economic  zone.  The  number of areas  that  have 
been  opened  to  the  rest  of the  world  has  been 
continually increased. The coastal areas, with 200 
million  inhabitanrs, have  thnved rapidly, giving 
great lmpetuS  to the  reIorm,  :i1e  opening up and 
economic developmenr in  the country as a whole. 
If  reform  and  economic  development  an:  to 
proceed smoothly, they must have powerful ideo-
logical  and  political  guaranrees.  The  Party  has 
put  forward  the  strategic  pnnciple of "grasping 
two  links at rhe same time." Sy  this it means t.tlat 
we should pursue the process or reform and open-
ing up and at :he same time fight crime. thac  we 
should develop the economy and at rhe same time 
strengthen democracy and the legal  system.  thac 
we  should  achieve  material  progress  and at  the 
same time foster an advanced culture and ideolo-
gy.  In partIcular, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 
12th Ceocral Committee adopted a resolution de-
claring that our ideology  must  contribute to  s0-
cialist  modernization.  promote  the  aU-round  re-
form and opening up and be  based on adherence 
to  the  Four Cardinal Principles.  The Party also 
stressed  that we  must explain  to  the  people  the 
need for continued struggle against bourgeois lib-
eralization  throughout  the  process  of socialist 
modernization. 
The  13th  National Congress of the  Party was 
convened in  1987. Its historic contributions were 
to expound in a systematic way the theory of the 
primary stage of socialism in China and to elabor-
ate the Party's basic line, describing it concisely 
as "one central task. two basic points." [The cen-
tral  task  was  economic  development;  the  two 
basic points were adherence to the Four Cardinal 
Principles and implementation of reform and the 
open  policy.  - Tr.J  The congress  attached im-
mense significance to the fact that following the 
Third Plenary Session of the  II th Central Com-
mittee a  way was  found to build socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. It declared that this was 
the  second  historic  leap forward  in integrating 
Marxism with Chinese practice, the fust having 
been the new-democratic revolution. 
In the five years since the Pany's 13th National 
Congress, we have continued our march along the 
road  to  socialism  with  Chinese  characteristics. 
Under complicated and difficult conditions both 
at home and abroad, the Party has united and led 
the people of aU our nationalities in an endeavour 
to  surmount difficulties and achieve  social  and 
political stability and economic developmem. 
The years from  1984 to  1988  were a period of 
accelerated expansion for  the Chinese economy. Appendix 
In  agriculture  and  industry,  in  rural  areas  and 
cities. in reform and development. progress in one 
;ector  reinforced  progress  in  another.  and  the 
economy  as  a  whole  was  raised  to  a  new  level. 
However.  during  this  period  of rapid  advance  , 
some  problems  arose:  in  particular.  price  rises 
were  a  little  too  sharp.  and  many  construction  i 
projects were redundant. The Party therefore de-
cided to spend some time improving the economic  ; 
environment and rectifying the economic order to 
facilitate reform and development. 
In  late  spring  and  early  summer of  1989,  a  : 
political disturbance broke out. and the Party and 
the  government,  relying  on  the  people.  took  a 
clear~ut stand against  unrest. They quelled  the  i 
counter-revolutionary  violence  in  Beijing.  de- i 
fending  the  power of the socialist  state and the 
fundamental interests of the people and ensuring  I 
the continued progress of reform. the opening up 
and modernization. A t the same time. the Central 
Committee explicitly proclaimed that the Party's  I 
basic  line and the policy  decisions  made by  the 
Thirteenth  National Congress  were  correct and 
that we  should  not  waver  in  our adherence  to 
them because of this political disturbance. 
The Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth 
Central Committee elected a  new central leader-
ship. That leadership adhered to the Party's basic 
line  in ail fields  of endeavour.  It continued  to 
make  economic  development  the  central  task, 
while trying to rectify the overemphasis of mater-
ial progress to the neglect of ideological progress 
by  strengthening  ideological  and  political work 
and  the  building of the  Party.  In  the  face  of 
dramatic changes in the international situation. 
the  Party  remained  calm  and  concentrated  its 
attention on domestic  affairs  while  keeping  an 
eye on developments abroad. It adopted resolu-
tions on a  number of subjects: on strengthening 
clean government, on further improving the eco-
nomic environment, rectifying the economic or-
der and deepening the reform. on cementing the 
ties between the Party and the masses. on devel-
oping and opening the Pudong Area of Shanghai, 
on its proposaJs for the ten-year programme for 
national economic  and social  development and 
the  Eghth  Five-Year  Plan..  on  improving  the 
large and medium-sized statc-owned enterprises 
and on strengthening agricultU!C and the Parry's 
work in the rural areas. These major policy deci-
sions made by the Party during a critical period 
of history were absolutely correct. 
Early this year. during an inspection tour of the 
south, Comrade Deng Xiaoping gave several im-
portant talks. He made a  penetrating analysis of 
the current international and domestic situation.  , 
He also made a scientific summation of the basic  . 
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practice  and  experience  of  the  P:irty  since  the 
Third Plenary Session of the  II  th Central Com-
mittee.  clearing  up  many  important  misconcep-
tions  that  had  perplexed  us  and  shackled  our 
thinking over the past few  years.  He  emphasized 
that the basic line must be iollowed unswervingly 
for  100  years. He  urged us  to  further emancipate 
our  nuntis,  to  be  more  daring  in  reform  and 
opening  up,  to  quicken  the  pace  of  economic 
development and not  to  lose  any favourable op-
portunil·Y· 
Last :viarch the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee held a  plenary meeting at which full 
agreement  was  reached on  these  talks  given  by 
Comrade  Deng  Xiaoping.  The  Political  Bureau 
stated that they would not only serve as an impor-
tant guide for our current effortS  in  reform and 
economic development and for  the work of the 
present congress.  but that they  would also  have 
far-reaching signitlcance for  the entire drive for 
socialist  modernization. Since  that meeting.  the 
Central Committee and  the  State Council have 
made a series of decisions on ways  to  accelerate 
the reform, the opening up and economic devel-
opment. The  talks. by  Comrade  Deng  Xiaoping 
and the plenary meeting of the  Political Bureau 
mark a new stage in China's reform and o~ning 
up and in its modernization drive. 
Looking back on the road we  have traversed in 
the past 14 years. we can see that there have been 
failings and mistakes in our work. There are still 
many difficulties to be overcome and many prob-
lems to be solved. and the people still have com-
plaints about certain aspects of our work. But on 
the  whole,  it  is  generally  acknowledged  in  the 
Party and the country that in these fourteen years 
we have truly concentrated on socialist moderni-
zation. rapidly improving the people's standard of 
living. bringing about a  new  situation~ and scor-
ing achievements that have attracted world atten-
tion. The Party has won the support of the people. 
The fundamental reason our Party was able to 
acxomplish so  much in fourteen years is  that it 
has  persisted  in  integrating  the  basic  tenets  of 
Marxism with the concrete practice of China and 
has gradually formulated the theory of building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. During the 
century and a  half since the publication of The 
Communist Manifesto.  the victories of the Rus-
sian October Revolution. the Chinese revolution 
and the revolutions in other countries have shown 
that  with  the  leadership of the  proletariat  the 
people can indeed seize political power. Tremen-
dous achievements have been  score~ and much 
has  been  leamed about how  to  build socialism. 
~evertheless. the question still needs further ex-
ploration. Indeed. in view of the drastic changes Appendix 
that  have  taken  place  internationally  in  recent 
years.  it calls for  profound study. 
The Chinese Communist Party has always held 
that countries must maintain their independence 
in  revolution and development and that the suc-
cess of socialism in  China depends essentially on 
ourselves, on the Chinese Party's theory and line. 
and on  the  united  efforts  of the  Party  and  the 
people. The new developments in  China and the 
achievements of socialism over the  last  14  years 
have led us  to compare our present with our past 
and our country with other countries. These com-
parisons have convinced us  that our Party's theo-
ry of building socialism  with Chinese character-
istics  is  correct  and  that  it  corresponds  to  ,he 
interests' and needs of the people.  In formulating 
this theory, the Party has for the first time given 
preliminary but systematic answers to  a series of 
basic questions about  how  to  build.  consolidate 
and develop socialism in  a country with a  baclc-
ward economy and cUlture like China. It has also 
developed Marxism by introd  ucing new ideas and 
viewpoints.  '. 
The hlain contents of the  theory of building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics are as  fol-
lows:  ,_ 
Tire  road to  socialism.  We  must take our own 
road, not regard books as dogma and not copy the 
models of other countries. We must take Marxism 
as  a guide to  action, make' practice the only test 
for truth, emancipate our minds. seek truth from 
facts, value the initiative of the masses and build 
a socialism with Chinese characteristics.  .. 
The  development  of socialism  in  stages.  Ac-
cording to our scientific  thesis.  China is  still  in 
the primary stage of socialism. which will last for 
at least a hundred years. All principles and poli-
cies  must  be  based on this fundamental reality. 
We  must not divorce ourselves from it or try to 
skip this stage. 
The fundamental t(Uk of  sociaiism. In essence. 
the objective of socialism is to liberate and devel-
op the productive forces. to eliminate exploitation 
and polarization. and· ultimately to achieve com-
mon  prosperity.  The  principal contradiction  in 
Chinese society  in the  present stage  is  the one 
between the growing material and cultural needs 
of the people and the backwardness of produc-
tion. Accordingly. to promote the all-round pro-
gress  of society.  we  must  give  priority  to  the 
growth of the productive forces and make econo-
mic  development our central task.  In the  fmal 
analysis. the  criterion for judging the success or 
failure of our work in various fields is whether it 
helps  develop the productive forces  of socialist 
society,  strengthen  the  overall  capacity  of the 
country  and  improve  the  people's  living  stan-
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dards.  Science  and  technology  constitute  a  pri-
mary productive force. and in  pursuing economic 
development we  must rely on scientific and tech-
nological progress and try to create a more highly 
skilled workforce. 
The  motive force of socialist development.  Re-
form is  also a revolution. a :-evolution whose goal 
is  to iiberate the producrive forces.  [t  is  the only 
way  [0 modernize China. [f we cling to outmoded 
ideas :lOd  remain content with the status quo, we 
shall accomplish nothIng. The objective of econo-
mic restructuring is  to develop a socialist market 
economy,  keeping  the  public sector as  the domi, 
nant  one  and  remuneration  according  to  one's, 
work  as  the principal mode of distribution. sup-· 
plemented by other sectors and ocher modes. The. 
objeca  ve  of politic:ll  restructuring  is  mainly  to 
improve the system of people's congresses and the 
practIce of multiparty cooperation and consulta-
tion under the leadership of the Communist Party 
and  to  develop  socialist  democracy.  In  correS-
pondence with the economic and political restruc-' 
turing, we  must build an advanced socialist  cul~' 
ture  and  ideology  and  develop  a citizenry who 
have high ideals. moral integrity, a better educa-' 
tion and a strong sense of discipline.  ' -
External conditions for  socialist  conslructi'On.· 
The questions of peace and development are'the' 
two top priorities on the international agenda. We: 
must adhere to an independent foreign  policy' of 
peace and try to create a favourable international. 
environment  for  our modernization drive.  It  is: 
essential for us  to open to the outside world. This: 
is  indispensable  to  the  reform  and to  economic' 
development.  We  should  also  develop  socialism 
by absorbing and utilizing the advances made-bY-
all other countries. including the developed capt-' 
talist  countries.  A  closed-door  policy  can  only! 
perpetuate backwardness.  .' :lI!C 
The  political guarantee for  socialist consln./t:..· 
lion.  We  must  keep  to  the  socialist  road  ana: 
uphold the people's democratic dictatorship. lead'-
ership  by  the  Chinese  Communist  Pany  and! 
Marxism-Leninism  and  Mao  Zedong  Thought!.:i 
These Four Cardinal Principles are the founda'" 
tion of the country. It is these principles that will: 
guarantee the sound development of the refo~ 
the process of opening up and the drive for mod"~ 
ernization. which will in  turn enrich the  princi=o~ 
pies with contemporary contenc  .  (r~. 
..  The  strategic  plan for  socialist  construction: 
Modernization should be realized in three stages:· 
1n this long process we should seize aU opportun-
ities to bring about every few years  a  period of 
particularly rapid development and good  econo" 
mic  resUlts.  Poverty  is  not  socialism.  but  it  is 
impossible' for  everyone  to  become  prosperous Appendix 
simultaneously.  We  must  allow  and  encourage 
some  areas and individuals  co  grow  rich first. so 
that  more  and  more  areas  and  individuals  will 
do  so  until  common  prosperity  is  eventually 
Jchieved. 
Forces  that  lead  in  bUilding  socialism  and 
forces  that are relied on. The Chinese Communist 
Party. as the vanguard or the working class. is  the 
(orce  at  the  core  leading the  socialist cause  for-
·.vard.  It  must  meet  the  requirements of the  re-
form.  the  opening  up  and  :he  modernization 
drive  by  cons,tantly  improving  itself and streng-
~hening its  leadership in Jiffcrent areas of work. 
Tile style of work of a party In power and its links 
with the people are vital co  lts  very existence. We 
:nust rely on the workers.  peasants and intellec-
lUals. on the unity of lhc people of various nation-
Jlities. and on the  broadest possible  united front 
Jr socialist workers.  patriots who support social-
1sm  and patriots who  deSlIC  the  reunification or 
:he motherland. The people's armed forces. led by 
:he Party, are the defenders of the socialist moth-
.:rland and an important force for building social-
ism. 
Reunification of {he  motherland.  We  have  put 
forward the cre<ltive concept of "one country, two 
systems" - the proposition that, on the premise 
that there is  only one China. for a  long  time  to 
~ome the main part of the country should adhere 
[0 the socialist system while Hong Kong,  ~acao 
lnd Taiwan maintain their original capitalist sys-
tem.  In accordance with  this  principle. we  shall 
work for the peaceful reunification of the moth-
.:rland. 
The theory of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics contains many other ideas. As we 
test it in the course of practice. study new situa-
tions  and solve new problems, we  shall continue 
to enrich. refine and develop it. 
Under the guidance of this  theory, our Party 
has  formulated  the  basic  line  for  the  primary 
stage of socialism:  to  lead the people of all our 
nationalities  in  a  united.  self-reliant.  intensive 
and pioneering effort to  turn China into a  pros-
perous,  strong, democratic. culturally advanced 
and modem .socialist country by making econo-
mic development our central task while adhering 
to  the Four Cardinal Principles and persevering 
in reform and the open policy. "One central task, 
two  basic points" is a succinct summarization of 
this  line.  To  carry  it  out.  OUt  Party  has  also 
formulated a set of principles and policies regard-
ing economics,  politics.  science  and  technology, 
education. culture and military  and  foreign  af-
fairs.  This line and these  principles and poliCies 
are  likewise  to  be  continually .:nriched.  refined 
and developed in the course of practice. 
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The theory or building socialism '.vlth  Chinese 
charactenstics has  taken  shape  graduaily  in  the 
current situauon in which peace and deveiopment 
are  the  priorities  or the  times.  and  as  we  have 
been  carrying  out  reform.. and  the  open  policy 
and  bringing  about  socialist  modernlZation.  It 
has  been  based  on  a  review  of  the  .:xpenence 
gained from our successes and failures in building 
:;ocialism in China and from those in other coun-
meso  It  is  the  product of the  integration or the 
fundamental  tenets  of  Yfarxism-L~ninism with 
the  reality of present-day China and the  special 
features of our urnes.  J  continuation and devel-
opment or y!ao Z~dong Thought, a c:ystallization 
or the collective wisdom of the entire Party mem-
bership  lnd  the  whole  Chinese  people,  and  an 
intellectual treasure belonging (0 them all. 
Comrade Deng Xiaoping is  the chief architect 
of our socialist reiorm. of the open policy and of 
the modernization programme. He  respects prac-
tIce and the masses and pays cons  tam anention to 
the interests and aspirauons of the majority of the 
people.  He  is  adept  at  generalizing  from  their 
experiences and innovations, and he can sense the 
direction  in  which  things  are  moving and seize 
upon  favourable  opportunitieS  whenever  they 
present  themselves.  He  has carried rorward  the 
tine work of our predecessors,  and at the :same 
time he  has  broken with outmoded conventions, 
displaying his great political courage by blazing a 
new  path  to  socialism  and his  great  theoretical 
courage  by  opening  new  perspectives for  Marx-
ism.  He  has  made historic contributions by  for-
mulating  the  theory  of building socialism  with 
Chinese characteristics.  .  . 
The experiences drawn from  practice over the 
past  l~ years can be summed up in one se'ntence:' 
We  must ftrnlly adhere to  the Party's basic line. 
guided by  the theOry  of building socialism'  with 
Chinese characteristics.  This  is... me  best  way  to 
ensure that we shall stand the' ,test of the aangers 
we  may face on 'the way to' our goal .  -..:.  . 
To adhere to 'the Party's' basic line.  we  must~ 
nrst  and  foremost.  persevere  in economic  de-
velopment as  our central  ~taSk.. Because' of both 
domestic and. international factorS, even after.the 
establishment of the basic SOcialiSt  system, class 
struggle will contihue to e..tist in some areas for a 
long  time and may be  ilitensified  under certain 
ciicumstances. We mUst have a clear 'understand-
ing  of this  question  and  handle  correctly  any 
problems that may arise. However, class struggle 
is  no  longer  the  principal  contradiction in our 
society. and economic development has  become 
our  central  task.  We  must  never  waver  in  it. 
.:.'(cept in c:lSe ot ;l larg~cale foreign in vasion. In 
Yl!ars  past we  sometimes  turned aside  from eco-Appendix 
nomic development.  because  we  did  not  have  a 
clear understanding of certain international and 
domestic events. That was a serious mistake. Over 
the  past  14  years.  however.  we  have never been 
distracted from this central task. despite the ma-
jor events of one kind or another that have taken  I 
place in China and abroad. We  should continue 
to concenwite on it  unremittingly in the years  to 
come. 
To  adhere  to  the  Party's  oasic  line.  we  must  I 
integrate  reform  and  the  open  policy  with  the 
Four Cardinal Principles. It is  because we  int:od- I 
uCI::d  reform lnd the  open  policy  that socialism 
wit:h Chinese :haracteristics is  so  vigorous today. 
And it is  bec:lUse reform and the open policy help 
consolidate lnd expand socialism that they have 
been progressUlg smoothly. The purpose of adher-
ing to the Four Cardinal Principles and persever-
ing  in  reform and the open policy  is  to  liberate 
and  develop  ,he  productive  forces  to  an  even 
greater extent.  As  we  proceed.  Party  members, 
leading cadres in particular. must be on the alert 
for  Right  tendencies.  but  also  and  mainly  for 
"Left" tendencies. Right tendencies are manifest-
ed chiefly  in  negating  the  Four Cardinal  Prin-
ciples.  in  pursuing  bourgeois  liberalization  and 
sometimes  in  creating  political  turmoiL  "Left" 
tendencies are  manifested chiefly in denying the 
correctness of the  reform  and  the open  policy, 
maintaining  that· the  main  danger of peaceful 
evolution toward capitalism comes from the ec0-
nomic sphere. and trying to distract us  from the 
central task: of economic development by emphas-
izing the need for class struggle. Right tendencies 
can be  the ruin of socialism. and so  can "Left" 
tendencies. 
"Left'· ide:JS  have deep roots in the ltistory of 
our Party.  Their exponents sound  very  revolu-
tionary; they try to intimidate people by pinning 
political labels on them. as if being more "Left" 
meant  being  more' revolutionary.  Most  of.  the 
mistakes that were made in the Course of building 
socialism during the 20  years beginning in 1957 
were "Left" in nature. It is likewise "Left" tenden-
cies that present the chief obstacle to our efforts 
to  explore a  new path for reform and the open 
policy  and  to  break:  out of the structures and 
conventions that hamper the development of the 
productive forces.  Now we are making it clear 
that we must guard against Right tendencies but 
also and mainly against "Left" tendencies. in or-
der that all our Party comrades. leading cadres in 
particular. will learn a profound lesson from the 
past and apply it to  the present realities and to 
their own  thoughts and work:. This will help them 
enhance  their  political  consciousness  and  their 
determination to carry out the Party's basic line. 
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to  emancipate their minds  and  to  work  together 
for  still  greater  successes  in  economic  develop-
ment  and  other  undertakings.  When  there  are 
problems  of  understanding,  differing  opinions 
and mistakes in practical work. we should analyse 
each  of  them  realistically,  and  not  arbitrarily 
describe them as  "Left" or Right political tenden-
CIes. 
To  adhere  to  the  Party's  basic  line.  we  must 
consolidate and expand political unity and stabil-
ity.  Without  political  and  social  stability,  any 
attempt to carry out reform and the open  policy 
and to  promote economIC development would be 
out of the question. We  must adhere to the Four 
Cardinal  Principles and resolutely  eliminate all 
factors  that  might  lead  to  unrest or  turmoil  in 
China.  Conversely,  if we  do  not  take  economic 
development  as  our central  task  and  carry out 
reform and the open policy,  and if we  therefore 
fail  to  achieve  economic growth.  any effort  to 
consolidate  unity and stability would  be  our of 
the question.  Only so  long  as  the  basic  line  re-
mains unchanged and there is social and political 
stability shall we  be able to  forge ahead steadily. 
II. The Major Tasks in the Reform and 
Economic Development in the 1990s 
The key to advancing the building of socialism 
with Chinese  characteristics is  to  adhere  to  the 
Party's basic line, accelerating the reform and the 
opening to  the outside world  and concentrating 
on  economic  development.  At  the  same  time. 
while making economic development our central 
task.  we should also improve our socialist demo-
cracy,  legal system. culture and ethics. so  as  to 
ensure all-round social progress.  . 
Modern Chinese history and the realities of the 
present-day. world show that SO  long as a country 
is economically backward. it will be in a passive 
position, subject to manipulation by others. No-
wadays the competition among the various coun-
tries is,  in essence.  a  competition of overall na-' 
tional strength based on economic. scientific and 
technological strength. A great number of coun~ 
tries and regions. especially our neighbours.  arc 
speeding up their developmenL If  we  fail  to de-
velop our economy rapidly, it will be  very  diffi~ 
cult for us to consolidate the socialist system and 
maintain long-term social  stability.  Whether we 
can  accelerate  economic growth is  therefore  an 
important question both economically and politi-
cally.  ". 
The economic  target set  for  the  19905  was  to' 
increase the gross national product annually by 6 
per cent. However, judging from  the situation at 
home and abroad. it is  possIble for us to  achie.ve Appendix 
a  higher  growth  rate.  According  to  an  initial 
estimate. we  can. achieve a growth rate of 8 or 9 
per cent, and we should strive to do so. If we work 
hard  to  improve  the  quality of products and  to 
optimize the structure of production and increase 
economic returns. we should be able to attain that 
goal.  Then,  by  the  end  of this  century.  overall 
economic  performance  will  have  improved.  the 
overall national strength will  have been raised to 
a new level. the output of the basic industrial and 
agricultural products will  have greatly increased 
and we  shall have exceeded  the  goal of quadru-
Pting the GNP of 1980. The structure of produc-
tion and the regional distribution of the economy 
will  have  become  more  rational.  and scientific 
and  technological  levels  and  managerial  skills 
will have been raised considerably. A large num-
ber of key  enterprises  will  have  reached  or ap-
proached advanced world standards. The people 
will be beginning to  lead a relatively comfortable 
life.  We  propose  that the  State Council readjust 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan in accordance with the 
estimated higher growth  rate and  begin drawing 
up the ninth. 
We  should  seize  the  present  opportunity  to 
accelerate economic development. In areas where 
conditions  permit.  we  should  do  our  best  to 
achieve  a  higher rate of growth.  We  should en-
courage expanded production by enterprises that 
can tum out high-quality products. operate effi-
ciently and satisfy the changing needs of markets 
both at home and abroad. At the same time.  we 
should proceed  from  actual conditions. keep de-
velopment  within  the  limits  of our capabilities 
and maintain an overall balance. In our efforts to 
speed up economic growth. we  should avoid  the 
mistakes of the pasL We should not rush headlong 
into  action.  neglecting  economic  results.  vying 
with each other in pursuit of a higher growth rate 
and  seeking  only  increased  output  value.  new 
construction projects  and expanded capital con-
struction. We  should do solid  work.  proceeding 
boldly but prudently and making concerted ef-
forts  to  accomplish  a  few  major tasks  that will 
pave the way for faster growth and better econo-
mic results in future. 
To accelerate economic growth we must further 
emancipate our minds, speed  up the reform and 
the opening to  the rest of the world and not get 
bogged down in an abstract debate over what is 
socialist and what is capitalist. To achieve super-
iority over capitalist countries, socialist countries 
should not hesitate to adopt from abroad. includ-
ing  from the developed  capitalist countries, any 
advanced  methods of operation or management 
techniques that reflect the general laws governing 
modem production and the commodity economy. 
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Foreign funds.  resources.  technology and skilled 
personnel. along with privately owned enterprises 
that are a useful supplement to our economy, can 
and should be  put to use for the benefit of social-
ism.  That will  not  harm  socialism  but  help  it. 
since political power is  in the hands of the people. 
and since we  have a strong public sector. 
Setting  the  right  objective  for  the  reform  of 
China's economic structure is  vital to  the success 
of the  drive  for  socialist  modernization. Correct 
understanding and  handling of the  relations  be-
tween  planning and market regulation  is  crucial. 
According  to  conventional  thinking,  a  market 
economy is  peculiar to capitalism. and a planned 
economy  is  the  basic feature of socialism.  Since 
the  Third  Plenary  Session  of  the  II th  Central 
Committee and with the deepening of the reform. 
we  have  gradually  freed  ourselves  from  those 
conventional' ideas  and  acquired  a  new  under-
standing  of  this  question.  This  has  played  an 
important role in advancing the reform and eco-
nomic development. The  12th National Congress 
declared that in a socialist economy planning was 
primary and market regulation secondary. At the 
Third Plenary Session of thel2thCentrai Commit-
tee.  the Party stated thac  a commodity economy 
was  a stage thac could not  be  bypassed in socio-
economic  development  and  that China's  social-
ist economy was  a planned commodity economy 
based  on  public  ownership.  The  13th  National 
Congress held that the socialist planned commod-
ity  economy  should  be  a  system  thac  integrat-
ed  planning  with  market  regulation.  After  the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Com-
mittee it said  that to  facilitate  the development 
of a  socialist  planned commodity economy,  we 
should  establish  an  economic  structure  and  an 
operating  mechanism  that  combined  planning 
with the use of market forces. 
In the important talks he gave earlier this year. 
Comrade Deng Xiaoping particularly pointed out 
that  a  planned  economy  was  not  socialism  -
there was  planning under capitalism too. A mar-· 
ket  economy  was  not  capitalism  - there  was 
market regulation under socialism too.  Planning 
and market regulation, he said, were both means 
of controlling economic activity. Whether the em- • 
phasis was on planning or on market regulation 
was  not  the· essential  distinction  between  s0-
cialism and capitalism. This brilliant thesis  has 
helped free us from the restrictive notion thar the 
planned  economy and the  market economy  be-
long  to  basically  different  social  systems,  thus 
bringing about a great  breakthrough in  our un-
derstanding  of  the  relations  between  planning 
and market regulation. 
With  the  reform  and  the  open  policy  introd-Appendix 
uced  in the last dozen years.  market forces  have 
functioned  more  extensively,  Control  over  the 
prices of most commodities has  been relaxed and 
the  extent  of  mandatory  planning  considerabl y 
reduced. which has given greater scope to market 
forces  in regulating economic activities. Practice 
in  China  has  proved  that  where  market  forces 
have been given full  play,  there the economy has 
been vigorous and has developed in a sound way, 
To optimize the economic structure.  to  improve 
economic  performance.  to  accelerate  economic 
development  and  to  take  part  in  lnternatio;]al 
competition.  we  must  continue  to  intensify  the 
market forces.  :--iow  that we  have gained a deeper 
understanding  of  them  in  practice,  we  should 
state explicitly that the objective or the reform of 
the economic structure will  be  to  establish a so-
cialist market economy that will  further liberate 
and expand the producu  ve  forces. 
By establishing such an economic structure we  I 
mean  to  let  market  forces,  under  the  macro-
economic control 'of the state, serve as  the basic 
means of regulating the aiJocation of resources, to 
subject economic acuvity to  the law of value and 
to  make  it responsive  to  the  changing  relations 
between supply and demand. We should make use 
of pricing and competition to distribute resources 
to  those  enterprises  that  yield  good  economic 
returns. In this way. we shall provide an incentive 
for enterprises to  improve their performance, so 
that the efficient ones will prosper and the ineffi-
cient ones will be eliminated. 
Since  the  market  is  sensitive  to  changes  in 
demand, we  should usc  it to make  timely read-
justment in production. as  necessary.  Neverthe-
less. we must be aware that the marlcet has its own 
weaknesses  and negative  aspects.  Macro-control 
of the  economy  by  the state  is  therefore  very 
important, and the way  in which it is  exercised 
must be improved. We  should work hard to es-
tablish  an,  integrated  national  market.  and  we 
should  give  more  rein  to  market  forces.  We 
should guide the growth of the market by econo-
mic policies, regulations. planning and necessary 
administrative means. in accordance with objec-
tive laws.  ,  , 
, , The socialist market economy is a component 
part of the basic system of socialism. So far as the 
ownership strUcture is.conccmed. for a long time 
to come we should allow  diverse sectors of the 
economy to develop side by'side. The public sec-
tor.  which  includes  enterprises  owned  by  the 
whole  people  and  enterprises  owned  by  coUec-
tives, is  to remain predominant. wilh the private 
sector,  which  includes  individually  owned  and 
foreign-owned enterprises. as a supplement. Dif-
ferent sectors of the economy can operate jointly 
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in different ways on a voluntary basis.  Enterpris-
es  owned  by  the  whole  people  should  play  the 
leading role when they compete with others in the 
market on an equal footing. 
So  far as  distribution  is  concerned. remunera-
tion according to one's work  WIll  remain the pre-
dominant  mode.  with  other  modes  as  a  supple-
ment;  these  too.  however,  should  be  fair  and 
based on performance. By  using various means of 
regulatlon.  including  the  market.  we  should en-
courage  the  advanced  and  help  raise  efficiency, 
We  should widen differences in  personal income 
to a  reasonable degree,  but at the same  time  we 
should  prevem polarization and gradually  bring 
J.bout common prosperity, 
Through  macro-comrol  a  socialist  country  is 
able to integrate people's immediate interests with 
their long-term interests and the interests of some 
with the interests of all, exploiting the advantages 
of  both  planning  and  market  forces.  The state 
plan is an important means of macro-controL We 
should  renew our concept  of planning and  im-
prove our methods. When  the state malces  plans, 
its  main tasks should be to  set  rational strategic 
targets for national economic and social develop-
ment, to  forecast economic development. to con-
trol total supply and total demand. to readjust the 
geographical distribution of industries and of the 
productive forces and to muster the financial and 
material resources necessary for the construction 
of important projects  - all  for  the  purpose  of. 
speeding up economic development by employing 
all economic levers. 
Establishing, and improving a socialist market 
economy will  be a  long  process.  because  it is a 
difficult and complex feat of social systems engi-, 
neering. We must be prepared to make sustained' 
efforts. but at lhe same time we should work with 
a sense of urgency. We  must keep to  the cor.rect. 
orientation. but at the same time we should p~ 
ceed in the light of actual conditions. During the: 
process of establishing the socialist market econ-, 
omy,  the extent to which planning is  combine4 
with market regulation and the form the combi'1 
nation takes may vary at different times, in die, 
ferent places and in different sectors of the econ.~ 
omy. We should be bold in exploring new ways, 
dare  to  experiment  and  constantly  review  9,~ 
experience so as  to expedite the replacement ot: 
the old structure with the new. The establishment 
of a  socialist  market  economy  involves  maD~ 
spheres of the economic base and the superstrUc-, 
ture.  and  it  lherefore  requires  corresponding. 
structural reforms and the readjustment of a  se~. 
ies  of policies.  We  must draw up a general plan 
and carry it out step by  step.  We  are convinced 
that  a  market  economy  established  under  the Appendix 
socialist  system  can  and  should  operate  better 
than one under the capitalist system. 
To accelerate the reform and opening up and to 
promote economic development and all-round so-
cial  progress,  we  must  redouble  our  efforts  to 
fulfil  the following  ten major tasks, all of which 
involve the overall interests. 
1.  To  accelerate  economic  reform  while  esta-
blishing a socialist market economy. 
To  establish  a  socialist  r.tarket  economy  we 
must do the following important and interrelated 
tasks. 
First, we  must change the way  in which state-
owned  enterprises  operate.  especially  the  large 
and medium-sized ones, and push them into the 
market so  as  to  increase  their  vitality  and  effi-
ciency. This  is  the key  to  establishing a socialist 
market economy, consolidating the socialist sys-
tem and demonstrating its superiority. By straigh-
tening  out  the  relations  between  ownership and 
management of enterprises, separating the func-
tions of the government from those of enterpris-
es  and  granting  the  latter  more  autonomy,  we  i 
should  turn them  into legal  entities responsible 
for their own decisions about their operation and 
expansion  and  for  their own  profits and  losses. 
They should become the most competitive enter-
prises and take responsibility for preserving and 
increasing the value of the state assets. The con-
tract system currently in force  should be  furth-
er improved. The shareholding system will  help 
promote  the  separation of the  functions  of the 
government from those of enterprises, the change 
in the way enterprises operate and the accumula-
tion of social capital. We should therefore try it 
out in selected enterprises. reviewing our experi-
ence regularly and formulating laws and regula-
tions  to  ensure  that  the  system  develops  in  a 
sound and orderly manner. Where conditions per-
mit. enterprises should be  encouraged to join or 
amalgamate into enterprise groups.  Some  small 
state-owned enterprises may be  leased or sold to 
collectives or individuals  •. 
Second.  we  must accelerate  the  establishment 
of the  market system.  We  should continue our 
efforts to develop commodity markets. especially 
for capital goods. and build up fmancial markets. 
including  markets  for  bonds.  stocks  and  other 
negotiable securities. and markets for technology, 
labour, information and real estate, so as to form 
an integrated national market system open to all. 
At the same time, we  should strengthen market 
rules and regulations, dismantle the barriers be-
tween  regions,  prohibit  embargoes  and  prevent 
the  formation  of monopolies,  so  as  to  promote 
competition on an equal footing.  Reform of the 
pricing system is  the key to  the building of mar-
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kets  and  the  restructuring oi the  economy.  It  is 
therefore necessary to  proceed more rapidly with 
that reform, in accordance with  the  tolerance of 
the different sectors of society,  straightening out 
price relations and establishing a system in  which 
most  prices are determined by  market forces. 
Third,  we  must deepen  the  reform of the sys' 
tern of distribution and the system of SOCIal secur-
ity.  We  should  smooth  the  relations  of distri-
bution  between  the  state  and  enterprises  and 
betweel\. the central and local  authorities,  taking 
into  consideration  the  interests  of the  state,  of 
collectives and of individuals. We  have to  introd-
uce  gradually a system  whereby  enterprises  pay 
tax  plus  a  percentage  of  prorits  and  a  system 
whereby  tax  revenues are shared  by  central and 
local authorities. We should speed  up the reform 
of the  wage  system,  with  the  aim  of gradually 
introducing different systems that are suitable for 
enterprises,  institutions  and  government  organs 
respectively, as  well  as  a mechanism for  normal 
increase of wages.  We  should also  speed  up  the 
establishment of a system of social security cov-
ering unemployment, the aged and health and the 
reform of the housing system in cities and towns. 
Fourth, we  must accelerate  the  change in  the 
functions of government. This is of major import-
ance if  we  are to  keep the superstructure in line 
with the economic base and to  promote economic 
development.  Unless  we  make  substantial  pro-
gress  in  this  respect,  it  will  be  hard  for  us  to 
advance  the  programme of reform  and  to  esta-
blish a socialist market economy. The fundamen-
tal  way  to  effect  this  change  is  to  separate  the 
functions of the government from those of enter-
prises.  Governments at all  levels  should  refrain 
from  intervening  in  areas  where  the  state  has 
decreed that functions and powers  belong to en-
terprises.  Neither central  nor  local  government 
departments may exercise powers that have been 
assigned to enterprises. The functions of the gov-
ernment are to  make  overall  plans,  to  see  that 
policies are carried out correctly, to  offer guid-
ance by supplying information.  to  organize and 
coordinate, to provide services and to inspect and 
supervise. Further efforts should be  made to  re-
form the management systems of the specialized 
departments in charge of planning,  investment, 
fmance, banking and so on and to  tighten audit-
ing  and  economic  supervision.  We  should  im-
prove  the  systems  and  methods  of  scientific 
macro-management of the economy  and  divide 
the  responsibilities  for  it  rationally  among  the 
central  authorities,  provinces,  autonomous  re-
gions and municipalities directly under the  cen-
tral government, giving full play to  the initiative 
of each. Appendix 
2.  To open  wider to  the outside world  and make 
more  and  better  use  of foreign  funds,  resources, 
technology and management expertise. 
The number of areas and regions open to other 
countries  needs  to  be  increased.  Exchanges  can 
take place in  all domains. at different levels Jnd 
through many channels. Continued etTorts should 
be  made to improve the management of the spe-
cial economic  zones,  the  open coastal  cities  and 
the open coastal economic development areas. We 
must open  more areas along  the  borders  Jnd  in 
the  interior  provinces  and  autonomous  regions. 
We  should  also  open  more  cities  along  thl! 
Yangtze  River.  while  concentrating  on  the  de-
velopment  and opening of the  Pudong  Area of 
Shanghai.  We  want  to  make  Shanghai  one  of 
the  international economic,  financIal  and  trade 
centres  as  soon  as  possible  and  to  bring  about 
a  new  leap  in  economIC  development  in  the 
Yangtze River Delta and the whole Yangtze Riv-
er basin.  We  should accelerate  the  opening and 
development of Guangdong, Fujian. Hainan and 
the  rim of Bohai  Bay,  enabling Guangdong and 
other areas where conditions are ripe to basically 
achieve the goal of modernization in  20  years. 
We  should open  up  more areas  to  foreign  in-
vestment.  We  should  continue  to  improve  the 
investment environment and provide better con-
ditions for foreign businessmen to invest and do 
business in China. and we  should give  them full 
legal protection. We should attract foreign invest-
ment in accordance with  the natiorial  industrial 
policy,  channeling  it  into  infrastructural  facili-
ties,  basic industries. enterprises that need  to  be 
technically  transformed  or  that  are  capital- or 
technology-intensive and also,  in a  certain  mea-
sure, into banking, commerce, tourism. real estate  i 
and  other domains.  We  should  ensure  rational  I 
distribution and better management of the econo-
mic and technological development zones and the 
development zones for industries using high and 
new technology. 
We should open up more international markets, 
diversify  our  trading  partners  and  develop  an 
export-oriented economy.  We should expand ex-
port  trade,  change  the  export  product  mix  and 
export high grade commodities of good quality. 
At the same time, we should increase imports in 
an appropriate  amount  and  make  use  of more 
foreign  resources and advanced  technology.  We 
should deepen the reform of the system for man-
aging foreign trade and establish, as soon as pos-
sible,  a  new system  that is  in  keeping  with  the 
development  of  the  socialist  market  economy 
and conforms to international norms. We  should 
grant to enterprises and to science and technology 
research institutes the power to engage in foreign 
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trade.  and  we  should  encourage  enterprises  to 
expand theIr investments abroad and their trans-
national operations. 
J.  To  readjust  and  optimize  the  structure  of 
production.  put  great  effort  into  agriculture  and 
accelerate the  development of basic  industries. in-
frastructural facilities and  the  tertiary industry. 
In light of the current condition of our econo-
my  and  its  trend of development.  we  should  try 
to  raise  the  level  of  agriculture.  which  is  the 
primary Industry. and steadily increase its output. 
We  should con[!nue expanding the secondary in-
Justry  and  readjusting  its  structure.  and  we 
should  make greater efforts  to  promote  the  ter-
tiary industry. 
Agriculture  is  the  foundation  of [he  national 
economy. WI!  must continue to  give first  priority 
to developing it, and we must revitalize the  whole 
rural  economy.  We  must  recognize  the  import-
ance  of diversification and.  while  ensuring that 
the output of grain and cotton increases steadily, 
continue to adjust the agricultural structure. We 
should do all we can to expand farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry. sideline production and ftsh-
eries. and to develop a highly efficient agriculture 
that provides greater and better yields. We should 
persist  in  revitalizing agriculture  by  relying on 
science  and  technology  and  on  education.  We 
should increase investment in  agriculture in dif-
ferent forms and through different channels. con-
tinue  our  efforts  to  build  water  conservancy 
projects and constantly raise the level of intensive 
management and overall productivity. We should 
vigorously expand township enterprises. particu-
larly supporting those in the central and western 
parts of the country and  in  areas  inhabited  by 
people of minority nationalities. 
We  must carry out the decision of the Eighth 
Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee in 
all  respects  by  further  restructuring  the  rural 
economy  and  reforming  the  methods of opera-
tion. We should try to stabilize for a long time to 
come, and constantly improve, the responsibility 
system. the main form of which is  the household 
contract that links remuneration to  output, and 
the  system  of  unified  management  combined 
with independent management. We should devel-
op  diverse  forms  of collectivized  agricultural 
services  and  gradually  increase  the  economic 
strength  of collectives.  as  actual  conditions  in' 
various  places  allow.  We  should move faster to 
reform the pricing system for agricultural prod-
ucts and the rural circulation system. In develop-
ing  the  rural  economy  we  should  continue  to 
expand the regulatory role of the market. 
Rapid development of such infrastructural fa-
cilities and basic  industries as  transportation, te-Appendix 
lecommunications.  energy,  important  raw  and 
semi-finished materials and water conservancy is 
urgently needed both to accelerate economic de-
velopment now and to  prepare for further devel-
opment later. For this purpose. we should concen-
trate on building efficiently a certain number of 
"backbone" projects of high quality.  We  should 
lose no time in  launching construction of the key 
Yangtze Three Gorges water conservancy project. 
the  project  to  divert  water  from  the  Yangtze 
River to north China. the railway for transporting 
coal  from west  to east China. the  IO-million-[Qn 
iron and steel complex  and other super-projects 
that will not be completed until the next century. 
We should intensify geological exploration. We 
should revitalize  the  machine-building and elec-
tronics industries. the petrochemical industry, the 
automobile industry and the construction indus-
try to make them the pillars of the economy. We 
should lose no time in developing high- and new-
technology  industries.  Ordinary  enterprises  in 
textiles.  processing  and  other  light  industries 
should  increase  their efficiency  and  raise  their 
technical  level  through  association.  reorganiza-
tion and technical transformation. Full attention 
should  be  paid  to  economizing energy and  raw 
and semi-finished materials so  that resources can 
be put to best use. So far as  investment in rL'(ed 
assets  is  concerned.  we  should  give  priority  to 
infrastructural facilities. basic industries and pro-
jects  for  the  technological  transformation,  re-
building  and  expansion  of existing  enterprises. 
especially those for the technological transforma-
tion of the old industrial bases and of "backbone"  !. 
enterprises. 
A  flourishing  tertiary  industry  is  one of the 
important  features  of  a  modern  economy.  At 
present. the total value of services in China is  far 
less than it is  in developed countries and even in 
many other developing countries. An expansion 
of commerce. banking, insurance and tourism. of 
services in the fields of information, law. account-
ing and auditing and also of neighbourhood ser-
vices will augment the growth of the market. It 
will also help to socialize and professionalize ser-
vices,  to achieve better economic results and in-
crease efficiency, and to ensure convenience for 
the people and enrich their lives. Moreover, it will 
create employment opportunities and provide the 
necessary conditions for readjusting  the econo-
mic structure, changing the way enterprises oper-
ate and reforming the government structure. We 
must call upon the initiative of the state. collec-
tives and individuals and step up development of 
the tertiary industry so  as  to greatly increase its 
proportion in the GNP. 
~. To accelerate progress in science and technol-
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ogy,  make special efforts to  develop education and 
give  full  scope to  the abilities of  intellectuals. 
Science  and  technology  constitute  a  primary 
productive force.  [f the economy is  to  be  revital-
ized. it is  necessary first and foremost to  promote 
the development of science and technology. Only 
stead.y progress in those domains will enable us  ,0 
gain the initiative in sharp competition. At a time 
when we  are facing  the major tasks of acceler:lt-
ing development, readjustlng the economIC struc-
tur:!  and improving performance. it  is  especially 
necessary  to  make  all  sec:ors  of  society  more 
aware of the importance of science and technolo-
gy  and  of  the  need  to  increase  investment  in 
them. so  that progress in those fields will provide 
the  basis  for  economic  development.  Scientific 
and technological work should be  geared  to  eco-
nomic  development,  which is  our main  field  of 
endeavour. Personnel should be divided rational-
ly  among three areas: development research. de-
velopment of high  and  new  technology  and  of 
industries using  it.  and basic  research. Scientists 
and technicians should set themselves the goal of 
scaling the heights:  the Chinese nation must take 
its  place  in  the  realm of advanced  science  and 
technology. 
By deepening the reform, we should establish a 
mechanism for integrating science and technolo-
gy  with the economy, making them real produc-
tive forces  by speedily commercializing research 
results. We should constantly improve the protec-
tion  of  intellectual  property  rights.  We  should 
assimilate  advanced  technologies  from  abroad 
and  improve  upon  them.  We  must  increase  the 
contributions  of  high  technology  to  economic 
growth. so as to bring about a change from ex.ten-
sive to intensive management of the economy as 
a whole. 
Scientific and technological progress, economic 
prosperity and social  advances  are  all  basically 
dependent on the raising of the educational level 
of workers and the training of personnel. Accord-
ingly, we must make education a strategic priori-
ty.  If we  are to modernize China, it  is  of funda-
mental  importance  to  raise  the  ideological  and 
ethical standards  and  the scientific  and educa-
tionallevels of the whole population. We have to 
make  the  educational  structure  as  effective  as 
possible and to do all we  can to strengthen basic 
education,  expand  vocational  and  adult educa-
tion,  develop  higher  education  and  encourage 
independent  study.  Governments  at  all  levels 
should devote  more  resources  to  education and 
urge all  non-governmental sectors  to  pool  funds 
to  open schools of different types,  thus breaking 
up the state monopoly of education. Schools of all 
types  at all  levels  should implement the  Party's Appendix 
principles with  regard to educatlon and raise  the 
overall  Quality  or'  instruction.  We  should  try 
to  eliminate  illiteracy  among  most  young  ,!TId 
middle-aged people by the end of the century and 
to  institute  nine-year  compulsory  education  in 
most places by that time as well. We  must turther 
reform the educational system. the content that is 
taught and the methods of teachmg it. strengthen 
the  training of teachers,  grant schools  more  au-
tonomy and promote the integration of educatlOn 
with the development of science and  technology 
and of tht>  economy. 
Intellectuals are members or the workmg class 
who have a better sClenufic and general education 
than others Jnd who.  as  pathbreakers, constitute 
advanced  productive forces.  They  have an espe-
cially  important  role  to  play  in  the  reform.  the 
opening up and the  modernizanon drive. Wheth-
er we do or do not give full scope to their abilities 
will determine, to a considerable degree, the pros-
perity or decline of our nation and the success or 
failure of the drive tor modernization. We should 
strive to  create a better environment for intellec-
tuals that will  allow  them  to  use  all their skills  ~ 
and knowledge. and we  should make further ef- ! 
fortS to create an atmosphere of respect for learn-
ing and for professionally trained people. 
We  are determined to  adopt policies and mea-
sures to improve the working, studying and living 
conditions of intellectuals  and  to  reward  hand- i 
somely  those  who  make  outstanding  contribu- ; 
tions. We should introduce a  regular reward sys-
tem.  We  appreciate it  when our people studying 
abroad show concern and support for the drive to 
modernize the motherland and become involved 
in it  in  various ways.  When they come back to 
participate in socialist construction. they will  be 
warmly welcomed no  matter what their political 
attitudes were  in  the  past~ proper arrangements 
will be made for their employment, and they wiU 
be  allowed  to  come  and  go  freely  and 
easily.  Intellectuals  have  made  tremendous 
contributions to the cause of socialist moderniza-
tion. We  have no doubt that they will live  up to 
the ardent hopes of the state and the people and 
prove  worthy  of  the  trust  placed  in  them  by 
working even harder to make fresh contributions. 
5. To exploit the particular adTutages of each 
redo...  accelerate  its  economic  development  and 
rationalize the geographical distribution of the dif-
ferent seeton of the economy. 
The territory of China is so vast that conditions 
vary greatly from place to  place. and so does the 
level of economic development. We should try to 
achieve a rational pattern of industry and prom-
ote the healthy development of regional econom- , 
ies under the guidance of unified planning by the 
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state.  We  should  proceed  in  the  light  of  local 
conditions and In accordance with a rational div-
ision  of  labour.  wIth  all  the  reglOns  exploitlng 
their own  particular advantages tor mutual bene-
fit  and prosperity. 
The coastal  region  in  east  China should  make 
every effort to  develop an export-oriented econo-
my,  concentrating  on  developing  products  that 
yield  a  high added value.  earn foreign  exchange 
and are  produced with advanced technology and 
an  efficient  use  of  energy  and  ra wand  semi-
finished  matenals.  The  regIon  should  use  more 
forelgn  capltal  and  other  toceign  resources  to 
achieve a higher growth rate and beti:er economIC 
performance. 
Through overall planrung. the state should sup-
port  the central and western  regions.  which  are 
endowed  with  rich  natural  resourct:s.  and  the 
border areas there. which have great potential for 
opening to  the outside world. To help establish a 
market economy, these regions and areas should 
open up faster to  the other parts of the  country 
and to  the outside.  They should build  more in-
frastructural projects to  facilitate  the utilization 
of their natural resources and develop industries 
and products for which they are particularly well 
adapted.  Where  conditions  permit.  they  should 
build up the export trade so  as  to  stimulate the 
development of the entire local economy. 
Instead of attempting to  build complete. self-
sufficient  economies  of their  own.  the  regions 
should do everything in the interest of the nation 
as  a  whole,  avoiding construction of redundant 
projects  and  duplication of imports.  We  should 
promote  rational exchange  and  cooperation  be-
tween  regions.  so  as  to  form  a  new  pattern of 
circulation that will  be  beneficial to  all.  In our 
effort to develop regional economies on the basis 
of their natural geographical features and existing 
economic links. we should take full advantage of 
key cities. 
To strengthen national unity, consolidate fron-
tier defence and promote economic development 
nationwide.  it  is  extremely  important  to  bring 
about faster development in areas inhabited  by 
people of minority nationalities. The poor regions 
must shake off poverty and set out on the road to 
prosperity as soon as possible. That is one of our 
strategic objectives for the second stage of China's 
development.  The  state  should  adopt  effective 
policies  to  support areas inhabited by  people of 
minority nationalities. the old revolutionary base 
areas. border areas and poor areas. In one way or 
another, economicaily developed  regions  should 
also  help them develop. 
6. To push forwud reform of the politiC2J struc-
ture  and  bring  about  great  advances  in  socialist Appendix 
democracy and in  the legal system. 
To keep  pace with economic development and 
the reform of the economic structure, it is  imper-
ative  co  push  forward  reform  of  the  political 
structure, bearing in mind that promotion of de-
mocracy must be closely combined with improve-
ment of the legal system. The goal of this reform 
is  to  build a socialist democracy suited to Chinese 
cond:,tions and in no respect a Western, multipar-
ty,  parliamentary system. The Constitution or our 
country  provides  that  the  state  organs  of  the 
Peo';lle's  Republic of China shall apply the  prin-
ciple of democratic centralism. which is  a funda-
mental principle in China. Democracy among the 
people  is  an essential  requirement  for  socialism 
and one of its  intrinsic characteristics.  Without 
democracy  and a  legal  system.  there can  be  no 
socialism or socialist  moderniption.  We  should 
make notable progress in developing SOCialist  de-
mocracy and perfecting the socialist legal system. 
so as  to consolidate the stable social and political 
environment and ensure the smooth  progress of 
economic development, the reform and the open-
ing to the outside world. 
We  should further improve the system of peo-
ple's  congresses.  strengthen the functions of the 
congresses and their standing committees in  leg- , 
islating.  exercising  supervision  and  so  on  and 
expand  the  role  of  the  people's  deputies.  We 
should improve the system of multiparty cooper-
ation and political consultation under the leader-
ship of the Communist Party. In this new period 
we  should consolidate and broaden the  patriotic 
united front and let the people's political consul-
tative conferences playa greater part in political 
consultation and in democratic supervision.  We 
should  continue  to  abide  by  the  principles  of 
"long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" 
of the  various  parties  and  "treating each other 
with all sincerity and sharing weal or woe".  We 
should  reinforce the practice of consulting with 
the democratic parties and support the appoint-
ment of their members and of persons  without 
party affiliations to 1e::1ing posts in state organs. 
with  a  view  to  solidifying  the  alliance  of our 
Party with non-Party people. 
For our unified. multinational state. the great 
solidarity of all nationalities is an important guar-
antee  that  the  motherland  will  remain  unified 
and that socialist modernization will be  realized. 
It is essential to implement all the Party's policies 
with regard to the nationalities. We must perfect 
the system of regional autonomy in areas inhabit-
ed  by  minority  nationalities  and  adhere  to  the 
principle  of equality.  mutual  assistance.  unity 
and co-operation among all  nationalities so as  to  ~ 
promote common prosperity. The Party's policies 
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on religion and on the affairs of overseas Chinese 
must  likewise  be  carried  out  conSCientiously  in 
the service of socialist modernization. 
Scientific  and  democratic  decision-making  is 
essential  to  democratic  centralism  and  to  the 
building of socialist  democracy.  Leading organs 
Jnd leading cadres must listen attentively co  the 
opinions of the  people.  seek advice r'rom  experts 
10  different fields and from  research and consul-
tancy institutions and establish a system of demo-
cratic  and scientific deCision-making  as  soon  as 
possible.  We  must  strengthen democracy  at  the 
grassroots  level  and see  to  it  that the congresses 
or'  workers  and other employees.  the  neIghbour· 
hood  committees  and  the  village  committees 
function well. We should improve the work of the 
organs supervising law  enforcement and govern-
ment administration. recogmze the importance of 
supervision by  public opinion through the media 
Jnd  gradually  perfect  the  supervisory  mechan-
ism. so  that government organs at all  levels and 
their staff will  be  brought under effective super-
vision. 
:\11  due attention should be  given to the legal 
system. To establish a socialist market economy. 
we  urgently  need  to  strengthen  legislation.  In 
particular. we  need  to  draw up laws and regula-
tions  that  will  ensure  smooth  progress  of  the 
reform and the opening up. and provide for better 
management of the overall economy and standar-
dize  the economic behaviour of enterprises and 
individuals. It is  essential to  enforce the Consti-
tution and other laws  strictly,  to  supervise their 
enforcement. to put an end to arbitrary interven-
tion  by  persons  in  authority and to  correct  the 
practice of replacing imprisonment for criminal 
offenses with lighter punishment.  We  must en-
sure the independence of the people's courts and 
procuratorates in  their work.  We  should streng-
then public security.  the  procuratorates and  the 
people's courts and improve the quality and com-
petence of their personnel. To enhance the under-
standing of the  people.  including the cadres, of 
democracy and -the legal system, education must 
be combined with practice. 
Good public order is  of major importance be-
cause it is of immediate concern to the people and 
because it is  necessary  to ensure social stability 
and economic development. We must adopt effec-
tive measures to  put an end to  the disorder that 
exists  in  some  places.  We  must strengthen  the 
people's democratic dictatorship and rely on close 
cooperation between the relevant organs and the 
people in an effort to improve aU  facets of public 
security. To uphold justice and protect the people. 
we  must crack down on  the  activities of hostile 
forces and of criminals. Appendix 
7.  To reform  the  administrative system and the 
organizational structure of the  Party and the gov-
ernment  so  as  to  bring  about  a  chan~e in  their 
functions.  straighten  out  their  relations.  simplify 
administration and improve efficiency. 
If  we  are  to  reform  the  political  structure. 
deepen the economic reiorm, (!stablish  a  market 
economy and accelerate the modernization drive. 
we  must  make  it  our urgent  task  to  reiorm  the 
organizational structure and to simplify adminis-
tration. At present. the overstaifing, overlappmg 
and inefficiency of many  Party and government 
organizations cut them otT  from  the  masses  and 
so greatly hamper the efforts  to change the  way 
enterprises operate that there is  no  alternative to 
reform. Party commiuees and governments at all 
levels  must  reach  a  common  understanding  on 
this  matter. They  must  make  up their minds  to 
reform  the  current  administrative  system  and 
their organization'al structure. in accordance with 
the principles o( separating the administration of 
the government from  the management of enter-
prises  and  achieving  simplification,  uniformity 
and efficiency. 
The departments in charge of the overall bal-
ance of the economy should turn their attention 
to enhancing macro-economic control. Some spe-
cialized economic departments and some organi-
zations whose functions overlap or whose work is 
similar  must  be  abolished  or  merged.  and  the  I 
number  of  temporary,  ad  hoc  organizations 
should  be  considerably  reduced.  Party and gov-
ernment organs must cut back personnel so that 
they do not exceed their authorized size. 
To reform organizational structure and simpli- i 
fy  administration  is  an  arduous  task  that  will 
demand  overall  planning.  meticulous  organiza-
tion. concerted effortS by people at all levels and 
phased implementation.  We  should  try  to  com-
plete it basically within three years. In the course 
of reducing personnel. we should raise efficiency 
and develop  the  productive forces.  On  the one 
hand.  we  want  to  rationalize  the  structure  of 
Party and government departments and improve 
the Quality of personnel; on the other. we want to 
transfer to  the service sector and  to other jobs 
where they are needed large numbers of profes-
sionally trained people. who will become a  vital 
new force in the modernization drive. 
We must accelerate the reform of the personnel 
and labour systems and gradually establish scien-
tific management systems and effective incentive 
mechanisms  appropriate  to  Party  and  govern-
ment departments. to enterprises and to  institu-
tions.  The  reform  in  this  connection  must  be 
combined with the reform of the organizational 
structure and of the wage system. The system of 
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;mblic  serVIce  must  be  put  !n  place  as  soon  as 
possible. 
8.  To continue  to  foster  both  material  progress 
and  cultural  and  ideological  progress.  attaching 
equal importance to  Doth. 
The reiorm. the  process or openmg to the out-
side  world  and  the  modernlza':lOn  dnve are sti-
mulating [he  Chinese peopie  to emancipate their 
minds,  acquire a  broader outlook.  turn their at-
:eotlon to the [uture and to  the world at large and 
(!xert  every dfort to advance material wellbeing. 
At the same time. these new undertakings call for 
greater  cuitur::ll  and  ideoioglcai  progress.  Only 
when there ,s  both matenal progress and cultural 
and  ideoiogIcal  progress  can  there  be  socialism 
With  Chinese characteristics.  Progress  in  this se-
com! sphere must be closely linked to  the central 
task oi (!COnOmlC  development. providing our de-
velopment,  reior-m  and  openmg  to  the  outside 
world  with  a  powerful  ideological  driving force 
and with strong intellectual support. 
The emphasis must be  on progress. We should 
attach great importance to  theoretical work. pro-
tect  academic  freedom.  take  care  to  integrate 
theory  with  practice.  initiate  creative  research. 
develop philosophy and other social sciences and 
uphold and advance  Marxism.  We  should  train 
more young and middle-aged theoretical workers 
so as  to  raise  their professional competence. We 
should  adhere  to  the  principles  of serving  the 
people and- the cause of socialism and of letting a 
hundred tlowers  blossom and a  hundred schools 
of thought contend. We should push forward the 
reiorm of the system of managing cultural under-
takings. improve our economic policies concern-
ing them and promote a flourishing socialist cul-
ture. We should attach importance to  the social 
impact of works of art and encourage the creation 
of works with he;llthy content and aesthetic val-
ue. especially ones in praise of reform. opening to 
the outside world and modernization. We should 
do  better  work  in  the  fields  of  the  press  and 
publishing.  radio  and  television.  literature  and 
art. We should usc ideological and political work 
to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses for devot-
ing themselves to socialist construction. 
We should teach the people of all nationalities. 
especially young people. about the PartY's  basic 
line. about modem and contemporary history and 
about  the  present  conditions  of our country, 
fostering  patriotism. community  spirit and s0-
cialist  ideology.  Thus.  they  will  come  to  prize 
national dignity, self-confidence and self-reliance. 
They  will  resist  the  corrosive  influence  of the 
decadent  capitalist  and  feudal  ideologies  and 
cherish correct ideals. convictions and values. 
In every trade and profession, we  should culti-
, 
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vate ethical conduct. gradually developing norms  T 
of occupational  ethics  appropriate  to  each  and 
resolutely  overcoming  unhealthy  practices  such 
as  the  abuse  of  power  for  personal  gain.  We 
should strengthen education in  social ethics and 
make a point of commending model workers who 
embody the  spirit of the  age.  Communities.  vii' 
lages,  townships,  enterprises and  schools  should 
all work for cultural progress.  We  should contin° 
ue  to  have  model  communitles  and  units  esta' 
blished jointly by the army and the people and by 
the police and the people, so as  to achieve cultural 
progress at the grassroots level  in  both town and 
country. Cultural progress requires material'sup-
port. We should increase investment in  this area 
through all  channels and  include cultural facili· 
ties in the overall programme of urban and rural 
cons truction. 
The spread of social evils damages people. espe-
cially young people.  both physically and mental· 
ly,  impedes the modernization drive, reform and 
opening to the outside world, and mars the image 
of socialism. These evils are therefore detested by 
the people, and we should wage a determIned and 
effective long-term campaign to wipe them our. 
Party committees at all levels should review the 
experience they have gained since we  began  the  i 
reform and the opening to  the outside world, so  I 
as  to  improve  their  leadership  in  the  effort  to 
achieve  cultural  and  ideological  progress.  We  . 
should maintain and enrich the fine traditions of  ! 
the Chinese nation.  assimilate  the  best  achieve-
ments of other peoples  and create an advanced 
culture  and  ideology  through  the  rich.  active 
practice of building socialism. We should create a 
favourable environment for the reform. the open- , 
ing up and the modernization drive and nurture 
one generation after another of citizens who have 
high ideaJs.  moral  integrity,  a  better education 
and a strong sense of discipline. 
9.  To coatinue  improriDc  people's  Iiring  stan-
dards.  strictly  coatrol  population  growth  and 
strenltbea euTironmental protection. 
The  purpose  of accelerating  the  reform.  the 
opening up and economic development is to meet 
the growing material and cultural demands of the 
people. As production expands and social wealth 
increases. the real incomes. the consumption lev-
els  and the living standards of both  urban and 
rural people will rise markedly. Their food,  clo-
thing. transportation and especially their housing 
will  greatly  improve.  Their  cultural  life  will 
grow richer. physical culture will develop. public 
health services will improve and the general level 
of health will rise. 
It will be a magnificent achievement when the 
people of our country - one-iifth of the world's 
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population  - can  lead  a  relatively  comfortable 
life.  At the same time,  J[ should be  remembered 
that China started with a poor economic founda· 
tion and that in this pioneering stage of the mod· 
ernization  drive  we  need  more  funds  for  con-
struction.  We  must  therefore  continue  the  fine 
tradition  of building  the  country  through  hard 
work and frugality.  We  should encourage people 
to  practise economy. 
We  should  firmly  carry  out  the  basic  state 
policies  of  controlling  population  growth  and 
strengthening environmental protection. We must 
never let  up in  the  work of family  planning.  We 
should  make  sure  that  the  established  goal  of 
population  control  is  attained.  promote  prena-
tal  and  postnatal  care and  improve  the  people's 
health. We  should study the ageing of the popu-
lation and take appropriate measures to deal with 
ir.  We  should increase [he  people's awareness of 
the  importance oi the environment, so  that they 
will help preserve land. mineral resources, forests. 
water and other natural resources. use them wise-
ly  and protect the ecology. 
10.  To  strengthen  the  army  and  increase  our 
defence capabilities so as to  guarantee the smooth 
progress of the reform. the opening up  and econo-
mic development. 
The Chinese  People's  Liberation Army is  the 
strong shield of the people's democratic dictator-
ship, a great wall of steel protecting the socialist 
motherland and an important force  for building 
socialism  with Chinese characteristics.  Now  and 
for  a  long  time  to  come. our drive  for  socialist 
modernization  will  be  conducted  in  a  complex 
and changing international environment. It is es-
sential always to uphold the Party's absolute lead-
ership over the army. In accordance with Com-
rade  Deng Xiaoping's concept of army-building 
in the new period, we  must create the best armed 
forces  that  our conditions  permit.  turning  the 
PLA  into  a  strong,  modernized.  revolutionary 
regular army and constantly increasing our def-
ence capabilities, so as  to  provide powerful  pro-
tection for the reform. tbe opening up and econo-
mic development. We have already cut tbe size of 
the army by one million men. From now on. it 
must  work  hard  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
modern  warfare,  pay  attention  to  quality  and 
enhance its overall cOmbat effectiveness. Thus it 
will  be ready to  perform even better the sacred 
mission of defending China's interests. its sover-
eignty over its territory, territorial waters and air 
space. and its maritime rights and of safeguarding 
the unity and security of the motherland. At the 
same time.  the army must consciously subordi-
nate  itself  to  the  overall  interests  of  national 
economic development. actively support and par-
I 
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ticipate  in  the  reform.  the  opening  up  and  the 
modernization drive and  make  its  contributions 
to  China's development and prosperity. 
The  army  must  strengthen  and  reform  itself. 
giving  education  and  training  strategic  import-
ance and improving  ~he overall combat effective-
ness  of officers  and  men.  All  army  units  must 
be  qualified politically and compete·.lt  militarily.  ' 
They  must  have  a  :'ine  style  of work.  maintain 
strict discipline and be assured of adequate logist-
ical support. To grJdually improve weapons  and 
equipment we  must  ;ecognize the  importance of 
scientific and technological  reseJrch for  national 
defence and that or :he defence industry. 
As always, Party organizations. governments at 
all  levels  ,lnd  all  the  Chinese  people  should  be 
concerned  with  strengthening  national  defence 
and should support the army in its tasks. We must 
educate  the  people  about  the  importance of na-
tional defence.  The army should  never abandon 
the work  it does. to  support the government and 
show its concern for the people. and the govern-
ment  should  never  abandon  its  support  for  the 
army and its preferential treatment of families of 
revolutionary  armymen  and  martyrs.  This  will 
improve the excellent situation in which both the 
army and the government on the one hand and 
the army and the people on the other are united 
and support each other. We must make a success 
of the work with regard to the militia and reserv-
ists.  constantly building  up the  reserves  for  na-
tional defence. 
The Chinese  People's  Armed  Police  is  an im-
portant force for protecting the drive for socialist 
modernization. We  must continue to  strengthen 
that force.  together with the public security and 
state security departments, so  they  can be  more 
effective  in  maintaining  national  security  and 
social stability. 
Comrades, 
The reform. the opening to  the outside world 
and the modernization drive are great undertak-
ings  of the  people.  To accomplish  the  arduous 
tasks of the 1990s. we  must rely wholeheartedly 
on the workinl class and on the rest of the vast 
labouring people. giving full play to their enthu-
siasm and creativity. So long as the Chinese pe0-
ple of all nationalities reII\ain closely united and 
work hard for the prosperity of the country and 
for socialist modernization. our cause will surely 
triumph. 
III. The International Situation and 
Our Foreign Policy 
In  ~he complex and volatile world situation. we 
have scored' major achievements in our relations 
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with  other countries.  The  People's  Republic  of 
China  has  cemented  optimum  good-neighbour 
relations  with  surrounding  countries  since  its 
founding,  has  strengthened  its  solidarity  and 
cooperation with the large numbers of developing 
countries  and  has  improved  and  expanded  its 
relations  with  all  countries.  induding the  devel-
oped ones  in  the  West,  on  the  basis  of the  Five 
Principles of Peaceiul Co-existence. China's inter-
national  intluence has  steadily increased  and  its 
international standing has  risen. 
The  world  today  is  in  a  historical  period  of 
great change. The bipolar structure has  come  to 
an  end.  forces  arc  disintegrating  and  their ele-
ments are being realigned and the  world  is  mov-
ing  in  the· direction  of  multi polarization.  The 
formation of a  new  structure will  be  a  long  and 
complex process.  For a long time to come, it will 
be  possible to  secure a peaceful international en-
vironment  and  avert  a  new  world  war.  At  the 
same  time.  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the 
current international situation remains turbulent. 
Contradictions everywhere are deepening, and in 
quite a few countries and regions ethnic contrad-
ictions. territorial disputes and religious conflicts 
have sharpened and  have even  led  to  bloodshed 
and  10C<l1  war.  International economic  competi-
tion  has  become  increasingly intense.  The econ-
omies of many developing countries have deter-
iorated even  more,  and  the  gap  between  North 
and South has further widened. 
The  questions  of  peace  and  development  re-
main  the  two  top  priorities on  the  international 
agenda  today.  Development  needs  peace,  and 
peace  cannot  be  maintained  without  devel-
opment. Hegemonism and power politics have all 
along  constituted  the  main  obstacles  to  peace 
and development. World development cannot be 
based for long on the poverty and backwardness 
of the great number of developing countries. The 
drastic changes and turmoil of the international 
situation have helped awaken the world's people. 
Among the developing countries that have shared . 
common experiences.  the  trend of safeguarding 
independence and sovereignty and seeking soli- . 
darity  and  cooperation  is  gaining  momentum. 
The world needs peace,  countries need  to devel-
op.  society  needs  to  progress.  economies  need 
to  thrive and living standards need  to  improve. 
These have become the universal demands of the 
world's peoples. 
Faced with the new international situation. the 
Communist Party of China. the Chinese govern-
ment  and  the  Chinese  people  will  continue  to 
develop their relations with foreign countries, to 
seek a  favourable  international environment for 
China's  reform.  opening  up  and  modernization Appendix 
and  to  make  their  own  contributions  to  world 
peace and development. 
China has consistently pursued an independent 
foreign  policy  of  peace.  The  basic  objectives  of 
that policy lre to safeguard our independence and 
sovereignty and to  promore world  peace and de-
velopment.  On  questions  involving our national 
interests  and  state  sovereignty,  we  shall  never 
yield  to  any outside  pressure.  China will  always 
stand firm as a strong defender of world peace.  It 
will  not  enter into  alliance with  any country or 
group of countries Jnd will  not join any military 
bloc. China will never seek hegp.mony lnd expan-
sion: it is opposed to  hegemon ism, power politics. 
aggression  and expansion  in  any  form.  China  is 
against  the  arms  race  and  stands  for  effective 
disarmament  and  arms  control  carried  out  in 
J  fair.  reasonable.  comprehensive  and  balanced 
manner.  Today,  some  countries  are  calling  for 
disarmament  too.  but  they  have  nor.  in  effect. 
reduced  the  number of their sophisticated  wea-
pons.  In  handling  international  affairs.  China 
abides strictly by  the Charter of the  United  :--ra-
tions and the acknowledged norms of internation-
al relations and adheres to the principled position 
of seeking truth from facts and upholding justice. 
The nature of the new international order that 
is  to  be established is a question of great concern 
to the international community today. In view of 
past experience and present reality. we  advocate 
the establishment of a  peaceful.  stable. just and 
rational new  international order on the basis  of 
the  five  principles  of  mutual  respect  for  sov-
ereignty  and  territorial  integrity.  mutual  non-
aggression  and  non-interference  in  each  other's 
internal affairs. equality and mutual benefit and 
peaceful .co-existence.  Such  a  new  order would  ' 
include a new internation:ll economic order based 
on equality and mutu:ll benefit. 
The  world  is  diverse.  and  differences  of all 
kinds  exist  among  nations.  The  peoples  of all 
countries are entitled to choose th~ social systems 
and paths of development that suit their specific 
conditions.  All  n:ltions.  big  or small.  strong or 
weak.  rich or poor.  should taxe part in  interna-
tional  affairs as  equal  members of the  interna-
tional  community.  All  nations  should  respect 
each other, seek common ground  while  putting  , 
aside differences. treat each other as  equals. and 
live  together in amity.  The differences and dis-
putes between nations should be resolved  peace- , 
fully through negotiation. in compliance with the 
United Nations Charter and the norms of inter-
national  law.  and  force  or  the  threat  of force 
should not be  used.  Hegemonism and power pol-
itics  - that is.  the  monopoly and manipulation 
of international affairs by a few countries - will 
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not  be  tolerated.  The  establishment  of  a  new 
international  order  is  a  long-term  undertaking, 
and  the  Chinese  people.  together  with  all  other 
peoples  of the  world.  wIiI  make  unremitting ef-
fortS  to accomplish it. 
.-\s  a  member  of  rhe  LJ nired  ~a[ions  and 
a  permanent  member  of  the  Security  Coun-
ciL  China attaches great Importance  to the  work 
of rhe  L" nired :--rations and acrively partiCipates In 
It.  We support the CnHed :-.iatlons ane.  the Secur-
Ity  Councll  in  theIr  efforts  [0  preserve  world 
peace.  promote  disarmament. push forward glob-
al  development and settle 1Oternatlonal disputes. 
China  IS  a developIng ::ountry.  A  key  element 
of our foreIgn  policy  IS  to strengthen our solidar-
ity and co-operation wah other third world coun-
tnes.  China and  the  other developing  countries 
Will. as  always. support each other 10 sateguard-
ing  their independence and sovereIgnty and will 
increase  their economic and cultural exchanges. 
China  has  become  an  observer  of  the  Non-
Aligned Movement and has established close ties 
with  the Group of 77  as  well.  We  shall  further 
strengthen our co-operatlon with them. 
China  is  willing  to  develop  friendly  relations 
and co-operation with all other countries on  the 
basis  of  the  Five  Principles  of  Peacetul  Co-
existence.  The differences  in social systems  and 
ideologies  should  not  constitute obstacles  to  the 
development of relations between nations.  In in-
ternational contacts. China will  never try to  im-
pose  its social system or ideology on other coun-
tries,  nor  will  China  allow  other  countries  to 
impose their social systems and ideologies on it. 
This  is  a  principled  position  and  it will  never 
change. 
China is fumly determined to open to the out-
side world and is  ready to  increase its economic. 
scientific and technological co-operation with all 
countries  on  the  basis  of equality  and  mutual 
benetit and to promote exchange in the fields of 
culture, education. health and sports. 
The Communist Party of China values its rela-
tions with the political parties of other countries. 
It  has  already  established  ties  of various  sorts 
with political  parries and organizations in more 
than 100 countries. We shall continue to develop 
friendly relations with such parties in accordance 
with  the  principles  of independence,  complete 
equality. mutual respect and non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs and to  increase mu-
tual understanding and co-operation in the spirit 
of seeking common ground  while  putting aside 
differences. 
The- founding of the People's Republic of China 
put an end to  the Chinese people's tragic history 
of suffering from long aggressIOn. oppression and Appendix 
humiliation.  and  it  fundamencally  changed  the 
situation of human rights  in  China. The people 
have become the masters of the country and have 
steadily built their own new life. The Constitution 
of our republic has  given  basic  protection  to  all 
the  people's rights. China has acceded to  a series 
of international conventions on human rights and 
agrees  to  the  conduct of international dialogues 
on human rights on an equal footing. In the final 
analysis. the question of human rights is a matter 
within each country's sovereignty; China is  reso·  ' 
lutely  opposed  to  the  use  of  human  rights  to  ' 
interfere: in other countries' internal affairs. 
Historical  experience  has  taught  us  that 
whenever. on any pretext. any country encroach-
es  upon the indc~ndence and sovereignty ot oth· 
ers  lnd  interferes  in  their  internal  affairs.  or  : 
whenever any big, strong or rich country coerces.  i 
humiliates  and  intimidates  countries  that  are 
small,  weak  or  poor;  it  will  be  internationally 
condemned. Any country that overreaches itself 
or rides roughshod over others will be denounced 
by  the peoples of the world. A  just cause enjoys 
abundant  support.  while  an  unjust  cause  rinds 
little.  The  forces  championing l  just cause  are 
always invincible. 
IV. Strengthening Party-Building and 
\  Improving Party Leadership 
We  must  follow  the  basic  line  of  the  Party 
unswervingly for a  long time to  come;  we  must 
rapidly eery out the socialist reform. the opening 
to  the outside world :md the modemization pro-
gramme; and we must maintain long-term stabil-
ity and make our country prosperous 3nd strong. 
The leey  to aU  this  is  our Party, a  party armed 
with Comrade Deng Xiaoping's theory of build-
ing socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
For more than seven dec:ldes  the Communist 
Party of Chin3 has united the Chinese people of 
aU  nationalities  and  led  them  in  a struggle  to 
overcome aU difficulties and Mrdships 3nd make 
a fundamental change in their status. in the di-
rection of Chinese history :md in the image of 
Chinese society. Since the Third Plenary Session 
of the Eleventh Centr.li Committee. it has led the 
people in an effort to  crc:lte a  new situation of 
reform. openinl up and modc:rniz:ltion in every 
field ot' endeavour. The great. glorious and cor-
rect Communist Party of China.  which led  the 
people to victOry in the revolution. can 300 lead 
them to victory in the reform :md in economic 
development. It would  be absolutely wrong and 
harmful for anyone to doubt. weaken or neg:l[e 
the Party's position in power 3nd its leading role. 
In the  new  historic:ll  period  there  have  been 
221 
major changes in  the environment in  which our 
Party  functions  and  in  the  tasks  it  undertakes. 
Ideologically,  politically, organizationally and in 
terms of work  style.  it  is  faced  with  many  new 
situations and problems. In light of the new real-
ities and in compliance with the Party's basic line. 
')Ie  must  adhere  to  the  principle  that  the  Party 
handles  Parry affairs.  being strict with its  mem-
bers.  improving  P:my  building  and  exercising 
more  dfective  power  :md  leadership.  This  will 
make it possible for our long-tested ~arxist Party 
(0 function better ;is the force at the core provid· 
ing  leauership in  the  reform.  the opening to  the 
outside world and the drive for moaernization. 
1. We should study tbe tbeory of building social-
ism  with  Chinese char.u:teristic:s and increase our 
awareness  of  tbe  need  to  rll'1Dly  C2rry  out  the 
Party's basic line_ 
Our  P:lCty  is  the  vanguard  of  the  working 
class.  and  Marxism-Leninism  and  Mao  Zedong 
Thought lre the guides to our action. Marxism is 
a  scienc\!  that  is  deeply  rooted  in  practice  3Dd 
developed through practice. The theory of build· 
ing socialism  with Chinese characteristics is  the 
latest product of the integration of Mar:tism with 
Chinese reality. It is a Manist theory for present-
day  China.  It is  a  powerful ideologicl weapon 
that  will  en3ble  us  to  fulfil  our new  historicl 
mission.  When we  talk about the  need to study 
Mar.tism-Leninism  and  M30  Zedong  Thought, 
we me:m in essence the need to study that theory. 
Leading  Party members. ltigh-ranking c:l(ires  in 
particular,  should  be  the  rust  to  study  it  and 
apply it in practice. We should try to understand 
Comrade Deng Xiaoping's strategy, theories and 
viewpoints 3nd to emulate his Scientific approach 
in examining new situations and his cr,e3tivity in 
solving  new  problems  by  applying  the  Marxist 
stand. viewpoint and method.  We  should  learn 
the basic theories. integrate them with practice. 
and know !low to use  them effectively. We hope 
that  througlI  study.  aU  our  Party  cadres  will 
acquire 3 nnn faith in soci:llism and communism. 
constantly  raise  their  political  level  and  their 
ability  to  solve  practical  problems.  and  tranS-
form their consciousness into tremendous mater-
ial  strength  that  will  serve  to  accelerate  the 
reform.  the  opening  up  3nd  the  drive  for 
modernization.  , 
Emancipating  our  minds  and  seeking  trUth 
from facts are the essence of the theory of build-
ing socialism with Chinese characteristics and a 
"magic weapon" guaranteeing that our Party will 
always be  vigorous. The two  precepts are identi-
cal. They mean that we  should keep our under-
standing in line with current realities. that under 
the  guid3Dce  of Marxism  we  should  break  the  \ Appendix 
shackles of traditional conceptions and subjective 
prejudices and overcome our habit of following 
the  beaten  track  and  rejecting  new  things.  We 
must noc  simply cling to  certain Yfarxist  princi-
ples. to  a dogmatic interpretacion of certain theo-
ries. to an unscientific or distorted understanding 
of socialism or to ideas that are wrong bec;ause in 
the  primary stage  of socialism  they  are  prema-
ture.  Instead.  we  must try  to  analyse  and solve 
problems with the world OutlOOK  lnd methods or 
dialectical  materialism  and  historical  material-
ism. adapting our thinking to c:tanging circumst-
ances.  In  the  coun:e  of  reform  lnd  economic 
development.  leading organs and  leading cadres 
at  all  levels  should  integrate  [he  Party's  line. 
principles and policies with the lctual conditions 
in  their localities  or departments.  They  should 
courageously explore new ways. conduct bold ex-
periments. frequently review their experience and 
seek creative solutions to  problems. 
We should be  lceenly lware that because mod-
ern science and technology lre progressing rapid-
lyand the socialist market economy is constantly 
expanding. there are many new things we need to 
understand  and  become  familiar  with.  All our 
Party comrades must regard it as an urgent. long-
term task  to  learn  through practice. We should 
study not only political affairs but also economic 
affairs.  advanced  techniques of production and 
management.  and  modern science  and  culture. 
We should work hard to  gain professional pron-
ciency and become skilled in our work. 
2. We must build stroDllndinc bodies and tr:lin 
saa:essors to the socialist cause. 
In accordance with the principle of making the 
contingent of cadres more revolutionary.  youn-
ger.  better educated and  more competent. with 
both professional ability and politicai integrity. 
. we  must. help make the leading bodies at every 
level  staunch  collectives  that  are  devoted  to 
Marxism and will resolutely follow  the road  to 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. This is of 
vital importance for. guaranteeing the continuity 
of the Party's line and the long-term  pe3ce and 
stability of the countrY. 
In judling the integrity and ability of cadres. 
we  must look primarily at their performance in 
carrying out the P:uty's basic line. We must ap-
point the right cadres  to important posts. They 
should be persons who fmniy carry out the basic 
line, who are hii.hlY  revolutionary and enterpris-
ing and who have a strong sense of their respon-
sibility  co  serve  the  people.  They  should  have 
scored outstanding achievements in  the reform. 
the opening up and the model"Ilintion drive and 
have  gained  the  trust of the  people.  We  must 
replace those cadres who  are irresponsible. have 
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proved  incompe~cnt or ha'le abused  their  power 
for  personal  gain.  Persuns  who  think  only  of 
themselves or who  merely crave official positions 
can  never  be  :lssi!;ned  to  important  po~lS.  In  se-
lecting cadres lor promOtion. we  must  follow  de-
mocratic  prm:euur.;s  ;]nd  the  mass  line  ;]:1J  act 
strictly  in  acconl;.Inct.:  with  regubtiul1~. rm;\ent· 
ing or corrccting unsou nd  pr:lcticcs. 
Sdectmg a  large  numb!!r of (inc  young  <':~lUr(;S 
to  become leaders It different levels  is  Cllrri:nll~ 
a  pressing ;]nd  important task.  To  accoJn:')lisll  il 
we  must brealc  with  the old  nOlions  of (0Ilow1l1~ 
seniority lnd seeking absolute  perfection.  widen 
the range of our search lnd open up nc'.v <.:hanneb 
of advancement.  We  should  take  goo<1  care  of 
young cadres and set high demands on  them. We 
should  make  an  effort  to  foster  and  promote 
women cadres and cadres from among the minor-
ity nationalities. We should continue the practice 
of transferring cadres from one job to  another as 
appropriate. We should strictly enforce the cadre 
retirement system and continue to  replace older 
cadres with  younger ones while encouraging co-
operation between [hem. We should take practical 
measures to show concern for retired cadreS both 
politically and in  terms of material benel1ts. giv-
ing them some work to do and making arrange-
ments for them to  enjoy their remaining yeats. 
The consolidation and development of social-
ism will require one generation after another of 
hard. persistent. unyielding struggle. The respon-
sibilities are heavy and the road is long; our hopes 
must be  placed on the young.  We  must win  the 
youth if wt.: are to win [he future. The Communist 
Youth  Lt.:a~ue  is  the  Party's  assistant  and  its 
reserve force:  we  must [alee  full advantage of it 
to  unite and  educate  young  people.  The whole 
Party and the whole society should be concerned 
about  the  healthy  growth  of our children  and 
adolescents. In the process of reform and econa-
mic development. we must work hard to  nurtUre 
tens of millions of successors [0 advance the s0-
cialist cause. 
In the course of our socialist  modemiz:ltion. 
attempts to bring about a  peaceful evolution [a-
ward capitalism and  the suugie against  those 
attempts  wiH  continue  for a  long  time.  so  we 
cannot let down our guard. Senior Party cadIes. 
in particular. must always bear this in mind. 
3. The P:uty should maintain close ties witla  the 
masses aad resolutely eliminate corru,doa. 
The people are the source of our strength. and 
their  support  is  [he  basis  of our success.  The 
Party's basic line. principles and policies adopted 
since the Third Plenary Session of the  11 th Cen-
tral Commin= conform  co  [he  interests of the 
people.  and  che:  Party has  maintained  basically Appendix 
good  relations with  the  people.  But  at  the  same 
time,  we  muse  recognize  that some  leading com-
rades are still bureaucratic or formalistic or show 
other failings  in  their work, and that a few  Party 
cadres  violace  the  law  and  discipline.  This  has 
seriously  tarnished  the  repucacion  of  the  Party 
and damaged its  relacions with the people. 
Every Parry member should remember that at 
all  times  and  under all  circumstances  he  must 
serve  the  people  wholeheartedly  and  keep  :0  J 
good work seyle, incegracing theory with practice. 
mainraining close  ties  wich  the  masses  and mJI.:· 
ing  self-criticisms.  L~ading  bodies  and  leading 
cadres ae  all  levels should  go  down  to  the  grJSs' 
roots units, investigacing and studying macters  JC 
first hand, so  as  to  get  to  know  the wishes of the 
people.  help  alleviate  their  hardships  and  take 
heed of their criticisms. They should also reduct: 
the number of meetings they hold and documents 
they issue. emphasizing instead practical work for 
practical  results.  In  this  way  they  will  be  able 
to  advance  the  fundamencal  aims  of the  Party, 
main  cain  a good  worle  style and follow  the mass 
line in practice. 
The Party should improve its leadership of the  I 
trade unions. the CommunisL  Youth League. the 
women's  federations  and  ocher  mass  organiza-
tions  and  encourage  them  to  serve  as  a  bridge 
linking the P3rty with the masses. 
The fight  against corruption  is  crucial  co  che 
maintenance of close cies  between the Party and 
the people. We should all recognize that this is an 
urgent. long-term and arduous struggle. Through-
out the course of the reform and the opening co 
the  outside  world.  we  must  combat  corruption 
and make determined efforts to improve the Pu-
rrs work style and to build cie:lll government. If 
we  want to win the people's confidence. we  must 
be successful in this. Leading bodies and leading 
cadres  at  all  levels  should  set  an  example  by 
performing their official duties honestly and dili-
gently for the-people. Leading Party cadres. ltigh-
and middle-ranking ones in particular. should be 
strict 'with themselves, set a good example. teach 
their children to do the same and take the lead in 
combatting corruption.  To  build  clean  govern-
ment we should rely on education, and especially 
on the 1ep1 system.  . 
Party organizations  and discipline  inspection 
organs at alllcvels should exercise strict supervi-
sion over Party cadres. We should also encourage 
the  people,  the democratic parties  and  persons 
without  party  affiliation  to  do  the  same.  For 
this purpose. we should institute a system under 
which  people both inside and outSide  the  Party 
can supervise  it.  with  Party  members  doing so 
either from the top down or from the bottom up.  , 
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In  panicular, we  should take effective  measures 
to  prevent  law  enforcement  departments  and 
cadres  who  arc  responsible for  assigning  person-
nel  and  distribuclOg  financial  and  material  re-
sources  from  Jbusing  their  power  for  personal 
gain  and  from  perpecuating  other  undesirable 
practices.  Persons  who  are  corrupt  damage  the: 
Party  and  harm  the  people,  so  they  must  be 
punished  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of Party 
disciplinc: Jnd the  1'1WS  of the state. 
4.  We  should  strei'lgtJten  primary Party ()rgani-
zatioDs  :lnd  encoural~e Party members  to  play 3D 
exemplary, vanguard role. 
The primary Parry organizations are the locus 
of all the P:my's work and the base of its fighcing 
capacicy. Party committees at all levels should try 
to  cum those organizations inca  a powerful force 
that can  uOice  WIth  the masses  Jnd lead  chem  in 
reform and socialist construction. In rural areas. 
we  should  make  a  greater  success  of  building 
village-level organizations with Party branches as 
the  nuclei.  In  state-owned  enterprises  Party or-
ganizations should likewise be the political nuclei. 
They should continue to  improve the system  un~ 
der which  the  factory  director assumes  full  res-
ponsibility  and  to  rely  wholeheartedly  on  the 
working  class.  Other  economic  organizations 
should  proceed  from  their own  conditions  and 
.lose no  time  in establishing P3rty organizations 
and drawing  up rules  to  govern  their work.  In 
addition. the primary P3rty organizations in gov-
ernment depo1rtments. schools. resc:lrch institutes 
and  urban  neighbourhoods  should  strengthen 
themselves as necessary. We should make a parti-
cular effort to draw intO the Party excellent work-
ers. farmers and intellectuals who are working in 
the forefront of production. Some primary pury 
organizations are weak at present. so Party com-
mittees at the next lligher level should send cadres 
there to help consolidate them. 
The new 'ltistorica1 period places new demands 
on pury members to set an example. It is there-
fore essential to educ:1te and supervise them more 
ef.fectively.  increase  their ability  and  cultivate 
their P3rty spirit. Our goal is  that. as  advanced 
elements.  they  should  faithfully  carry out  the 
Party's  basic  line.  devote  themselves  to  the  re-
form.  the  opening  up  and  the  modernization 
drive. work heart and sou! for the interestS of the 
people  and.  together  with  them.  contribute  to 
economic development and social  progress.  All 
party  members should  be  urged  to  emancipate 
their minds.  emphasize  reform  and  innovation. 
respect  science  and  do  practical  work.  They 
should take intO  consideration the situation as  a 
whole. unite and coordinate their efforts. be mod-
est  and  prudent.  learn  from  the  advanced  and 
I 
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work hard to make contributions and attain goals  I 
without considering  their own  interests.  In  this 
way.  Party  members can  fully  playa vanguard 
role  in  promoting  both  material  progress  and 
ideological and cultural progress. 
5.  We  should  uphold and improve the  ~ystem of 
delI'locratic  centralism  and  safeguard  Party soli-
darity and unity. 
i.vlodernization. reform and opening to  the out-
side world are Herculean undertakings. Only  by 
combining centralism based  on democracy  with 
democracy  under  centralized  guidance  can  we 
enable aU Party organizations and all Party mem-
bers to  take the initiative and demonstr:lte their 
creativity.  Only  by  so  doing  can  we  pool  the 
wisdom of the entire membership. guarantee that 
the  Party's  policy  decisions  will  be  correct  and 
carried out effectively and make sure that it wiU 
tighten its discipline. increase its fighting capacity 
and advance our cause. 
We should enhance inner-Party democracy and 
institute more systems as  necessary to  protect the 
democratic rights of all Party organizations and 
members.  Channels  for  inner-Party  democracy 
must be cleared and widened. so that Partyorgan-
izations  will  be  promptly  informed of the opi-
nions. suggestions and criticisms of the members. 
In inner-Party activities we  should carry on the 
fine tradition of speaking the trUth and matching· 
our deeds to our words. We should also encourage 
Party  members  to  express  their  views,  and. we 
should protect their right to do so, as set forth in 
the  Party  Constitution.  We  must  identify  and 
deal with anyone who infringes upon the demo-
cratic rights of Party members, suppresses criti-
cism, retaliates against those who dare to criticize 
or tries to frame others. 
Party committees at aU  levels  must maintain 
and strengthen the Party's collective leadenhip. 
If a  PartY  member has differing views.  he may 
preserve them. but lle must abide by the decisions 
made by the coUective. We must see to it that the. 
organizational principle of the Party is adhered to 
- the principle that individual Party members 
are subordihate to the organization. that the mi-
nority .is  subordinate  to  the  majority.  that  the 
lower Party organizations are subordinate to  the 
higher ones and that all the constituent organiza-
tions and members of the Party are subordinate 
to  the National Congress and the Cenual Com-
mittee.  We  must not tolerate  liberalism or any 
defiance of organization and discipline. such as 
going one's own way in disregard of orders and 
prollibitions.  We  must  tighten  P:lCty  discipline 
and keep a constant watch on the way it is  main-
tained. All Party members are equal before PartY 
discipline; anyone who violates it must be subject 
224 
to  disciplinary  measures. Our objective  is.  as  al-
ways. to create a political situation in which there 
is  both centralism and democracy, both discipline 
and freedom. both unity of will and a relaxed and 
lively atmosphere. 
The Party's unity is its life. At tllis critical time 
when we need to speed up the reform. the opening 
to  the outside and the modernization drive,  it  is 
particularly  important  for  the  comrades  of the 
entire  Party  to  close  ranks  on  the  basis  of the 
Party's basic line. Every Party member. especially 
every leading cadre. should conscientiously work 
to safeguard Party unity and the authority of the 
Central Committee. They should aU  be  in agree-
ment  with  the  Central  Committee  on  ideologi-
cal and political matters. We  must never permit 
anyone  to  attempt  to  undermine  and  split  the 
Party.  Both  central and local  Party committees 
should hold democratic meetings regularly. ;Mem-
bers of leading groups should trust. support and 
understand  each  other and  engage  in  criticism 
and  self-criticism.  They should  co-operate  with 
each other to make their work a success. Leading 
cadres at all levels should set a good example by 
adhering to  principle. observing strict discipline, 
protecting  the interests of the  Party as  a  whole 
and  strengthening  unity.  So  long  as  the  Party 
remains  vigorous  and  united  in  struggle,  our 
cause will surely triumph. 
To strengthen Party building and improve Par-
ty  leadership,  the  13th Central Committee  pre-
sents for the examination and deliberation of this 
National Congress  the draft of a revised Consti-
tution of the Communist  Party of China.  This 
draft includes  in. the Constitution the  theory of 
building  socialism  with  Chinese  characteristics 
and the PartY's basic line. This is of great impon-
ance to ensure that there is unity of understand-
ing and action throughout the PartY and that we 
continue to advance along the path to socialism 
with Chinese characteristics. 
Since it was founded ten years ago, the Central 
Advisory  Commission  has  done  much  fruitful 
work.  It has  helped  the  Central Committee  to 
preserve Party unity and social stability and to 
promote the reform, the opening up and the mod- . 
emization drive, thus making historic contribu-
tions to  the Party, the state and the people. The 
Central  Advisory  Commission  now  presents  to 
this  National Congress a  proposal that the com-
mission be abolished as of this cong!CSS. 
Comrades., 
To accomplisll the reunification of the mother-
land is in the fundamental interest of the Chinese 
nation.  and  it  is  the  common  aspiration of the 
entire Chinese people. including our compatriots 
in  Taiwan.  Hong  Kong  and  Macao  and  those 
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residing overseas.  WI!  shaH  work  steadfastly for 
the  gre:lt  cause,  adhering  to  the  principles  of 
peaceiul reunification and "one country, two sys-
tems". The Chinese government will continue to 
co-operate with  the  British and Portuguese gov-
ernments to  ensure that the transfer of power in 
Hong  Kong  and  Macao  proceeds  smoothly  and 
that the two  regions enjoy long-term stability and 
prosperity. Taiwan  is  an  integral  part of the sa-
cred territory of China. We  resolutely oppose  in 
any  form  the  notion "two Chinas," "one China,  I 
one  Taiwan,"  "one  country,  two  governments"  I 
and ;Iny  aces  aimed  at  bringing about  the  inde-
pendence of Taiwan. We  shall continue  to  work 
for direct links  for  postal.  air. and shipping ser-
vices  and  trade  between  the  tWO  sides  of  the 
Taiwan  $lraits and  to  promote  peop!c:-to-people 
exchanges and co-operation  in  various  fields.  In 
particular.  we  shall  work  for  greatly  expandc:d  ' 
c:conomic  co-operation  between  the  two  sides  in 
an effort to  revitalize the economy of the whole  ' 
nation. 
We reiterate that ehe Chinese Communist Party 
is  ready  to  establish  contact  with  the  Chinese 
Kuomincang at the earliest possible date to create 
conditions for talks on officially ending the state 
ot hostility between the  two sides of the Taiwan 
Straits and gradually realizing peaceful reunifica-
tion.  Representatives  from  other  parties.  mass 
organizations and all circles on both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits could  be  invited  to  join in such 
talks. On the premise that there is only one China. 
we arc prepared to  taile with the Taiwan authori-
ties  about any  matter.  including  the  form  that 
official  negotiations  should  take.  a  form  that 
would  be  acceptable to  both sides. We hope that 
the Taiwan authorities will comply with the wish-
es  of the  people  and help  remove  the artificial 
. obstacles to the reunification of the motherland. 
so as to make it possible for relations between the 
two sidc.:s  to enter a new stage of development. 
Comrad~ 
Socialism is a completely new social system in 
the  history of manbnd. It is  bound  to  replace 
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capitalism  - that  is  the  general  trend of social 
and historical development. Any new  social sys-
tem,  as  it  is  born.  consolidated  and  developed, 
inevitably  follows  a  zigzag  course  involving  a 
succession of struggles and sacrifices, of victories 
and defeats. Communists and the people in gener-
al  will  surely  be  tempered  in  this  process  and 
draw  lessons  from  it,  pushing  socialism  in  the 
right direction. Thanks to  the 110ited efforts of ail 
the  Party  comrades  and  the  people  of all  our 
nationalities,  socialism  is  nourishing  in  China. 
China is  a  huge country with  l.l billion  people, 
and the Chinese Communist Party is a great party 
with  50  million  members.  There  is  no  doubt 
that the  vigorous development of socialism  with 
Chinese  characteristics  will  mOllce  an  important 
contribution to socialism and  to  human progress 
worldwide. 
The period between now and the middle of the 
next  century will  be  a  most  important and pre-
cious  time  for  malcing  our country  prosperous 
and  for  advancing socialism.  We  have  difficult 
tasks to  accomplish, and we  bear grave responsi-
bilities. In the  L990s  we  must establish a prelimi-
nary new economic structure and attain the ob-
jective  of  the  second  stage  of development:  a 
relatively  comfortable  level  of life  for  all  our 
people.  In another 20  years.  when  we  mark the 
--looth anniversary of the founding of the Party. a 
whole set of more mature and'·complete manage-
ment systems will have taken shape in every field 
of work.. Thus. in the middle of the next century. 
when  we  celebrate the  looth anniversary of the 
founding of the  People's Republic of China.  we 
shall  have  attained  the  objective  of  the  third 
stage: the basic realization of socialist moderniza-
tion.  The cOmt:ldes  of the  whole  Party and the 
people of all our nationalities must  unite  more 
closely under the leadersllip of the Centra! Com-. 
mittee. Sharing weal and woe. and with all heartS  . 
beating as one. we must hoLd  high the great ban-
ner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and 
forge ahead courageously toward the zpagnif'u:ent 
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Appendix II 
A.  Guidelines for Stablizing the Economy 
(Excerpts  of the  Presidential  Reform  Plan  in  1990  in  the  Former 
Soviet Union) 
BASIC  GUIDELINES  FOR  T'HE  STABILIZATION  OF  THE  ~A­
TIONAL  ECONOMY  AND  THE  CHANGEOVER  TO  A  ~MRKE!' 
ECONOMY -As Approve<1  'Jy  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet  on 
Oct.  19,  1990.  (Izvestia,  Oct.  Z1,  [lp.  Z-5.  18,000 
words.  Excerpts:)  ••• 
1. nm  CHOICE  lIAS  BEEN  MADE 
There  is  no  alternative  to  chanlPng  over  to  a  :narl<et 
system.  The  entire  experience  of  the  'Norld  has  [lroven  :he 
vitality  and  e!!ectiveness  of  a  market  economy.  The  transi-
tion  to  a  market  economy  in  our society  is  dictated  entirely 
by  the  interests  of  man,  and  its  ~oal is  to  create a  socially 
oriented  economy,  to  turn  all  [lrodUction  toward  the  meet-
i~ of  consumer  needs,  to  overeome  shortages  and  the dis-
grace  oC  maXing  [>eople  wait  in  Une.  to  [lrovide  &enuine 
economic  rtee<1om  {or  citizens.  and  to  establish  conditions 
that eneoul"age  industriousness,  creativity,  initiative and 
hi~ [lroduetivity.  • •• 
These  basic  guidelines  are  meant  to serve as  the  (ounda-
tion  {or  coordinate<1  actions  by  all  the republies  and  Union 
agencies  to  stabilize  the  national  economy  and  make  the 
cha~eover to  a  marlcet  economy.  In  this  connection,  each 
3Ovel"eign  L"epublic  will have  the opportunity  to  work  out 
and  implement  a  set at eoocl"ete  measures  (or the  tl"ansi tion 
to  a  marlcet  system,  talcini  into  ac:count  its spec:ific  30Cial 
and  economic:  situation and  its own  national  and  historical 
factors. 
l. ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  IN  A  ONION 
OP  SOVEllBIGN  REPUBLICS 
Eeonomic:  relations  amonc  sovel"eign  repubUes  will be 
based on  a  ntc:OItlition  at the state sovereignty  and  equality 
of  the  repubUes  and,  at the same  time,  at  the  integrity  at 
the  Union  as  a  (ederation.  with  the understandinc  that  the 
enterprise  is  the  (oundation  of the economy  and  the  task at 
the state is  to  create  the  most  Cavorable  eonditions  Cor  its 
opera tions •  ' •• 
3.1'BK LOGIC AND  srAGBS OP RCONOlllC 
UCOVJDlY ..um 11IB  CBAlfGBOVJDl 
TO  A MAlI.KBT  RCONOllY 
This dUftcult  [)ath  needs  to  be  travele<1  in  as short  a 
time  as  I)OIIIIible.  Experience  with stabilization..progr&ms  in 
othel' countries  and  the ealc:u1ations  and  (orec:asts"  that have 
been made  with  res-pec:t  to our eondltions show  that this ~ 
riod  may  Lut approximately one  and  a  haJ!  to two  years. 
And  it is ror this  \Mriod  that  the  additional  ~wers sranted 
to  the  count1'7's  President are  intended •••• 
The  tasks at stabWzation at  the  eeonomy  and  the 
ehanieoftl" to a  marlcet  system  are  to be earned out in 
rour  stages. Appendix 
At  tbe very  outset tber1t  wiD.  be an announcement  ol tbe  I 
introduction at  lectsJ.ative acts that will reintorce  tbe basic 
principles  and  iUideUn- at  tbe economic  reform  ~  and,  most 
imQartantly,  a  system at  tDeUU1'9!l  to  stabWze tbe national 
economy  will be Initiated, b&'1niinI  about: 
an  Improvement  In t!nances  and  monetary  circulation by 
reduc:1ne  tbe state budget datlcit. curtailing  the  emission  at 
money,  restructuring tbe banJc1ng  system  and  putti~ ental'-
prise anances In  orear; 
protection for  tbe  public'~l  monetary  saving'S  by  increasing 
interest  rates at savings  banJcs;  a  balancing  ot  the public's 
income  and  expenditures;  support for  tbe  productIon at con-
sumer ~;  and,  on  tbat oasis,  a  restoration  and  normail- • 
zarion  ot the  consumer mar.<et;  ! 
stabilization  o(  reeiproc:ll  delivenes  and  prevention.  to 
the  exten  t  ;>ossible.  ot a  deeline  in  production; 
destatization and  pnvatization ot  property.  and  imple-
mentation  at a  land  reform; 
stabilization  of  roreign-'!COnomic  ties.  ! 
The  most  dtmcu1t  thing  at  this  stage  is  to  restrain  the .. 
pnce  rise  that  has  begun:  to  limit  the  ~rowth in  wholesale 
and  purchase  pnces,  to  implement  a  &radual  increase  in 
state pnces (or  (uel,  raw  matenals  and  buildIng  matenals.  ,', 
and  to  control  the  level at  3tate retail  pnces  (01'  mass- ,·a 
consumption  ~oods. All  this  'Nill.  have  to  be  done  in  such  ~ 1 
way  as,  on  the one  hand.  to  covel'  the  budget  detlcit,  . 
which  is  ~wing beeause  of  the  rise  in  purehase  and  whole-' 
sale pnces,  and  on  the  other.  to  prevent  runaway  inl1atio,,~: 
'..,hile  at  the  same  time  improvlng  the  conditions  at  the 
commodity-money  balance  ~ol'  an  accelerated  transition  to ., 
market  system  in  the subsequent stage.  ~:,  I 
Stage Il-Striet PfDaocial  Umits 
aDd  a  lIla:ible Price Formation System 
1 
The  basic  content ot  this  stage  is  the  consistent and  ~i 
&1"8dual  transition  to  market  .,rices  (01'  consumer goods  and'~ 
(01'  !l  wide  ranee ot  "roduc:ts  used  (01'  "reduction and  teeh-': 
fiCal  IlUro;>oses.  The  measures  talcen  at the "revlous stage  '-j 
should  prevent  excessive  increases  in  tbese  prices.  In  tbe  .' I 
fUture,  inflationary  "rocesses are  to  be  held  in check  by  ,~ 
means  ot strict anancia! and  eredit \101icies.  r. 
At  tbis  stage fIrm  state "nces  will  be retained  (01'  at  'j 
1east one-third ot  all ~el  and  MlW  and  otber materi-: 
w_hicl1 is  important  (01'  regulation ot  the  overall "riee  >;j 
level and  the level at state Mltail  "rices on  essential con-
sumer ioods.  prices  that will determine  the  de1!nition  at &.. 
subsistence  income  (or  the  ~tion. 
'.  At  the same  time.  tbe 3C!ale  at destatization at pro 
...:nn  be upended,  there  will be privatization  ol small  ent 
"rises. and  the  marteet  infrastructure  will  be developed. 
Special  measures  will be talcen  to  redIstribute capita! 
vestments  and  otbel'  resources  in  ra¥Or  at in<tustries  that 
worle  rot"  tbe pubJ.ic.  and  incentives  (or  their development 
and  expansion  will be strencthened. 
The  initial  result at  the amergency  measures  and  tbe 
aralization at "rices will be seen  In  the (orm  at •  marked 
improvement  in tbe oonsumer-market situation,  especially 
with  respect to ioods  that sell at prices determined  by 
ply  and demand. 'lbe stricter and  tnON  consistent tbe im-
plementation at  IJIU8Ur'eI In the area at  ~aneial and  credl 
policy  and  ~  measures  to eUminate  overheated  demand, 
lower the !'be in prices will be.  Goods  will become  re 
ava.ilable.  This  !a  the ftrst IlOIitive  result tbat can come 
from  tbe  reform~ and  it abIoluteLy  muat  be aehieved.  '.' 
Dul"inC  tbe  transitional period  ~ special  mechanisms  will 
introduced  to provide social protect1on  (01'  tbe llUbJ.ic'S  lD: 
come, lncluc1lnc  the induinc ~  Income  to the dynamics 
retail prices. At the same  time,  meaures  w1l1  be initiat 
to provide 5Up9Ort (or soeially  vulnerable segments at 
population. 
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In  this  coMecrt1on,  republics  and  local bodies  of !1O,ru'" 
~an apply  vartoua  measures  to !'eIUl&te  prices..  lM:luclInlr: 
temporary  price t'reae on  lDUI-consumptlon 
event that tlIese  prices rise  excessively,  can  Introc2Uc:e 
tioned  distribution of •  number  of ioods,  with 
paid  from  tlIeir own  budgets  to  procfucers  and 
tor for  related losaes,  and  ~an provide  social ol'tltecUOD< 
tlIe  public's  Income. 
.  With  tbe  aim  of meintaininC  produc:t1on  and 
~ies, a state contracting system  trill be set up  to 
responsibWty  for  tlIe  placing  of  state orders  on  a cO/ltrllC-lI 
tual basis,  and  for  tlIe  distribution  of  produ~ts supplied 
del' state orders  and  the  regulation  of  I>ri~es for  those 
ucts • 
S~e  lll-Pormation of  11  ~et 
The  main  goal  of  this  sta~e is  to  achieve  a  basic  stabili-
;:ation  of  the  market  for  both  consumer  goods  and  means  of 
)roduction,  while  expandi~ the  sphere  oC  market  relations 
rod  establishinl{  a  [lew  system  at  economic  ties. 
Contradictory  processes  ',orill  be at  work  in  the  economy 
it this  time.  On  the one  hand,  one  can  expect  increasi~ 
;aturation  oC  the  market  witll  goods.  The  market  inCrastruc-
:moe  'Hill  develop  a t  an accelerated  pace,  and  the  eitect  of 
entrepreneurial  activity  on  economic  activity- 'Hill  grow.  The 
'Jtilization  ot  material  resources  should  become  more  eco-
aoaUcal.  and  production stoclc3  will  decline.  The  resources 
tlIat  are freed  up  will  aUlpYlent  the  producer-goods  market 
wd  promote  its stabilization. 
At  this  sta~e the  emphasis  'HIll  Je on  the  (ormation  ot  a,' 
lloUSlnl{  market,  the implementation  ot  waite  reforms.  the 
:estructurilli ot  relations  between  enterprises  and  local So-
viets  in  tlIe  social sphere,  and  the rurther libel'8..liza tion  ot 
"ri~es • 
The  creation of  a  housing  market  is  an  essential  element 
rI.  the  changeover  to  a  market  economy.  It  will  make  it 
~ible to  put  into  circulation one at  the  most  important 
(!Ommodities.  one  that  is  capable at  absol't)ing  a  significant 
:JOrtion  at  the  public's  e1!ective  demand.  tlIus  servilli  to 
~nce the  consumer  market  and  strengthen  incentives  ror 
lIDor  activity. 
There  is  also  11  need  to  restructure  the  w~e system. 
The  main  idea  here  is  to  eliminate  ~mentation and  estab-
!ish  a  state minimum  w~e--ror- aJ.l  enterprises,  regardless ot 
their  (orm  ot  ownershiP-based on  a  minimum  consumer- bud-
get.  calculated  with  II  view  to  the  new  level ot  expenses 
~or housil1l  and,  in  general,  ror  the expanded  rallie  oC 
~  and  services  that can be acquired  at personal  expense 
Ilt  market  prices.  A realistic  minimum  wage  will  be an  im-
portant  means  of social  proteetion  for  working  people.  At 
the  same  time,  restrictions  on  oppol"tWtities  to  earn  money 
will be  removed. 
In  tandem  with  these measures,  as  economie conditions 
permit.  republics  and  local  bodies  are  to  develop etrorts  to 
remove  from  enterprises  tlIe  excessive  and  unevenly  distrib-
uted  responsibility  fOl"  maintaining  rac:ilities  in  the social 
spnere.  This  will malee  it easier for  enterprises  to  enter 
into  market  relations  and  will  enhance  their ability  to com-
pete. 
With  the successM.  implementation  oC  measures  from  the 
"revious  stages, "ractfcally all the baie conditions  needed 
ror  the  stable t\metloning  01  the economy  will be created: 
balanced  prices  and  budget, a saturated  market  for  con-
sumer  ioods and  services,  a  modern  banldng sy3tem  and  a 
(oreign-currency  market. 
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The  conditions that develop  alter implementation  oC  the 
housing  ~onn will promote  the [ormation  at  II  labor ma:-
leet.  Trade  unions  will iain II stronger position  as  deCendel'3 
0(  the  wortdntr  p809Le"  interests.  and  unions  at  entrepre-
neul'3  and  manacers  will be formed.  On  the basis  at  qree-
ments  IUnOnc  them,  with  the state ptaytnc  II  L'elUiating 
1'01e,  the opportunity "ill be  ~reated for  the  organization at 
a labor  marlcet and  for  llUb11c  eontroi over the dynamics  at 
income  and  ~c_. 
As  eompetitioll,  entrepreneurial aet1vity  and  price stabi-
Uzation  dev~,  ftnanc:ial  and  ~redit restrictions "ill be 
l'emoved.  A  ~han«e in  taxes  lind  interest rates for  ~red1t 
IIIill  be  introduced  30  lIS  to stimulate business  activity  and 
increase 'Investments. 
Sbp IV~etfaa  at  tbe StabilJpdaa Period 
The  basic  tasla at  this  period  are  to  reintoree  the stabi-
lization  at the  economy  and fInances,  to  improve  the eon-
IU/ner  mar1cet  and,  in  particular.  to  speed  the  rate at fOl'-j 
Il14tion  at  the  eompetiUve  market  environment needed  for 
~he ruIl-aedged fUnctioning  at the 3eit-regulating mecharu" 
Inherent  in  a  market. 
Durill(  this  period  there  needs  to be signiticant  progress 
In  demonopolization  oC  the  economy,  destatization  and  pri-
vatization. 
The  preconditions  must  be  created  (or  an  increase  in  the 
levei  oC  economic  activity,  particulariy  In  light  industry  and 
the  (ood  industry,  the  agrarian sector and  the  service 
sphere. 
A  preponderance  of  prices  based  on  supply  and  demand, 
combined  with  a  tlaianced  budget,  will create  the  necessary 
conditions  for  resolvinc  the  key  problem  in  the  chanceover 
to  a  market economy-the problem  oC  internal convertibility 
of  the  ruble.  The  essence ot  the problem  is  to  enable  all 
domestic  enterprises  and  (ol'eign  companies  operating on 
USSR  temtory  to  buy  and  sell freely.  at market  rates.  the 
foreign  currency  needed  {or  current business  opera tions • 
The  internal convertibility  oC  the  ruble  will  open  up 
broad  opportunities  for  an  in.t1ux  aC  foreign  investments. 
',.,hich  the country  needs  so  badly  ~or carrying out structural 
chances  and  retooling,  and  also  (or developing  competition 
on  the domestic  market  and  overcoming  monopolism.  [t can 
be  said  that,  ~ven the  conditions  prevailing  in  our country, 
this  is  an  important  prerequisite  tor engaging  the  market 
mecharu"m  f'ull-throttie •••• 
4.  MEASURES  TO  Sl'ABII.J.ZE  THE  ECONOMY 
PUtting ~  aod  !DD08tary  circ:uLatiaa  oa  a  30WId 
r.sia i3  the  key  task  at  stabilization.  [t involves  eliminating 
the surplus  at  money  in  circulation,  bringing  the money  sup-
ply  in  line  with  the supply  at  ioods,  and  strengthening the 
rubie. 
PIl'3t  and  Coremost.  the  Union  and  republic  budget defi-
cits must  be  drastically  reduced starting in  November-
December at  this year.  in  1991,  the aggregate  budget defi-
cit at  the  Union  and  the  republics should  not  exceed  2.~ 
~  at  the gross  national  product  (it should  be  no  more  than 
25  billion  to  30  billion  rubles). That  is  the amount  at defi-
cit  that can realistically  be !tnanced by  aoating loans 
amall(  the i8neraJ.  IlUblic.  enterprises  and organizations,  and 
abroad •••• 
Budget  expenditures  for  the end  at 1990  and  for'  1991 
will be  reduced  by: 
!Urther cutting investments  in  production facilities ••• ; 
cutting spendinr on  the needs  of.  the  USSR  MInistry  of 
De(ense  and  the  State Security  Committee,  specifically  by 
reducing  arms  purena.ses  and  military  development.  Some  at 
the l\mds  obtained  by  cutting  ~ditures are  to be spent 
on  raising  the ;>ay  at  military  personnel and  building  housing 
(or them •••• 
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1'l'ansCorminst  the  banking system  and  creating etr'ective 
levers  to  !'eIJU,late  tbe money  ~ply are at decisive  signifi-
cance (or  putting  monetary  circ:ulation  an  !l. 30und  basis, 
\)reventin«  intlation  and  establi.siling  stricter financial  re-
3triCtiOns  (or  enterprises. 
To  this  end,  specialized state banks  are  to  be  turned 
into  joint~toclc commercial  banla aperatinc an  the same 
(ooting  as  other commereial  banJcs.  They  will be d1rectiy 
responsible  (or  meeting  the  economy's  needs  (or credit and 
\)ayment  services. It is advisable  to  retain one sta  te banJc, 
whicn,  "11th  support t'rom  the budget,  would  atter credlt on 
preferential tema to stimulate economic:  ac:tivtty  In  the in-
terests at the state. The  Savtnp BanK  will retain the status 
at a  state banJc,  aDd  the state will iU4Rntee the intl!irity 
01.  d~its. it necessary  by  Induing them. 
The  USSR  State BanK,  the  republic  ~entra1 barua,  and 
their institutions  l'Iill be given  the Itmctions at a  reserve 
system  "lith a  single  manqement body  that  will establlstt 
uniform,  agreed-upon,  universally  binding  rules  (01'  !'eIJU,lat-
Inc  credit  and  the  money  supply,  including  reserve  require-
ments  (or coaunerc:ial bania,  discount  ratas, etc. '!he 
[state]  mol1q)Oly  an  the emission  at money  will be  main-
tained,  as  l'Iill a  uni.tied  set at  benIcing-ovel'Sight  \)rinc:i-
plese  ••• 
Enterprises  l'Iill experience anancial dUDculties  in  con-
nection  with  the implementation at these  measures.  To  {acil-
itate their adaptation  to  the  new  conditions  and  give  them 
an  apportu',1ity  to  accumulate  their awn  'Norkin~ capItal  and 
and  'Nays  to  increase  their  emciency,  \)lallS  call for  the  rol-
lowing  iTJeasures:  as  a  arst \)rionty,  destatizing such  enter-
\)nse5,  turning  them  into  joint~tocl< companies  and  breakin~ 
them  c'.own  into  smailer  units; 
cro,:ating  stabilization  funds; 
d/:!veloping  commercial credit  among  enterprises  as  an  e1-
eme'Ot  of  the new  whoiesaLe  market,  30  as  to  lessen  the  or-
ient.ation  toward  banJc  credit; 
encouraging  the  \)ractice  at  issuing  bonds  to  augment 
""'orking  capital; 
shutting down  hopeJ.ess1y  inetr1cient  enterprises.  • •• 
The stabilization  funds  will  be  (ormed  from  special-\)ur-
\)ose  budget  allocations,  enterprise  \l8yments,  a  \)Ortion  o( 
the  \)roceeds  from  the sale o( state \)roperty,  the sale  of 
bonds,  and  other sourees. 
Financial  assistance  (rom  the stabilization funds  'Nili  be 
\)rovided  on  specific  terms  that may  include  requirements  to 
reorganize  the  enterprise,  repiace  the  management,  reduce 
unproductive  expenditures,  change  the  line  of business,  split 
up  the  enterprise,  etc. 
Normailzatioa  ~  tbe eoaaumer  maricet  is  the  most  impor-
tant  \)art ot  the stabilization  \)rogram  (rom  a  social  stand-
\)Oint.  To  achieve  it,  on  the one  hand,  an  etr'ective  use 
must  be  (ound  {or  the  huge  surplus  oC  money  that  the  \)ublic 
has  accumulated,  and  on  the otller hand,  the volume  at 
goods  and  services  reaching  the consumer  marlcet  must  be 
incre  ased • 
To  accom~h the am taslc,  it is !;)roposed  that  the 
sphere at  !;)urehasable  goods  and  services  be expanded. The 
sale at hoUSing,  dachas,  building  materials  and  various  kinds 
of state \)roperty  to  the !;)ublic:  is  to be  increased,  and  fees 
are  to  be charged {or  the long-term leasing at  \)iots  of land 
in  the  country.  By  redistributinc construction capacity  and 
giving  construc:tion  OrpnizatiOIW  additional  incentives,  an 
additional quantity  at  residential.  rooms  and  lIarages  will 
have  to be built  and severaJ.  milllon  out-oi-town !;)lots  of 
land  will  have  to !;)repared  as early  as 1991, so  that they 
can be  soJ.d  to  the  public. 
There  are aJso  !;llans  to bolTOW  money  (rom  the  public  at 
no  interest,  to  be  \)aid  back  in  the near  ~ture (at tlxed 
terms)  with  materia!  benetlts  and  goods  in short supplY-<lU-
to mobiles ,  personal  computers,  t'Ilmiture,  !;)hone  service,  ad-
ditional  housing,  garden  3heds,  Pl'8ies, out-oi-town garden 
:?lots  and  others.  • •• 
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DemonopoiJzation  and  privatization  are  under  way  in  re-
tail  and  wholesale  trade and  the {ood- and  coll3Um~ervice 
seetors,  as  well  as  in  a  significant  percentage  01.  the  enter-
prises  that supply  tlwtm  witll  goods.  • •• 
It nec~,  rationed d1atrtbution  01.  a  limited selection 
ot  essentiaL ~  will be used  at the city,  l"eIional  01"  re-
public level. 
GuaraateeiDr  tbe stliDiUty  <1  aeaGOaM ti-Jis especially 
important  in  tlwt  transitional period.  considering the  unstable 
nature at the  eme~  marlcet-bue<i  ties  and  the dallier at 
production's beinc  thrown  into disorder. 
In  accordance  ·..,ith  the  OSSR  President's  Decree,  ex' 
economic  ties  will  be  maintained  in  1991,  and  severe sa 
tions  will  be  imposed  {or  breaJcinII  them.  • •• 
StreugtheniDg  tbe ossa's !onip-ecooomie pmitioa 
~ently requires  that  the country's  hard~nc:y situatio 
be  normalized  and  foreign  capiW be attracted as  quiclc.ly' 
possible.  To  create the conditions  (or  this,  there must 
a)  a  clear-cut program  (or stabilizing the political aDd 
nomic  situation,  a  program  that enJoys  the support  of  th 
republics  and  the country's  main  [)Ubllc  (orees:  b)  a  na-
tional  pl'Oiram  (01"  cut~  back  military  spending,  the 
and  weapons  and  conve~  military  production:  and c) 
new  doctrine  01.  (oreign~nomic ties,  with  iUarantees fI 
(oreign  investments. 
It these  programs  are adopted  and  implemented,  there.-
a  possibility  ot: 
reeeiving  various  (orms  of assistance  (rom  developed 
italist  countries,  including  long-tenn  loans  on  favorable 
terms: 
with  the  concurrence of  the  appropriate  Soviet ot  P 
ple's  Deputies,  leasing  individual  fuel  and  raw-material d 
posits  and  tracts of  forest  land,  and  organizing  joint  ven-
tures  (01"  the complete  processiru{  of these natural  resoure 
with  due  regard  for  modern  environmental  requirements; 
auctioning  of!  or  leasing  real estate,  including  untinisb 
construction  projects; 
having  the state sell {oreign  investors  seeurities  ·..,ith 
various  types of backing  and  stocks  of  USSR  enterprises 
organiza  tions ; 
beginning  to  process,  with  the  help at {oreign  capita1~ 
the numerous  dumps  and storage sites  (01"  wastes  and  sec-
ondary  materials; 
aMually  attracting (oreign  investments  in  the  organiza 
tion  of jOint  ventures; 
promoting  the  investment  of {oreign  capital  in  the  dev 
opment ot  a  moc1ern  tourism  indUStry  and  business  infrast 
ture •••• 
Ta.llcs  with  the  [nternational Monetary  Fund,  the Euro-
pean  Communities  and  leadilll foreign  states on  rInanc:ial 
economic support (or  the  process  of  restructuring  and 
retonn  are nearing compLetion; 
starting Jan.  I,  1991,  accounts  with  Cr1EA  countries 
will be settled at world  prices and  in  /'reely  convertibLe 
currency; 
the  USSR's  economic:  assistance  to  foreign  3tatas is 
cut bac:k  and  put onto  a  commereial basis. 
It is  intended  that  the USSR  Supreme  Soviet set a  ceil 
inc  on  the OSSR's  foreign  debt every yeu and  approve  ttl 
budget  (01"  usista.nc:e  at  this  type.  • •• 
It  is  important  that deeisions  be  reached  as  quickly  _ 
j)OSIIible  on  questions  01.  enterprises'  r1iht  to mortgage 
and  property,  thereby openinc  a  way  {or  them  to  obtailt 
cured  loans from  foreign  banlcs  {or  the  [)U~e at  expano~_ 
their exports. 
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5. MIL\StlIlBS roa'TBB  P'OBMA'nOM 
0. A  IIAllUl" BCOMaIY 
~  tar aa~,  cBtatiatioa, privatizat10a
l 
IDd  the deftIcpDeat at cumpwtltfaa.  • •• 
It  is  lllaMed  In  the near fUture  to declare freedom  at 
eetlnomic  activity  and  at  the development  at  en~preneur-
ship  In  the country,  establlsl.tinC  treedom tor I!  variety  at 
organizations  and  ~itizens  tel  sl1l8le  in  economic  activity, 
allowing [or  the  ~reatioo at  I!!It~  and  (or their t"e(is-
tration 00  the  basis  at  a  stmpJ.e.,statement,  I!nd  stipulatlni 
the  impermissibility at  Interference by state administrative 
bodies  in the  'IfOne  at  enteJ"ri:ses,  rerardless  ot  their (orm 
at  ownership  and  managemftnt. 
'lbe Illan  is  to  ~t these  provisions  into  !!trect  by  means 
at a  Decree  at  the  OSSR  President.  • •• 
At  the same  time,  lists at  types at  activities that are 
prohibited,  are the sole [)reroptive ot  the state, or are al-
lowed  oniy  alter obtaining a state Ueense  will be coNirmed 
at the  Union  level  and  in the  ~bUcs. • •• 
Oestatization [)rograms  will be  ~ued with  the  adop-
tion,  at  the  Union  and  republic:  levels,  at  appropriate  deci-
sions  in  the  (orm  at Decrees ot  the lJSSll  President  and  the 
tu(hest bodies  at [)Ower  in  the republics.  • •• 
'lbe OSSR  State Property Fund  will be  in  cbarge at  all 
the concrete  wone  ot dest&tization at the  Union  level.  Simi-
lar qenc:ies  'irill be  ~reated in the republics. 
Priority  dest&tization  and  [)rivatization  measures  are  to 
be  ~a.rried out tlrst  and  forelJlOlt  in  thoae  areas  where  it 
makes  the most  sense  for  nollState structures  to  be  in  oper-
ation. 'lbese include  trade, ~e  tood  services,  eonsumer 
Hl"vice  opera tions,  and  repair and  c:onstruetion organiza-
tions,  as  well  as  small enterprises  in other sectors.  At  the 
same  time,  etr'oru  will be  made  this  year to convert Iarre 
and  med1um~ized enterprises in dUrerent  branches at indus-
try  and  other spheres  into  joint~ocJc companies.  • •• 
Approximately  9~ at  all [)roperty  is  owned  by  the 
state. 
Therefore,  the  destatization [)rocess  eouId  be a  long-
drawn-out one.  Various  methods  ot  speeding it up  will  be 
sought  and  tested,  taJcing  into  account  the  interests  of  all 
eitizens.  . •• 
Laad  retarm  aDd  the dktioetiw (eatuns ot  !'armiDg 
lIWtcet reiatiexa  in  the acro-iDdaItriai  complex. The  key 
areas  in  the {ormation  at  a  market  economy  in  the  agrarian 
sphere are: 
implementation at land  reform  and  the ereation of  ~ondi­
tions  tor'  the !tractive t'Unctioning  at various  forms  at owner-
ship  and  man8l{ement,  elImination  at the  monopoly  on  land 
ownership,  and  the (ormation  at  an  economy  in the  agrarian 
sector' that is  baed on  a  variety  o! socioeconomic  arrange-
ments; 
elImination at  administrative structures  (Of'  the state 
manalement at qricuIturai  ~roduction,  and  rejection  at ad-
ministrative estabUshment  at mandatory  ordel"!  (or  agrieuJ.-
turaJ.  output; 
enhanc:ed  [)restige  and  improved  motivation  (or  [)ellunt 
labor,  every  eneouralement at  enteroprise,  lind  healthy 
competition among  ~oods [)roducers; 
the development  and  implementation  at special-purpose 
[)rogr!llT1S  (or  developing  the  ;lroduction-related and  social 
in!ra3tructure  in  the  eountryside,  with  Clnandal  sup[)Ot"t  {'rom 
the state; 
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tne  en.surt~ ot  11  social  pouey  that c:or-responas  to  the 
needs  I1nd  requirements  ot  l"Ur8.I.  residents,  I1nd  the creation 
ot  sociaJ.  I1nd  economic  guarantees  ot  11  tItting position  {or 
the  peasantry  in sooiety.  The  republics  will  I1dopt  land 
~es  I1nd  other direct  teg:isiative  11c:t3  ~ati~  land  rela-
tions  "Rith  regard  {or  the lpec:ial  features  of  in<1ividuaJ.  re-
gions  of the  coun try,  34ft  condi tions {or  granting land  to  ev-
eryone  who  wants  it  and  is  capallle  t:1  utilizing it  e1rec:tive-
ty  for  agricultural  produc:tfon,  I1lId  detemune  the  procedures 
for  an  employee  to  wit.h<l1'8w  !'reely  tram  a  state,  <:Oc)ge1"!l-
ttve or other enterprise  (assoc:iation)  .nth  lUI  allotment  of 
land  I1nd  a  share  01.  the property  that has  been ac:eumu-
lated,  provlded  that  he  organize  independent  agricultural 
production.  • •• 
The  hignest  bodies  01.  state \)Ower  in  the  republics  IU'e  to 
create land  reform  committees  and  lll8ign  them  the task of 
inventOf'Ytnc  and  asaessing  agricultunu lands,  idantitying 
tands  tha:t  ue not  being  used  emciently,  !"eI{Ulatfnc land 
tenure  and  performing  consultative  a.nd  oversignt !'unctions. 
Worle  is  to  be  done  to  transtorm  ineft!cient collective 
I  (arms  and  state farms  by  turning either all or part of their 
, Lands  over'  to  cooperatives.  leaseholders,  peuant farms,  and 
industriaL Ill' other enterprises In order to Ht up  qricultural 
commodity  ~c:tfon. and  also  to ~ct.  IMt3OIW.  auil-
!ary fanninc  and  colleet1ve ~t  and  truCk !'armiDc 0\*'8-
~ tiona.  •••  .  ,  .  .. 
Price !armatbl paUey. Free lDatIcet  1lr1e«s  IN an inte-
it'al  aJ.ement  of a  lJW1cet  ec:onomy.  To  make  the  transition 
to such Ilrices  less ~.  ~ally  where pc1c. for con-
sumer ~  and  services are concerned  to  it Is Ilr"Q9OMd  that 
they be ~  poadually  from  administrative control. In  the 
Initial stap, controls  'fill be removed  on  ~rices [or •  IP'OUP 
of nonessential  &oods. 
At  the same  time,  with  the aim  of providing social 
tec:t1on  (or  the \)OpWation,  it is  planned  to  maint4in  sea 
prie«s  (or the ioods  and  services  that form  the  basis  of 
minimum  sublristenc:e  level for (amilles  (the republics  1rilI  . 
determine •  baleet ot (oodstutI!J  and  rnanutactured  &OOds 
~  ~)  .... 
.  It is  I)rOposed  that,  as  of 1992,  price controls  be 
tained  only  (or a  narrow  range  01.  essential  consumer 
(certain types of breed  and grain  Ill'Oduc:ts,  meat and 
~~c:ts, eertaiD  types  of ttsn,  vegetable  oil, supr, !Ded' 
lCUl_  and  some  medical articles,  3p4Icial  ioods  (or 1llaI1Dt4.-
I)eOple,  3ehool  textboolcs,  eertain ehild1'8n's  articles, 
transportation rates,  and  rates (01"  a  number  of  muruciPel 
semces).  • •• 
In  the  event that decontrolled  prices Ne at an 
excessive rate,  •  tempof'lll"Y  price c:eiling  <!an  be set by 
decision  at t't!pubUc  ana  looal  bodies. 
Duri~ the  traMitional  period  the state cannot  all  I1t  .Ill 
onc,e  abandon  the  poliey  of  maintaini~ low  retail prices  to~ 
vanollS  goods  and,  consequently,  price SUbsidies.  There  .~ 
needs  to  be  a  ~mental change  in  the  way  that  price 
subsidies  (01'  goods  are paid,  however,  so  it is  protttable t' 
produce  I1nd  sell  these goods  and,  eonsequently,  inexpensive.l 
goods  do  not suddenly  become  scaree.  •••  ~. 
It ,is  proposed  that  prices  (or t'tIel-llnd-energy  and  raw.  . 
matenaJ.  resources  I1lId  some  types  of products  in  mass  d 
mand  that are  exchanged  among  l'epubUes  be set on  tlle  ba-
~is  ot  a  ~~tenll agreement  among  the  republics,  taldnc' "" 
mto  eOl1S1de1'8tlon  suggestions  (rom  Union  agencies,  30 ~  • 
enterprises can  be intormed  of these prices  as  quicldy  as 
possibLe.  It  would  be a  good  idea  to  provide (or  11  gra 
increase in  ~e prices  (or t'tIel-and'"'!nergy  and  other l'e- ; 
sources,  which  would  make  it possible  to  avoid  shal1l  JUDI 
tn  production  costs  I1lId  prices  in  other sec:tOI'!,  and  ·..,oul 
provide some  time  to  implement  l'eSouree-eonservation  me 
sures ... 
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Refarm  ~  the baDir::inC  3JStem.  :\ solid  ruble  is  the 
to  acceieratilllt  the  eeonomic  reforms.  A  unilled  mo 
system  and  the  Ilreser"/8tion  at  centralism  in  monetary 
credit  ;>oilcy  lU'e  a  condition  {or  strengthening  it. 
This  requires  the  !Sl'ilest  ~ible reorganization at 
USSR  State  Bank.  WIt!l  a  'liew  to  siving  it  the  (unctions 
a  t"eServe  system. 1'0  :his  end,  a  mpreme body  af  maJBasz'e-'ll. 
,'ment  ot  the  OSSR  State  Sank  is  being  create<1---a 
Council,  which  includes  the  Chairman  at  the  USSR 
Bank,  who  is  appointed  by  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet. 
the directors  at the  ~bliC9' central banla •  .u  the 
try', central banlc.  tbe  USSR  State  Bank  will  retain ia 
mon09Oly  on  the  emission  at  money  and  determine  <!Ornmoa' 
ienera1  principles  (or JanJcing  ove1'9ight. 
The need  (or  adoptin«  mcn  a  banlcing  system  in  the 
country  is  tied  to  the need  (or  centralization at morletJtnI 
and  credit policy  in  :!Ie context at 30vereign  republics 
the {ormation  at a  t'elMWed  (ederal  anion  on  the  basis 
mcn repubUcs. 
andel'  this  approaeb.  the republics  "ill adopt  their 
~  Laws.  [)rovtded  they  are not at varianee 1Ifitb-
lecisiadon on  beJel  &ad  banIcinc. 
The  main  eondItloa tor the lJSSR  State  BanK's 
manee  at the runctio. at a· reserve system  will 
jaction at unilateral actions  to  recuJ,ate  or llmit mDIBetU1l 
circuiadon  aDd  credit. In  the t"ItCIUblics,  the central 
will  be  removed  !rom  dfrec:t  iOvemment jurisdiction 
present anoual reports to  the ~me  Soviets  p 
not  inter1'eN  in  their eurrent overadons. 
Commereializadoll at  the  ~&llzec1 stat. 
~ement of the credit :'IItom. They  wt1I  l» trandoru.clO 
independent  Ioint-stodC companies  with  as  broad  a 
tion  of shares ..  poaible. 
Commerci&llzatioll aaumes that beJel will  "\l'~"~~':: 
the Umia of  their 0'" l't'ISOUl'Ces  and  the  I.'1IS4I)~e_ 
by  others. that they will be able to ehocae  Indltpllftdt~!! 
to  "hom they wish  to utend credit and  trill be able 
prices  aDd  tern (Ol'  the credit.  that there  'Iri1l  be •  ' 
unil1ed  system ol taution and  reculation (or all banJcs.  and 
that  clients  will  be ~  to cnoase  their own  banlc.  • •• 
The  State Insurance system  is to be reformed  over  the 
course  of severa! rnoaths.  State InsuraDce  a(encies  will  be 
trSJ1Slormed  into  commercial  institudons 011  a  stock-holding 
baSis,  and  the creadOll of ne" illSW'llDl:e  companies  will  be 
~tted, including ones  with  (orei(n puticipation.  A  sys-
tem  of state insuranee oversight  will be  organized.  Insur-
ance  M!SO~  will  DO  longer go  into  the state bu~t. 
State ~don  ol banks  will consist ol 3Upervision of 
their  activities  tl-om  the standpoint ol j)t'Otacdng  clients'  in-
terests. The  central o.rucs  at republics  lIfiU  be asaiped the 
taSk  of l'eIistering  the openilllt of banIcs,  supel'Visini  their 
operations  and  their  accounting  and  reporting  procedures. 
and  creating  mecbanisms--l1nanreed  with  (ees  paid  by  the 
oania  themse!ves--(or ;lrotecting  the  interests  at  co IMler-
eiai-bank  depositors. 
Under  the  conditions ot the  cha~eover to  a  market  sys-
tem,  monetary  and  credit  policy  takes on  Cundamentally  newl 
characteristics.  With  the  aim  af brilUPllIt  order  to  monetary 
circulation  and  credit operations,  a  transition  is  to  be  made! 
(rom  credit  and  cash  plannilllt  to  regulation  of  the  total  vol-
ume  at money  in  circulation. The  key  task  oC  the  first  Cew 
months  is  to  ~educe credit sharply  and  to  limit  the  growth 
of  the  money  supply. 
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rtemovaJ.  o{  some  or  the  ~ds In  banks  and  the  deposit  oC 
those  runds  In  the  central  bank  'Nill  be at  the  center  of.  the 
system  o{  monetary  and  credit  ~ation at  the  initial 
sta~e.  By  changing  the  norms  ~or  ~eserve requirements,  the 
Reserve  System  will  be  able  to  ~ate  the  credit  resources 
of  commercial  bank3  and,  consequently,  exert  en  influence 
on  the  volume  at :noney  In  CIrculation  and  on  i::l11ationary 
processes. 
Interest  policies  'Nill  be  just  is important.  For  the  tirst 
three  to  six  months,  a  new  lnterest-rate structure  'Nill  be 
introduced  by  administrative  means  (lo~-term rates  higher 
than  short-term.  loan  rates  :ti~ner  than  deposit  :-ates) ,  with 
a  >1~tCicant increase  in  avera~e :nterest levels,  'Nhich 
should  limit  demand  (or credit lnd  ~educe noncash  additions 
to  the  money  supply. 
A  redbcounting ,Iystem  will  be  put  lnto  aperation--the 
money  collected  tram  bank3  by  '{snous  methods  will  be 
loaned  to  them  at  an  interest  :"Ilte  set  in  keeping  with  the 
?;aa.ls  o{  monetary  and  credit ;>olicy;  thUS,  bank3  will  be 
(arced  to set  their  interest  rates  in  accordance  'lfith  the 
central bank',  rate  (it  i.t  to  be  the same  (or  all  members  o{ 
the  Reserve System). 
The  ruble  must  be iiven  the status ol the 301e  legal ten-
der  on  the  territory  ol the  USSR.  For  the ~  oC  stabi-
Uzing  the  ruble',  ~ha.sing power,  the  issuing at other 
monetary  units  and sUlTOIates  and  the use  01.  (oreip cur-
~ncy as  a  means  at  ~yment will be  prohibited. 
lleitroebitiDc (Oleip  e=  .... Mttrity. The  clutn1feover 
to  a  market  roequires  the (ormatioll  in  the  OSSR  at.  an  apen-
type  economy  that develop. ill interactioll  with  the  world 
economy  and ill eompetition  with it. Theretore,  the  Basic 
Guidelines  proceed ~  the ~tioa  that the country', 
l!UItoms  territory,  currenc:y  system,  I'riac:iples  01  investment 
~licy and  (Ol'eip~nomic \)QUe:,  must be unilied,  with 
expanded  autbotity  (01'  the Unioa  n!pUbUcs  in  these  areas. 
A statewide SCene:,  (OC'  a.nadnc (oreip-«onomic ties. 
With  direct  ~ntatioll  01  the  UniOIl  n!pUbUcs,  will be 
crea ted  to achieve this. 
ander the eondlUOIW  ~  the traDlitioa to a  market sys- , 
tam,  the  eat~riH will become  the  ~riDc:ipal ctcur- in for-; 
~ign-~noaUC: ac:tivtty. Plana call (or destatization  and  de-
centra.LIzatioll  01.  foreip-ec:onomic:  ac:t1vtty-lOI' shiftinc  ' 
~ommeretal O()eI'IlUoIW  to  the  eateft)C'ise  level and  ensuring  \ 
their OQef'Stional.  iDdependenc:e.  wtIile  focusing  the  wor1c  at 
state SCeneies  on  M!IUIating  these operations and  ~roviding 
incentives  for  them. 
Petroleum.  natural ias,  iOld,  diamonds  and  ~reeious 
stones.  specia.LIzec1  technolOC.  and  possibly  several ather 
types of.  iQOds  an a  Ust  compiled  with  the  anion  republics' 
eonc:urrence  will be eonsidered  Union-level export  resources 
and  an to be sold  unciel'  special eondltions. 
Departmental  (Ol'eilJl~nomic: asaociations will be trans-
(ormed  into  middleman l!rms,  inc:luding  joint-stock eom-
~nies. and  where  necessary  will be  broken  into smaller 
units and  dlversitled. 
With  the  aim  01.  encouraging and  organizing (oreign-
economic:  ac:tivity: 
new  customs  and  foreign-eurrency  legislation  will be 
adopted  in  the (orm  at norms  with  dlreet applicability;  ~rin­
ciples for  new  investment  legislation  will  likewise  be 
adopted; 
dif!erentiated (oreign-eurrenc:y  coetTIcients  will  be  abol-
ished; 
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as  of  Jan.  1,  1991,  {oreign-currency  earnings  will  be 
posted  directly  to  enterprises'  accounts;  a  portion  o!  these 
earnings  'Nill  De  subject  to  mandatory  sale  to  Union  and  re-
[>UbUc  budgets  in  accordance  with  norms  that  will  encourage 
the  export ot  :nanufactured  ~oods; 
in  order  to  expand  enterprises'  independence  in  matters 
ot  foreilPl  currency,  an  internal  (oreign-eurrency  market  wili 
be created,  'Nith  the  free  sale  and  purehase  ot  currency  at 
market  rates;  :epublic  banks  and  some  commercial  banks 
will  [>8rticipate  in  foreign-currency  and  credit  operations; 
enterprises  'Nill  be  authorized  to  act  independently  in  at-
tracting foreign  credits,  using  their  own  property  as  collat-
eral; 
before  Vlarch  1991,  insura',lce  systems  are  to  be  created 
to  protect  enterprises  against.  forelgn-~nomic nsicJ,  a 
Union  system  ot  foreIgn-economic  information  is  to  be  intro-
duced,  and  state certification  of  rttlusiness  schools"  and  con-
sulting arms  is  to  be  condu(:ted  (or  the  purpose  ot  improving 
the  quality  of business  training  and  services. 
~~ement ot  the {oreif{Tl-economic  complex  is  to  shift 
primarily  to  the  use  ot  legnl  and  economic  levers  (customs 
juties,  exchange  rates,  bank interest  rates).  A  new  OSSR 
(:ustoms  tant! will  be  introduced  to  regulate  foreign  compe-
tition on  the  domestic  market.  The  number  of  export  goods 
SUbject  to  centralized  licensing  will  be  reduced  to  a  mini-
mum •••• 
~  to eUmiDate  the sMdow  ecoaomy.  Changing 
over  to  a  market  system  is  the  most  etrective  way  to  elimi-
nate  the shadow  economy. 
Basic  measures  to  eradicate  the shadow  economy  coin-
cide  with  highly  important  areas  oC  the  reform.  A3  world 
experience shows,  more  than  911'5  at  the operations  per-
formed  by  a  shadow  economy  c:an  be eliminated fairly  quick-
ly  with  the  aid  oC  measures  _t~establisl'l  a  mark~t. 
5. SOCIAL  POLICY  OOBlMG  'THE 
CBABGEOVBJl  TO  A 1fAJlKET  SYST!lII 
A socially  oriented  market economy.  the creation at 
which  is  the  aim  at  the  Baic Guidelines,  is an  economic 
system  in  which  each  ~U{) and  social segment  oC  the popu-
lation  is  given  broad  opportunities to  realize its !Wl  poten-
tial and  meet its  needs  on  the basis  oC  freely  chosen  em-
ployment  and  the  ~wth  oC  [>e~nal income. 
For everyone employed  in  the economy.  one ot  the  most 
important and soeially  invigoratinC factors  will  be  the op-
portunity  to choose !reely where  and  under  what form  at 
ownersnip  and  management  they eh to apply  their  knowl-
edge  and  experience.  • •• 
The  new  economic  system  will  ~rovide an  opportunity  for 
people.  if they  are so  inclined,  to start  their own  busi-
ness--to organize a  cooperative,  become  the  owner at a 
shop,  restaurant or [>rivate  tui. or create a  small  enter-
~rise or some  other form  at Oliliness. 
Preedom  to choose the  (OntlS in which  one applies one's 
labor  will  become  an important factor  in  improving  llving 
conditions  (or [>e8Sants  as well. They  will choose between a 
large farm--a collective or state farm-..a  small  leasehold 
collective.  or a  small  individual (ann.  E'rospects  will  open 
up  Cor  rapid  ~wtll in  the [>e8Sallts'  [>el"SOn81  income,  inter-
est in  which  will be  rein(orced  by an ever-increasing aow 
ot  ~ods (rom  the cities. 
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C'uDllc  ~nsumption CUnds  will  be used  to  ensure all seg-
men~ at  the  population  a  guaranteed  level  at social  beneilts 
that should  be considered  the  minimum.  As  a  role,  a  higher 
leveJ.  at  eonsumptfon  will  be  provided  at no  east  to citizens 
not  yet or no  longer  able  to  work--c:hildren,  the disabled 
and  pensioners.  All  able-bodied  persons  will  have  to  raise 
theit'  standal"d  at  Uving  primarily  through  their own  labor 
and  per.!Onal  income.  • •• 
Speciltcally,  the (allowing  changes  are being  proposed  in 
the current  methods  and  instruments  (or  applying social  pol-
icy • 
Wqe retorm •.  ,. Ounng  the  course  at  wage  reform, 
state  rates  'Afill  be  c:onsidered  the  ~aranteed minimum 
wages  (or  employees  '..nth  the corresponding  quaJ..\tlcations. 
Fl'Om  this  perspective  their application  '..nll  be  mandatory 
throughout  the  entire country  and  (or  all  enterprises.  re-
~ardless at.  their {arm  at  ownership.  Republics  and  enter-
prises  may  at  their  own  discretion set rates  ~or  wages  to  be 
paid  from  their own  available  runds,  but  these  may  not  be 
lower  than  the state rates •••• 
At  the same  time,  a  new  system  will be  introduced  ror 
hiring  enterprise managers  on  ~ntract, in  which  the state 
rate  will UkewiM  serve as  the minimum  pay  level. 
All  other questions  ~ncerning wages-{orms  and  systems 
at  wages,  bollUBes,  awards,  supplemental pay,  etc.--are to 
be  decided  by  the  enterprises  indl!?8ndently,  without  inter-
(erenee from  st.ate qencies.  Individual  wages  will  not  be 
limited  and  will  be  NJIUlated  oniy  by  the  income  tax. 
Stock dividends  paid  by  enterprises and  other earnings 
!rom  proQert1  will be a  ne. souree at income.  ... 
St~  sacial ~  (or u-.. uu.bM to weft IDd 
tar stIIdeaa. The  Law  on  Pensions  {or  USSR  CItizens,  which 
will  be implemented  from  1990  through  1993,  has no. been 
adopted. 
An  important distfnlUis/ting (eature at the  new  pension 
system  is  the  way  it is  tied  to a  minimum  consumer budget 
and  the changing  ~ndftions at a  market  economy.  Measures 
to  change  the pension  system  will  make  it possible  to  raise 
the  average size at  pensions  by  approximateJ.y  5~.  t 
As  the e1re<:tlveness  at the economy  increases,  there: 
be a  rurther centrallzed  increase  in  various  sut.idfes  tf 
the birth  and  rearinc ot  a  child,  and  also  (or the dfsablt( 
There  will  be  a  substantia! state-financed  increase  in  sti'"! 
pends  (or students.  ~ 
The  republics  may  reral"d  the centrally established ~ 
(or  pensions,  SUbsidies  and  stipends as  minimum guaran_ 
at  material security (or  the categories at citizens in  qa-. 
tion.  They  ttave  the  right  to  increase the size at these-" 
paymen~ it they can and  the  necessary t\mds.  • • •  • 
1be mfni  ..... eo...aDIr Iludpt IDd  a ~  ..... (or .... 
pI'Oteetfoa ~  tbe ~tfGa  apiaIt iDaatfae. The ~ 
~nsumer budget  index  lIrill be used  actively  as  an  im~ 
instrument  in  the  implementation at  the ne. social poUqt 
~amilfes ."hose avera,e per capita  income  (alls  below  tz.a 
minimum  subaistenee level  lIrill receive  ~riority  assis~ 
from  loca!  and  state agencies. 
At  the same  time,  the basic  (orm  at assistance  in  I 
context at a  market  economy  will  be the creation at ~ 
(avorable  ~ndltions (or increuing personal  earned ~ 
Families  in  need  at  such  ttelp  will  be  ~ven priority  in tIIiI 
allocation at  land  (or the ereation at II  personal  IIUX~ 
(arming  operation or a  peasant farm,  will be  ~ted  cree 
on  (avorabie  terms,  ~tc. And  oniy  in  S9e<:iaJ.  cases  I1filI ~ 
be provided  ."ith direct matenal  assistance lind suPport_'t:1 
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Tne  unmediate  introduction  o! such  a  minimum  c:OIlSUllle 
budget  does  not seem  ~ible at the present  time. 3 
problem  i3  not  merely  one  at a  tack  o!  (Unds.  The  eo 
does  not  yet  have  norma!  c:onditions  (or  an  uninterrupt 
supply  o!  ~oods to  maintain  such  a  budget-there are 
altes  everywhere  in  the eonsumer  market.  similar  ~oods i 
varying prices  are  virtually  nonexistent.  the system at  ' 
based  services  i3  still undeveloped,  and  there is  no  rre..  I 
at  housing.  :I ' 
Therefore.  at the  initial stage.  a  minimum  eonsume 
budl{et  based  on  a  limited  "basket"  CIt  eonsumer ioods 
be estaollshed  (or  1991.  It  will  subsequently  be revised  WIt 
a  view  to  the  ec:onomy',  c:apabilitle!l.  :a 
The  minimum  c:onsumer  budget  tl',at  is  established 
serve  only  as  a  starting  point  (or  the eorrespond1nc  c: 
tions  in  the  republics.  which  will  establish  their own ~ 
mum  eonsumer budltets  with  a  view  to  loc:al  eondltions 
There  needs  to  be  a  system  to protect  income ap 
intlation  30  that  price  increases  do  not  worsen  I>8Ople'S 
ations.  The  Illan  is  to  do  this  by  means  o!  various ty:i 
eompensation.  primarily  by  indexing incomes-that is, 
increasing  incomes  in  aceordance  with  increases  in  the  . 
o£  retail  prices  (or  the  "basket"  at  c:onsumer  ~oods. 
·..,ill  be  done  with  ~  disclosure  at  all  relevant 
The  index  will  ~  let at  lO~ (or  pensions, 
subsidies,  and  at up  to  1~  (or  employees  with 
ries  and  wage  rates  (military  pel'SOnne1,  teachers, 
c:ians.  researeh  personnel.,  amce  workers,  etc.), 
into  account  the  wage  level..  At  econ()mi'IC-!lC1~lmtablil1 
enterprises,  the  wa(e ~  will  be subject to 
The  establishment at  the  minimum  eonsumer  btJdiet 
the procedure {or  indexinc  income  will be  regulated 'Of' 
islation at  the  USSR.  and  the  republics. 
RqaIoflD8llt ~.  ••• Special stata employment 
vices  will  be set ~  under the local Soviets,  not 
assist  with  job plaeernent but also  to aid  in  the .. __  H,,,., 
new  joCli  and  in  retraininc and  refresher training.  alter! 
c:atlonal  counsel1nc  and,  !1nally.  provide  material 
people  who  lind  themselves  tamporarily  without 
Soviets  will  organize paying  publlc-,arvice jobs  {or 
porartly  unemployed.  It is at  (undamental  Importance 
the employment  service  will  provide  its sarvices  to 
{ree at  charge.  • •• 
To  supplement  the  material support 5']stem  now  in 
(or  I>8Ople  who  and  themselves  without  work.  there  a~ 
~lal1S  to  introduce direct .un~mployment benet1ts  (or· cases  in 
which.  (or  30me  reason.  It  LS  not  pos:nble  to  ()lace  a  ()el'SOn 
quickly  or to  obtain  retraining (or  him. 
HoaIioIJ  reform  •  .\ laoor  market  that assumes  the (ree 
movement  at  the  tabor  (oree  around  the  eountry  and  beyond 
its  borders  in  response  to  supply  and  demand  c:annot  func-
tion  normally  it there  is  no  housing  market. 
The  prinCiples  and  eonditions being  developed,  in  accor-
dance  with  the  USSR  ?resident'S  Decree  on  that subject.  (or 
the  implementation ot  a  housinc  reform  will be submitted  (or 
gene1'1l1  discussion  in  the  neU (uture. 
'1be  9OCi&l ~  UDder  martret  eaaditiaaa.  With  the 
transition  to  Ii market  economy,  one  o!  the most  important 
taskS  i3  to provide support  at the  anion  and  republic  Levels 
for  the nonmlll'ket  sector ot  the national  ec:onomy,  that is, 
for  those  sectors and  types  at  activity  that cannot,  in  prin-
c:iple,  be  ieared  to  eommercial criteria. These  include  a 
large segment ot  health care,  physical d tness and  sports, 
educa tion.  c:ulture  and  the arts,  environmental protection. 
basic  science  and  30  on •••• 
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This  is  the  only  3ecto~ at the  economy  in  ,..,ruch.  as  a 
matter at pnnciple,  rtnancial  and  other  restnctions  will  not 
be  applied  even  dunng  the  period  at stabilization ot  the  na-
tional  economy.  The  budget  ro~ the  SOCIal  sphere  '",ill  be-
come  the  prinCipal  indlcato~ of society's  and  the  l~lative 
branch',  real attitude toward  culture,  education.  public 
health,  science  and  envitonmental-protection  measures •••• 
1. smUCTURAL  AND  INVESt'MENT POLlCY 
DURING nm  CHANGEOVER 1'0  A  MARKET STS'ln1 
The  creation  of  a  modem-day  structure (or  the  economy 
is  a  necessary  condition  (or  the  transition  to  a  market. 
economy  and  a  prerequisite (or  the latter', successtu.l  func-
tioning.  The  drama  of  the situation  Ues  in  the  ract  that  the 
depth  at  the  distortions  that  have  developed  nullifies  any 
attempt  to  make  the  chaR\{eover  to  an  economy  based  on 
market  mechanisas  it that  attempt does  not  runultanf.>OWIly 
make  structural challies  in  the existing economy. 
The  key  areas at  structural.  challlJes  are: 
the creation of  a  developed  consumer-manuCacturing sec-
tor of  the  economy  as  a  necessary  condition  (or  the  mobili-
zation  of social  reserves  (or  economic  growth; 
elimination of  the  imJ)a!anee  in  the  economy"  technologi-
cal structure as  the principal  t"I!ucn  (or the per";)etuation  at 
a  res~erilli  economy.  • •• 
Conservation  of enere' resourees  is  of extreme  impor-
tance.  The ~  is  to  redUce  losses,  increll3e  the  thorough-
ness  with  which  resources  are  processed,  and  on  this  basis 
bring  about  I  stabilization at the  volume  at resource con-
sumption  (or  •  period  at flve  to  1D  years. The  practice at 
increasing  the  export at  ene!"iY  and  raw  materials  must  be 
rejected. 
One  can  expect  that a  poliey  at  restrained  development 
at  sectors in  the fuel  and  power complex-4 polley  in  keep-
ing  "lfith  •  nearly  stable domestic  ene!"iY-conswnption 
level-will malee  it possible  in  the  future  to  hold  down  the 
annual  increase  in  our country', capital investments  in  the 
fuel  and  power  co~ex to a  moderate  level.  . 
The  prodUction  inCrastructure-trallSl)Ol"tation,  commuruca-
tions  and  the  saCekeeping  of goods  and  equipment~hould oc-
cupy  a  special place  in  struc:tura.L  and  investment  policies. 
Its  current state not only  could  become  a  bottleneck In the 
(ormation at a  marleet  system,  but also  entails a  threat  to 
the t'Unct1oninC  at the mo.t imQortant  sectors at the national 
economy.  Investments  In this sphere  must  have  the  same 
priority  as the production  at  consumer !roodS. 
Straigtl1:torward  assessments  at  possible  cutbacks  tn  arell3 
where  InftStment resources  are u:sed  inetrective1y •••  will 
malee  it ~e  to plan  on  a  certain  l"educ:tion-to  the 
level at  the 12th  Five-Year ~n  the level at investment 
in  the economy's  production  (aeillties.  At  the· same  time, 
there will be increased  capital investment  in  the  lmplemen-
tatton at social pl'Olf'SlIIS. 
State __  tide aDd  tec:bDieal  polley.  tn  the  area at 
science,  the state will assume  the finanCing  of  basic  re-
sea~11 and  the  maintenance  of the Structures  needed  to 
conduct  it •••• 
During  the  changeover  to a  market,  scientific  and  tech-
nical  potential must  not  be  lost-98rticularly  insofar  as  it 
ensures  the development  of areas at  long-term strategic  im-
portanee (or the country.  On  the one hand,  the  prinCipal 
criterion (or economic  measures  aimed  at the (ormation  ot 
marleet  relations should  be  their intluence  in  making  produc-
tion  more  receptive  to  scientitic  and  technical  aChievements 
and  in  increll3ing  incentives  (or creative initiative  and  en-
trepreneurial activity.  On  the other hand,  it  is  necessary 
to  strengthen  the  role  at  the state  in  maintaining  and  bol-
stering intellectual potential  and  in  developing  high-priority 
areas at scientitic and  technical progress.  particularly dur-
ing  the  transitional  period. 
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The  great  bulle  at  applied  research  and  development  'Nill 
be  conducted  on  a  commercial  basts.  . •• 
Comersioo ~  the IDilltuy-iDdIBtriaJ. complex. The  con-
version  p~am  must  be  developed  as  an  overall  national-
economic  program  '..,hose  content  ts  tied  closely  to  all the 
elements  of  the stratei:f  for'  structural  transformations  tn 
the  country',  economy. 
The  result  of  its  implementation  will  be  the creation  at 
new  production  facilities  oriented  toward  meeting  the  econ-
amy's  needs  {Or'  ci  villan  products.  .,. 
Etrective  implementation  of  the conversion  program  can 
be ensured  it  the  Jamers  separat~ the  defense  complex 
{rom  the  rest of  t."e  economy  are  removed.  This  ts  compa ti-
ble  '..,ith  continued  Union  ownership  and  highly  centralized 
man8(ement  of  the  enterprises  that are  most  closely  in-
volved  in  ensuring  the  country's detense  capability.  • •• 
Meaures eM  state repJ.atioa ~  muetural c~  ill the 
eeooomy.  The  driving  force  behind  the  process  of  structural 
ch.!lrtge  in  the  economy  should  be  economic  initiative on  the 
part of  enterprises  and  entrepreneurial activity  on  the  part 
at  the [lUblic,  activities  that  require  etr'ective  l~al and 
economic  guarantees.  With  the  aid  01.  state  ~atol'Y mea-
sures,  this  powertU1  {actor should  be  aimed  fust  and  [ore-
most  at saturatinC the consumer'  marleet. 
Special state  [)rogra~rticul.ariy investment  [)rogramS, 
both centralized  and  decentralized-.'lave a  special  :"Ole  to 
play  here •••• 
S. llKOIlGANlZA'nOM  or nm  MANAaEMEHT  SYST!JII 
The  chal1lteover  to  marlcet  relations and  their etr'ective 
t'Unctioning  are poaible only  it there  is strong and  clearly 
ol'Pnized state power.  The  experience of all countries  that 
have created  a  developed  market  economy  and  a  high  stan-
dard  01.  living (or  their'  people  attests  to  this •••• 
A decisi  ve  move  must  be  made  to  new  structures at 
state and  economic  manqement  that are aimed  at the {or-
mation  at  a  market-type economy  and  that  will ensure  e!-
{ective  interaction  amolll{  Union,  republic  and  local  Oodies. 
The  interests  at  the  cause  demand  that  the development  and 
implementation  of  economic  reforms  and  programs {or  the 
cha~ver to  marlcet  relations  be sat aside  immediately  as 
a  special (Unction  01.  state administration. 
Plrst  01.  all,  maximum  use  must  be  made  here  01.  the 
powers  that  were  t"ecently  granted  to the President  01.  the 
USSR  by  the USSR  Supreme  Soviet.  rn  this  situation  the 
:"Ole  at  the  Counc:tl  01.  the  Pederation should  be expanded;  it 
should  work out and  implement.  through  Union  and  republic 
bodies at powv,  decisions '!lgreed  UQOn  by  the l"'ItpullUcs.  To 
this  end.  an  Intel'l"epullUc  Economic  Committee  made  up  of 
l'e{)l'eSentatives  01.  the republlcs: specialists  and  sc:hola.rs  is 
to  be created  under- the  Council at the  Feder'Stion •••• 
The  vertical chain  of authority  01.  executive bodies 
should  be restored  immediately,  so  that  N!pUbllc  iOvern-
ments  and  Soviet  executive committees at various  levels  are 
subordinate  to  two  bodies-to their respective Soviets  of 
People's  Deputies  and  to  the  higher'  bodies  01.  executive 
power.  Decisions  made  by  the  higher bodies  within  the lim-
its of their authority  are binding  UQOn  the lower bodies •. 
Things  must  be  maneged  in  such  a  wey  that  new  struc-
tures  consistently  and  irreversibly  replace bodies  that do 
~ot meet  the demands  of a  market  economy.  A dual  task 
must  be  performed:  Market-economy  structures need  to  be 
romed  and  used  to  gradually  replace  the  agencies  01.  the 
administrative  system.  yet care must  be  taken  not  to  ~et 
ahead  at  event:l~ot to  break  existing  ties  without  due  re-
5ard  ~or  the  creation  ot the  necessary  conditions  in  the na-
tional  economy. 
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[n  the  near  ~uture a  nwnOer  o(  Union  and  ~?uOli~  ~ies 
'Nlll  have  to  ~  created  to  perform  new  run~tions ansinl{ 
:rom  the  cha~eove1' to  a  ,'n&l'lCet.  A 3tate  ~ntra~t system 
'Nill  ~ave to  be deve!oped_ l!ompLex  of  orl{anizations  that 
?Lace  orders  ~or ~  to  meet  state needs.  seLeet  ~ntra~­
tors  and  pf'e?4l'1!  and  ~nelude contra~cs.  A  USSR  State 
Property  :und  also  needs  to  be  o~nized. along  with  a 
State  (nspeetorate (or  Securities  Oversigtlt.  a  State  l'ri~es 
!nd  Standards  ~torate. a  R~onal Deve!Q9ment  [nvest-
ment  fund.  sn  All-Union  :oreign-Currenc:y  fund.  an  E~o­
aomi~ Stabilization  Fund.  a  :und  to  ?romote  empLoyment,  a 
GSSR  .  .l.ntlmon09Qly  Corruntttee,  a  CSSR  State  (nsurance 
Oversl~ht .  .l.~ency,  a  USSR  ?enslon  Fund.  a  Committee  to 
?romote  Smail  3usines.ses  and  Sntrepreneursnip.  and  cOlTe-
3pondilll{  o~anizations in  the  repub1i~. 
?rolp"llms  (or  the  (ormation  o(  stock  eXl!halll{es.  sood.s 
and  commodities  e:cchanlte3.  insurance  I!ompanies,  auditinlt 
firms.  holdinlt  compantes.  !Jrokeral{e  houses.  commercial 
banks.  trading  houses.  intermediary  tradinl{  firms.  commer-
l!iaL  I!enters  and  I!ompanies.  auctions.  trade  (airs.  etc., 
need  to  be  implemented  on  the  basis  or  initiative and  with 
the  support  of  the  state •.  ,. 
Coordinated  efforts  are  needed  on  the  part ot  all-Union. 
republi~,  locaL  and  economi~-oran~h bodies,  enterprises and 
associations  to  develop  society's  management  potential. 
make  t'Undamental.  l!l1anges  in  the  'HOrle  of  training I!enters, 
personnel  servi~es and  ~nsu1ting and  research  services,  anc 
utilize  new  o~nizationaL rorms  (or  these  purposes.  • •• 
During  1991,  no  (ewer  than  180-200  territoMal  training 
I!enters  and  1.:00-1.JOO  trainilll{  centers at  major  industrial 
associations  and  edu~ational institutions  need  to  be  put  into 
operation;  textbooks  and  teaching  aids  on  the marleet  econ-
omy  and  the  principles  of entrepreneurial  and  managerial 
a~tivities need  to  be produced;  the physical  (acilities  need 
to be I!reated  (01'  the development  and  production,  in  ~op­
eration  with  leading  (oreign  crrms,  o(  audiovisual  and  com-
puter-oased  teaching  prolp"ams;  and  an  extensive network  or 
~nsulting support  needs  to  be organized  ror  management 
personnel  snd  speeialists.  .,. 
~ew types  of  trainmg  that  meet  the  needs  of the  marke 
economy  are !:leing  set  up.  I!OOperacion  with  (oreign  ;Jartner 
is  ~w,"g, lind  the  practi~e of sending  unde!'it'aduates. 
graduate students and  doctoral  candidates abroad  [or  study 
is  expanding.  as  is  the creation  of joint <:enters.  rt  will  bf' 
come  increasingiy  ~ommon (or  Soviet  speeialiscs  to  spend 
proLo~ed periods  working  lind  studying  IIbroad,  in  some 
I!sses  on  the  basis  of individual  ~ontracts.  • •• 
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B.  Man, Freedom and the Market 
(Excerpts of Shatalin's Economic Reform  Programme  In 1990  In the 
Former  Soviet Union) 
AIMS:  SHIFT  PROPlm1'Y  PROM  STATE  TO  PEOPLE r  ALLOW 
FREE  CHOICE;  JO!N1'-STOCK  Frn.:,IS,  PRIVATELY  OWNED 
~  BUSINESSES;  GRADUAL  PRICE  REFORM;  JOBLESS 
AID;  ::CONOMIC  UNION  PACl  FOR  SOVEREIGN  REPUBLICS 
~,  FREEDOM  AND  THE  MRK.:.-r .-Izvestia Acquaints 
Reade!"!  With  the  Basic  Ideas  of  the  ?ro!p'am  Worked  Out  by 
a  Group  Under  the  Leadership  at Academician  S.  S.  Sha ta-
lin.  (Izvestia,  Sept.  ..,  pp.  1,  3.  Complete  text:)  editors' 
Note.-The  Russian  SFSR  Supreme  Soviet  has  b~  its  dis-
cussion  at  the  p~am  for  the  changeover  to  a  market  that 
has  l>een  ?rep~ by  a  group  under  the  leadership  of.  Aca-
demician  S.  S.  Sha talin.  This  grolJ9,  as  is  known.  'Nas 
(ormed  on  instructions  (rom  the  ?!-eident  of  the  USSR  in 
line  with  an  aceord  among  :.f.  S.  Gorbachev,  B.  ~.  Yel-
tsm,  ~. r.  RyZhlcov  and  I.  S.  Silayev. 
The  group  wol'lced  Cl"om  AU(.  13  to  31  at  the  RSFSR 
Council of :.flni.sters'  At\Chanie13koye  vacation  l~e  outside 
Moscow,  enlisting  the cooperation  at  a  large number  of 3l)e-
ciallsts and  entire researeh  colleetives.  The  complete docu-
ment,  consisting  of several hundred  ~es, constitutes a 
program  for  changinc over to  a  marltet  and  forming  the 
foundations  at  a  marlcet  economy,  taking'" !nto  aceount  the 
economie  and  polltieal  realities at  our  time. The drafte!"! 
proeeeded  Cl"om  the premise  that  the main  burden  of the 
chanieove!"  to  a  new  economie  system should  be borne  by 
the state,  not by  individuals.  The  :nar1<et  is  being created 
to  give  ~le  a  bette!"  ute,  not, at  course,  to  punl3h  them 
at the  hands  of those  who  are  just out  to  improve  their own 
lot. 
The  drafters at  the p~  haft ulced  the editors at 
Izvestia  to  aequaint the  pWlile  witb some  at  its main  Ideas, 
so  that ~le  can understand,  at least  in  ~eral outline, 
what  this ~  proQOMSp  t.aXinc  into  aceount,  naturally, 
that  the (oL"thc:oming  di8eUSlrioa  aDd  t'urther  'IIfOrk  on  the pro-
gram  1rill make  301M  adjuatmena  • 
• • • 
This pr'OIrSm  eouid  appear only under  the conditions at 
restruc:turinC.  and  It Ues  entirely  within  the  ~hannel at the 
polley  begun  in 1985. M.  S. Gorbac:hev  and  B.  N.  Yeltsin 
were  the initiators at Its ~t1aa.  It ~an be  ~arrled out 
only  with thei!'  joint support. 
As  a  result at  many  years at domination  by  a  totalitarian 
social and  pollt1c:al system. our society  has anded up  in  a 
state at deep  ~risi.t. The  Indec:istven ..  at  the  ~vemment 
and  the miac:a1c:ulationa  It has made  in  economic:  polley  have 
brought  the country'to  the  brink at catastrophe. ~"II 
Uves  are beeoming  more  and  more  dImcwt,  and  hopes rev  'I 
better t'Uture  are  being lost. The situation can be o~  1\ 
only  by  well-thought-out and  energetie Iletions,  SUPPO~ 
by  the  people  and  grounded  in  their solidarity  and  [)4tri~ 
tism.  ::".t  II Appendix 
Our  society  has  aCC'.m'Iuiated  11  great deal at  nqatiYll'~  I 
expenence  with  economIc  reforms,  which  people  now  , 
only  'NIth  changes  (or  t!le  worse  in  their lives.  Unlomma  1 
ly,  life  has  taught  us  to  believe  more  readily  in  the be  , 
than  in  the  good.  rmplementation  at the "roposed "rogra.a), I 
should  disprove  this  sad ex?erience.  ", 
The  "rogram's  main  dLstinguishing  (eature  is  that it  fs.", 
grounded  in  11  !'Undamentally  new  economic  doctrine. Me  '.  , 
ment  toward  11  market  '.orill  be  I1bove  all at  the  expense ~ 
the state,  not  I1t  the  e%pense  at ordinary  people.  'j,.;II 
An  essentially  antipopular  ;>olicy  'NBS  [lursued  (01'  11  la~ 
penod:  a  rich  stateNlth a  poor  ;leop!e.  The  state  conc~ 
trated  in  its  hands  enormous  resources,  'lirtually  the  en~ 
ownership  at  means  at  production.  Resources  were spent....  I 
thoughtlessJ.y  on  ~gantic and  inetf!cient  tJrojects.  on  build-U 
Lng  tl{)  military  might  and  on  (ol'e~-polic:y  adventures 
I 
an  ideological  underp~. although  all this  has  long 
beyond  our  means. 
The  program  sets  the  task  at  taking  everything OOSBlQuq. 
{ away  ~m  the state and  ~ving it  to  people.  There 
\ 
ous  reason  to believe  that  the  return  to  the  pe09ie 
significant  share at "roperty  and  resources  on  various 
'iIrill  ellSlln!  much  more  etftcient  and  thritty  use at  thia. 
, \ erty  and  these resourees  and  will.  make  it  ~ible to 
I  many  n~t!ve phenomena  in  the  pl"OCes8  ol changing 
:  11  market.  rt  is  necessary  to  resolutely  reduce  all. 
spen~, includ~ spend~ on  items  coneealed 
ety. 
Only  when  all  the  j;)CIIIIibUities  Uld  resources 
inI devoured  today  by  the iii'antic  state machine 
to  the  needs  at ~e  and  when  pe<l9le  learn  that 
beirut  done.  only  then  will.  the country's leadership 
right  to appeal.  to the ;>eople  to show  patience.  to 
greatest paaible burQens  in  the name  at the  hOlnelmc[...! 
the  name  at  their own  tuture  and  that at their c:hi:ldz_.,j 
91e  Il50  should  appeal.  to other countries  (or  u.liaUnc:.!I 
They  will.  3Upport  ta it they  c:onsider  our Ol'Olll'8.m 
ttc:iently  resolute  and  well  ~ed.  it they  are  con!tld4I1l~ 
that the u.istance they  provide  will be used sensibly 
etrectively  (01'  the iood  ol people. 
Each  person.  each  enterprise  and  each  g~aphic area 
sovereign  republic  will.  see  in  the  "roposed  program  11  re-
~  to  its vital interests and  will receive,  with  the pro-
pID's  help.  an  opportunity  to  l1et  (at"  the  implementation  at 
tbIf8  interests  right now,  immediately. 
nus  is  yet another ttlndamental  (eature at  the  program: 
pegpie  do  not  have  to  wait  for  3OIJleone's  permission  Of'  in-
,auctions,  they  can act  in  I1c:c:ordance  with  their own  in-
terests•  The  program  shows  how  one can act best and  most 
ISfllCtively  alone  these  lines.  A  person  who  reads  this I?ro-
~  with  his  own  interests in  mind  can determine  what  is 
JdYIIltageous  to  him  pe1'3Onally  and  decide  ahead  oC  time 
.oen  and  what  he  should  do.  what  he should  demand  ~m 
1IiJOCII.  in  what quantity  and  under  what  conditions,  in  order 
to  exercise  his  economic  rights  and  interests. 
:fo  one  is  imposing  a  Idnd  or type at I1ctivity  on  anyone; 
everyone  is  Cl'ee  to choose  (or  himselt.  gearing  his  choice  to 
his  desires  and  \XlLDibUities:  whether  to become  an entre-
preneur,  a  hired  employee  in  state ~tr:'ctur:es or  11  man~1' 
ill  I  joint-stock  enterprise.  engage  III  IlldiVldual  enterpnse. 
or  beCOme  a  member  at a  ~tive.  The  reform  grants 
citizens  the  right ot  ecoaomic  selC-detenninatlon,  establish-
ing  rules  the  ooservanc:e  oC  which  will.  prevent  certain enti-
ties  (people,  ~ups  oC  people,  enterprises or geographic 
areas)  (rom  securing  their  own  interests  by  inlrtnging on  the 
economic  rights  at others. It is  ~edom ot choice  that  is 
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tne  oasIS  o!  people's  personal  (reedom,  the (oundation  (or 
disClosing  the  individual's  creative potential.  These are still 
not  the  Ml!es  at  the ruture  market  eeonomy-they  will 
eme~e [n  the  course  at  the {ormation  and  development  at 
thi3  society.  The  eeonomic  content at  the  proposed  program 
is  the  changeover  to  a  mulee!,  the creation  ot  the  founda-
tions  oC  a  society  with  a  new  eeonomic  system. 
The  system at  eeonomic  relations  and  management  at  the 
national~onomic complex  that currently  exists  in  our 
~ountry  is  to  blame  {or  the  fact  that  [n  a  very  rich  country 
industrious  people  live  at a.evel that does  not  at all cOlTe-
3pOnd  to  the  wealth  of the  irea or  to  their  talents  and  e!-
(orts.  People  live  worse  than  they  worle,  because  they  ei-
ther  are  not  produeing  wha':  they  themselves  need  or  what 
they  do  produce  is  lost  or  not  used. 
The  ;Jroposed  ;Jrogram  outlines  'Nays  of changing  over  to 
an  ~conomic system  that  is  capable at  eliminating  this  situa-
tion  and  providing  all citizens  'Nlth  a  real opportunity  to 
make  their  lives  signi1!cantly  better. Thus,  the  program  can 
Je  regaf'ded  as  II  program  {or  realizing citizens'  rights  to  a 
better,  more  adequate  lile. 
A  ~'s  Rigbt  to Property .-The right  to  property  is  ]': 
,-ealized  through  destatization  and  privatization,  through  the ,I 
transCer  of state property  to citizens.  It  is  in  the  return at  : 
property  to  the  ~le, /lrst  and  foremost,  that  the social  • 
orientation at  the  eeonomy  is  maniCested.  This  is  not  an act 
at  revenge but the  restors tion  of social  justice,  a  form  of 
~oditying a  person's right  to  !tis  share  of the country's  ac-
cumulated  national  wealth  and  of.  the  wealth  that  will  be 
created  in  the ruture.  Privatization--and 3peciaL  emphasis 
should  be placed  on  thja.....js  a  form  of distributing  responsi-
bility  for  the condition  and  level.  of the development of so-
Ciety  aJIIOI1C  all of its  memt:lers  who  desire  to take on  this 
responsibilIty.  Privatization should  be absolutely  voluntary 
and  should  not  resemble  collectivization  in  revef'Se. 
?roperty  in  the  hands  of  eVel'1one-this  is  a  ~tee  of I 
the  stabilIty at society,  an  important condition  {or  prevent-
iNt social and  national upheavals.  A person  who  has  his  own  . 
home  and  plot at  land,  which  he can  always  transfer or 
leave  to nis chUdren •• person  who  owns stoeks  01'  other  ~­
nancw UNts.  has  aD  ~jec:t1ve rtaJce  in  the stability at so-
ciety,  in soc:ial  and national eoncord. On  the other hand. 
our  sad experience shows  I10w  danCet'o-- (01"  society.  (01"  its 
normal  ute and development,  is a  [)4trSOn  who  has  nothing  to 
lose. 
The p~  i1ves  equal  chanees  to everyone.  However', 
this  equality at  chanees  should  not be perceived  as  a  mirror 
image  of.  wage-Ievellnc.  In order to  prevent privatization 
Cram  tuminc  into a  means  (or  the legal and excessive en-
richment  of  the (ew,  the  procedure itsell should  ensure ~ 
ticipation  in  privatization by  Vef'1  broad  strata at  the popu-
lation:  vtrtually  everyone,  even if' he has no  SUbllt~aL ~i~ 
t1aJ.  ~itaJ.. should  be able,  it ne so  deares.  to obtam his  , 
share of  the  national wealth. Equality at  opportunity  will be, 
ensured by a  dlvemty of (ortm at  privatiza~on, which  will 
make  it possible  to lease property,  to buy  It on  credit,  to 
acquire it on  a  joint-stock basis,  etc. 
It is  a  point of  tundamental importance  that the state  { 
I  cannot and  should not give out its property  Cree  at  c~~e. 
Property  must  be earned,  since a  persoo has, Uttle faith,  U1 
or appreciation  of property  that he has  recelved  as  a  gift. 
At  the 38IIIe  time  some  state - should  be considered!  ,  i"  ..... -·z.  I 
as  having  already  been  earned by  ~le,  an~ It may  be 
gi ven  to  them  Cree  of chArie  or (or  a  ~mbolic payment. 
What  is  involved  here,  above  all,  are 10ng-OCCUPIed  apaf't-
ments  with  minimal  Uving  3pace per  person,  small  ~af'den 
ploU,  and  many  other things. 
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Immediately  atter  this,  wor!c  is  to  I>egin  on  the  creation 
betore  the  end  o{  the year at  50  to  50  joint-stocle  compa-
nies  based  on  !.arie ttate entet"pMses,  as  well  as  the  trans-
fer  or we (or  a  symbolic  payment  at  certain  (to all  intents 
and  [lutpQSeS,  already  earned)  categories at housing  and 
[llots  o{  land. 
An  inventory  is  to  be conducted  at  the  country's na-
tionai  wealth,  !irst at all  its  ~ld and  currency  reserves, 
strategic stocks,  the [lroperty  r:1  [lubUc  organizations,  un-
rtnisned  construction,  the [lroperty  at  the  Armed  Forees  and' 
certain other types at  state [lroperty  (passengl~ cars,  state 
dachas,  etc.). Local  (district  and  city)  Sovie:ts  will  con-
duct  an  inventory  at nonresidential buildings.  Local  Soviets 
will  al.so  I'reeze  a  large flumber  at [lrodUction··Cacility  con-
struction [lrojects  on  the  basis  01.  the  results at  the  inven-
tory  o{  unfinished  construction. TIte  value  at  these  [lrojects, 
unwtalled  equipment  and  stocks at construction  materials 
will  be  estimated.  This  worle  ',Ifill  malee  it [lfl3Sibie  to  I>egin 
to  sell 30me  stocks at  materIals  to  the  [lOpulation,  enter-
[lrises  and  cooperatives. 
Local  Sovtet:i  ',Ifill  estimate  the  '!alue  of  trade  enter-
[lrlSes,  consumer-servtce  and  local-industry  enterprises,  and 
smail  and  mediwn-sized  enterprises  at  other branches.  Alter 
an  analysis  of  the  CinanciaL  condition  at  these  enterprises 
has  been  conducted,  a  list  of  them  ',Ifill  be [lublisned  in  the 
[lress,  indicating  time  £>eriods  and  terms  (or  their  privatiza-
tion.  TIten,  'Nith  complete  ~lasnost about  the [lrogT'es3  of 
privatization,  the we of nonresidential  buildings  and  small 
ente1"prises--worlc3hops,  stores,  service  establishments,  ki-
osI<s-will  I>egin.  TIte  [lrograrR  is  aimed  at enabling  [leop1e 
to  use  the  money  they  have  to  acquire  [lroperty.  Shifting  a 
significant  part at  demand  to  these  [lutposes  ;vill  also  make 
it [)OSSible  to avoid  a  substantial  rise  in  [lrices  as  they  are 
~y  "liberated." 
At  the same  time,  the local Sovtets  will  conduct  an  in-· 
ventory  r:1  land,  taking  into  ac:c:ount  the nature  at  its  use. \ 
TIte  implementation  at  these  measures  will  make  it  [lOSSibie 
to  ensure  access  to  land  for  all  those  who  wish  to  engage  , 
in  ql'iculture.  Along  with  this,  there  will  be  an  expansion 
at  the  allocation  at  land  to  gardening and  orehard  associa-
tions,  with  the sale at  plots  (or  a  charge.  In  this  process, 
&!ready  allocated [llots  up  to  a  certain size  will  be sold  (or 
a  moderate charge,  while  plots over the  established  size 
will  be sold  for  their (Ull  market  value. 
TIte  basic:  IIJCt'Ic  load  in  realizing the  l'ights  at  citizens  to 
own  [lr'OPerty  will  rest  with  specially  created privatization 
agencies  and  land  reform  eonvnittees under  the  province 
(district)  Soviets at  People's  ~uties. 
The l'iCht  of citi%ens  to economic:  activity  is  to  be en-
sured  by  the redistribution  at  property between  the state 
and citizens in  the course at  destatization.  and  also  by  the 
adoption  at  a  Law  on  Entrepreneurial Activity. The state 
will  create an economic:  environment that  will (acilltate the 
development  at initiative  and  entet"pri.se,  will  simpliry  as 
much  as possible  the  procitdure fol'  openinC  one', own  busi-
n... will ~  to orpnize it properly,  and  will  support it 
with tax beneftts  and cre<lits  in  COIJI98tition  with  large en-
terprises. The ~  ~eeds  (rom  the [lremise  that small 
businesses  are  necessary  to  society  in  order to  tum produc-
tion  toward  satistying the  requirements at  each specific  per-
son,  to combat  the diktat at  monopolists  in  the  consumer 
and  producer markets,  and  to create the  necessary condi-
tions  Cor  the  t'apid  ~utting to use  at new  scienunc  /tnd 
technical ideas,  to  which  small and  medium-,ized  businesses 
are  the  most  receptive. 
'lbe RfItIt  at  Clttzen. to Ecoooalie  Activity.  -How  , 
teehnicaLly  speaking,  will  ~1e's l'ight  to [lroperty  be  re-
alized? 
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On  the  very  11m  day  0'  the  beginning  at  the  llrogram" 
implementation,  equal.  rigtlts  ror  all physical  and  juristic 
lIersons  to  carry on  economic  activity  will be amcially  llro-
claimed.  A llrogram  at llrivatization,  the  transformation  of 
Large  state enterprises  into  joint-stocle  companies,  and  the 
sale at small trade,  lIublic-eatel'ing,  consumer-service  and 
other enterprises  will be announced. This  same  statement 
will  talk  about  granting  ~tees  oC  ownership  rights  to 
any  type at  lI~rty, except  that  10fhich  belolliS  excl.usively 
to  the state.  An  amnesty  will  be announced  ror  those  con-
victed  under  articles dealing  with  entre?reneurial activity, 
and  these  articl.es  themselves  will  be  removed  /rom  criminal 
and  administrative legisLation.  At  the  same  time,  the strug-
gl.e  against crimes  against  citizens'  property  will  be stepped 
up. 
By  legU1.ative  means,  a  ravorable  atmosphere  will be 
llrovided  Cor  withdrawing  enterprises  t'rom  state ownership  at 
the  initiative 0'  labor  collectives  that apply  to  the  State 
Property  Fund  at republic  Committees  Cor  the  Management  at 
State ?ropet'ty. 
The state will llrovide  incentives  ror  the  development  at 
international economic  ties  and  travel abroad  ror  worle  or 
study.  Attempts  to construct  a  system (enced  oIt (rom  the 
outside  world  have  vi1'tUaJ.ly  consigned  most  branches  at  our 
economy  to  degradation  and stagnation. The  opening  up  of 
the  domestic  marleet  will  malee  our country's  entrepreneurs 
compete  with  inexpensive  imported  600ds  both  within  the 
country  and  abroad,  which  will  give  our  economy  dynamism 
and  aexibillty  in  satistying the  requirements  at  the  market, 
and  hence  at the consumer. 
The  ~t  r1  Citizens  to Freedom  r1  Coaswner Choice 
and Fair ?l"iceI.-<reedom o(  consumer  choice  holds  a  rather 
important  place  among  the  rights  and  liberties  in  the  new 
economic  system.  The  country's consumer  market  today  has 
been  destroyed  virtually  completely,  and  our  consumers-
that  is,  all o(  U5-<U'e,  accordin~y,  without  rights.  The 
citizens  o{  Ii  ~at \lOwer  have  turned  out  to  be  hostages  o( 
empty  stores,  having,  ror  all lIr&ctical  IIUrposes,  (allen  un-
der  the  \lOwer  o{  ~-produc~  monopolists  and  goOO3-
distributing  monopolists. 
Among  the  many  reasons  (or  this  situation,  in  the  Cront 
rank  is  the  inflationary  sums  ~  money,  not  backed  by 
goods,  that  have  been "aid  to the  population,  mainly  in  the 
I)dt rew  years. The  constantly  heard  reproaches  to  the  eC-
ract that I*l()le supposedly  have  a  great  deal at  ~surplus" 
money  and  that it must  be  taleen  away  3Omeh~·  are  essen-
tially  immoral.  Can  we  really  consider  as  ~surplus" saving3 
that come  to  a  little more  than  1,500  rubles  lIer  capita?  It 
we  take  into account citizens'  personal property,  which  is 
meager  ror  the mast 1JVt,  it is clear that the  overwhelm~ 
majority  at the possessors  01.  ~surp1us" money  are  not rar 
rtom  the brink  o{  \lOverty.  Even  the  total sum  of all the 
money  that eonsumers  are  t'eady  today  to  invest  immediately 
in  various ioods  is  extremely  small. But our consumer  mar-
ket caMot stand UQ  to even  this  monetary  conirontation. 
The  retotm  is aimed  at normaUzing  the condition  at the 
eonsumer  market throucn  Uberallzinc  price (ormation. But 
during th. transitional l,l4Iriod  this  will  be done  by  forrninC 
conunodi ty  reserves,  including  througtl  import deliveries, 
taJcinC  into  account the fortllcoming  stage-bJ~tap ehange-
over to unrestricted l)rices (or many  types at goods.  An  un-
restricted uchanle rate for  buylnc and selling  foreign  eur-
renc:y  will be introduced. and  a  (oreign-eurnnc:y  market 
will  be devei09ed.  A.  number  01.  large banks  will receive  the 
right  to trade  in foreiin curnnc:y at market "rices,. and  So-
viet citizens  will be \)e1"!I\itted  to keep  foreign  currency 
!reely  in  banks. 
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On  the  very  lirst day  0'  the  Oeginning  ot  the  !;lrogram's 
implementation,  equal rights  (or  ail !;lhysical  IUld  jul13tic 
I:)ersons  to carry  on  economic  activity  will be of%lcially  !;lro-
claimed.  A !;lrograJ!1  r1  !;lri va tiza  tion,  the  transforma  tion  of 
large state enterpl13es  into  joint-stock companies,  and  the 
sale ot  smail  trade,  !;luollc-eatering,  consumer-service  and 
other enterprises  will be  announced. This  3ame  statement 
will  talk about  gran~  ~arantees 01.  ownership  rights  to 
any  type of !;lr"OPerty,  except  that  whic:1t  belongs  exclusively 
to  the state.  An  amnesty  will  be announced  (or  those  con-
victed  W\der  artic:les  dealing  with  entrepreneurial activity, 
and  these  artic:les  themselves  ·..,ill  be  removed  ~m  criminal 
and  administrative  legISlation.  At  the same  time,  the strug-
~e against crimes  qainst citizens'  !;lroperty  will  be stepped 
up. 
By  legislative  means,  a  (avorable  atmOSt)here  will be 
!;lrovided  (or  ...,ithdrawing  enterpl13es  ~m  state ownership  at 
the  initiative of  labor  collectives  that apply  to  the  State 
Property  t:und  or repuollc  Committees (or  the :.1anagement  ot 
State ?I'operty. 
The state will !;lrovide  incentives  (or  the  development  at 
intemationaJ.  economic  ties  and  travel abroad  (or  work  or 
study.  Attempts  to construc:t  a  system (enc:ed  ott {rom  the 
outside  world  ltave  virtually  consiined  most  branches  01.  OUl' 
economy  to  degradation  and  stagnation. The  opening  up  of 
the  domestic  market  will  make  our country's  entrepreneurs 
compete  with  inexpensive  imported ~  ~th within  the 
country  and  abroad,  whic:h  will  give  our  economy  dynamism 
and  aexlbillty  in  satistying the  requirements  at  the  market, 
and  hence  of the consumer. 
The ~t  at.  CitizeDa  to Freedom  at.  Coaswner Choice 
and  Fair  Pr'iees.--i~om at consumer  choice  holds  a  rather 
important  ;>lac:e  among  the  rights  and  liberties  in  the  new 
economic  system.  The country's consumer market  today  has 
been destroyed  virtually  completely,  and  our  consumers-
that is,  ail of ~,  accordinl{1y,  without  rights.  The 
citizens ot  a  sreat  ~wet" have  turned  out  to  be  hostages  or 
empty  stores,  having,  ~or ail practical. purposes,  (allen  W\-
del'  the  ~wer of iOOds-produc:ing  monopolists  and  ~oods­
distributing  monopolists. 
Among  the  many  reasons  (01'  this  situation,  in  the  {rent 
ranlc  is  the  in1lationary  sums  r1  money,  not backed  by 
goods,  that ltave  been ;>aid  to  the  ~u1ation, mainly  in  the 
put (ew  yean. The  constantly  heard  reproaches  to  the  ef-
(ect that ~le  supposedly  ltave  a  ~at deal of  Nsurplus" 
money  and  that it must  be  taken  away  somehcS'W-' ~  essen-
tially  imrnot'al.  Can  we  really  consider  as  Nsurplus"  savin~ 
that come  to  a  little :note  than  1,500  rubles  !;leI'  capita?  It 
we  take  into  account  citizens'  tlersonal  !;lroperty,  whif:tI  is 
meager  (01'  the  moat  I)&rt,  it is  clear that the  overwhelming 
majority  r1  the poaessors 01.  Nsurplus"  money  are not (ar 
~m  the brinJc  ot  ~verty. Even  the  total sum  of  ail the 
money  that consumers are ready  today  to  invest  immediately 
in  various ioods  is  extremely small.  But  our consumer  mar-
ket caMOt stand ~  to even  this  monetary  controntatlon. 
The  re!orm  is  aimed at normalizing  the condition  of the 
consumer  market  throuCh  l1berallzlng !;lric:e  formation.  But 
durinC  th. transitionaJ.  ~od  this  will be done  by  (orming 
commodity  reserves,  !nc:J.udlng  through ~  deliveries, 
taxinC  into account t.be  (orthcoming stage-bJ-stqe change-
over to t.mreStr'icted  prices  (01"  many  types at ioods.  An  un-
restric:ted excnanp rate (or buying  and seWng (oreiin cur-
rency  will be introduced. and  a  (oreign-eurrenc:y  market 
will  be  developed.  A.  aUlllbel"  at  large banks  will receive  the 
right  to trade  in fore. currency  at market !;Iric:es p  and  So-
viet citizens will be t)4Irtnitted  to keep  (oreign  currency 
~ely in  banks. 
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TIle  opinion  exists  that  the  cllllru{eover  to  a  mar1cet 
impossible  without  an  administrative  price  increase. 
program  makes  it possible  to  begin  this  changeover 
a  centralized price  increase.  TIle  market  knows  the 
fall o{  prices,  but  the administrative system, 
the  past few  years,  has  changed  prices  onJ.y  in  an 
direction.  We  can see (rom  our  as  yet nonmarket 
that  liCe  i3  ~ett~ more  expensive,  and  this  is 
much  more  quickly  than  the  otftcial statistics  l'e<:ogni2:e  .. 
Why  should  people  have  any  Ctlnfidence  that  the 
price lists (rom  the  State Prices  Committee  will  give 
that  are  (air or close  to  (air,  when  up  to  now  such 
have  not once  been  (ol"thcomini  (rom  the  State 
mittee?  O{  course,  there  is  no  ~arantee that  free-rnAPoin 
prices  will  be fair  immediately,  but soone or later 
mar1cet  will  establish  (air  prices,  while  administrative 
trol and  centralized  management  o{  prices  will never 
Even  when  the  ~overnment suceeeds  in  ~UlIIUI","',""'''''o:I.'''W 
I<eepini  low  prices  (or  one  Ctlmmodity  or anothe 
(Ol" ~  in  the shol"t-supply  category),  all that 
sumer  can do,  as  Ii  M1le,  is  be Ctlntent  with  the  awv.m.iiiil: 
that  low  prices  do  exist somewhere.  ror the  most 
these goods  are not  available  Cor  sale,  or  they  iO  to 
privileged strata of  the population. TIle  greater part t1 
consumers  have  Cor  a  Ian(  time been  acquiring  them  0 ... 
market,  including  the  "black"  market, at much  higher 
prices • 
:  The  changeover to  unrestrieted prices  will be 
j  stl!{)  by  stl!{),  beginnini  with  commodities  that 
I  prime-necessity  Ctlnsumel"  goods  and  are 
'high-income strata at the population.  Thus,  the 
priee increases  will Call  on  them  flrst  o{  all. 
In  accordance  with  the  program,  (ood  products  are 
di.!rerentiated  by  quality  grade.  Broad  di.!rerentiation 
prices  Cor  ~oods dl!{)8nding  on  their  quality  is  to  be 
bined  with  low  priees  Cor  a  raI1(e  o{  prime  necessities. 
share  o{  unrestncted  prices  will be  increased step by 
TIlere  are  plans  to  or"ganize  courses  and  programs  Cor  the' 
retraining  and  retresher  training  o{  workers  and  office  em-
~loyees and  to  (orm  a  system  o{  volunteer-manned  public 
'Norks  projects.  TIle  critical nature  o{  the  employment  proo-
lem  will  be eased  Ctlnsiderably  by  the creation  o{  additional 
job  slots  at  new  production  CacUities,  in  trade and  in  the 
semce sphere,  and  by  providing  incentives  (or  the  develop-
ment  o{  entrepreneurship  and  small  enterprises. 
The  ~tion  oC  employment  should  ensure  !lot  the  per-
manent  llSIignment  o{  a  wol'1Cer  to  a  specific  job  but  the 
creation  ot ~ondltions Cor  Ctlntinuous  ~wth in  quailllcations 
and  occupational skills.  It  is  the development  o{  such  Ii 
continuously  operating mechanism  and  its improvement  in 
accordance  with  emerging  problems  that  will become  the 
core  o{  state employment  policy. 
The  Ript at  Ent~  to Prt!edam at ~  Ac:tiT-
ity .-TIle economic  I'reedom  of enterprises consists  in  grant-. 
ing  them  the opportunity  to  opef"llte  in  the  interests  o{  their. 
employees,  stockholder-owners  and  the state and  in  aecor- I 
dance  with  market  Ctlndltions,  to  indl!{)8ndently  determine  I 
the  volume  and  structure at  theit production,  the  volume  oCt 
sales  and  prices  for  their output,  and  to  ~hoose theit part-( 
!lers. 
From  vittuaUy  the  v8l"'f  beginning  of  the  program's  Im-
plementation,  enterprises  will have  the opportunity  to,  \ 
Change  theit ownet"S:  either thrOqh privatization  (mainly 
(or  small  and  medium-flzed  enterprises)  01"  thrOulh  transCor-\ 
mation  into  joint-stock eomQARies  (primarily for  medium-
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sized  and  large  enterpt1ses).  Henee,  right  alter  the  \>~, 
13  announced  enterprise  ~ect1ves ~an ~  \>reparations  j 
and  ~  t11to~ this ()roesI as  painlessly  as  possible,  a  "roo-
~ess that dltrers  fundamentally  fl'om  our practice a/.  sending 
down  suct!  decisions like bolts  fl'om  the blue. They  will ~ 
able  to  resc1ve  as  they 3" tit  the  question  at hiring hignly 
<lUaillled  managers  on  ~n  tract  • 
WIth  a  view  to  maintaining  economic stability,  estab-
lished  economic  ties  will evidently  be  ~en  until  July 
1991.  However,  after that enterprises  will rec:eive  the :iiht 
on  their own  to  determine  their product  mix  and  production 
volume  and  their  c~tomers and  stlp\>liers,  and  to  o~ani.ze 
the  unrestricted  marKeting  o( output  throughout  the  coun-
try . 
Enterprises  will  'o'Iithdraw  Crom  the  system  o( branch 
monopolies  and  will  have  to  establish  horizontal  ties  wit!l 
their  [)8l'tners. They  will also  be  able  to  acquire  material 
resources  on  the  wholesale  market,  including  unfinished  ~n­
struction,  etc.,  to freely  sell surplus  equipment,  stocks  at 
materials  and  other ptoQerty,  and  to  lease  out  their nxed 
asaets. They  will be uanted  the  right  at d1rec:t  [larticipa-
tion  in  {oreign-economic  activity.  Enterprises  will  be able 
to  buy  and  sell foreign  currency  on  a  domestic  currency 
marlcet. 
In  acquiring new  Mil'U  and  expanding  the sphere  a/.  their 
economic  freedom,  enterprises  should  take  into  ~nsideration 
that  the [lrogr'am  [lrop0se5  harsh  restrictions for  them:  an 
increase'in chllries  Cor  ~redits,  the  reduction  o( budget sub-
sidies  to  :l;ero,  a  sharp decrease  in  state  ~apital invest-
ments,  a  reduction  in  state [lurehases,  and  foreign  competi-
tion.  An  awareness at these  realities  will  h~  enterprises 
do  a  better job o( dealing  with  their newly  acquired rree-
dom. 
1be R"{)UO'Its'  IUpcs to Ecoaomie SowniptJ  .-These 
~ghts are to  be  ensured,  in  accordance  with  this  \>rogrant, 
on  the basis a/.  a  Treaty  01.  Economic  Union  Between  Sover-
eign  States and  a  nwnDer  of agreements sup{)lementing it. 
The  conclusion  a/.  agreements  on  interrepublic  dellveries  sD<1 
on  dellveries  for  all-Union  needs,  as  well  as on  mechanisms 
at maintaining  economic  ties  during  the  transitional period, 
is  also  proposed. 
The  main  thesis  in  reiations  oetween  the  republics  and 
the  center  is  that  no  one  is  to  direct or give  orde1"5  to 
anyone  else.  The  entire [)rograIn  is  based on  respect (or  the 
declarations  oC  sovereignty  adopted  by  the  republics.  It  :.s 
imooSll1ble  to  conduct  the  economic  reform  on  the Oasis  at 
directives  rrom  the center,  no  matter  how  tight  they  may 
be. TIle  [leoples  will  no  longer [)ut  up  with  IJ.  situation  in 
which  CUndamental  questions  of  their lives  are  resolved  at 
the center,  without  their participation.  TIle  program  takes 
into  account  the  rapid  ~wth ot  national seit-awareness, 
and  thereCore  the  principal  role  in  implementing  the  trans-
formations  is  assigned  to  the  republic  governments  and  local 
bodies  a/.  power.  ?ower should  be orougtlt  closer to [)eqUe. 
In  exereising  their  tights  to  economic  sovereignty,  the 
peoples  will  rec:eive  an  opportunity  to  dispose  o(  the  na-
tional  wealth  oC  their  republiCS  on  their own,  to  prevent 
the senseless  wastin&  at resourees,  and  to [)reserve  the  en-
vironment and  mineral  wealth  for  coming  ~nerations. The 
republic  governments  now  bear responsibility  Cor  the devel-
opment  of  the  territories  under  their  jurisdiction and,  ae-
~ordingly,  they  are  taking  on  a  large part  oC  the  powers 
reiated  to  managing  the economy. 
The  republlcs  will  determine  the  level of  the  basic  taxes 
and  the {orms  and  methods  ot  privatization,  and  they  will 
~te  prices {or  most  ~.  Each  republic  will itseit ttnd 
ways  to  cart"J  out land  and  housing  reforms,  and  the ~­
lie  iQvernments  will  warle  out their own  systems a/.  soeial 
guarantees and  Corm  the  republic b~ts  on  their own. 
~ont!'1  will  be tnnsterred  to  the  Union  to  dnance only  thase 
programs  In  whicn  the peoples  have  a  real stake. 
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The  M!publics  are  to  determine  the  extent at  their  inde-
Ilendence  in  managin~ the  economy  and  take  upon  them-
selves  the  handllni  at  relevant  types at  state Ilroperty·  The 
uJ.timate  &'Oal  at  the demarcation  of  \>OWe1"S  with ~  to 
the management  at state \l~  is  not simply  its  transfer 
/rom  anion  to ret)Ubllc  jurisdiction  t1\rt  destatization  IlI1d  "ri-
vatization.  By  an aceord ~  all  the  M!publlcs,  many 
ty{)eS  at  I)fO()4!rty  are to  remain  undel"  all-Union  ownership. 
Economic  int~tion is  necesary,  but it should  be  ~n­
strueted not on  a  unitary  basis  and  the ctlJctat  at the  centet" 
but  on  a  voluntary,  mutually  advantqeous buts Imd  !!qUal 
\l&f'tIlership.  Tn  entering into an  economic  union t  the  ~ver­
eip M!publlcs  will reach  agreement  on  the  ~en.el"aJ.  ~clples 
of  eeonomic  \)Olley,  on  the develQ9ment  at  a  sUlI~e marICet. 
and  on  the  coordinated  implementation  of  the  ret'orm.  TIle 
union's  administrative  bodies  will be  formed  on  t.he  basis  of 
Ilarity  representation for  all  the republics. The  formation  at 
these bodies  is  to be  planned  at the  very  beginning at  the 
program.  TIle  \>Owers  transferred to  the  union  administrative 
bodies  will  be  agreed  upon  by  all  the  republics  and  codified 
in  the Treaty  of  Economic  Union. 
Participation  in  the  economic  union  shouJ.d  be advanta-
geous  to the  sovereign  republics,  and  therefore  the  volun-
tary  nature of  entry  into  the  union  and  the  right at !ree 
withdrawal  therefrom  must  be stipulated. At the same  time, 
a  member  of the economic  union  is  to  take on  certain obli-
gations agreed upon  by  all  its participants.  If a  republic  re-
fuses  to fullW.  these obligations but wishes  to participate  in 
certain social and  economic  programs  at the  union,  it re- I 
ceives the status at an  associate member  (observer),  which· 
constricts its rights  within  the framework  at  the lUlion. 
".  Beoaomie Rigbts t1 U.  Carter.-TIlese rights con-
stitute  the sum  total of  the rights delegated  by  the sover-
eign  M!publics.  Within  the framework  at these agreed-upon 
rights, the center exercises its \>OWe1"S  with respect to the 
management  of  an-Union  property  and  funds and all-Onion 
economic  programs,  and  it also  ensures the maxinlum  possi-
ble  coordination  in  the  implementation at  the reform.  I 
".  BJcbt  t1 Society .~ur  society has the  unconditionali 
right  to  live better right  now,  not  in  the distant Cuture. 
and  the proposed  program  for'  the changeover'  to  a  market 
economy  is  ainled  at  the  Culiest  possible  realization  of this 
right. 
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